Commit Graph
9 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
agessaman 9b739a9b43 fix(network): harden Ethernet-preferred lifecycle 2026-09-04 08:42:46 -07:00
agessaman 3666cb6da9 fix(mqtt): preserve WiFi outage state for alerts 2026-08-20 19:46:44 -07:00
agessaman 4bdbe33a45 fix(mqtt): Align JWT reuse with renewal buffer 2026-08-17 10:42:09 -07:00
agessaman 436bb65ae6 fix(mqtt): consult the RTC when libc cannot vouch for the fallback clock
The usable-clock fallback asked libc only, which does not answer for the case it
was written to cover. On a cold boot ESP32RTCClock::begin() stamps libc with a
2024 placeholder on power-on; AutoDiscoverRTCClock::begin() probes the chip but
never copies its time across, and getCurrentTime() reads the chip directly. So a
Station G3 or T-Beam Supreme that knows exactly what time it is, on a network
with UDP/123 blocked, still failed the plausibility test, left _ntp_synced false,
and brought up no slots — precisely the deployment the fallback exists for.

Ask the RTC when libc is below the floor. libc still wins when it is usable: a
clock SNTP set recently outranks a chip that may have drifted. Accepting the RTC
value then flows through the same block, so settimeofday() repairs libc and the
epoch is written back to the chip.

The choice is chooseFallbackClock() in MQTTConnectionPolicy, host-tested across
the four states including the power-on placeholder and the exact floor. Also
corrects the previous commit's claim that configTime() is called only when a
server replied — the fallback necessarily points it at each server before knowing
that; it is the post-acceptance call that is now conditional.
2026-08-14 19:58:50 -07:00
agessaman 0d12ec7d79 fix(mqtt): defer the stale-token reconnect when the mint fails
The corrected-clock path reconnected a disconnected slot whether or not
createSlotAuthToken() had produced anything, which re-presented the credentials
the correction had just invalidated. Minting fails for recoverable reasons —
allocation pressure is treated as recoverable elsewhere in this file — so the
path is reachable, and the reconnect it spends is one that cannot succeed.

Move the decision into MQTTConnectionPolicy as classifyStaleToken(), where the
four outcomes are named and host-tested rather than spelled out in nested
conditions: Defer on a failed mint, Reconnect a client that is down, Bounce a
live session whose broker enforces exp, KeepAlive one whose broker does not.
Deferring leaves the slot to the backoff ladder, which mints again on its next
attempt.

Covers the reviewer's first four cases. The other two — that a completed SNTP
sync is required, and that time(nullptr) reflects the accepted epoch before
_ntp_synced flips — are inside MQTTBridge.cpp, which the native env does not
compile; locking those down needs a seam around the IDF calls that does not
exist yet.
2026-08-14 19:41:14 -07:00
agessaman c0c823b6b0 fix(mqtt): reuse a still-valid JWT on ordinary reconnects
Every ordinary backoff reconnect and every circuit-breaker probe minted a
fresh JWT and re-applied credentials, with no check of whether the existing
token was still valid. setCredentials() always dirties the esp-mqtt config, so
reconnect() then called esp_mqtt_set_config() as well. On a flapping broker
that is a signing plus a configuration-copy cycle on every retry, and these
observers see ~38 genuine reconnects/day per slot.

The no-bounce renewal change (27bd05a1) only stopped the proactive renewal
from tearing down a live session; it left this retry path untouched, which is
why a soak shows renewals neither firing nor failing for hours while drops
continue — each reconnect silently re-mints and pushes the expiry out.

Reuse the credentials when their validity is provable and refresh them
otherwise. canReuseJwtForReconnect() lives with the other policy predicates so
it is host-testable, and it establishes current_time < token_expires_at before
subtracting: token_expires_at is unsigned, so an already-expired token would
otherwise wrap to ~4e9 seconds and read as valid for decades. The
>= kMinimumValidEpoch term also rejects the 0 that a failed renewal writes.

Minting stays the default for every uncertain case — unsynced clock, missing or
insane expiry, empty token, or an expiry inside kJwtReconnectSafetyMarginSecs
(60 s), which covers the handshake itself.

Two paths still always mint, deliberately:

  - The circuit-breaker probe. It is the recovery of last resort for a slot
    that has already failed repeatedly, quite possibly on auth, and it runs
    once per 30 minutes — so a fresh token there costs nothing worth counting
    against keeping that path guaranteed-clean.
  - Any slot whose last error was a broker refusal. Before this change, minting
    on every retry accidentally recovered from server-side credential
    invalidation: key rotation, revocation, broker clock skew, or an audience
    change after a reconfigure. Reuse would have retried a rejected credential
    until it neared expiry — up to 24 h for every preset that leaves
    token_lifetime at the default. onError already detects
    MQTT_ERROR_TYPE_CONNECTION_REFUSED and only logged it; it now also sets a
    per-slot force-mint flag, cleared on a successful connect and wherever the
    credentials it referred to are blanked. The flag is volatile because the
    esp-mqtt callback sets it and the bridge loop consumes it.

The reconnect log line reports the decision and its outcome — REUSE, MINT with
a reason, and OK/FAILED for the mint — because a silently failed mint is the
case most likely to end in an auth refusal. It never prints the token.

Host tests cover the reuse boundary: exact margin, already-expired, expiry 0,
sub-epoch expiry, empty token, unsynced clock, and the force-mint override.
2026-08-14 09:47:40 -07:00
agessaman f25492c7fd feat(mqtt): implement slot activation classification for MQTT connections
Add a new classification mechanism for MQTT slot activation to inform
users whether a slot will connect on the current hardware. This includes
detailed handling of enabled slots and their limits, improving the CLI's
ability to provide accurate feedback during configuration. Additionally,
unit tests are introduced to validate the new functionality across various
scenarios, enhancing overall robustness.
2026-07-20 16:00:24 -07:00
agessaman b0cf29fb33 test(mqtt): extract + test remaining inline MQTT decision points (Phase 6)
Close the host-testable gaps named in Phase 6 of STABILITY_TESTABILITY_HANDOFF.md
by moving the last inline decision logic into the pure, host-tested policy seams:

- WiFi STA reconnect backoff: extract the inline ladder + wrap-safe timing from
  handleWiFiConnection() into MQTTConnectionPolicy::{wifiReconnectBackoffMs,
  wifiReconnectDue,nextWifiBackoffAttempt}. Behavior-preserving (elapsedMs is the
  wrap-safe form of the old ULONG_MAX branch); ladder/clamp/attempt-cap unchanged.
- Publication outcome pairing: name the (packet, raw) -> delivered contract as
  MQTTPacketQueuePolicy::queuedPacketPublished() and wire both queue-drain sites;
  partial success = completed, not retried.
- Freeze MQTTPublicationType enum values in a test (the bridge-side MQTTMessageType
  alignment is already enforced by a compile-time static_assert).

Adds host tests for all three (exact boundaries + millis() rollover). Native suite
green (13 dirs); non-PSRAM observer firmware smoke build compiles.

WebConfig batch/reboot/stop state-machine extraction and queue-orchestration
coverage remain open (tracked in the Phase 6 status).
2026-07-19 00:50:15 -07:00
agessaman 26a8a3cb58 feat(mqtt): refactor message building to use MQTTPayloadBuilder
Replace direct JSON construction in MQTTMessageBuilder with calls to
MQTTPayloadBuilder for building status, packet, and raw messages.
This change improves code maintainability and reduces duplication by
centralizing message formatting logic. Additionally, update platformio.ini
to include ArduinoJson dependency for JSON handling.
2026-07-18 15:47:11 -07:00