mirror of
https://github.com/agessaman/MeshCore.git
synced 2026-08-27 11:09:56 +00:00
Two findings from review, both real, both mine. The CLI could read secrets the portal has never exposed. CommonCLI splits its surface by CALLER, not by command: a serial caller (sender_timestamp 0, physical access) reads secrets in plaintext, a remote one gets "******** (serial only)". Its own comments say so — "Serial only (WiFi creds grant LAN access); remote sees set/unset". execCommand passes 0, which is what makes `erase`, `stats-*` and `set freq` reachable at all, and with it the terminal inherited the serial console's plaintext answers for an HTTP request: `get prv.key` returned this node's identity, `get wifi.pwd` the operator's network. Worse in setup mode, which authenticates by proximity to an open AP — and `start webconfig ap` can be run on an already-configured node, so the secrets are real by then, not blank. I had reasoned that the AP was the trust boundary either way because the wizard can already rewrite these. That conflated two capabilities: replacing a WiFi password does not reveal the current one, and replacing an identity does not reveal the existing private key. /api/config has always masked these on read (wcIsSecretKey); the CLI simply broke that rule. Now only the READ is masked — the command surface stays whole — in CommonCLI's own words, keeping the set/unset signal that is the useful part. Onboarding could also skip the mandatory password. handleConfigPost refuses to arm a reboot during initial setup without one; the CLI only warned in the browser, which a pasted script or a direct POST ignores, so a node could reboot onto the LAN still holding the factory credential. Same rule now applies at POST. It is satisfied by a `password` command anywhere in the session rather than only in the same request, so the natural two-step console flow still works — the form batch always sends both together and never needed that memory. wcIsSecretReadCommand lives in WebConfigKeys.h beside the rest of the secret classification, pinned by three host tests: what must be masked, what must not, and that only reads are touched. 17 keys + 24 batch tests pass; the audit checks a masked read round-trips as masked.
236 lines
9.7 KiB
Python
236 lines
9.7 KiB
Python
#!/usr/bin/env python3
|
|
"""Check the portal terminal's command table against the mock backend.
|
|
|
|
Autocomplete in webui/index.html carries its own list of commands. Nothing ties
|
|
that list to what a node actually answers, so it can quietly drift into offering
|
|
commands that do not exist — or, more often here, the mock can lag the table and
|
|
make a perfectly real command look broken.
|
|
|
|
This drives every command the table offers through /api/cli and reports the ones
|
|
that come back an error, so the two stay honest about each other.
|
|
|
|
python3 scripts/webconfig_mock_server.py --port 8137 &
|
|
python3 scripts/webconfig_cli_audit.py
|
|
|
|
Exits non-zero if anything fails that is not in EXPECTED_FAILURES. Stdlib only.
|
|
"""
|
|
|
|
import json
|
|
import os
|
|
import re
|
|
import secrets
|
|
import sys
|
|
import time
|
|
import urllib.error
|
|
import urllib.request
|
|
|
|
BASE = os.environ.get("WEBCONFIG_MOCK", "http://localhost:8137")
|
|
HERE = os.path.dirname(os.path.abspath(__file__))
|
|
INDEX_HTML = os.path.join(HERE, "..", "webui", "index.html")
|
|
|
|
# Errors that are the correct answer, not a gap.
|
|
EXPECTED_FAILURES = {
|
|
# Runtime-gated on the real device by Board::canControlLoRaFemLna(); the
|
|
# command exists in every build and the board answers for itself. The mock
|
|
# board is a Heltec V3, which has no front-end module.
|
|
"get radio.fem.rxgain": "unsupported",
|
|
"set radio.fem.rxgain on": "unsupported",
|
|
# Guarded by the firmware the same way when no alert PSK is configured.
|
|
"alert test": "not configured",
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# Commands that change the node out from under the audit.
|
|
SKIP = {"reboot", "clkreboot", "poweroff", "shutdown", "erase", "start ota",
|
|
"stop webconfig", "ota update", "start webconfig", "start webconfig ap"}
|
|
|
|
|
|
def table():
|
|
"""The commands autocomplete offers, read straight out of the page."""
|
|
html = open(INDEX_HTML, encoding="utf-8").read()
|
|
|
|
def section(start, end):
|
|
return html[html.index(start):html.index(end)]
|
|
|
|
verbs = re.findall(r'\["([^"]+)","', section("var CLI_VERBS=", "var CLI_KEYS="))
|
|
keys = re.findall(r'\["([^"]+)","(?:[^"\\]|\\.)*",(\d)',
|
|
section("var CLI_KEYS=", "var CLI_SLOT="))
|
|
fields = re.findall(r'\["(\w+)","', section("var CLI_SLOT=", "var CLI_TYPES="))
|
|
|
|
gets = ["get " + k for k, mode in keys if mode != "2"]
|
|
gets += ["get mqtt%d.%s" % (n, f) for n in (1, 3) for f in fields]
|
|
# Verbs taking an argument need a value the node will accept; those are
|
|
# covered by the round-trip probes below rather than guessed at here.
|
|
plain = [v for v in verbs if not v.endswith(" ") and v not in SKIP]
|
|
return gets + plain
|
|
|
|
|
|
# Where top-level commands are implemented. MyMesh handles a few before
|
|
# delegating to CommonCLI, which is exactly how discover.* stayed missing from
|
|
# the table for so long: grepping CommonCLI alone does not see them.
|
|
COMMAND_SOURCES = [
|
|
"src/helpers/CommonCLI.cpp",
|
|
"src/helpers/CommonCLI_Observer.cpp",
|
|
"examples/simple_repeater/MyMesh.cpp",
|
|
]
|
|
|
|
# Firmware commands the table deliberately does not offer. Everything below
|
|
# except tls.bundletest is also rejected by /api/cli (wcCliUnavailable), so the
|
|
# portal never pretends to run something it cannot.
|
|
NOT_OFFERED = {
|
|
"tls.bundletest", # TLS debugging, not an operator command
|
|
"start ota", # binds port 80, which the portal is already using
|
|
"clock sync", # takes its time from the caller; a web request has none
|
|
"log", # streams to Serial and stalls the radio ("log start" is offered)
|
|
"get acl", # streams to Serial, returns nothing
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
def firmware_commands():
|
|
"""Top-level command literals the firmware dispatches on."""
|
|
found = set()
|
|
for rel in COMMAND_SOURCES:
|
|
path = os.path.join(HERE, "..", rel)
|
|
try:
|
|
src = open(path, encoding="utf-8").read()
|
|
except OSError:
|
|
continue
|
|
for lit in re.findall(r'(?:mem|str)n?cmp\(\s*command\s*,\s*"([^"]+)"', src):
|
|
found.add(lit.strip())
|
|
return found - NOT_OFFERED
|
|
ROUND_TRIPS = [
|
|
("set radio.watchdog 30", "get radio.watchdog", "30"),
|
|
("set dutycycle 25", "get dutycycle", "25.0"),
|
|
("set alert.mqtt on", "get alert.mqtt", "on"),
|
|
("set bridge.source tx", "get bridge.source", "tx"),
|
|
("set mqtt.neighbors on", "get mqtt.neighbors", "on"),
|
|
("set path.hash.mode 2", "get path.hash.mode", "2"),
|
|
("set mqtt.iata den", "get mqtt.iata", "DEN"),
|
|
# Secret reads are masked back down for an HTTP caller, in CommonCLI's own
|
|
# words for a non-serial one (wcIsSecretReadCommand).
|
|
("set guest.password hunter2", "get guest.password", "******** (serial only)"),
|
|
("set wifi.pwd hunter2", "get wifi.pwd", "******** (serial only)"),
|
|
]
|
|
|
|
|
|
class Client:
|
|
def __init__(self, base):
|
|
self.base = base
|
|
r = self._open("/api/login", b'{"password":"password"}')
|
|
self.cookie = r.headers["Set-Cookie"].split(";")[0]
|
|
# The node caps a sequence at MAX_BATCH and reports it; chunk to match
|
|
# rather than hardcoding a number that drifts when the slot is resized.
|
|
self.max_cmds = json.load(self._open("/api/status")).get("max_cmds", 24)
|
|
|
|
def _open(self, path, data=None):
|
|
headers = {"Content-Type": "application/json"}
|
|
if getattr(self, "cookie", None):
|
|
headers["Cookie"] = self.cookie
|
|
return urllib.request.urlopen(urllib.request.Request(
|
|
self.base + path, data=data, headers=headers,
|
|
method="POST" if data is not None else "GET"))
|
|
|
|
def run(self, cmds):
|
|
"""[(command, result)]. The node never echoes the command back — it may
|
|
carry a secret — so results pair with what was sent, by index."""
|
|
out = []
|
|
for i in range(0, len(cmds), self.max_cmds):
|
|
chunk = cmds[i:i + self.max_cmds]
|
|
results = self._sequence(chunk)
|
|
if len(results) != len(chunk):
|
|
sys.exit("node returned %d results for %d commands" % (len(results), len(chunk)))
|
|
out += list(zip(chunk, results))
|
|
return out
|
|
|
|
def _sequence(self, cmds):
|
|
reqid = secrets.token_hex(8)
|
|
body = json.dumps({"reqid": reqid, "cmds": cmds}).encode()
|
|
for _ in range(200): # the executor frees itself in time
|
|
try:
|
|
self._open("/api/cli", body)
|
|
break
|
|
except urllib.error.HTTPError as e:
|
|
if e.code != 409:
|
|
raise
|
|
time.sleep(0.5)
|
|
# Results stream and page, so keep reading from a cursor until the node
|
|
# says done — "done" arrives only once every result has been handed over.
|
|
out = []
|
|
while True:
|
|
r = json.load(self._open("/api/cli/result?reqid=%s&from=%d" % (reqid, len(out))))
|
|
out += r.get("results", [])
|
|
if r["state"] == "done":
|
|
return out
|
|
time.sleep(0.05)
|
|
|
|
|
|
def main():
|
|
try:
|
|
cli = Client(BASE)
|
|
except OSError as e:
|
|
sys.exit("cannot reach the mock at %s (%s)\n"
|
|
"start it with: python3 scripts/webconfig_mock_server.py --port 8137" % (BASE, e))
|
|
|
|
failures = []
|
|
|
|
cmds = table()
|
|
unexpected = []
|
|
for cmd, res in cli.run(cmds):
|
|
if res["ok"]:
|
|
continue
|
|
want = EXPECTED_FAILURES.get(cmd)
|
|
if want and want in res["reply"]:
|
|
continue
|
|
unexpected.append((cmd, res["reply"]))
|
|
print("commands offered by autocomplete : %d" % len(cmds))
|
|
print("answered : %d" % (len(cmds) - len(unexpected)))
|
|
print("sequence cap reported by the node: %d" % cli.max_cmds)
|
|
for cmd, reply in unexpected:
|
|
print(" FAIL %-30s %s" % (cmd, reply))
|
|
failures += unexpected
|
|
|
|
# The reverse direction: a command the firmware implements but the table
|
|
# never offers is invisible to the check above, because the check only ever
|
|
# drives what the table already knows about.
|
|
offered = " ".join(cmds) + " " + " ".join(
|
|
re.findall(r'\["([^"]+)","', open(INDEX_HTML, encoding="utf-8").read()))
|
|
missing = sorted(c for c in firmware_commands() if c not in offered)
|
|
print("\nfirmware commands not in the table: %d" % len(missing))
|
|
for c in missing:
|
|
print(" MISSING %s" % c)
|
|
failures += [(c, "not offered by autocomplete") for c in missing]
|
|
|
|
results = cli.run([c for probe in ROUND_TRIPS for c in probe[:2]])
|
|
print("\nround-trips : %d" % len(ROUND_TRIPS))
|
|
for i, (setc, getc, want) in enumerate(ROUND_TRIPS):
|
|
setr, getr = results[i * 2][1], results[i * 2 + 1][1]
|
|
# `get` answers "> value"; compare the value, as the terminal displays it
|
|
got = re.sub(r"^>\s?", "", getr["reply"])
|
|
if setr["ok"] and got == want:
|
|
continue
|
|
print(" FAIL %-30s got %r, wanted %r (set: %s)"
|
|
% (getc, got, want, setr["reply"]))
|
|
failures.append((getc, got))
|
|
|
|
# Commands the portal refuses must be refused clearly, not run and fudged.
|
|
print("\nrefused with a reason : ", end="")
|
|
refused = []
|
|
for cmd in sorted(NOT_OFFERED - {"tls.bundletest"}):
|
|
try:
|
|
cli._sequence([cmd])
|
|
refused.append((cmd, "was accepted, expected a 400"))
|
|
except urllib.error.HTTPError as e:
|
|
body = json.load(e) if e.code == 400 else {}
|
|
if e.code != 400 or not body.get("error"):
|
|
refused.append((cmd, "HTTP %d, expected 400 with a reason" % e.code))
|
|
print("%d/%d" % (len(NOT_OFFERED) - 1 - len(refused), len(NOT_OFFERED) - 1))
|
|
for cmd, why in refused:
|
|
print(" FAIL %-30s %s" % (cmd, why))
|
|
failures += refused
|
|
|
|
print("\n%s" % ("FAILED: %d" % len(failures) if failures else "all clear"))
|
|
return 1 if failures else 0
|
|
|
|
|
|
if __name__ == "__main__":
|
|
sys.exit(main())
|