mirror of
https://github.com/TokTok/c-toxcore
synced 2026-05-13 23:43:16 +00:00
aed24408db
`new_nonce` has been an alias for `random_nonce` for a while now. Having two names for the same operation is confusing. `random_nonce` better expresses the intent. The documentation for `new_nonce` talks about guaranteeing that the nonce is different from previous ones, which is incorrect, it's just quite likely to be different.
212 lines
6.8 KiB
C
212 lines
6.8 KiB
C
/* net_crypto.c
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*
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* Functions for the core crypto.
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*
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* NOTE: This code has to be perfect. We don't mess around with encryption.
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*
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* Copyright (C) 2013 Tox project All Rights Reserved.
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*
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* This file is part of Tox.
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*
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* Tox is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
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* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
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* the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or
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* (at your option) any later version.
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*
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* Tox is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
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* but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
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* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
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* GNU General Public License for more details.
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*
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* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
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* along with Tox. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
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*
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*/
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#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H
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#include "config.h"
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#endif
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#include "crypto_core.h"
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#if crypto_box_PUBLICKEYBYTES != 32
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#error crypto_box_PUBLICKEYBYTES is required to be 32 bytes for public_key_cmp to work,
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#endif
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/* compare 2 public keys of length crypto_box_PUBLICKEYBYTES, not vulnerable to timing attacks.
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returns 0 if both mem locations of length are equal,
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return -1 if they are not. */
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int public_key_cmp(const uint8_t *pk1, const uint8_t *pk2)
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{
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return crypto_verify_32(pk1, pk2);
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}
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/* return a random number.
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*/
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uint32_t random_int(void)
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{
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uint32_t randnum;
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randombytes((uint8_t *)&randnum , sizeof(randnum));
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return randnum;
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}
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uint64_t random_64b(void)
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{
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uint64_t randnum;
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randombytes((uint8_t *)&randnum, sizeof(randnum));
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return randnum;
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}
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/* Check if a Tox public key crypto_box_PUBLICKEYBYTES is valid or not.
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* This should only be used for input validation.
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*
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* return 0 if it isn't.
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* return 1 if it is.
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*/
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int public_key_valid(const uint8_t *public_key)
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{
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if (public_key[31] >= 128) { /* Last bit of key is always zero. */
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return 0;
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}
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return 1;
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}
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/* Precomputes the shared key from their public_key and our secret_key.
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* This way we can avoid an expensive elliptic curve scalar multiply for each
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* encrypt/decrypt operation.
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* enc_key has to be crypto_box_BEFORENMBYTES bytes long.
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*/
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int encrypt_precompute(const uint8_t *public_key, const uint8_t *secret_key, uint8_t *enc_key)
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{
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return crypto_box_beforenm(enc_key, public_key, secret_key);
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}
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int encrypt_data_symmetric(const uint8_t *secret_key, const uint8_t *nonce, const uint8_t *plain, uint32_t length,
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uint8_t *encrypted)
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{
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if (length == 0 || !secret_key || !nonce || !plain || !encrypted) {
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return -1;
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}
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uint8_t temp_plain[length + crypto_box_ZEROBYTES];
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uint8_t temp_encrypted[length + crypto_box_MACBYTES + crypto_box_BOXZEROBYTES];
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memset(temp_plain, 0, crypto_box_ZEROBYTES);
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memcpy(temp_plain + crypto_box_ZEROBYTES, plain, length); // Pad the message with 32 0 bytes.
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if (crypto_box_afternm(temp_encrypted, temp_plain, length + crypto_box_ZEROBYTES, nonce, secret_key) != 0) {
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return -1;
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}
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/* Unpad the encrypted message. */
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memcpy(encrypted, temp_encrypted + crypto_box_BOXZEROBYTES, length + crypto_box_MACBYTES);
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return length + crypto_box_MACBYTES;
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}
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int decrypt_data_symmetric(const uint8_t *secret_key, const uint8_t *nonce, const uint8_t *encrypted, uint32_t length,
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uint8_t *plain)
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{
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if (length <= crypto_box_BOXZEROBYTES || !secret_key || !nonce || !encrypted || !plain) {
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return -1;
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}
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uint8_t temp_plain[length + crypto_box_ZEROBYTES];
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uint8_t temp_encrypted[length + crypto_box_BOXZEROBYTES];
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memset(temp_encrypted, 0, crypto_box_BOXZEROBYTES);
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memcpy(temp_encrypted + crypto_box_BOXZEROBYTES, encrypted, length); // Pad the message with 16 0 bytes.
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if (crypto_box_open_afternm(temp_plain, temp_encrypted, length + crypto_box_BOXZEROBYTES, nonce, secret_key) != 0) {
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return -1;
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}
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memcpy(plain, temp_plain + crypto_box_ZEROBYTES, length - crypto_box_MACBYTES);
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return length - crypto_box_MACBYTES;
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}
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int encrypt_data(const uint8_t *public_key, const uint8_t *secret_key, const uint8_t *nonce,
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const uint8_t *plain, uint32_t length, uint8_t *encrypted)
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{
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if (!public_key || !secret_key) {
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return -1;
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}
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uint8_t k[crypto_box_BEFORENMBYTES];
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encrypt_precompute(public_key, secret_key, k);
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int ret = encrypt_data_symmetric(k, nonce, plain, length, encrypted);
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sodium_memzero(k, sizeof k);
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return ret;
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}
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int decrypt_data(const uint8_t *public_key, const uint8_t *secret_key, const uint8_t *nonce,
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const uint8_t *encrypted, uint32_t length, uint8_t *plain)
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{
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if (!public_key || !secret_key) {
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return -1;
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}
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uint8_t k[crypto_box_BEFORENMBYTES];
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encrypt_precompute(public_key, secret_key, k);
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int ret = decrypt_data_symmetric(k, nonce, encrypted, length, plain);
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sodium_memzero(k, sizeof k);
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return ret;
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}
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/* Increment the given nonce by 1. */
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void increment_nonce(uint8_t *nonce)
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{
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/* TODO(irungentoo): use increment_nonce_number(nonce, 1) or sodium_increment (change to little endian)
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* NOTE don't use breaks inside this loop
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* In particular, make sure, as far as possible,
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* that loop bounds and their potential underflow or overflow
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* are independent of user-controlled input (you may have heard of the Heartbleed bug).
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*/
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uint32_t i = crypto_box_NONCEBYTES;
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uint_fast16_t carry = 1U;
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for (; i != 0; --i) {
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carry += (uint_fast16_t) nonce[i - 1];
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nonce[i - 1] = (uint8_t) carry;
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carry >>= 8;
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}
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}
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/* increment the given nonce by num */
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void increment_nonce_number(uint8_t *nonce, uint32_t host_order_num)
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{
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/* NOTE don't use breaks inside this loop
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* In particular, make sure, as far as possible,
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* that loop bounds and their potential underflow or overflow
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* are independent of user-controlled input (you may have heard of the Heartbleed bug).
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*/
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const uint32_t big_endian_num = htonl(host_order_num);
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const uint8_t *const num_vec = (const uint8_t *) &big_endian_num;
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uint8_t num_as_nonce[crypto_box_NONCEBYTES] = {0};
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num_as_nonce[crypto_box_NONCEBYTES - 4] = num_vec[0];
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num_as_nonce[crypto_box_NONCEBYTES - 3] = num_vec[1];
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num_as_nonce[crypto_box_NONCEBYTES - 2] = num_vec[2];
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num_as_nonce[crypto_box_NONCEBYTES - 1] = num_vec[3];
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uint32_t i = crypto_box_NONCEBYTES;
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uint_fast16_t carry = 0U;
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for (; i != 0; --i) {
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carry += (uint_fast16_t) nonce[i - 1] + (uint_fast16_t) num_as_nonce[i - 1];
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nonce[i - 1] = (unsigned char) carry;
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carry >>= 8;
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}
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}
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/* Fill the given nonce with random bytes. */
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void random_nonce(uint8_t *nonce)
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{
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randombytes(nonce, crypto_box_NONCEBYTES);
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}
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/* Fill a key crypto_box_KEYBYTES big with random bytes */
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void new_symmetric_key(uint8_t *key)
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{
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randombytes(key, crypto_box_KEYBYTES);
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}
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