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2456762179 |
feat: account data export and users.db backup (#2141)
A small follow-up to parts A to E of #2128: users can download all data the instance holds about them, and the server backs up `users.db`. Stacked on #2140. Review the commits after that branch. ## The situation - An instance with accounts holds personal data, but a user has no way to get a copy (GDPR articles 15 and 20). Self-delete already exists. - `users.db` is the only file the server writes, and nothing backs it up: `GET /api/backup` snapshots the analyzer database only. ## What this PR adds **Data export.** `GET /api/account/export` and a "Download my data" button on the account page give one JSON file with: - the profile, including activation and a pending email change; - sessions (times and user agent); - synced settings, own proposals, notification prefs and watches; - audit rows where the user is actor or target, with other accounts as an id only; - the mail log. Password hash, session and link tokens and the unsubscribe token are left out: they are credentials. Each export is audited as `user.export`. **users.db backup** - Daily `VACUUM INTO` snapshots through `internal/users`, on by default when user management is on. They go to `backups/` next to `users.db`, the 7 newest are kept, the directory is 0700 and the files 0600. Rotation only touches `users-<timestamp>.db` files and never the snapshot it just wrote. Config: `userManagement.backup {enabled, dir, keep}`. - `GET /api/admin/users-backup`: an admin downloads a fresh snapshot to keep off the server; audited as `user.backup`. - `docs/user-guide/accounts.md` gains a restore procedure. It covers what a restore brings back (accounts deleted after the snapshot, old passwords, revoked sessions) and how to clean that up afterwards. Spec: [`docs/specs/2026-10-08-account-export-and-users-backup-design.md`](https://github.com/efiten/CoreScope/blob/feat/account-export-backup/docs/specs/2026-10-08-account-export-and-users-backup-design.md). ## Verification - `internal/users` with `-race` and the `cmd/server` suite pass locally, 30 new Go tests. The file-mode tests skip on Windows. - `sh test-all.sh` exits 0; the XSS gate in diff mode passes. - User-management E2E: 27 of 27 steps locally. - On our production instance since 8 October 2026; the first snapshot there was 143 kB. ## Not in this PR - Importing an export into another instance. - Off-site upload of the snapshots. The admin download covers that by hand. --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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de364a8bb6 |
feat: mail notifications for watched nodes (user management part E) (#2140)
Part E of #2128: a logged-in user watches nodes and gets one mail when a watched node goes offline, comes back, or reports a low battery. Admins can add instance events: a new foreign node, and an observer going offline or back. This covers the per-user mail part of #775. Stacked on #2139 (part D, which builds on #2138). Review the commits after that branch. ## The situation A sysop learns that a repeater went silent, or that its battery is running down, only by opening CoreScope. #775 asks for notifications. Accounts (part A) now give a verified address to mail and a mailer with delivery status. ## What this PR adds **Events.** They use the instance thresholds, so a mail does not disagree with the node page: - `node.offline`: silent for the role's `healthThresholds` window. Last heard comes from the packet store, and repeaters and rooms count relayed traffic (#1598). - `node.battery`: advert telemetry below `batteryThresholds.lowMv`, recovered at `lowMv + 100`. - Admins only: `foreign.new` (once per node) and `observer.offline`. **Store.** Schema v5 with `notification_prefs`, `notification_watches` and `notification_state`. **Server** (only with `userManagement.notifications.enabled`) - A notifier next to the janitor, every `intervalMinutes` (5). The evaluator is a pure function of watches, prefs, stored states and node snapshots. - No burst after a restart or a new watch: a subject's first evaluation stores its state without mailing. The loop waits for the startup load. While ingest is stale (newest packet older than 30 minutes) the offline checks pause, and after recovery they wait one silent window. - One mail per user per check. Limits: 20 per user and 100 per instance per rolling 24 hours, 50 watches per user. A change over a limit is recorded and never mailed later. - Every mail has a one-click unsubscribe (`List-Unsubscribe` and `List-Unsubscribe-Post`). The GET only redirects to a confirm page, so link scanners cannot unsubscribe anyone. Node names are cleaned of control and bidi characters before they go into a mail. - Routes: `GET`/`PUT /api/account/notifications`, `PUT`/`DELETE /api/account/notifications/watches/{pubkey}`, `POST /api/account/notifications/watch-my-nodes` (copies the synced "my nodes" list), `GET`/`POST /api/notifications/unsubscribe`. `mailer.Message` gains `Headers`. **Frontend.** A "Notify me" toggle on the node pages, a Notifications section on the account page (`#/account?section=notifications`), an unsubscribe page, and the notification mail count on the admin overview. Spec: [`docs/specs/2026-10-07-node-notifications-design.md`](https://github.com/efiten/CoreScope/blob/feat/notifications/docs/specs/2026-10-07-node-notifications-design.md). ## Performance Each check reads watches, prefs and states from `users.db` (one query each), the watched nodes from the analyzer DB in chunks of 500, and last-heard times from the packet store. | Measurement | Result | |---|---| | One check on our staging instance, 130,000 packets in memory, 1 watcher | 6.9 ms, of which 0.93 ms holding the store read lock | | Evaluator benchmark, 100 users with 50 watches each, 2,000 nodes | 1.75 ms | No work is added to ingest, broadcast or any request path. ## Verification - `internal/users` and `internal/mailer` with `-race`; the `cmd/server` suite plus `-race` on the notifier tests; 74 new Go tests. The same Windows-only failure as noted in #2138 applies. - `sh test-all.sh` exits 0; the XSS gate in diff mode passes. - User-management E2E: 26 of 26 steps locally. With notifications off the new steps fail, so they do test the flag. - On our staging and production instance since 7 October 2026. ## Not in this PR - Other channels (Discord, Telegram, webhooks). Detection is separate from delivery, so one can be added. - The topology, RF and anomaly alerts of #775. - If the whole server starts after a feed outage that already ended, the grace window is unknown and a watcher can get one wrong offline mail. The user guide says so. --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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abbe6846ff |
feat: propose and approve hashtag channels (user management part D) (#2139)
Part D of #2128: logged-in users propose a hashtag channel, an admin approves, rejects or later revokes it, and the ingestor decrypts approved channels without a restart. It is the first consumer of a generic proposal table, and answers the request in #2092. Stacked on #2138 (part C). Review the commits after that branch; GitHub shows C's commits here until it is merged. ## The situation - An instance decrypts only the hashtag channels listed in `hashChannels`. Users who want a city or club channel shown have to ask the operator, who edits `config.json` and restarts the ingestor. - #2092 asked for a suggest-and-approve flow; a downstream fork (dborup/CoreScope#99) runs one with anonymous suggestions and a file queue. ## What this PR adds **Name rules (`internal/channel`).** `ValidateHashtagName`, mirrored in the browser: - at most 31 UTF-8 bytes including `#` (firmware `ChannelDetails.name[32]`), case preserved, `Public` refused in any case; - control, bidi, separator and format characters refused except ZWJ, plus invisible fillers (`Other_Default_Ignorable_Code_Point`, U+2800, non-ASCII spaces). Go and JS give the same verdict for every code point. **Store.** Schema v4, one generic `proposals` table (kind, subject, status pending/approved/rejected/revoked, proposer, reviewer, note). One row per (kind, subject); limits are checked in the same transaction as the change. **Server** (only with `userManagement.channelProposals.enabled`) - `POST /api/proposals`, `GET /api/account/proposals`, `GET /api/admin/proposals`, `POST /api/admin/proposals/{id}/approve|reject|revoke`. - 400 for an invalid name. 409 for a duplicate, a rejected name, or a name already in `hashChannels`/`channelKeys` ("this channel is already decrypted on this instance"). 429 over a limit (`maxPending` 100, `maxApproved` 128, `perUserPerDay` 5). - `GET /api/channels` gains `approvedChannels`, so approved channels are listed before they have traffic. With the feature off the response is byte-identical. **Ingestor.** Opens `users.db` with `mode=ro` every 60 seconds, re-validates the names, and swaps its key map through an `atomic.Pointer`. Configured channels always win, and a failed read keeps the last good set. The ingestor never writes `users.db`; AGENTS.md now says so. **Frontend.** "Propose for everyone" in the add-channel dialog, an "approved" marker in the channel list, "My proposals" on the account page, and an admin "Proposals" tab with a warning on approve. The packet detail pane now escapes the channel name: until now only the operator chose those names. Spec: [`docs/specs/2026-10-07-channel-proposals-design.md`](https://github.com/efiten/CoreScope/blob/feat/channel-proposals/docs/specs/2026-10-07-channel-proposals-design.md). ## Performance Every key is tried on each GRP_TXT that no key opens (`decodeGrpTxt`). Benchmark of that worst case: | Keys | Time per packet | |---|---| | 320 configured | 204 to 216 µs | | 320 configured + 128 approved | 272 to 320 µs | That is about +33%, linear in the key count and capped by `maxApproved`. With the feature off the decoder gets the identical map and no ticker runs. ## Verification - `internal/channel`, `internal/users` (with `-race`), `cmd/server` and `cmd/ingestor` pass locally, 53 new Go tests. The ingestor's `TestWriteStatsAtomic_SymlinkAtDestIsReplaced` needs symlink rights on Windows and fails on `master` too. - `sh test-all.sh` exits 0; the XSS gate in diff mode passes. - User-management E2E: 21 of 21 steps locally (propose, approve, the channel appears, revoke removes it). - On our staging and production instance since 7 October 2026. ## Not in this PR - Private (PSK) channels: their keys stay in the browser (#725). - Anonymous proposals. - Names that need ZWNJ (some Persian and Urdu spellings) and subdivision flags are refused, because ZWNJ and tag characters are format characters. Allowing them later only widens the rule, so no approved name gets stranded. --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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18a634c115 |
feat: admin dashboard with overview and audit log (user management part C) (#2138)
Part C of #2128: an admin area with an overview, the user table and a global audit log. Off by default like the rest of user management: with `userManagement` off nothing changes, and non-admins get no new UI. This is the first of 4 stacked PRs (C, D, E, then a small export/backup follow-up). Each later one contains this branch; review them in order. ## The situation - An admin could manage users one by one in `#/admin/users`, but nothing showed whether the instance needs attention: accounts stuck in activation, bouncing mail, someone guessing a password, an MQTT source that dropped. - The audit log existed (`internal/users/audit.go`) but could only be read per user, and logins were not recorded. ## What this PR adds **Store (`internal/users`)** - Schema v3: an index on `audit_log(at)`. - `AuditList` with filters (action or group prefix like `user.login.*`, user as actor or target, period) and keyset pagination; `PruneAudit`; `Stats` for the user figures. **Server** - `GET /api/admin/stats` (typed struct): accounts by status, admins, registrations and active users over 7 and 30 days, logins and failed logins in 24 hours, mail by final status, and the attention items computed server-side. - `GET /api/admin/audit`: filtered, newest first, `next` cursor. - `GET /api/admin/users` gains `bouncing=1`. - Logins are audited as `user.login` and `user.login.failed` (reason `wrong_password`, `pending` or `disabled`). An unknown address writes no row. The writes are asynchronous, so the login response does not wait on `users.db`. Login rows are pruned after 90 days. **Frontend** - `#/admin?tab=overview|users|audit`: `admin.js` (tab shell), `admin-overview.js` ("Needs attention", Users card, System card from the existing health, MQTT and observer endpoints), `admin-audit.js` (filters in the URL, "Load more"). `admin-users.js` becomes the Users tab; the old `#/admin/users` link rewrites to it. - `/api/healthz` is read on open and on Refresh only, not on the 60-second timer, because it walks every packet under a read lock. Spec: [`docs/specs/2026-10-07-admin-dashboard-design.md`](https://github.com/efiten/CoreScope/blob/feat/admin-dashboard/docs/specs/2026-10-07-admin-dashboard-design.md). ## Verification - `internal/users` and `cmd/server`: `go vet` and `go test` pass locally, 26 new Go tests. One upstream test, `TestSaveGeoFilterPreservesFileMode`, also fails on Windows on plain `master` (file modes) and is unrelated. - `sh test-all.sh` exits 0; the XSS gate in diff mode passes. - User-management E2E with the `e2etest` build: 13 of 13 steps locally. - Running on our staging and production instance since 7 October 2026. ## Not in this PR - Restricting existing pages (perf, MQTT status) to logged-in users or admins. The admin area adds no access mechanism of its own, so that stays a later router rule plus endpoint check. - Server-enforced customizer tab restrictions (#1508). - The 24-hour, 5-attempt and 10-minute attention thresholds are constants for now (AGENTS.md rule 8: customizer later). --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |