This PR replaces the strict, hardcoded limits on API list endpoints
(introduced in the recent security patch) with a new
operator-configurable `listLimits` block. This change is needed as issue
1540's implementation introduced a 500max node limit on the live map or
any other function that leverages the api/nodes backend.
Previously, we attempted to bypass public caps for internal UI requests
using a heuristic based on browser headers (`Sec-Fetch-Site`). Following
review, we decided to drop that heuristic entirely to eliminate any
security-by-browser-convention surface area.
Instead, `queryLimit()` returns to its original, mathematically simple
bounds-checking shape, and the absolute maximums are now drawn from
`config.json`. This provides equal DoS protection against all callers
while allowing server operators to tune the ceilings based on the size
of their mesh (e.g. embedded devices can tighten the knobs, regional
hubs can raise them).
### Changes Made:
- **`config.go`**: Introduced a `ListLimits` config struct containing
`PacketsMax`, `NodesMax`, `AnalyticsMax`, and `ChannelMessagesMax`.
Added safe initialization to ensure default caps (10000, 2000, 200, 500
respectively) apply even if the block is omitted from the config.
- **`clamp_limit.go`**: Deleted `isInternalUIRequest` entirely and
restored `queryLimit` to its original signature (`r, def, max`).
- **`routes.go`**: Replaced all hardcoded integer ceilings on list
endpoints (`/api/packets`, `/api/nodes`, etc.) with
`s.cfg.ListLimits.*`.
- **`config.example.json`**: Added the `listLimits` block with
documentation to guide new operators.
- **`clamp_limit_test.go`**: Purged all header-heuristic testing.
### Verification:
- All 611 backend unit tests pass (`npm run test:unit`).
- Bounds-checking math continues to enforce hard DoS clipping exactly at
the operator's specified configuration limit.
---------
Co-authored-by: mc-bot <bot@openclaw.local>
Co-authored-by: openclaw-bot <bot@openclaw>
Follow-up to v3.8.3 security train. Found by non-XSS input-validation
audit.
Three findings closed in one PR — all defense-in-depth: medium is
genuinely DoS-only (no data exposure), lows tighten log hygiene and SPA
path handling so future router changes can't silently expose the
filesystem.
## Findings addressed
### MEDIUM — unbounded `limit` on list endpoints
- **What:** four list endpoints accepted `limit=999999999` and passed
the value straight to SQL `LIMIT ?` and Go `make(..., 0, limit)`.
- **Where:** `cmd/server/routes.go` — handlePackets (incl. multi-node
branch), handleNodes, handleChannelMessages, handleAnalyticsSubpaths,
handleAnalyticsSubpathsBulk per-group lim, handleDroppedPackets.
- **Fix:** new `clampLimit(raw, def, max)` helper in
`cmd/server/clamp_limit.go` plus `queryLimit(r, def, max)` HTTP wrapper.
Caps: packets/nodes/channels/dropped = 500, analytics buckets /
bulk-health = 200. Already-clamped endpoints (handleBulkHealth) migrated
to the helper for uniformity. Silent clamp — no response-shape change.
Negative / zero / non-numeric → default.
### LOW — log injection via newline in advert name
- **What:** advert `name` field allows `\n` / `\t` (sanitizeName
intentionally preserves them for display). Logged at two MQTT-ingest
sites, an attacker with publish ACL could forge log lines.
- **Where:** `cmd/ingestor/main.go:659,690`.
- **Fix:** new `sanitizeLogString` in `cmd/ingestor/sanitize_log.go`
strips control bytes < 0x20 and DEL with `?`. Wrapped at the two log
call sites that interpolate `name=` and `observer=`. Stored display
values untouched.
### LOW — SPA static handler depends on default mux path-cleaning
- **What:** `cmd/server/main.go:469` joins `r.URL.Path` to root; safe
today only because gorilla/mux runs `path.Clean` and `http.FileServer`
rejects `..`. A future `SkipClean(true)` or router swap would silently
expose the filesystem.
- **Where:** `cmd/server/main.go` (spaHandler).
- **Fix:** new `isSafeStaticPath` rejects requests whose decoded or raw
path contains `..`, `%2e%2e`, `\\`, or `%5c` with a 400. Legit asset
names with dots (`/app.js`, `/customize-v2.js`, `/themes/dark.css`) are
unaffected.
## TDD
- Commit 1 (red): adds `TestClampLimit`, `TestSpaHandlerPathTraversal`,
`TestSanitizeLogString` with stub helpers — tests fail on assertions
(not build errors), proving they gate the change.
- Commit 2 (green): production fix. Revert the green commit and the red
commit's assertions fail.
## Audit reference
Source: non-XSS input-validation audit dated 2026-06-03 (workspace).
Sibling PR `fix/xss-r2-trace-obs-anl` owns the XSS findings — not
included here.
---------
Co-authored-by: clawbot <clawbot@users.noreply.github.com>
