2 Commits

Include renames

Author	SHA1	Message	Date
Kpa-clawbotandbot	367265eb59	feat(#1369): cross-domain embed support (CORS env override + ?embed=1 chrome suppression) (#1500) ... Closes #1369. ## What Cross-domain embed support, shipped as two halves: ### Part A — CORS env override + read-only contract * `applyCORSEnv()` reads `CORS_ALLOWED_ORIGINS` (comma-separated, trimmed, empties dropped). Set in env → overrides `cfg.CORSAllowedOrigins`. Unset/empty → config.json value wins. * `Access-Control-Allow-Methods` tightened from `GET, POST, OPTIONS` → `GET, HEAD, OPTIONS`. The cross-domain surface is read-only by contract; same-origin admin writes don't go through preflight and are unaffected. * `config.example.json` adds `corsAllowedOrigins: []` + a comment explaining the env override and the embed URL pattern. * No wildcards introduced (still supported as `["*"]` for ops that opt in). No credentialed CORS. ### Part B — `?embed=1` chrome suppression * `shouldEmbedRoute(basePage, hashSearch)` — pure helper, allowlisted to `map` and `channels`, requires `embed=1` in the hash querystring. * `navigate()` toggles `body.embed` based on the helper. * CSS hides `.top-nav`, `[data-bottom-nav]`, `.nav-drawer`, `.nav-drawer-backdrop`, zeroes body padding/margin, reclaims `100dvh` for `#app.app-fixed`. Use: `<iframe src="https://analyzer.example/#/map?embed=1">`. For iframe-only display, no CORS entry is needed (the iframe loads the document, not a JSON API). The CORS allowlist only matters when the embedding origin's own JS calls `/api/*` directly. ## Tests | File | Asserts | Status | |---|---|---| | `cmd/server/cors_embed_1369_test.go` | 4 (env override, env-empty, env-trim, GET/HEAD contract, preflight POST rejected) | green | | `test-embed-mode-1369.js` | 9 (helper allowlist + param parsing) | green | | `cmd/server/cors_test.go` | existing | updated to read-only method-set assertion | TDD: 2 red commits (one per part, both compile, both fail on assertions) → 2 green commits. ## Out of scope (per the issue's narrow ask) * Other SPA routes do not honor `?embed=1` (their chrome makes layout assumptions; defer until requested). * No iframe sandboxing recommendation — that's the embedder's responsibility. * No CSP / `X-Frame-Options` change in this PR — frames are already permitted; add an explicit `frame-ancestors` policy in a follow-up if operators want to whitelist embedders at the HTTP layer too. ## Security notes (DJB lens) * Allowlist is exact-match, case-sensitive string compare — no normalization, no scheme/host parsing, no surprises. * No `Access-Control-Allow-Credentials` (would let third parties read auth'd state via cookies). * No reflection of arbitrary origins (every echoed origin came from the allowlist). * Methods narrowed to read-only; even a misconfigured allowlist can't grant cross-origin writes through this middleware. 🤖 Generated with OpenClaw --------- Co-authored-by: bot <bot@corescope.local>	2026-05-30 13:22:41 -07:00
Kpa-clawbotandyou	4b8d8143f4	feat(server): explicit CORS policy with configurable origin allowlist (#883) (#971) ... ## Summary Adds explicit CORS policy support to the CoreScope API server, closing #883. ### Problem The API relied on browser same-origin defaults with no way for operators to configure cross-origin access. Operators running dashboards or third-party frontends on different origins had no supported way to make API calls. ### Solution **New config option:** `corsAllowedOrigins` (string array, default `[]`) **Middleware behavior:** | Config | Behavior | |--------|----------| | `[]` (default) | No `Access-Control-*` headers added — browsers enforce same-origin. **Preserves current behavior.** | | `["https://dashboard.example.com"]` | Echoes matching `Origin`, sets `Allow-Methods`/`Allow-Headers` | | `["*"]` | Sets `Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *` (explicit opt-in only) | **Headers set when origin matches:** - `Access-Control-Allow-Origin: <origin>` (or `*`) - `Access-Control-Allow-Methods: GET, POST, OPTIONS` - `Access-Control-Allow-Headers: Content-Type, X-API-Key` - `Vary: Origin` (non-wildcard only) **Preflight handling:** `OPTIONS` → `204 No Content` with CORS headers (or `403` if origin not in allowlist). ### Config example ```json { "corsAllowedOrigins": ["https://dashboard.example.com", "https://monitor.internal"] } ``` ### Files changed | File | Change | |------|--------| | `cmd/server/cors.go` | New CORS middleware | | `cmd/server/cors_test.go` | 7 unit tests covering all branches | | `cmd/server/config.go` | `CORSAllowedOrigins` field | | `cmd/server/routes.go` | Wire middleware before all routes | ### Testing **Unit tests (7):** - Default config → no CORS headers - Allowlist match → headers present with `Vary: Origin` - Allowlist miss → no CORS headers - Preflight allowed → 204 with headers - Preflight rejected → 403 - Wildcard → `*` without `Vary` - No `Origin` header → pass-through **Live verification (Rule 18):** ``` # Default (empty corsAllowedOrigins): $ curl -I -H "Origin: https://evil.example" localhost:19883/api/health HTTP/1.1 200 OK # No Access-Control-* headers ✓ # With corsAllowedOrigins: ["https://good.example"]: $ curl -I -H "Origin: https://good.example" localhost:19884/api/health Access-Control-Allow-Origin: https://good.example Access-Control-Allow-Methods: GET, POST, OPTIONS Access-Control-Allow-Headers: Content-Type, X-API-Key Vary: Origin ✓ $ curl -I -H "Origin: https://evil.example" localhost:19884/api/health # No Access-Control-* headers ✓ $ curl -I -X OPTIONS -H "Origin: https://good.example" localhost:19884/api/health HTTP/1.1 204 No Content Access-Control-Allow-Origin: https://good.example ✓ ``` Closes #883 Co-authored-by: you <you@example.com>	2026-05-02 12:04:37 -07:00