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15
Commits
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7f8f71e773 |
fix(live): reconnect when the websocket goes silent (#1074) (#2020)
## Problem #1074 reports that after a proxy dropped the WebSocket, live updates only came back 8 to 10 minutes later. The client only reconnects from `onclose` (`public/app.js:791` on master). A half-open connection (a proxy or NAT dropping state without a FIN reaching the browser, a laptop that slept) can keep a WebSocket OPEN for minutes without `onclose`, and nothing retries in the meantime. The server does ping every 30s (`cmd/server/websocket.go:252` on master), but ping frames are answered by the browser below the page and JS cannot observe them. The only app-level frames are packet broadcasts (`websocket.go:337, 343, 366`), which stop on a quiet mesh. So the client had no signal to tell a quiet mesh from a dead socket. ## Change Server (`cmd/server/websocket.go`): - On the existing ping tick, `writePump` also writes the text frame `{"type":"heartbeat"}` (`:283`, bytes at `:80`). One 20-byte frame per client per 30s, from the goroutine that already writes the ping, no hub lock. - The interval moves to `Hub.pingInterval` (default 30s, `:118`) so a test can shorten it. Client (`public/app.js`): - Every frame refreshes `wsLastMessageAt` (`:841`). One timer (`checkWSLiveness`, `:806`) fires at last message + `WS_STALE_MS` (75s, one late or lost heartbeat of slack) and replaces the socket if it is still silent. It is armed at socket creation, so a stuck handshake is covered too. - `dropWS` (`:796`) detaches the old socket's handlers before `close()`, so a late close event cannot schedule a second connection. - `connectWS` (`:818`) cancels a pending reconnect and drops the previous socket, so the watchdog, resume checks, `onclose` and pull-to-reconnect cannot stack sockets. Before this, `pullReconnect` on a non-open socket left a third socket 3s later. The 3s `WS_RECONNECT_MS` delay after `onclose` is unchanged (`:837`). - `visibilitychange` (to visible) and `online` run the check immediately (`:861`), because a hidden or sleeping tab's timers can run late. - Heartbeat frames are matched by exact bytes (`:842`) and are not pulsed or dispatched to `onWS` listeners. Compatibility: tabs loaded before the deploy dispatch heartbeats to their listeners until reloaded. Every current listener filters on `msg.type`, so the visible effect is a logo pulse and a `/stats` cache refresh every 30s. Perf: one `Date.now()` and one string compare per WS message on the client; one extra 20-byte write per client per 30s on the server. ## Tests - `test-ws-stale-watchdog-1074.js`: real `app.js` in a vm with a fake clock, timers and WebSocket. 12 tests: silence past the threshold replaces the socket exactly once; a handshake that never opens is replaced; heartbeats and packet traffic keep the socket; heartbeats are not dispatched; resume and `online` after silence reconnect immediately, with recent traffic they do not, and hiding does not trigger a check; repeated resume events open one socket; after `onclose` only the reconnect timer is pending; pull-to-reconnect leaves one socket. 9 of 12 fail on master. 12 of 12 source mutations (threshold, reconnect path, detaching, timer cleanup, resume wiring, heartbeat filter) are caught. Registered in `test-all.sh` and the deploy.yml unit step. - `TestWritePumpSendsAppHeartbeat`: fails with a read timeout without the heartbeat, even with pings every 20ms. `TestHubDefaultPingInterval` pins the 30s interval that `WS_STALE_MS` assumes. - `go test ./...` in `cmd/server` passes; gofmt and go vet are clean. ## Browser validation On a staging instance (build `139e484e`, together with #1979's branch), in Chrome, no console errors: - A `{"type":"heartbeat"}` frame arrived on the open socket within the observation window. - Silent socket: after `ws.onmessage = null`, the page replaced the socket after 76.2s (threshold 75s plus a 250ms poll); the old socket ended in CLOSED, the new one OPEN. - Normal close: `ws.close()` led to a new OPEN socket after 4.1s, and exactly one new `WebSocket` was constructed. ## Not verified - The reporter's proxy setup was not reproduced; that their delay was a half-open socket is a hypothesis consistent with the symptom. Hence `Refs`, not `Fixes`. - Laptop sleep and the `visibilitychange` / `online` resume path were only covered by the unit test, not in a browser. - Behaviour under Chrome's intensive background-timer throttling and mobile tab freezing was not measured; a frozen but healthy tab may do one unnecessary reconnect on resume. - Go tests were run without `-race`. Refs #1074 ## Review follow-up (commit `72e5e906`) An independent review found no blocking bug: all data writes stay on the write goroutine, pong-based dead-client detection still works, and no ordering of onclose, watchdog, resume checks and pull ends with two live sockets or none. It reproduced the silent-socket case in headless Chromium through a blackholing TCP proxy (replacement 75.0 s after the last frame). Changed: 1. **Startup wiring tested.** The first resume test now boots through the page's real `DOMContentLoaded` listeners, so removing `setupWSResumeCheck()` from startup makes it fail. 2. **Wall clock stepping back.** If the clock steps back after the last message, the watchdog no longer re-arms for the size of the step (a 1 h step used to delay detection by about an hour). A negative silence reading is treated as stale, so the socket is replaced within `WS_STALE_MS` of the step (`public/app.js:810-814`). A step in either direction costs at most one extra reconnect on a healthy socket. `Date.now()` stays the clock so a tab resumed after sleep is still checked against real elapsed time. 3. **Pull-to-reconnect at once.** On an OPEN socket, pull-to-reconnect now replaces it through `connectWS()` instead of closing it and waiting for onclose, which took 63 s on a half-open connection in the review's measurement (`public/app.js:927-934`). This was slow on master too; it is safe now that `connectWS()` detaches the old socket. Tests: 12 to 16 in `test-ws-stale-watchdog-1074.js`; `test-pull-to-reconnect.js`, `test-pull-to-reconnect-1091.js` and `test-live.js` pass. Correction to the compatibility note: tabs opened before the deploy treat the heartbeat like any other message. Besides the logo pulse, `app.js` runs `updateNavStats` on every message and invalidates the cached `/stats` and `/nodes` responses 5 s later; `packets.js` also pushes every message into `pauseBuffer` unfiltered (~1310-1313), so an old tab with Packets paused sees its counter rise by 2 per minute. Cosmetic: heartbeats are filtered out on replay, and a reload ends it. Not verified: real hidden-tab or mobile freeze behaviour, Firefox and Safari, and the reporter's proxy setup. --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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1ffaad8eb1 |
feat(#1794): per-IP limits and a deny list on the /ws upgrade (#1974)
Closes #1794. Follow-up to #1793, decided **before** the upgrade because the handshake is the resource being protected. - Deny list of addresses and CIDRs → 403 - Per-IP concurrent connection cap → 403 - Per-IP upgrade rate limit over a rolling minute → **429**, not 403: a temporary refusal should not read as "never come back" - Rejection counters split by cause in `/api/stats` under `websocket` ### The decision this feature lives or dies on Most CoreScope installs sit behind nginx, Caddy, Traefik or an ingress. `cdn_detection.go` says so in as many words: it deliberately excludes `X-Forwarded-For` from its CDN signals precisely because *every* reverse-proxied install sets it. For those deployments `r.RemoteAddr` is the proxy, `127.0.0.1` for every visitor on earth. A per-IP cap keyed on that address protects nobody and hands the sixth legitimate browser tab a 403. That is a self-inflicted outage wearing the costume of hardening. So: - **`X-Forwarded-For` is believed only from an address listed in `webSocket.trustedProxies`.** From anywhere else it is attacker-supplied, and trusting it would let anyone mint a fresh source IP per connection, which is strictly worse than having no limit at all. - **When the peer looks like a local reverse proxy and no `trustedProxies` is set, the per-IP limits are skipped**, and one warning names the setting that fixes it. Silently refusing real users is the worse failure. - **The deny list still applies there**, because it is the operator's explicit instruction rather than an inference. That is the answer to @mcode6726's question on the thread: it is neither "always the socket address" nor "always the header", and the operator decides which by naming their proxy. ### Two deliberate departures from the issue body **`maxConnsPerIP` ships as 0 (off), not 5.** Carrier-grade NAT puts thousands of unrelated mobile subscribers behind a single public IPv4. A cap of 5 refuses real visitors on phones while a scraper simply rents more addresses: all of the cost, none of the benefit. `upgradesPerMinPerIP` ships at **30 and on**, because that one *is* safe under CGNAT: a real client upgrades a handful of times per minute even while reconnecting, so 30 leaves ordinary traffic untouched while flattening a reconnect loop. A pointer type distinguishes "unset" from an explicit `0` that turns it off. **The default deny list is not shipped.** The thread proposed seeding 44 CIDRs for one VPS provider after a single scraper was seen at `23.111.177.6`. I have left it out: blanket-blocking a hosting provider by default breaks legitimate operators who host there, is undiscoverable by the person locked out (they see a bare 403), and ages badly as ranges get reassigned. The mechanism is here and `config.example.json` shows exactly how to configure it, so any operator who wants that list can have it in one line. If you want it shipped as a default anyway, that is your call as maintainer and it is a one-line change. ### Verification 19 tests, including all five the issue specifies as TDD requirements, each marked with the issue's own wording. Beyond those five: - a **bare address** in the deny list works, not just CIDR form. Operators write `1.2.3.4`, and silently ignoring that would be the worst possible failure for a deny list: it looks configured and blocks nothing - an unparseable deny entry is skipped and logged, not fatal. One typo must not take the server down - one client behind a trusted proxy does **not** exhaust another client's budget behind the same proxy, which is the entire point of honouring XFF - changing a forged XFF from an untrusted peer buys no fresh budget - `release` frees a slot and is **idempotent**, because `Unregister` can run twice for one client and double-crediting would leak slots - a **rejected** upgrade does not consume rate budget, or a retrying client could never recover once its window cleared - limits skipped for loopback and private peers; deny list applies anyway - a nil limiter allows everything, so a `Hub` built without `ConfigureLimits` behaves exactly as before - idle per-IP state is collected, while a record with a live connection never is Full `cmd/server` suite green, `gofmt` clean. ### Not done - No runtime config reload; restart required. Listed as optional in the issue. - No `WS_DENY_IPS` env override. Also listed as optional. - From the OWASP expansion in the first comment: `maxPayload` and the idle/read timeout are **already in master** (`SetReadLimit`, `SetReadDeadline`). The ping/pong heartbeat is not, and is not in this PR either; it is a separate change to the read/write pumps and belongs in its own review. Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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40f664c587 |
chore(#1859): gofmt sweep + gofmt/go vet CI gate (rebase of #1881) (#1941)
Rebase of #1881 by @SaarMesh-Bot onto current master. Their three commits are preserved, two of them cherry-picked with authorship intact; the sweep itself had to be regenerated. Opened as a new PR rather than force-pushing their branch. Closes #1881 once merged. Addresses parts 1 and 3 of #1859; part 2 landed as #1937. ## Why regenerated rather than merged The sweep in #1881 was cut on 2026-09-02 07:13 and roughly forty PRs landed after it, so it went `CONFLICTING/DIRTY`. Re-running `gofmt` on current master is cheaper and less error-prone than resolving 72 conflicts that are all whitespace. The drift it fixes also grew in the meantime: 66 files now, against 72 then, but spread differently. ## The three commits 1. **`style(#1859)`** — `gofmt -w` across the 14 modules. 66 files. 2. **`test(#1859)`** — @SaarMesh-Bot's fix for the one `go vet` copylocks finding, `cmd/ingestor/coverage_boost_test.go`: the range variable copied a `Config` embedding `sync.Once`. Cherry-picked unchanged. 3. **`ci(#1859)`** — @SaarMesh-Bot's CI step that fails on gofmt drift or vet findings, plus `.git-blame-ignore-revs`. Cherry-picked with one change, noted in the commit message: the ignore file pointed at `04bc80ee`, the sweep commit on their branch, which does not exist on this base and would make `git blame --ignore-revs-file` error. Repointed at `d3a02599`, the sweep here. ## Verification The claim "formatting only" is checked twice rather than asserted: - Every changed file is byte-identical to `gofmt(previous content)`. 0 of 66 deviate. - With line comments and all whitespace stripped, 0 of 66 files differ, so no code outside comments changed. 14 of the 66 also show doc-comment reflow. Since Go 1.19 `gofmt` re-indents indented comment blocks to tabs and inserts a blank comment line before them; the behavior matrix above `resolveHopWithContext` in `cmd/ingestor/path_resolver.go` is a clear example. That is gofmt's own output, not an edit, but it is worth naming because it makes the diff look larger than "whitespace" suggests. The gate was run locally exactly as the workflow runs it: `gofmt` clean, and `go vet` clean in all 14 modules, including `cmd/ingestor` which is what commit 2 fixes. Suites: `cmd/server` ok (80.7s), `internal/packetpath` ok (2.3s), `cmd/ingestor` passes except `TestWriteStatsAtomic_SymlinkAtDestIsReplaced`, which fails identically on bare master with "A required privilege is not held by the client" (Windows symlink privilege on my host, not code). ## Sequencing This should go last in the queue. The sweep touches 66 files, so merging it before the remaining open Go PRs gives each of them a conflict about nothing but formatting. After it lands the gate is active, and any PR with drift fails CI until it runs `gofmt -w`. Excluded from the sweep: the misnamed `Dockerfile.go`, which is a Dockerfile that gofmt cannot parse (the workflow excludes it too), and `docs/DEPLOYMENT.md`, which a case-insensitive filesystem surfaces as a spurious modification against `docs/deployment.md` and is unrelated. --------- Co-authored-by: SaarMesh-Bot <300107934+SaarMesh-Bot@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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ec0ebeda2f |
fix(#1793): WebSocket CheckOrigin allowlist (block cross-origin scrapers) (#1795)
## Summary Closes the wide-open `/ws` WebSocket upgrader (`CheckOrigin: return true`) that lets any browser origin scrape live packet data. Replaces it with an explicit allowlist consulted from `cfg.CORSAllowedOrigins`, plus an implicit same-origin allowance and an empty-Origin (non-browser client) allowance. Fixes #1793. ## Rules (`Hub.checkOrigin`) - Empty `Origin` header → **allow** (non-browser clients; per-IP rate/deny gating tracked separately in #1794). - `Origin` host == request `Host` (case-insensitive) → **allow** (same-origin). - `Origin` matches an entry in `cfg.CORSAllowedOrigins` by exact case-insensitive match → **allow**. - `"*"` in `cfg.CORSAllowedOrigins` is **deliberately ignored** for `/ws`. A startup `[ws] WARNING:` is logged once when present. - Anything else → **reject** (gorilla returns 403). ### Deliberate divergence from CORS XHR CORS XHR (`corsMiddleware`) still honors `"*"` for read-only cross-origin GETs. The `/ws` upgrade does NOT, per OWASP's WebSocket Security Cheat Sheet: > Use an allowlist, not a denylist. Avoid wildcards or substring matching. — https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/WebSocket_Security_Cheat_Sheet.html `"*"` on the WS path would re-open the exact CSWSH/scraping vector this PR closes, so it is rejected with a startup warning rather than silently honored. This intentional asymmetry is documented in the updated `_comment_corsAllowedOrigins` in `config.example.json`. ## TDD red → green - `e5974c6a` **RED** — adds `cmd/server/websocket_checkorigin_test.go` with five cases; `SetAllowedOrigins` introduced as an enforcement stub so the test compiles and fails on the assertion (CI fails on this commit by design). - `a4791dc3` **GREEN** — implements `Hub.checkOrigin`, wires `SetAllowedOrigins` from `main.go`, updates the config example. All tests pass. ## Tests added (`cmd/server/websocket_checkorigin_test.go`) - `TestCheckOriginRejectsForeignOrigin` — foreign Origin → 403 - `TestCheckOriginAllowsEmptyOrigin` — non-browser client → 101 - `TestCheckOriginAllowsSameHost` — same-origin → 101 - `TestCheckOriginAllowsAllowlistedOrigin` — exact allowlist match → 101 - `TestCheckOriginWildcardDoesNotAllowForeignOrigin` — `"*"` in allowlist still rejects foreign origin → 403 ## Files changed - `cmd/server/websocket.go` — `Hub.allowedOrigins`, `SetAllowedOrigins`, `checkOrigin`, wired into `Upgrader.CheckOrigin`. - `cmd/server/main.go` — `hub.SetAllowedOrigins(cfg.CORSAllowedOrigins)` at the single call site. - `cmd/server/websocket_checkorigin_test.go` — new test file. - `config.example.json` — updated `_comment_corsAllowedOrigins` to document `/ws` gating and the `"*"` divergence. ## Out of scope (follow-up) - **#1794** — per-IP rate limit / deny list / connection cap for non-browser clients (which still bypass Origin because they don't send one). Layered defense; not in this PR. ## Verification - `go test ./cmd/server/...` — all server tests pass locally (574s). - Preflight clean (`bash ~/.openclaw/skills/pr-preflight/scripts/run-all.sh origin/master`). --------- Co-authored-by: openclaw-bot <bot@openclaw.local> |
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caf3851ff8 |
feat(server): add opt-in HTTP gzip and WebSocket permessage-deflate compression (#934)
## Summary
- Adds `"compression": {"gzip": true, "websocket": true}` config option
(both `false` by default — no behavior change)
- HTTP gzip middleware wraps the entire router; skips WebSocket upgrade
requests and clients without `Accept-Encoding: gzip`
- WebSocket permessage-deflate enabled via
`hub.upgrader.EnableCompression` when `websocket: true`
- `CompressionConfig` struct and `GZipEnabled()` /
`WSCompressionEnabled()` helpers on `Config`
- `Hub.upgrader` moved from package-level var to struct field so tests
using `NewHub()` don't need changes
## Why opt-in / off by default
Operators behind a reverse proxy that already compresses (nginx, Caddy
with `encode gzip`) should leave this off to avoid double-compression.
Only enable when the proxy does **not** compress.
## Test plan
- [x] `TestCompressionConfigDefaults` — both helpers return false when
`Compression` is nil
- [x] `TestCompressionConfigExplicitFalse` — both helpers return false
when set to false
- [x] `TestCompressionConfigEnabled` — both helpers return true when set
to true
- [x] `TestGZipMiddlewareCompresses` — response body is valid gzip,
headers set correctly
- [x] `TestGZipMiddlewareSkipsNoAcceptEncoding` — passthrough when
client doesn't send Accept-Encoding: gzip
- [x] `TestGZipMiddlewareSkipsWebSocket` — WebSocket upgrades are never
gzip-wrapped
All 6 tests pass (`go test ./...` in `cmd/server`).
🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: OpenClaw Bot <bot@openclaw.local>
Co-authored-by: efiten-bot <bot@efiten.dev>
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f87eb3601c |
fix: graceful container shutdown for reliable deployments (#453)
## Summary Fixes #450 — staging deployment flaky due to container not shutting down cleanly. ## Root Causes 1. **Server never closed DB on shutdown** — SQLite WAL lock held indefinitely, blocking new container startup 2. **`httpServer.Close()` instead of `Shutdown()`** — abruptly kills connections instead of draining them 3. **No `stop_grace_period` in compose configs** — Docker sends SIGTERM then immediately SIGKILL (default 10s is often not enough for WAL checkpoint) 4. **Supervisor didn't forward SIGTERM** — missing `stopsignal`/`stopwaitsecs` meant Go processes got SIGKILL instead of graceful shutdown 5. **Deploy scripts used default `docker stop` timeout** — only 10s grace period ## Changes ### Go Server (`cmd/server/`) - **Graceful HTTP shutdown**: `httpServer.Shutdown(ctx)` with 15s context timeout — drains in-flight requests before closing - **WebSocket cleanup**: New `Hub.Close()` method sends `CloseGoingAway` frames to all connected clients - **DB close on shutdown**: Explicitly closes DB after HTTP server stops (was never closed before) - **WAL checkpoint**: `PRAGMA wal_checkpoint(TRUNCATE)` before DB close — flushes WAL to main DB file and removes WAL/SHM lock files ### Go Ingestor (`cmd/ingestor/`) - **WAL checkpoint on shutdown**: New `Store.Checkpoint()` method, called before `Close()` - **Longer MQTT disconnect timeout**: 5s (was 1s) to allow in-flight messages to drain ### Docker Compose (all 4 variants) - Added `stop_grace_period: 30s` and `stop_signal: SIGTERM` ### Supervisor Configs (both variants) - Added `stopsignal=TERM` and `stopwaitsecs=20` to server and ingestor programs ### Deploy Scripts - `deploy-staging.sh`: `docker stop -t 30` with explicit grace period - `deploy-live.sh`: `docker stop -t 30` with explicit grace period ## Shutdown Sequence (after fix) 1. Docker sends SIGTERM to supervisord (PID 1) 2. Supervisord forwards SIGTERM to server + ingestor (waits up to 20s each) 3. Server: stops poller → drains HTTP (15s) → closes WS clients → checkpoints WAL → closes DB 4. Ingestor: stops tickers → disconnects MQTT (5s) → checkpoints WAL → closes DB 5. Docker waits up to 30s total before SIGKILL ## Tests All existing tests pass: - `cd cmd/server && go test ./...` ✅ - `cd cmd/ingestor && go test ./...` ✅ --------- Co-authored-by: you <you@example.com> Co-authored-by: Kpa-clawbot <kpabap+clawdbot@gmail.com> |
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738d5fef39 |
fix: poller uses store max IDs to prevent replaying entire DB
When GetMaxTransmissionID() fails silently (e.g., corrupted DB returns 0 from COALESCE), the poller starts from ID 0 and replays the entire database over WebSocket — broadcasting thousands of old packets per second. Fix: after querying the DB, use the in-memory store's MaxTransmissionID and MaxObservationID as a floor. Since Load() already read the full DB successfully, the store has the correct max IDs. Root cause discovered on staging: DB corruption caused MAX(id) query to fail, returning 0. Poller log showed 'starting from transmission ID 0' followed by 1000-2000 broadcasts per tick walking through 76K rows. Also adds MaxObservationID() to PacketStore for observation cursor safety. Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com> |
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ab03b142f5 |
fix: per-observation WS broadcast for live view starburst — fixes #237
IngestNewFromDB now broadcasts one message per observation (not per transmission). IngestNewObservations also broadcasts late arrivals. Tests verify multi-observer packets produce multiple WS messages. Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com> |
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df63efa78d |
fix: poll new observations for existing transmissions (fixes #174)
The poller only queried WHERE t.id > sinceID, which missed new observations added to transmissions already in the store. The trace page was correct because it always queries the DB directly. Add IngestNewObservations() that polls observations by o.id watermark, adds them to existing StoreTx entries, re-picks best observation, and invalidates analytics caches. The Poller now tracks both lastTxID and lastObsID watermarks. Includes tests for v3, v2, dedup, best-path re-pick, and GetMaxObservationID. Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com> |
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f55a3454aa |
feat(go): replace map[string]interface{} with typed Go structs in route handlers
Phase 1: Create cmd/server/types.go with ~80 typed response structs
matching all proto definitions. Every API response shape is now a
compile-time checked struct.
Phase 2: Rewire all route handlers in routes.go to construct typed
structs instead of map[string]interface{} for response building:
- /api/stats -> StatsResponse
- /api/health -> HealthResponse
- /api/perf -> PerfResponse
- /api/config/* -> typed config responses
- /api/nodes/* -> NodeListResponse, NodeDetailResponse, etc.
- /api/packets/* -> PacketListResponse, PacketDetailResponse
- /api/analytics/* -> RFAnalyticsResponse, TopologyResponse, etc.
- /api/observers/* -> ObserverListResponse, ObserverResp
- /api/channels/* -> ChannelListResponse, ChannelMessagesResponse
- /api/traces/* -> TraceResponse
- /api/resolve-hops -> ResolveHopsResponse
- /api/iata-coords -> IataCoordsResponse (typed IataCoord)
- /api/audio-lab/buckets -> AudioLabBucketsResponse
- WebSocket broadcast -> WSMessage struct
- SlowQuery tracking -> SlowQuery struct (was map)
Phase 3 (partial): Add typed store/db methods:
- PacketStore.GetCacheStatsTyped() -> CacheStats
- PacketStore.GetPerfStoreStatsTyped() -> PerfPacketStoreStats
- DB.GetDBSizeStatsTyped() -> SqliteStats
Remaining map usage is in store/db data flow (PacketResult.Packets
still uses maps) — these will be addressed in a follow-up.
Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
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fc494962d1 |
fix(go): add broadcast diagnostic logging, rebuild fixes stale deployment
The Go staging packets page wasn't live-updating because the deployed binary was stale (built before the #162 fix). Rebuilding from current source fixed the issue — broadcasts now fire correctly. Added two permanent diagnostic log lines: - [poller] IngestNewFromDB: logs when new transmissions are found - [broadcast] sending N packets to M clients: logs each broadcast batch These log lines make it easy to verify the broadcast pipeline is working and would have caught this stale-deployment issue immediately. Verified on VM: WS clients receive packets with nested 'packet' field, all Go tests pass. Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com> |
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95afaf2f0d |
fix(go): add nested packet field to WS broadcast, fixes #162
The frontend packets.js filters WS messages with m.data?.packet and extracts m.data.packet for live rendering. Node's server.js includes a packet sub-object (packet: fullPacket) in the broadcast data, but Go's IngestNewFromDB built the data flat without a nested packet field. This caused the Go staging packets page to never live-update via WS even though messages were being sent — they were silently filtered out by packets.js. Fix: build the packet fields map separately, then create the broadcast map with both top-level fields (for live.js) and nested packet (for packets.js). Also fixes the fallback DB-direct poller path. Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com> |
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afe16db960 |
feat(go-server): in-memory packet store — port of packet-store.js
Streams transmissions + observations from SQLite at startup into 5 indexed in-memory structures. QueryPackets and QueryGroupedPackets now serve from RAM (<10ms) instead of hitting SQLite (2.3s). - store.go: PacketStore with byHash, byTxID, byObsID, byObserver, byNode indexes - main.go: create + load store at startup - routes.go: dispatch to store for packet/stats endpoints - websocket.go: poller ingests new transmissions into store Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com> |
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b2e6c8105b |
fix: handle WebSocket upgrade at root path (client connects to ws://host/)
Node.js upgrades WS at /, Go was only at /ws. Now the static file handler checks for Upgrade header first and routes to WebSocket. Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com> |
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742ed86596 |
feat: add Go web server (cmd/server/) — full API + WebSocket + static files
35+ REST endpoints matching Node.js server, WebSocket broadcast, static file serving with SPA fallback, config.json support. Uses modernc.org/sqlite (pure Go, no CGO required). Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com> |