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Part A of #2128: optional, off-by-default user accounts. With the feature off nothing changes; with it on, visitors can register and log in, and admins manage users and use the operator actions without the API key. PR #2130 (settings sync) builds on this one. The two are meant to be merged together. ## The situation - Operator actions (geofilter save and prune, backup, perf reset) need the shared `apiKey`. There is no per-person right. - Nothing in CoreScope knows who a visitor is, so the requests in #2128 that need that (#1835, #2092, #1508, #730) have nothing to build on. ## What this PR adds **Two new Go modules** - `internal/users`: a separate `users.db` (SQLite through `modernc.org/sqlite`) with users, sessions, single-use tokens, an audit log and a mail log. Passwords use argon2id. - `internal/mailer`: a `Mailer` interface with a Brevo client (send, delivery events, webhook parsing) and an in-memory fake for tests. **Server (`cmd/server`)**, active only with `userManagement.enabled` - 24 routes, all documented in OpenAPI under the `users` tag ([`auth_routes.go`](https://github.com/efiten/CoreScope/blob/feat/user-management/cmd/server/auth_routes.go)): - auth: register, activate, login, logout, me, forgot, reset; - account: profile, password, email change with confirmation, sessions, self-delete; - admin: list, detail, disable, enable, delete, role, resend activation, manual activation, mail status refresh; - a Brevo webhook, registered only when `mail.webhookSecret` is set. - `requireAdmin` replaces `requireAPIKey` at the 7 operator call sites: the API key **or** an admin session. With the feature off it is the old API-key gate (`TestRequireAdminWithoutUserManagementIsAPIKeyGate`). - `/api/config/client` gets `userManagement: {enabled: true}` only when the service started; with the feature off the response is byte-identical. **Frontend** - `auth.js` (header account control, request helper that adds the CSRF header), `account.js` (login, register, activate, forgot, reset, confirm email, my account), `admin-users.js` (`#/admin/users`, deep-linked filters), `account.css` (theme tokens only). - On phones the top-bar control is hidden, so a conditional entry goes into the bottom-nav "More" sheet and the nav drawer. - The customizer geofilter tab and the Perf "Reset stats" button use the admin session when there is one. **Config.** A `userManagement` block (`config.example.json`, [`docs/user-guide/accounts.md`](https://github.com/efiten/CoreScope/blob/feat/user-management/docs/user-guide/accounts.md)). The Brevo key can come from `CORESCOPE_BREVO_API_KEY`. The server refuses to start when the block is enabled but incomplete. ## Security choices - Session cookie `cs_session`: HttpOnly, SameSite=Lax, Secure when `publicBaseUrl` is https. Every cookie-authenticated state change needs the `X-CS-CSRF` header and a matching Origin. - Activation needs the token **and** the account password. Without the password, an attacker who keeps re-registering a known address could get the owner to activate an account that carries the attacker's password. - Register, forgot and email change answer identically for known and unknown addresses. A password reset ends all sessions, a password change ends all other sessions, and both end outstanding email-change links. - Rate limits: login 10 per 15 minutes, register and forgot 5 per hour, per IP and per address. The bucket count is capped. `trustedProxies` makes the per-IP limits see real client IPs behind a proxy. - Server logs carry `#<user id>`, never addresses, tokens or passwords; mail-provider error texts are redacted before logging. ## Performance No change to an existing hot path with the feature off. With it on: - One `users.db` lookup per authenticated request (session by token hash). - The admin user table rebuilds its `tbody` on each filter change. `users.List` caps the result at 1000 rows (`internal/users/users.go`), which bounds the rebuild. - `map[string]interface{}` in `openapi.go`: 79 before, 78 after. ## Verification - `internal/users`, `internal/mailer` and `cmd/server`: `go vet` and `go test -race` pass locally. 121 new Go tests. - `cmd/server` with `-tags e2etest`: vet and the e2e hook tests pass. - `sh test-all.sh` exits 0. `tests/unit/test-user-management-ui.js`: 67 passing (vm, real modules). - `tests/e2e/test-user-management-e2e.js` (6 steps) passed locally against an `e2etest` build with the fake mailer and against a feature-off build. CI builds the `e2etest` binary and runs the suite on a second server (`deploy.yml`). - On a staging instance with a real Brevo key: register, activation mail delivered, activate, admin table, "Refresh status" showing sent, deferred, delivered, opened and clicked. ## Not in this PR - Settings sync (#2130), the admin dashboard, approval flows and notifications (parts B to E of #2128). - A `requireReadAuth` mode (#1835). Sessions from this PR are what such a mode would accept. - Binary size and build time with `modernc.org/sqlite` linked next to `mattn/go-sqlite3` were not measured. Their driver names do not collide. #1992 discusses the driver choice. - No Brevo webhook was configured on staging; delivery status there came from "Refresh status". --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
284 lines
9.0 KiB
Go
284 lines
9.0 KiB
Go
package main
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import (
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"errors"
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"log"
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"net/http"
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"strconv"
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"time"
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"github.com/meshcore-analyzer/mailer"
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"github.com/meshcore-analyzer/users"
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)
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const (
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msgCheckMail = "If the address can receive mail, a message is on its way. Check your inbox."
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msgBadLogin = "incorrect email or password"
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msgMailFailed = "mail could not be sent, try again later"
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)
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func (s *Server) handleRegister(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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a := s.auth
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var req registerRequest
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if !decodeJSON(w, r, &req) {
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return
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}
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email, err := users.NormalizeEmail(req.Email)
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if writeValidation(w, err) {
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return
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}
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name, err := users.ValidateDisplayName(req.DisplayName)
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if writeValidation(w, err) {
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return
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}
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if writeValidation(w, users.ValidatePassword(req.Password)) {
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return
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}
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if !a.allow(w, r, a.signup, "email:"+email) {
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return
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}
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// Hash before the lookup so new and existing addresses cost the same.
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hash, err := users.HashPassword(req.Password)
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if err != nil {
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writeError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "internal error")
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return
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}
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if existing, err := a.st.GetByEmail(email); err == nil {
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// Identical response either way (no account enumeration).
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if existing.Status == users.StatusPending {
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// Newest registration wins: the account takes the password and
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// name of the latest request, and activation demands that
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// password, so a squatter cannot plant credentials and the owner
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// can recover a squatted address. Failures stay invisible to the
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// client (same response as every other branch).
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if err := a.st.SetPassword(existing.ID, hash); err != nil {
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log.Printf("[users] register: update pending user #%d: %v", existing.ID, err)
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} else if err := a.st.SetDisplayName(existing.ID, name); err != nil {
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log.Printf("[users] register: update pending user #%d: %v", existing.ID, err)
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} else {
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existing.DisplayName = name
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_ = a.mailToken(r.Context(), existing, users.PurposeActivate, 48*time.Hour, "", "activate",
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func(tok string) mailer.Message { return a.activationMail(existing, tok) })
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}
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} else {
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_ = a.sendMail(r.Context(), existing, "register-notice", a.registerNoticeMail(existing))
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}
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writeJSON(w, okResponse{OK: true, Message: msgCheckMail})
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return
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}
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u, err := a.st.CreatePending(email, name, hash)
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if errors.Is(err, users.ErrEmailTaken) { // lost a race with a concurrent register
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writeJSON(w, okResponse{OK: true, Message: msgCheckMail})
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return
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}
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if err != nil {
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writeError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "internal error")
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return
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}
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err = a.mailToken(r.Context(), u, users.PurposeActivate, 48*time.Hour, "", "activate",
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func(tok string) mailer.Message { return a.activationMail(u, tok) })
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if err != nil {
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if derr := a.st.Delete(u.ID); derr != nil {
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log.Printf("[users] rollback of user #%d failed: %v", u.ID, derr)
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}
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writeError(w, http.StatusServiceUnavailable, msgMailFailed)
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return
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}
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a.audit(nil, "user.register", idPtr(u.ID), nil)
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writeJSON(w, okResponse{OK: true, Message: msgCheckMail})
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}
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// handleActivate needs the token and the account password: a re-register
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// of a pending address replaces the password, so whoever clicks must prove
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// they know the newest one (a squatter's link cannot log the owner into an
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// account carrying the squatter's password).
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func (s *Server) handleActivate(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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a := s.auth
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var req activateRequest
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if !decodeJSON(w, r, &req) {
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return
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}
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uid, err := a.st.TokenUser(req.Token, users.PurposeActivate)
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if err != nil {
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writeTokenError(w, err)
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return
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}
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if !a.allow(w, r, a.login, "activate:#"+strconv.FormatInt(uid, 10)) {
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return
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}
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u, err := a.st.GetByID(uid)
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if err != nil && !errors.Is(err, users.ErrNotFound) {
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log.Printf("[users] activate: load user #%d: %v", uid, err)
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writeError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "internal error")
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return
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}
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if err != nil || u.Status != users.StatusPending {
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writeError(w, http.StatusGone, "this account is already activated, log in instead")
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return
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}
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ok, err := users.VerifyPassword(u.PasswordHash, req.Password)
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if err != nil {
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log.Printf("[users] activate: verify password for user #%d: %v", u.ID, err)
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writeError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "internal error")
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return
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}
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if !ok {
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writeError(w, http.StatusUnauthorized, "wrong password for this account")
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return
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}
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// Activate only on the hash that was just verified: a re-register in
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// between replaces it, and the newest password must be proven.
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switch err := a.st.ActivateWithToken(req.Token, u.ID, a.roleFor(u.Email), u.PasswordHash); {
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case err == nil:
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case errors.Is(err, users.ErrAccountChanged):
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writeError(w, http.StatusConflict, "account changed, try again")
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return
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case errors.Is(err, users.ErrTokenInvalid), errors.Is(err, users.ErrTokenExpired):
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writeTokenError(w, err)
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return
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default:
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log.Printf("[users] activate user #%d: %v", u.ID, err)
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writeError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "internal error")
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return
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}
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a.audit(nil, "user.activate", idPtr(u.ID), nil)
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if u, err = a.st.GetByID(u.ID); err != nil {
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writeError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "internal error")
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return
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}
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a.startSession(w, r, u)
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}
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// startSession creates a session, sets the cookie and answers with /me.
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func (a *authService) startSession(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, u *users.User) {
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raw, sess, err := a.st.CreateSession(u.ID, a.set.sessionTTL, r.UserAgent())
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if err != nil {
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writeError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "internal error")
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return
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}
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_ = a.st.TouchLogin(u.ID)
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a.setSessionCookie(w, raw, sess.ExpiresAt)
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writeJSON(w, meFrom(u, sess))
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}
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func (s *Server) handleLogin(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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a := s.auth
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var req loginRequest
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if !decodeJSON(w, r, &req) {
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return
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}
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email, emailErr := users.NormalizeEmail(req.Email)
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key := "email:" + email
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if emailErr != nil {
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key = "email:invalid"
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}
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if !a.allow(w, r, a.login, key) {
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return
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}
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var u *users.User
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if emailErr == nil {
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u, _ = a.st.GetByEmail(email)
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}
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if u == nil {
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users.BurnPasswordCheck(req.Password)
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writeError(w, http.StatusUnauthorized, msgBadLogin)
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return
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}
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ok, err := users.VerifyPassword(u.PasswordHash, req.Password)
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if err != nil || !ok || u.Status != users.StatusActive {
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writeError(w, http.StatusUnauthorized, msgBadLogin)
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return
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}
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// Config wins: an address in adminEmails is always admin.
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if a.isConfigAdmin(u.Email) && u.Role != users.RoleAdmin {
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if err := a.st.SetRole(u.ID, users.RoleAdmin); err == nil {
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u.Role = users.RoleAdmin
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a.audit(nil, "user.role.config", idPtr(u.ID), map[string]string{"role": "admin"})
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}
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}
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a.startSession(w, r, u)
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}
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func (s *Server) handleLogout(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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if c, err := r.Cookie(sessionCookieName); err == nil && c.Value != "" {
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_ = s.auth.st.DeleteSessionByToken(c.Value)
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}
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s.auth.clearSessionCookie(w)
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writeJSON(w, okResponse{OK: true})
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}
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func (s *Server) handleMe(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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u, sess := s.auth.currentUser(w, r)
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if u == nil {
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writeError(w, http.StatusUnauthorized, "not logged in")
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return
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}
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writeJSON(w, meFrom(u, sess))
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}
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func (s *Server) handleForgot(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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a := s.auth
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var req emailRequest
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if !decodeJSON(w, r, &req) {
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return
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}
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email, err := users.NormalizeEmail(req.Email)
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if err != nil {
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writeJSON(w, okResponse{OK: true, Message: msgCheckMail})
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return
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}
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if !a.allow(w, r, a.signup, "email:"+email) {
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return
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}
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u, err := a.st.GetByEmail(email)
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if err != nil || u.Status != users.StatusActive {
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writeJSON(w, okResponse{OK: true, Message: msgCheckMail})
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return
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}
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err = a.mailToken(r.Context(), u, users.PurposeReset, time.Hour, "", "reset",
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func(tok string) mailer.Message { return a.resetMail(u, tok) })
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if err != nil {
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writeError(w, http.StatusServiceUnavailable, msgMailFailed)
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return
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}
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writeJSON(w, okResponse{OK: true, Message: msgCheckMail})
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}
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func (s *Server) handleReset(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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a := s.auth
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var req resetRequest
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if !decodeJSON(w, r, &req) {
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return
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}
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if writeValidation(w, users.ValidatePassword(req.Password)) {
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return
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}
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uid, _, err := a.st.ConsumeToken(req.Token, users.PurposeReset)
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if err != nil {
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writeTokenError(w, err)
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return
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}
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hash, err := users.HashPassword(req.Password)
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if err == nil {
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err = a.st.SetPassword(uid, hash)
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}
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if err != nil {
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writeError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "internal error")
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return
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}
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// Sessions first: a token-store failure below must not leave an
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// attacker's session alive.
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if err := a.st.DeleteUserSessions(uid, 0); err != nil {
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log.Printf("[users] reset: end sessions for user #%d: %v", uid, err)
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writeError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "internal error")
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return
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}
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// A pending email change must not survive the owner's recovery.
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if err := a.invalidateTokens("reset", uid, users.PurposeEmailChange); err != nil {
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writeError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "internal error")
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return
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}
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a.audit(idPtr(uid), "user.password.reset", idPtr(uid), nil)
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writeJSON(w, okResponse{OK: true, Message: "Password changed. Log in with your new password."})
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}
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