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Part A of #2128: optional, off-by-default user accounts. With the feature off nothing changes; with it on, visitors can register and log in, and admins manage users and use the operator actions without the API key. PR #2130 (settings sync) builds on this one. The two are meant to be merged together. ## The situation - Operator actions (geofilter save and prune, backup, perf reset) need the shared `apiKey`. There is no per-person right. - Nothing in CoreScope knows who a visitor is, so the requests in #2128 that need that (#1835, #2092, #1508, #730) have nothing to build on. ## What this PR adds **Two new Go modules** - `internal/users`: a separate `users.db` (SQLite through `modernc.org/sqlite`) with users, sessions, single-use tokens, an audit log and a mail log. Passwords use argon2id. - `internal/mailer`: a `Mailer` interface with a Brevo client (send, delivery events, webhook parsing) and an in-memory fake for tests. **Server (`cmd/server`)**, active only with `userManagement.enabled` - 24 routes, all documented in OpenAPI under the `users` tag ([`auth_routes.go`](https://github.com/efiten/CoreScope/blob/feat/user-management/cmd/server/auth_routes.go)): - auth: register, activate, login, logout, me, forgot, reset; - account: profile, password, email change with confirmation, sessions, self-delete; - admin: list, detail, disable, enable, delete, role, resend activation, manual activation, mail status refresh; - a Brevo webhook, registered only when `mail.webhookSecret` is set. - `requireAdmin` replaces `requireAPIKey` at the 7 operator call sites: the API key **or** an admin session. With the feature off it is the old API-key gate (`TestRequireAdminWithoutUserManagementIsAPIKeyGate`). - `/api/config/client` gets `userManagement: {enabled: true}` only when the service started; with the feature off the response is byte-identical. **Frontend** - `auth.js` (header account control, request helper that adds the CSRF header), `account.js` (login, register, activate, forgot, reset, confirm email, my account), `admin-users.js` (`#/admin/users`, deep-linked filters), `account.css` (theme tokens only). - On phones the top-bar control is hidden, so a conditional entry goes into the bottom-nav "More" sheet and the nav drawer. - The customizer geofilter tab and the Perf "Reset stats" button use the admin session when there is one. **Config.** A `userManagement` block (`config.example.json`, [`docs/user-guide/accounts.md`](https://github.com/efiten/CoreScope/blob/feat/user-management/docs/user-guide/accounts.md)). The Brevo key can come from `CORESCOPE_BREVO_API_KEY`. The server refuses to start when the block is enabled but incomplete. ## Security choices - Session cookie `cs_session`: HttpOnly, SameSite=Lax, Secure when `publicBaseUrl` is https. Every cookie-authenticated state change needs the `X-CS-CSRF` header and a matching Origin. - Activation needs the token **and** the account password. Without the password, an attacker who keeps re-registering a known address could get the owner to activate an account that carries the attacker's password. - Register, forgot and email change answer identically for known and unknown addresses. A password reset ends all sessions, a password change ends all other sessions, and both end outstanding email-change links. - Rate limits: login 10 per 15 minutes, register and forgot 5 per hour, per IP and per address. The bucket count is capped. `trustedProxies` makes the per-IP limits see real client IPs behind a proxy. - Server logs carry `#<user id>`, never addresses, tokens or passwords; mail-provider error texts are redacted before logging. ## Performance No change to an existing hot path with the feature off. With it on: - One `users.db` lookup per authenticated request (session by token hash). - The admin user table rebuilds its `tbody` on each filter change. `users.List` caps the result at 1000 rows (`internal/users/users.go`), which bounds the rebuild. - `map[string]interface{}` in `openapi.go`: 79 before, 78 after. ## Verification - `internal/users`, `internal/mailer` and `cmd/server`: `go vet` and `go test -race` pass locally. 121 new Go tests. - `cmd/server` with `-tags e2etest`: vet and the e2e hook tests pass. - `sh test-all.sh` exits 0. `tests/unit/test-user-management-ui.js`: 67 passing (vm, real modules). - `tests/e2e/test-user-management-e2e.js` (6 steps) passed locally against an `e2etest` build with the fake mailer and against a feature-off build. CI builds the `e2etest` binary and runs the suite on a second server (`deploy.yml`). - On a staging instance with a real Brevo key: register, activation mail delivered, activate, admin table, "Refresh status" showing sent, deferred, delivered, opened and clicked. ## Not in this PR - Settings sync (#2130), the admin dashboard, approval flows and notifications (parts B to E of #2128). - A `requireReadAuth` mode (#1835). Sessions from this PR are what such a mode would accept. - Binary size and build time with `modernc.org/sqlite` linked next to `mattn/go-sqlite3` were not measured. Their driver names do not collide. #1992 discusses the driver choice. - No Brevo webhook was configured on staging; delivery status there came from "Refresh status". --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
128 lines
3.9 KiB
Go
128 lines
3.9 KiB
Go
package users
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import (
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"database/sql"
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"errors"
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"fmt"
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"strings"
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"time"
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)
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// Session is one logged-in device. The raw token exists only in the cookie.
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type Session struct {
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ID int64
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UserID int64
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CSRFToken string
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CreatedAt time.Time
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ExpiresAt time.Time
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LastSeenAt time.Time
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UserAgent string
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}
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const maxUserAgent = 200
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const sessionCols = `id, user_id, csrf_token, created_at, expires_at, last_seen_at, user_agent`
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func scanSession(row rowScanner) (*Session, error) {
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var s Session
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var created, expires, seen int64
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if err := row.Scan(&s.ID, &s.UserID, &s.CSRFToken, &created, &expires, &seen, &s.UserAgent); err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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s.CreatedAt, s.ExpiresAt, s.LastSeenAt = fromUnix(created), fromUnix(expires), fromUnix(seen)
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return &s, nil
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}
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// CreateSession starts a session and returns the raw cookie token.
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func (s *Store) CreateSession(userID int64, ttl time.Duration, userAgent string) (string, *Session, error) {
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raw, hash, err := NewToken()
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if err != nil {
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return "", nil, err
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}
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csrf, _, err := NewToken()
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if err != nil {
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return "", nil, err
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}
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if len(userAgent) > maxUserAgent {
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userAgent = strings.ToValidUTF8(userAgent[:maxUserAgent], "")
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}
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now := s.now()
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res, err := s.db.Exec(`INSERT INTO sessions (token_hash, user_id, csrf_token, created_at, expires_at, last_seen_at, user_agent)
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VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?)`, hash, userID, csrf, unix(now), unix(now.Add(ttl)), unix(now), userAgent)
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if err != nil {
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return "", nil, err
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}
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id, err := res.LastInsertId()
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if err != nil {
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return "", nil, err
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}
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return raw, &Session{ID: id, UserID: userID, CSRFToken: csrf, CreatedAt: fromUnix(unix(now)),
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ExpiresAt: fromUnix(unix(now.Add(ttl))), LastSeenAt: fromUnix(unix(now)), UserAgent: userAgent}, nil
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}
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// LookupSession resolves a raw cookie token. Unknown and expired sessions
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// return ErrNotFound; expired ones are deleted on the way.
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func (s *Store) LookupSession(raw string) (*Session, error) {
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sess, err := scanSession(s.db.QueryRow(`SELECT `+sessionCols+` FROM sessions WHERE token_hash = ?`, HashToken(raw)))
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if errors.Is(err, sql.ErrNoRows) {
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return nil, ErrNotFound
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}
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if err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("users: lookup session: %w", err)
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}
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if !s.now().Before(sess.ExpiresAt) {
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_, _ = s.db.Exec(`DELETE FROM sessions WHERE id = ?`, sess.ID)
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return nil, ErrNotFound
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}
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return sess, nil
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}
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// ExtendSession marks the session seen now and moves its expiry to now+ttl.
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func (s *Store) ExtendSession(id int64, ttl time.Duration) error {
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now := s.now()
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return expectOne(s.db.Exec(`UPDATE sessions SET last_seen_at = ?, expires_at = ? WHERE id = ?`,
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unix(now), unix(now.Add(ttl)), id))
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}
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func (s *Store) DeleteSessionByToken(raw string) error {
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_, err := s.db.Exec(`DELETE FROM sessions WHERE token_hash = ?`, HashToken(raw))
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return err
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}
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// DeleteSession revokes one session, only if it belongs to userID.
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func (s *Store) DeleteSession(userID, sessionID int64) error {
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return expectOne(s.db.Exec(`DELETE FROM sessions WHERE id = ? AND user_id = ?`, sessionID, userID))
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}
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// DeleteUserSessions revokes all of a user's sessions except exceptID (0 = none kept).
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func (s *Store) DeleteUserSessions(userID, exceptID int64) error {
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_, err := s.db.Exec(`DELETE FROM sessions WHERE user_id = ? AND id != ?`, userID, exceptID)
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return err
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}
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// ListSessions returns a user's sessions, most recently seen first.
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func (s *Store) ListSessions(userID int64) ([]Session, error) {
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rows, err := s.db.Query(`SELECT `+sessionCols+` FROM sessions WHERE user_id = ? ORDER BY last_seen_at DESC, id DESC`, userID)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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defer rows.Close()
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var out []Session
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for rows.Next() {
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sess, err := scanSession(rows)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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out = append(out, *sess)
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}
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return out, rows.Err()
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}
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func (s *Store) PruneExpiredSessions() (int64, error) {
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res, err := s.db.Exec(`DELETE FROM sessions WHERE expires_at <= ?`, unix(s.now()))
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if err != nil {
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return 0, err
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}
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return res.RowsAffected()
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}
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