Files
meshcore-analyzer/internal/users/sessions.go
T
efitenandClaude Opus 5.5 d232072f85 feat: optional user accounts (part A: foundation) (#2129)
Part A of #2128: optional, off-by-default user accounts. With the
feature off nothing changes; with it on, visitors can register and log
in, and admins manage users and use the operator actions without the API
key.

PR #2130 (settings sync) builds on this one. The two are meant to be
merged together.

## The situation

- Operator actions (geofilter save and prune, backup, perf reset) need
the shared `apiKey`. There is no per-person right.
- Nothing in CoreScope knows who a visitor is, so the requests in #2128
that need that (#1835, #2092, #1508, #730) have nothing to build on.

## What this PR adds

**Two new Go modules**
- `internal/users`: a separate `users.db` (SQLite through
`modernc.org/sqlite`) with users, sessions, single-use tokens, an audit
log and a mail log. Passwords use argon2id.
- `internal/mailer`: a `Mailer` interface with a Brevo client (send,
delivery events, webhook parsing) and an in-memory fake for tests.

**Server (`cmd/server`)**, active only with `userManagement.enabled`
- 24 routes, all documented in OpenAPI under the `users` tag
([`auth_routes.go`](https://github.com/efiten/CoreScope/blob/feat/user-management/cmd/server/auth_routes.go)):
  - auth: register, activate, login, logout, me, forgot, reset;
- account: profile, password, email change with confirmation, sessions,
self-delete;
- admin: list, detail, disable, enable, delete, role, resend activation,
manual activation, mail status refresh;
  - a Brevo webhook, registered only when `mail.webhookSecret` is set.
- `requireAdmin` replaces `requireAPIKey` at the 7 operator call sites:
the API key **or** an admin session. With the feature off it is the old
API-key gate (`TestRequireAdminWithoutUserManagementIsAPIKeyGate`).
- `/api/config/client` gets `userManagement: {enabled: true}` only when
the service started; with the feature off the response is
byte-identical.

**Frontend**
- `auth.js` (header account control, request helper that adds the CSRF
header), `account.js` (login, register, activate, forgot, reset, confirm
email, my account), `admin-users.js` (`#/admin/users`, deep-linked
filters), `account.css` (theme tokens only).
- On phones the top-bar control is hidden, so a conditional entry goes
into the bottom-nav "More" sheet and the nav drawer.
- The customizer geofilter tab and the Perf "Reset stats" button use the
admin session when there is one.

**Config.** A `userManagement` block (`config.example.json`,
[`docs/user-guide/accounts.md`](https://github.com/efiten/CoreScope/blob/feat/user-management/docs/user-guide/accounts.md)).
The Brevo key can come from `CORESCOPE_BREVO_API_KEY`. The server
refuses to start when the block is enabled but incomplete.

## Security choices

- Session cookie `cs_session`: HttpOnly, SameSite=Lax, Secure when
`publicBaseUrl` is https. Every cookie-authenticated state change needs
the `X-CS-CSRF` header and a matching Origin.
- Activation needs the token **and** the account password. Without the
password, an attacker who keeps re-registering a known address could get
the owner to activate an account that carries the attacker's password.
- Register, forgot and email change answer identically for known and
unknown addresses. A password reset ends all sessions, a password change
ends all other sessions, and both end outstanding email-change links.
- Rate limits: login 10 per 15 minutes, register and forgot 5 per hour,
per IP and per address. The bucket count is capped. `trustedProxies`
makes the per-IP limits see real client IPs behind a proxy.
- Server logs carry `#<user id>`, never addresses, tokens or passwords;
mail-provider error texts are redacted before logging.

## Performance

No change to an existing hot path with the feature off. With it on:
- One `users.db` lookup per authenticated request (session by token
hash).
- The admin user table rebuilds its `tbody` on each filter change.
`users.List` caps the result at 1000 rows (`internal/users/users.go`),
which bounds the rebuild.
- `map[string]interface{}` in `openapi.go`: 79 before, 78 after.

## Verification

- `internal/users`, `internal/mailer` and `cmd/server`: `go vet` and `go
test -race` pass locally. 121 new Go tests.
- `cmd/server` with `-tags e2etest`: vet and the e2e hook tests pass.
- `sh test-all.sh` exits 0. `tests/unit/test-user-management-ui.js`: 67
passing (vm, real modules).
- `tests/e2e/test-user-management-e2e.js` (6 steps) passed locally
against an `e2etest` build with the fake mailer and against a
feature-off build. CI builds the `e2etest` binary and runs the suite on
a second server (`deploy.yml`).
- On a staging instance with a real Brevo key: register, activation mail
delivered, activate, admin table, "Refresh status" showing sent,
deferred, delivered, opened and clicked.

## Not in this PR

- Settings sync (#2130), the admin dashboard, approval flows and
notifications (parts B to E of #2128).
- A `requireReadAuth` mode (#1835). Sessions from this PR are what such
a mode would accept.
- Binary size and build time with `modernc.org/sqlite` linked next to
`mattn/go-sqlite3` were not measured. Their driver names do not collide.
#1992 discusses the driver choice.
- No Brevo webhook was configured on staging; delivery status there came
from "Refresh status".

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-07 09:25:29 +02:00

128 lines
3.9 KiB
Go

package users
import (
"database/sql"
"errors"
"fmt"
"strings"
"time"
)
// Session is one logged-in device. The raw token exists only in the cookie.
type Session struct {
ID int64
UserID int64
CSRFToken string
CreatedAt time.Time
ExpiresAt time.Time
LastSeenAt time.Time
UserAgent string
}
const maxUserAgent = 200
const sessionCols = `id, user_id, csrf_token, created_at, expires_at, last_seen_at, user_agent`
func scanSession(row rowScanner) (*Session, error) {
var s Session
var created, expires, seen int64
if err := row.Scan(&s.ID, &s.UserID, &s.CSRFToken, &created, &expires, &seen, &s.UserAgent); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
s.CreatedAt, s.ExpiresAt, s.LastSeenAt = fromUnix(created), fromUnix(expires), fromUnix(seen)
return &s, nil
}
// CreateSession starts a session and returns the raw cookie token.
func (s *Store) CreateSession(userID int64, ttl time.Duration, userAgent string) (string, *Session, error) {
raw, hash, err := NewToken()
if err != nil {
return "", nil, err
}
csrf, _, err := NewToken()
if err != nil {
return "", nil, err
}
if len(userAgent) > maxUserAgent {
userAgent = strings.ToValidUTF8(userAgent[:maxUserAgent], "")
}
now := s.now()
res, err := s.db.Exec(`INSERT INTO sessions (token_hash, user_id, csrf_token, created_at, expires_at, last_seen_at, user_agent)
VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?)`, hash, userID, csrf, unix(now), unix(now.Add(ttl)), unix(now), userAgent)
if err != nil {
return "", nil, err
}
id, err := res.LastInsertId()
if err != nil {
return "", nil, err
}
return raw, &Session{ID: id, UserID: userID, CSRFToken: csrf, CreatedAt: fromUnix(unix(now)),
ExpiresAt: fromUnix(unix(now.Add(ttl))), LastSeenAt: fromUnix(unix(now)), UserAgent: userAgent}, nil
}
// LookupSession resolves a raw cookie token. Unknown and expired sessions
// return ErrNotFound; expired ones are deleted on the way.
func (s *Store) LookupSession(raw string) (*Session, error) {
sess, err := scanSession(s.db.QueryRow(`SELECT `+sessionCols+` FROM sessions WHERE token_hash = ?`, HashToken(raw)))
if errors.Is(err, sql.ErrNoRows) {
return nil, ErrNotFound
}
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("users: lookup session: %w", err)
}
if !s.now().Before(sess.ExpiresAt) {
_, _ = s.db.Exec(`DELETE FROM sessions WHERE id = ?`, sess.ID)
return nil, ErrNotFound
}
return sess, nil
}
// ExtendSession marks the session seen now and moves its expiry to now+ttl.
func (s *Store) ExtendSession(id int64, ttl time.Duration) error {
now := s.now()
return expectOne(s.db.Exec(`UPDATE sessions SET last_seen_at = ?, expires_at = ? WHERE id = ?`,
unix(now), unix(now.Add(ttl)), id))
}
func (s *Store) DeleteSessionByToken(raw string) error {
_, err := s.db.Exec(`DELETE FROM sessions WHERE token_hash = ?`, HashToken(raw))
return err
}
// DeleteSession revokes one session, only if it belongs to userID.
func (s *Store) DeleteSession(userID, sessionID int64) error {
return expectOne(s.db.Exec(`DELETE FROM sessions WHERE id = ? AND user_id = ?`, sessionID, userID))
}
// DeleteUserSessions revokes all of a user's sessions except exceptID (0 = none kept).
func (s *Store) DeleteUserSessions(userID, exceptID int64) error {
_, err := s.db.Exec(`DELETE FROM sessions WHERE user_id = ? AND id != ?`, userID, exceptID)
return err
}
// ListSessions returns a user's sessions, most recently seen first.
func (s *Store) ListSessions(userID int64) ([]Session, error) {
rows, err := s.db.Query(`SELECT `+sessionCols+` FROM sessions WHERE user_id = ? ORDER BY last_seen_at DESC, id DESC`, userID)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
defer rows.Close()
var out []Session
for rows.Next() {
sess, err := scanSession(rows)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
out = append(out, *sess)
}
return out, rows.Err()
}
func (s *Store) PruneExpiredSessions() (int64, error) {
res, err := s.db.Exec(`DELETE FROM sessions WHERE expires_at <= ?`, unix(s.now()))
if err != nil {
return 0, err
}
return res.RowsAffected()
}