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Part 2 of 3 for #2173 (companion linking): the server routes, bearer auth and the link handshake. Builds on #2174 (merged); `upstream/master` is merged in, so the diff shows only this part. Everything here is behind `userManagement.enabled` and answers 404 with it off. ## Changes in this PR **Device tokens and bearer auth** - `POST /api/auth/device-token`: email + password returns a bearer token, stored as a `kind = 'device'` session with a label. Same failure answers and the same rate limit as login. - Server-enforced scope for a bearer token: `/api/auth/me`, `/api/auth/logout`, `/api/account/companions*`, `/api/account/settings`. Everything else answers 403. - A bearer header only counts when there is no session cookie, so an auth proxy that adds its own `Authorization` header does not hide a logged-in browser. Cookies never accept a device token. - The sessions list on the account API carries `kind` and `label`; logout with a bearer token revokes that device. **Linking a companion** - `POST /api/account/companions/challenge` `{pubkey}` returns `{challenge, expiresAt, host}`: 32 random bytes, single use, 5 minutes, bound to the caller and the pubkey. - `POST /api/account/companions` `{pubkey, challenge, signature, name}`: the signature is the companion's Ed25519 signature over `corescope-link:<host>:<challenge>` (`internal/sigvalidate.VerifyMessage`). The challenge is consumed in every case. - A companion linked to another account moves to the caller (the newest proof wins). Both users get a `companion.transfer` audit row and the previous owner a mail. That mail is a security notice: it is sent whatever the node notification settings are. - `GET /api/account/companions` (with `lastSeenAt` from `client_receptions`) and `DELETE /api/account/companions/{pubkey}`. - Linking does not touch the synced `meshcore-my-nodes`: a companion is not a node to monitor. - Admin user detail lists linked companions; the account data export includes companions and device sessions. **Coverage and config** - `GET /api/rx-coverage?mine=1`: only coverage of the caller's linked companions (401 when logged out, 403 for a device token). With `gaps=1` (#2172) the reply carries no `gaps` member under `mine=1`, because the track query takes one companion and cannot narrow to a set yet (`TestRxCoverageMineOmitsGaps`). - `clientRxCoverage.requireLinkedCompanion` (default off) is read and reported in `/api/config/client`, which also announces `userManagement.companionLinking`, so CoreDrive RX shows its login only where linking exists. The ingestor side is part 3. - CORS: for origins in `corsAllowedOrigins`, the device-token routes alone also allow POST/PUT/DELETE and the `Authorization` and `Content-Type` headers. No credentialed CORS. Documented in `config.example.json`. - OpenAPI and `docs/api-spec.md` cover the new routes. ## Verification - 26 new tests in `cmd/server` and `internal/sigvalidate`, among them: `TestCompanionLinkFlow`, `TestCompanionLinkRejections` (signature by another key, malformed signature, challenge bound to another pubkey, unknown challenge; reuse and expiry are covered by the store tests in #2174), `TestCompanionTransfer`, `TestCompanionTransferMailIgnoresNotificationSettings`, `TestBearerScopedRoutes`, `TestBearerIgnoredWithCookie`, `TestDeviceTokenSharesLoginRateLimit`, `TestCORSBearerRoutes`, `TestCompanionRoutesAbsentWhenOff`, `TestRxCoverageMine`, `TestRxCoverageMineOmitsGaps` (fails without the `mine == nil` guard), `TestVerifyMessage`. - `cmd/server`, `internal/sigvalidate` and `internal/users`: `go vet` and `go test ./...` green, `gofmt` clean. - The linking flow runs on analyzer.on8ar.eu since 9 October 2026 with CoreDrive RX v1.19.0 (a real companion linked through the signed challenge). ## Not in this PR - The ingestor's linked-only filter, the account page (Devices, Companions), the "My coverage" toggle and the user docs: part 3. - Per-user broker credentials and per-user API keys (non-goals in the spec). --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
259 lines
7.9 KiB
Go
259 lines
7.9 KiB
Go
package main
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import (
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"log"
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"os"
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"path/filepath"
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"sync"
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"sync/atomic"
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"time"
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"github.com/meshcore-analyzer/mailer"
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"github.com/meshcore-analyzer/users"
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)
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// authService is the optional user-management layer. Server.auth is nil
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// unless userManagement.enabled, and nothing in this file runs then.
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type authService struct {
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st *users.Store
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mail mailer.Mailer
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set *userMgmtSettings
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ipr *wsLimiter // only its clientIP rule is used
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login *rateLimiter
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signup *rateLimiter // register, forgot, self-service resend
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hook *rateLimiter
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settingsPut *rateLimiter // PUT /api/account/settings, per user
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companion *rateLimiter // companion challenge + link, per IP and per user
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// approved is the snapshot of approved hashtag channel names, filled at
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// construction and reloaded from users.db after every proposal decision.
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// approvedMu serialises the reloads so an older read never replaces a
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// newer one.
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approvedMu sync.Mutex
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approved atomic.Pointer[[]string]
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// notify evaluates node notifications; nil unless
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// userManagement.notifications.enabled.
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notify *notifier
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warnIndistinct sync.Once
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stop chan struct{}
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stopOnce sync.Once
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wg sync.WaitGroup // the janitor and the notifier
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auditWG sync.WaitGroup // in-flight auditAsync writes
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}
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func newAuthService(set *userMgmtSettings, st *users.Store, m mailer.Mailer) *authService {
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a := &authService{
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st: st, mail: m, set: set,
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ipr: &wsLimiter{trustedProxies: set.trustedProxies},
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login: newRateLimiter(10, 15*time.Minute),
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signup: newRateLimiter(5, time.Hour),
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hook: newRateLimiter(600, time.Minute),
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settingsPut: newRateLimiter(60, time.Hour),
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companion: newRateLimiter(60, time.Hour),
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stop: make(chan struct{}),
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}
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a.refreshApproved()
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return a
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}
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// initUserManagement builds s.auth when the feature is on. Call it after
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// NewServer and before RegisterRoutes. measurementDBPath is passed to
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// users.Open as a forbidden path, so users.db can never be the analyzer DB.
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func (s *Server) initUserManagement(measurementDBPath string) error {
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if !s.cfg.UserManagementEnabled() {
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if s.cfg.ClientRxRequireLinkedCompanionSet() {
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log.Printf("[users] clientRxCoverage.requireLinkedCompanion is set but userManagement is off: the setting is ignored")
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}
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return nil
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}
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set, err := resolveUserManagement(s.cfg.UserManagement, measurementDBPath, os.Getenv)
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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st, err := users.Open(set.dbPath, measurementDBPath)
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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var m mailer.Mailer
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if set.provider == "fake" {
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m = &mailer.Fake{}
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} else {
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m = mailer.NewBrevo(set.brevoAPIKey, set.fromEmail, set.fromName)
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}
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s.auth = newAuthService(set, st, m)
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s.auth.logStartup()
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s.auth.wg.Add(1)
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go func() {
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defer s.auth.wg.Done()
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s.auth.janitor(time.Hour)
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}()
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if set.notify.enabled {
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s.auth.notify = newNotifier(s.auth, serverNotifySource{s: s}, time.Now)
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s.auth.wg.Add(1)
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go func() {
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defer s.auth.wg.Done()
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s.auth.notify.loop(s.auth.stop, set.notify.interval)
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}()
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log.Printf("[notify] node notifications enabled: every %s, at most %d mails per user and %d in total per 24 hours",
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set.notify.interval, set.notify.perUserPerDay, set.notify.maxMailsPerDay)
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}
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return nil
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}
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// closeUserManagement stops the janitor and closes users.db. Safe when off.
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func (s *Server) closeUserManagement() {
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if s.auth == nil {
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return
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}
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s.auth.stopOnce.Do(func() {
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close(s.auth.stop)
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s.auth.wg.Wait()
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s.auth.waitAudits()
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if err := s.auth.st.Close(); err != nil {
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log.Printf("[users] close: %v", err)
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}
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})
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}
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func (a *authService) logStartup() {
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log.Printf("[users] user management enabled: db=%s, %d config admin(s), webhook=%v",
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absForLog(a.set.dbPath), len(a.set.adminEmails), a.set.webhookSecret != "")
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admins, err := a.st.List(users.ListFilter{Role: users.RoleAdmin})
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if err != nil {
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log.Printf("[users] list admins: %v", err)
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return
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}
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for _, u := range admins {
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if !a.isConfigAdmin(u.Email) {
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log.Printf("[users] note: admin #%d is not in adminEmails (promoted in the UI, or removed from config)", u.ID)
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}
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}
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}
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func (a *authService) janitor(every time.Duration) {
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t := time.NewTicker(every)
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defer t.Stop()
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for {
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a.prune()
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a.maybeBackup(time.Now())
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select {
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case <-a.stop:
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return
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case <-t.C:
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}
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}
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}
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func (a *authService) prune() {
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if _, err := a.st.PruneStalePending(48 * time.Hour); err != nil {
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log.Printf("[users] prune pending: %v", err)
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}
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if _, err := a.st.PruneExpiredSessions(); err != nil {
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log.Printf("[users] prune sessions: %v", err)
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}
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if _, err := a.st.PruneLinkChallenges(); err != nil {
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log.Printf("[users] prune link challenges: %v", err)
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}
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if _, err := a.st.PruneTokens(7 * 24 * time.Hour); err != nil {
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log.Printf("[users] prune tokens: %v", err)
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}
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if _, err := a.st.PruneMail(90 * 24 * time.Hour); err != nil {
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log.Printf("[users] prune mail log: %v", err)
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}
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// Login rows only; every other audit action is kept (admin-dashboard spec).
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if _, err := a.st.PruneAudit([]string{"user.login", "user.login.failed"}, 90*24*time.Hour); err != nil {
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log.Printf("[users] prune login audit: %v", err)
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}
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if _, err := a.st.PruneProposals(proposalRetention); err != nil {
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log.Printf("[users] prune proposals: %v", err)
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}
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a.login.gc()
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a.signup.gc()
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a.hook.gc()
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a.settingsPut.gc()
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a.companion.gc()
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}
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func (a *authService) isConfigAdmin(email string) bool { return a.set.adminEmails[email] }
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// refreshApproved reloads the approved hashtag channel names from users.db,
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// oldest approval first and capped at maxApproved like the ingestor. The
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// mutex spans the read and the store, so concurrent decisions cannot leave
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// an older read in place. A failure is logged and keeps the previous
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// snapshot. No-op with proposals off.
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func (a *authService) refreshApproved() {
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if !a.set.proposals.enabled {
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return
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}
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a.approvedMu.Lock()
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defer a.approvedMu.Unlock()
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list, err := a.st.ApprovedSubjects(users.KindHashtagChannel, a.set.proposals.maxApproved)
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if err != nil {
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log.Printf("[users] load approved channels: %v", err)
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return
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}
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a.approved.Store(&list)
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}
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// approvedChannels returns the current snapshot; never nil.
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func (a *authService) approvedChannels() []string {
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if p := a.approved.Load(); p != nil {
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return *p
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}
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return []string{}
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}
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// roleFor is the role an address gets on activation.
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func (a *authService) roleFor(email string) users.Role {
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if a.isConfigAdmin(email) {
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return users.RoleAdmin
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}
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return users.RoleUser
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}
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func (a *authService) audit(actor *int64, action string, target *int64, detail map[string]string) {
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if err := a.st.Audit(actor, action, target, detail); err != nil {
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log.Printf("[users] audit %s: %v", action, err)
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}
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}
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// auditAsync writes an audit row in the background, so neither the write
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// nor a locked users.db delays the response. Best-effort: a failure is
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// logged by a.audit, and a row is lost if the process stops first.
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func (a *authService) auditAsync(actor *int64, action string, target *int64, detail map[string]string) {
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a.auditWG.Add(1)
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go func() {
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defer a.auditWG.Done()
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a.audit(actor, action, target, detail)
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}()
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}
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// waitAudits blocks until every auditAsync write has finished.
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func (a *authService) waitAudits() { a.auditWG.Wait() }
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func idPtr(id int64) *int64 { return &id }
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// invalidateTokens burns uid's outstanding links of each purpose. A failure
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// is logged (user id only) and returned; callers answer 500.
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func (a *authService) invalidateTokens(op string, uid int64, ps ...users.Purpose) error {
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for _, p := range ps {
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if err := a.st.InvalidateTokens(uid, p); err != nil {
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log.Printf("[users] %s: invalidate %s tokens for user #%d: %v", op, p, uid, err)
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return err
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}
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}
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return nil
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}
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// absForLog resolves path for a log line, so a relative users.db path shows
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// which file it means; the path as given when it cannot be resolved.
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func absForLog(path string) string {
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if abs, err := filepath.Abs(path); err == nil {
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return abs
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}
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return path
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}
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