Files
meshcore-analyzer/cmd/server/auth_service.go
T
efitenandClaude Opus 5.5 b2cda21a27 feat(server): companion linking routes, device tokens and bearer auth (#2175)
Part 2 of 3 for #2173 (companion linking): the server routes, bearer
auth and the link handshake. Builds on #2174 (merged); `upstream/master`
is merged in, so the diff shows only this part. Everything here is
behind `userManagement.enabled` and answers 404 with it off.

## Changes in this PR

**Device tokens and bearer auth**
- `POST /api/auth/device-token`: email + password returns a bearer
token, stored as a `kind = 'device'` session with a label. Same failure
answers and the same rate limit as login.
- Server-enforced scope for a bearer token: `/api/auth/me`,
`/api/auth/logout`, `/api/account/companions*`, `/api/account/settings`.
Everything else answers 403.
- A bearer header only counts when there is no session cookie, so an
auth proxy that adds its own `Authorization` header does not hide a
logged-in browser. Cookies never accept a device token.
- The sessions list on the account API carries `kind` and `label`;
logout with a bearer token revokes that device.

**Linking a companion**
- `POST /api/account/companions/challenge` `{pubkey}` returns
`{challenge, expiresAt, host}`: 32 random bytes, single use, 5 minutes,
bound to the caller and the pubkey.
- `POST /api/account/companions` `{pubkey, challenge, signature, name}`:
the signature is the companion's Ed25519 signature over
`corescope-link:<host>:<challenge>`
(`internal/sigvalidate.VerifyMessage`). The challenge is consumed in
every case.
- A companion linked to another account moves to the caller (the newest
proof wins). Both users get a `companion.transfer` audit row and the
previous owner a mail. That mail is a security notice: it is sent
whatever the node notification settings are.
- `GET /api/account/companions` (with `lastSeenAt` from
`client_receptions`) and `DELETE /api/account/companions/{pubkey}`.
- Linking does not touch the synced `meshcore-my-nodes`: a companion is
not a node to monitor.
- Admin user detail lists linked companions; the account data export
includes companions and device sessions.

**Coverage and config**
- `GET /api/rx-coverage?mine=1`: only coverage of the caller's linked
companions (401 when logged out, 403 for a device token). With `gaps=1`
(#2172) the reply carries no `gaps` member under `mine=1`, because the
track query takes one companion and cannot narrow to a set yet
(`TestRxCoverageMineOmitsGaps`).
- `clientRxCoverage.requireLinkedCompanion` (default off) is read and
reported in `/api/config/client`, which also announces
`userManagement.companionLinking`, so CoreDrive RX shows its login only
where linking exists. The ingestor side is part 3.
- CORS: for origins in `corsAllowedOrigins`, the device-token routes
alone also allow POST/PUT/DELETE and the `Authorization` and
`Content-Type` headers. No credentialed CORS. Documented in
`config.example.json`.
- OpenAPI and `docs/api-spec.md` cover the new routes.

## Verification

- 26 new tests in `cmd/server` and `internal/sigvalidate`, among them:
`TestCompanionLinkFlow`, `TestCompanionLinkRejections` (signature by
another key, malformed signature, challenge bound to another pubkey,
unknown challenge; reuse and expiry are covered by the store tests in
#2174), `TestCompanionTransfer`,
`TestCompanionTransferMailIgnoresNotificationSettings`,
`TestBearerScopedRoutes`, `TestBearerIgnoredWithCookie`,
`TestDeviceTokenSharesLoginRateLimit`, `TestCORSBearerRoutes`,
`TestCompanionRoutesAbsentWhenOff`, `TestRxCoverageMine`,
`TestRxCoverageMineOmitsGaps` (fails without the `mine == nil` guard),
`TestVerifyMessage`.
- `cmd/server`, `internal/sigvalidate` and `internal/users`: `go vet`
and `go test ./...` green, `gofmt` clean.
- The linking flow runs on analyzer.on8ar.eu since 9 October 2026 with
CoreDrive RX v1.19.0 (a real companion linked through the signed
challenge).

## Not in this PR

- The ingestor's linked-only filter, the account page (Devices,
Companions), the "My coverage" toggle and the user docs: part 3.
- Per-user broker credentials and per-user API keys (non-goals in the
spec).

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-10 18:20:49 +02:00

259 lines
7.9 KiB
Go

package main
import (
"log"
"os"
"path/filepath"
"sync"
"sync/atomic"
"time"
"github.com/meshcore-analyzer/mailer"
"github.com/meshcore-analyzer/users"
)
// authService is the optional user-management layer. Server.auth is nil
// unless userManagement.enabled, and nothing in this file runs then.
type authService struct {
st *users.Store
mail mailer.Mailer
set *userMgmtSettings
ipr *wsLimiter // only its clientIP rule is used
login *rateLimiter
signup *rateLimiter // register, forgot, self-service resend
hook *rateLimiter
settingsPut *rateLimiter // PUT /api/account/settings, per user
companion *rateLimiter // companion challenge + link, per IP and per user
// approved is the snapshot of approved hashtag channel names, filled at
// construction and reloaded from users.db after every proposal decision.
// approvedMu serialises the reloads so an older read never replaces a
// newer one.
approvedMu sync.Mutex
approved atomic.Pointer[[]string]
// notify evaluates node notifications; nil unless
// userManagement.notifications.enabled.
notify *notifier
warnIndistinct sync.Once
stop chan struct{}
stopOnce sync.Once
wg sync.WaitGroup // the janitor and the notifier
auditWG sync.WaitGroup // in-flight auditAsync writes
}
func newAuthService(set *userMgmtSettings, st *users.Store, m mailer.Mailer) *authService {
a := &authService{
st: st, mail: m, set: set,
ipr: &wsLimiter{trustedProxies: set.trustedProxies},
login: newRateLimiter(10, 15*time.Minute),
signup: newRateLimiter(5, time.Hour),
hook: newRateLimiter(600, time.Minute),
settingsPut: newRateLimiter(60, time.Hour),
companion: newRateLimiter(60, time.Hour),
stop: make(chan struct{}),
}
a.refreshApproved()
return a
}
// initUserManagement builds s.auth when the feature is on. Call it after
// NewServer and before RegisterRoutes. measurementDBPath is passed to
// users.Open as a forbidden path, so users.db can never be the analyzer DB.
func (s *Server) initUserManagement(measurementDBPath string) error {
if !s.cfg.UserManagementEnabled() {
if s.cfg.ClientRxRequireLinkedCompanionSet() {
log.Printf("[users] clientRxCoverage.requireLinkedCompanion is set but userManagement is off: the setting is ignored")
}
return nil
}
set, err := resolveUserManagement(s.cfg.UserManagement, measurementDBPath, os.Getenv)
if err != nil {
return err
}
st, err := users.Open(set.dbPath, measurementDBPath)
if err != nil {
return err
}
var m mailer.Mailer
if set.provider == "fake" {
m = &mailer.Fake{}
} else {
m = mailer.NewBrevo(set.brevoAPIKey, set.fromEmail, set.fromName)
}
s.auth = newAuthService(set, st, m)
s.auth.logStartup()
s.auth.wg.Add(1)
go func() {
defer s.auth.wg.Done()
s.auth.janitor(time.Hour)
}()
if set.notify.enabled {
s.auth.notify = newNotifier(s.auth, serverNotifySource{s: s}, time.Now)
s.auth.wg.Add(1)
go func() {
defer s.auth.wg.Done()
s.auth.notify.loop(s.auth.stop, set.notify.interval)
}()
log.Printf("[notify] node notifications enabled: every %s, at most %d mails per user and %d in total per 24 hours",
set.notify.interval, set.notify.perUserPerDay, set.notify.maxMailsPerDay)
}
return nil
}
// closeUserManagement stops the janitor and closes users.db. Safe when off.
func (s *Server) closeUserManagement() {
if s.auth == nil {
return
}
s.auth.stopOnce.Do(func() {
close(s.auth.stop)
s.auth.wg.Wait()
s.auth.waitAudits()
if err := s.auth.st.Close(); err != nil {
log.Printf("[users] close: %v", err)
}
})
}
func (a *authService) logStartup() {
log.Printf("[users] user management enabled: db=%s, %d config admin(s), webhook=%v",
absForLog(a.set.dbPath), len(a.set.adminEmails), a.set.webhookSecret != "")
admins, err := a.st.List(users.ListFilter{Role: users.RoleAdmin})
if err != nil {
log.Printf("[users] list admins: %v", err)
return
}
for _, u := range admins {
if !a.isConfigAdmin(u.Email) {
log.Printf("[users] note: admin #%d is not in adminEmails (promoted in the UI, or removed from config)", u.ID)
}
}
}
func (a *authService) janitor(every time.Duration) {
t := time.NewTicker(every)
defer t.Stop()
for {
a.prune()
a.maybeBackup(time.Now())
select {
case <-a.stop:
return
case <-t.C:
}
}
}
func (a *authService) prune() {
if _, err := a.st.PruneStalePending(48 * time.Hour); err != nil {
log.Printf("[users] prune pending: %v", err)
}
if _, err := a.st.PruneExpiredSessions(); err != nil {
log.Printf("[users] prune sessions: %v", err)
}
if _, err := a.st.PruneLinkChallenges(); err != nil {
log.Printf("[users] prune link challenges: %v", err)
}
if _, err := a.st.PruneTokens(7 * 24 * time.Hour); err != nil {
log.Printf("[users] prune tokens: %v", err)
}
if _, err := a.st.PruneMail(90 * 24 * time.Hour); err != nil {
log.Printf("[users] prune mail log: %v", err)
}
// Login rows only; every other audit action is kept (admin-dashboard spec).
if _, err := a.st.PruneAudit([]string{"user.login", "user.login.failed"}, 90*24*time.Hour); err != nil {
log.Printf("[users] prune login audit: %v", err)
}
if _, err := a.st.PruneProposals(proposalRetention); err != nil {
log.Printf("[users] prune proposals: %v", err)
}
a.login.gc()
a.signup.gc()
a.hook.gc()
a.settingsPut.gc()
a.companion.gc()
}
func (a *authService) isConfigAdmin(email string) bool { return a.set.adminEmails[email] }
// refreshApproved reloads the approved hashtag channel names from users.db,
// oldest approval first and capped at maxApproved like the ingestor. The
// mutex spans the read and the store, so concurrent decisions cannot leave
// an older read in place. A failure is logged and keeps the previous
// snapshot. No-op with proposals off.
func (a *authService) refreshApproved() {
if !a.set.proposals.enabled {
return
}
a.approvedMu.Lock()
defer a.approvedMu.Unlock()
list, err := a.st.ApprovedSubjects(users.KindHashtagChannel, a.set.proposals.maxApproved)
if err != nil {
log.Printf("[users] load approved channels: %v", err)
return
}
a.approved.Store(&list)
}
// approvedChannels returns the current snapshot; never nil.
func (a *authService) approvedChannels() []string {
if p := a.approved.Load(); p != nil {
return *p
}
return []string{}
}
// roleFor is the role an address gets on activation.
func (a *authService) roleFor(email string) users.Role {
if a.isConfigAdmin(email) {
return users.RoleAdmin
}
return users.RoleUser
}
func (a *authService) audit(actor *int64, action string, target *int64, detail map[string]string) {
if err := a.st.Audit(actor, action, target, detail); err != nil {
log.Printf("[users] audit %s: %v", action, err)
}
}
// auditAsync writes an audit row in the background, so neither the write
// nor a locked users.db delays the response. Best-effort: a failure is
// logged by a.audit, and a row is lost if the process stops first.
func (a *authService) auditAsync(actor *int64, action string, target *int64, detail map[string]string) {
a.auditWG.Add(1)
go func() {
defer a.auditWG.Done()
a.audit(actor, action, target, detail)
}()
}
// waitAudits blocks until every auditAsync write has finished.
func (a *authService) waitAudits() { a.auditWG.Wait() }
func idPtr(id int64) *int64 { return &id }
// invalidateTokens burns uid's outstanding links of each purpose. A failure
// is logged (user id only) and returned; callers answer 500.
func (a *authService) invalidateTokens(op string, uid int64, ps ...users.Purpose) error {
for _, p := range ps {
if err := a.st.InvalidateTokens(uid, p); err != nil {
log.Printf("[users] %s: invalidate %s tokens for user #%d: %v", op, p, uid, err)
return err
}
}
return nil
}
// absForLog resolves path for a log line, so a relative users.db path shows
// which file it means; the path as given when it cannot be resolved.
func absForLog(path string) string {
if abs, err := filepath.Abs(path); err == nil {
return abs
}
return path
}