mirror of
https://github.com/Kpa-clawbot/meshcore-analyzer.git
synced 2026-10-12 13:18:58 +00:00
Part 2 of 3 for #2173 (companion linking): the server routes, bearer auth and the link handshake. Builds on #2174 (merged); `upstream/master` is merged in, so the diff shows only this part. Everything here is behind `userManagement.enabled` and answers 404 with it off. ## Changes in this PR **Device tokens and bearer auth** - `POST /api/auth/device-token`: email + password returns a bearer token, stored as a `kind = 'device'` session with a label. Same failure answers and the same rate limit as login. - Server-enforced scope for a bearer token: `/api/auth/me`, `/api/auth/logout`, `/api/account/companions*`, `/api/account/settings`. Everything else answers 403. - A bearer header only counts when there is no session cookie, so an auth proxy that adds its own `Authorization` header does not hide a logged-in browser. Cookies never accept a device token. - The sessions list on the account API carries `kind` and `label`; logout with a bearer token revokes that device. **Linking a companion** - `POST /api/account/companions/challenge` `{pubkey}` returns `{challenge, expiresAt, host}`: 32 random bytes, single use, 5 minutes, bound to the caller and the pubkey. - `POST /api/account/companions` `{pubkey, challenge, signature, name}`: the signature is the companion's Ed25519 signature over `corescope-link:<host>:<challenge>` (`internal/sigvalidate.VerifyMessage`). The challenge is consumed in every case. - A companion linked to another account moves to the caller (the newest proof wins). Both users get a `companion.transfer` audit row and the previous owner a mail. That mail is a security notice: it is sent whatever the node notification settings are. - `GET /api/account/companions` (with `lastSeenAt` from `client_receptions`) and `DELETE /api/account/companions/{pubkey}`. - Linking does not touch the synced `meshcore-my-nodes`: a companion is not a node to monitor. - Admin user detail lists linked companions; the account data export includes companions and device sessions. **Coverage and config** - `GET /api/rx-coverage?mine=1`: only coverage of the caller's linked companions (401 when logged out, 403 for a device token). With `gaps=1` (#2172) the reply carries no `gaps` member under `mine=1`, because the track query takes one companion and cannot narrow to a set yet (`TestRxCoverageMineOmitsGaps`). - `clientRxCoverage.requireLinkedCompanion` (default off) is read and reported in `/api/config/client`, which also announces `userManagement.companionLinking`, so CoreDrive RX shows its login only where linking exists. The ingestor side is part 3. - CORS: for origins in `corsAllowedOrigins`, the device-token routes alone also allow POST/PUT/DELETE and the `Authorization` and `Content-Type` headers. No credentialed CORS. Documented in `config.example.json`. - OpenAPI and `docs/api-spec.md` cover the new routes. ## Verification - 26 new tests in `cmd/server` and `internal/sigvalidate`, among them: `TestCompanionLinkFlow`, `TestCompanionLinkRejections` (signature by another key, malformed signature, challenge bound to another pubkey, unknown challenge; reuse and expiry are covered by the store tests in #2174), `TestCompanionTransfer`, `TestCompanionTransferMailIgnoresNotificationSettings`, `TestBearerScopedRoutes`, `TestBearerIgnoredWithCookie`, `TestDeviceTokenSharesLoginRateLimit`, `TestCORSBearerRoutes`, `TestCompanionRoutesAbsentWhenOff`, `TestRxCoverageMine`, `TestRxCoverageMineOmitsGaps` (fails without the `mine == nil` guard), `TestVerifyMessage`. - `cmd/server`, `internal/sigvalidate` and `internal/users`: `go vet` and `go test ./...` green, `gofmt` clean. - The linking flow runs on analyzer.on8ar.eu since 9 October 2026 with CoreDrive RX v1.19.0 (a real companion linked through the signed challenge). ## Not in this PR - The ingestor's linked-only filter, the account page (Devices, Companions), the "My coverage" toggle and the user docs: part 3. - Per-user broker credentials and per-user API keys (non-goals in the spec). --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
117 lines
5.0 KiB
Go
117 lines
5.0 KiB
Go
package main
|
|
|
|
import (
|
|
"errors"
|
|
"net/http"
|
|
"testing"
|
|
"time"
|
|
|
|
"github.com/meshcore-analyzer/users"
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
func TestBearerScopedRoutes(t *testing.T) {
|
|
f := newAuthFixture(t)
|
|
alice := f.registerAndActivate(t, "alice@example.org", "Alice", pw)
|
|
tok := f.deviceToken(t, "alice@example.org", pw, "Pixel").Token
|
|
foreign := header("Origin", rxOrigin)
|
|
|
|
w := f.do("GET", "/api/auth/me", nil, bearer(tok))
|
|
expectStatus(t, w, http.StatusOK)
|
|
if me := decode[meResponse](t, w); me.ID != alice.me.ID || me.CSRFToken != "" {
|
|
t.Fatalf("me via bearer = %+v", me)
|
|
}
|
|
// A write from another origin without any CSRF header: allowed for a bearer.
|
|
w = f.do("PUT", "/api/account/settings", settingsPutRequest{Doc: &settingsDoc{V: 1, Keys: map[string]string{"meshcore-theme": "dark"}}},
|
|
bearer(tok), foreign)
|
|
expectStatus(t, w, http.StatusOK)
|
|
expectStatus(t, f.do("GET", "/api/account/settings", nil, bearer(tok)), http.StatusOK)
|
|
|
|
for _, c := range []struct{ method, path string }{
|
|
{"GET", "/api/account/sessions"},
|
|
{"PATCH", "/api/account"},
|
|
{"POST", "/api/account/password"},
|
|
{"DELETE", "/api/account"},
|
|
{"GET", "/api/admin/users"},
|
|
} {
|
|
if w := f.do(c.method, c.path, nil, bearer(tok), foreign); w.Code != http.StatusForbidden {
|
|
t.Errorf("%s %s with a device token = %d, want 403", c.method, c.path, w.Code)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if _, err := f.st.GetByID(alice.me.ID); err != nil {
|
|
t.Fatalf("account touched by an out-of-scope request: %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func TestBearerRejectsWebAndBadTokens(t *testing.T) {
|
|
f := newAuthFixture(t)
|
|
alice := f.registerAndActivate(t, "alice@example.org", "Alice", pw)
|
|
// alice.cookie.Value is a web session token; as a bearer it would skip CSRF.
|
|
for _, tok := range []string{alice.cookie.Value, "nonsense", ""} {
|
|
if w := f.do("GET", "/api/auth/me", nil, bearer(tok)); w.Code != http.StatusUnauthorized {
|
|
t.Errorf("bearer %q = %d, want 401", tok, w.Code)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// A bearer header only counts without a session cookie: an auth proxy that
|
|
// adds its own Authorization: Bearer must not break cookie logins.
|
|
func TestBearerIgnoredWithCookie(t *testing.T) {
|
|
f := newAuthFixture(t, "admin@example.org")
|
|
admin := f.registerAndActivate(t, "admin@example.org", "Admin", pw)
|
|
alice := f.registerAndActivate(t, "alice@example.org", "Alice", pw)
|
|
proxy := bearer("id-token-from-a-proxy")
|
|
|
|
w := f.do("GET", "/api/auth/me", nil, as(alice), proxy)
|
|
expectStatus(t, w, http.StatusOK)
|
|
if me := decode[meResponse](t, w); me.ID != alice.me.ID || me.CSRFToken == "" {
|
|
t.Fatalf("me with cookie + foreign bearer = %+v", me)
|
|
}
|
|
expectStatus(t, f.do("GET", "/api/account/sessions", nil, as(alice), proxy), http.StatusOK)
|
|
expectStatus(t, f.do("GET", "/api/admin/users", nil, as(admin), proxy), http.StatusOK)
|
|
|
|
// Writes take the cookie path, so the CSRF check applies.
|
|
put := settingsPutRequest{Doc: &settingsDoc{V: 1, Keys: map[string]string{"meshcore-theme": "dark"}}}
|
|
expectStatus(t, f.do("PUT", "/api/account/settings", put, as(alice), proxy), http.StatusOK)
|
|
noCSRF := &client{cookie: alice.cookie}
|
|
expectStatus(t, f.do("PUT", "/api/account/settings", put, as(noCSRF), proxy), http.StatusForbidden)
|
|
|
|
// A device token next to a cookie is not used either: the cookie decides.
|
|
tok := f.deviceToken(t, "alice@example.org", pw, "Pixel").Token
|
|
expired := &client{cookie: &http.Cookie{Name: sessionCookieName, Value: "stale"}}
|
|
expectStatus(t, f.do("GET", "/api/auth/me", nil, as(expired), bearer(tok)), http.StatusUnauthorized)
|
|
|
|
// Logout ends the cookie session and leaves the device token alone.
|
|
expectStatus(t, f.do("POST", "/api/auth/logout", nil, as(alice), bearer(tok)), http.StatusOK)
|
|
expectStatus(t, f.do("GET", "/api/auth/me", nil, as(alice)), http.StatusUnauthorized)
|
|
expectStatus(t, f.do("GET", "/api/auth/me", nil, bearer(tok)), http.StatusOK)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func TestBearerLogoutRevokesDevice(t *testing.T) {
|
|
f := newAuthFixture(t)
|
|
alice := f.registerAndActivate(t, "alice@example.org", "Alice", pw)
|
|
tok := f.deviceToken(t, "alice@example.org", pw, "Pixel").Token
|
|
|
|
expectStatus(t, f.do("POST", "/api/auth/logout", nil, bearer(tok), header("Origin", rxOrigin)), http.StatusOK)
|
|
if _, err := f.st.LookupSession(tok); !errors.Is(err, users.ErrNotFound) {
|
|
t.Fatalf("device token survived logout: %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
expectStatus(t, f.do("GET", "/api/auth/me", nil, bearer(tok)), http.StatusUnauthorized)
|
|
expectStatus(t, f.do("GET", "/api/auth/me", nil, as(alice)), http.StatusOK)
|
|
// The cookie logout keeps its origin check.
|
|
expectStatus(t, f.do("POST", "/api/auth/logout", nil, as(alice), header("Origin", rxOrigin)), http.StatusForbidden)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func TestBearerSlidingExpiry(t *testing.T) {
|
|
f := newAuthFixture(t)
|
|
f.registerAndActivate(t, "alice@example.org", "Alice", pw)
|
|
f.st.SetClock(func() time.Time { return time.Now().Add(-80 * 24 * time.Hour) })
|
|
tok := f.deviceToken(t, "alice@example.org", pw, "Pixel").Token
|
|
f.st.SetClock(time.Now)
|
|
|
|
expectStatus(t, f.do("GET", "/api/auth/me", nil, bearer(tok)), http.StatusOK)
|
|
sess, err := f.st.LookupSession(tok)
|
|
if err != nil || sess.ExpiresAt.Before(time.Now().Add(users.DeviceSessionTTL-time.Hour)) {
|
|
t.Fatalf("device token not extended on use: %+v, %v", sess, err)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|