Files
meshcore-analyzer/cmd/server/companion_transfer_test.go
T
efitenandClaude Opus 5.5 b2cda21a27 feat(server): companion linking routes, device tokens and bearer auth (#2175)
Part 2 of 3 for #2173 (companion linking): the server routes, bearer
auth and the link handshake. Builds on #2174 (merged); `upstream/master`
is merged in, so the diff shows only this part. Everything here is
behind `userManagement.enabled` and answers 404 with it off.

## Changes in this PR

**Device tokens and bearer auth**
- `POST /api/auth/device-token`: email + password returns a bearer
token, stored as a `kind = 'device'` session with a label. Same failure
answers and the same rate limit as login.
- Server-enforced scope for a bearer token: `/api/auth/me`,
`/api/auth/logout`, `/api/account/companions*`, `/api/account/settings`.
Everything else answers 403.
- A bearer header only counts when there is no session cookie, so an
auth proxy that adds its own `Authorization` header does not hide a
logged-in browser. Cookies never accept a device token.
- The sessions list on the account API carries `kind` and `label`;
logout with a bearer token revokes that device.

**Linking a companion**
- `POST /api/account/companions/challenge` `{pubkey}` returns
`{challenge, expiresAt, host}`: 32 random bytes, single use, 5 minutes,
bound to the caller and the pubkey.
- `POST /api/account/companions` `{pubkey, challenge, signature, name}`:
the signature is the companion's Ed25519 signature over
`corescope-link:<host>:<challenge>`
(`internal/sigvalidate.VerifyMessage`). The challenge is consumed in
every case.
- A companion linked to another account moves to the caller (the newest
proof wins). Both users get a `companion.transfer` audit row and the
previous owner a mail. That mail is a security notice: it is sent
whatever the node notification settings are.
- `GET /api/account/companions` (with `lastSeenAt` from
`client_receptions`) and `DELETE /api/account/companions/{pubkey}`.
- Linking does not touch the synced `meshcore-my-nodes`: a companion is
not a node to monitor.
- Admin user detail lists linked companions; the account data export
includes companions and device sessions.

**Coverage and config**
- `GET /api/rx-coverage?mine=1`: only coverage of the caller's linked
companions (401 when logged out, 403 for a device token). With `gaps=1`
(#2172) the reply carries no `gaps` member under `mine=1`, because the
track query takes one companion and cannot narrow to a set yet
(`TestRxCoverageMineOmitsGaps`).
- `clientRxCoverage.requireLinkedCompanion` (default off) is read and
reported in `/api/config/client`, which also announces
`userManagement.companionLinking`, so CoreDrive RX shows its login only
where linking exists. The ingestor side is part 3.
- CORS: for origins in `corsAllowedOrigins`, the device-token routes
alone also allow POST/PUT/DELETE and the `Authorization` and
`Content-Type` headers. No credentialed CORS. Documented in
`config.example.json`.
- OpenAPI and `docs/api-spec.md` cover the new routes.

## Verification

- 26 new tests in `cmd/server` and `internal/sigvalidate`, among them:
`TestCompanionLinkFlow`, `TestCompanionLinkRejections` (signature by
another key, malformed signature, challenge bound to another pubkey,
unknown challenge; reuse and expiry are covered by the store tests in
#2174), `TestCompanionTransfer`,
`TestCompanionTransferMailIgnoresNotificationSettings`,
`TestBearerScopedRoutes`, `TestBearerIgnoredWithCookie`,
`TestDeviceTokenSharesLoginRateLimit`, `TestCORSBearerRoutes`,
`TestCompanionRoutesAbsentWhenOff`, `TestRxCoverageMine`,
`TestRxCoverageMineOmitsGaps` (fails without the `mine == nil` guard),
`TestVerifyMessage`.
- `cmd/server`, `internal/sigvalidate` and `internal/users`: `go vet`
and `go test ./...` green, `gofmt` clean.
- The linking flow runs on analyzer.on8ar.eu since 9 October 2026 with
CoreDrive RX v1.19.0 (a real companion linked through the signed
challenge).

## Not in this PR

- The ingestor's linked-only filter, the account page (Devices,
Companions), the "My coverage" toggle and the user docs: part 3.
- Per-user broker credentials and per-user API keys (non-goals in the
spec).

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-10 18:20:49 +02:00

87 lines
3.0 KiB
Go

package main
import (
"net/http"
"strings"
"testing"
"github.com/meshcore-analyzer/users"
)
func TestCompanionTransfer(t *testing.T) {
f := newAuthFixture(t)
f.srv.auth.set.notify.enabled = true
alice := f.registerAndActivate(t, "alice@example.org", "Alice", pw)
bob := f.registerAndActivate(t, "bob@example.org", "Bob", pw)
aliceTok := f.deviceToken(t, "alice@example.org", pw, "Pixel").Token
bobTok := f.deviceToken(t, "bob@example.org", pw, "iPhone").Token
pk := pubHex(companionKey)
expectStatus(t, f.linkCompanion(t, aliceTok, companionKey, "Car"), http.StatusOK)
sent := len(f.fake.Sent())
expectStatus(t, f.linkCompanion(t, bobTok, companionKey, "Bike"), http.StatusOK)
if l, err := f.st.GetCompanionLink(pk); err != nil || l.UserID != bob.me.ID {
t.Fatalf("after transfer: %+v, %v", l, err)
}
for _, uid := range []int64{alice.me.ID, bob.me.ID} {
if !hasCompanionAudit(t, f, uid, "companion.transfer", pk) {
t.Fatalf("no companion.transfer audit row for user #%d", uid)
}
}
msgs := f.fake.Sent()
if len(msgs) != sent+1 {
t.Fatalf("mails sent for the transfer = %d, want 1", len(msgs)-sent)
}
if m := msgs[len(msgs)-1]; m.To != "alice@example.org" || !strings.Contains(m.Text, "Car") || !strings.Contains(m.Text, pk[:12]) {
t.Fatalf("transfer mail = to %q, text %q", m.To, m.Text)
}
if list, _ := f.st.ListCompanionLinks(alice.me.ID); len(list) != 0 {
t.Fatalf("previous owner still lists it: %+v", list)
}
}
// The transfer mail is a security notice: it goes out whatever the node
// notification settings are, only not to an inactive or bouncing address.
func TestCompanionTransferMailIgnoresNotificationSettings(t *testing.T) {
for _, tc := range []struct {
name string
instance, user bool
bouncing bool
wantMails int
}{
{"instance notifications off", false, true, false, 1},
{"user opted out", true, false, false, 1},
{"both off", false, false, false, 1},
{"address bouncing", true, true, true, 0},
} {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
f := newAuthFixture(t)
f.srv.auth.set.notify.enabled = tc.instance
alice := f.registerAndActivate(t, "alice@example.org", "Alice", pw)
f.registerAndActivate(t, "bob@example.org", "Bob", pw)
if !tc.user {
if _, err := f.st.SetNotifyPrefs(alice.me.ID, false, users.NodeNotifyEvents); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
}
aliceTok := f.deviceToken(t, "alice@example.org", pw, "Pixel").Token
bobTok := f.deviceToken(t, "bob@example.org", pw, "iPhone").Token
expectStatus(t, f.linkCompanion(t, aliceTok, companionKey, "Car"), http.StatusOK)
if tc.bouncing {
if err := f.st.SetEmailBouncing(alice.me.ID, true); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
}
sent := len(f.fake.Sent())
expectStatus(t, f.linkCompanion(t, bobTok, companionKey, "Bike"), http.StatusOK)
if !hasCompanionAudit(t, f, alice.me.ID, "companion.transfer", pubHex(companionKey)) {
t.Fatal("no companion.transfer audit row")
}
if n := len(f.fake.Sent()) - sent; n != tc.wantMails {
t.Fatalf("%d transfer mail(s) sent, want %d", n, tc.wantMails)
}
})
}
}