Files
meshcore-analyzer/cmd/server/device_token_test.go
T
efitenandClaude Opus 5.5 b2cda21a27 feat(server): companion linking routes, device tokens and bearer auth (#2175)
Part 2 of 3 for #2173 (companion linking): the server routes, bearer
auth and the link handshake. Builds on #2174 (merged); `upstream/master`
is merged in, so the diff shows only this part. Everything here is
behind `userManagement.enabled` and answers 404 with it off.

## Changes in this PR

**Device tokens and bearer auth**
- `POST /api/auth/device-token`: email + password returns a bearer
token, stored as a `kind = 'device'` session with a label. Same failure
answers and the same rate limit as login.
- Server-enforced scope for a bearer token: `/api/auth/me`,
`/api/auth/logout`, `/api/account/companions*`, `/api/account/settings`.
Everything else answers 403.
- A bearer header only counts when there is no session cookie, so an
auth proxy that adds its own `Authorization` header does not hide a
logged-in browser. Cookies never accept a device token.
- The sessions list on the account API carries `kind` and `label`;
logout with a bearer token revokes that device.

**Linking a companion**
- `POST /api/account/companions/challenge` `{pubkey}` returns
`{challenge, expiresAt, host}`: 32 random bytes, single use, 5 minutes,
bound to the caller and the pubkey.
- `POST /api/account/companions` `{pubkey, challenge, signature, name}`:
the signature is the companion's Ed25519 signature over
`corescope-link:<host>:<challenge>`
(`internal/sigvalidate.VerifyMessage`). The challenge is consumed in
every case.
- A companion linked to another account moves to the caller (the newest
proof wins). Both users get a `companion.transfer` audit row and the
previous owner a mail. That mail is a security notice: it is sent
whatever the node notification settings are.
- `GET /api/account/companions` (with `lastSeenAt` from
`client_receptions`) and `DELETE /api/account/companions/{pubkey}`.
- Linking does not touch the synced `meshcore-my-nodes`: a companion is
not a node to monitor.
- Admin user detail lists linked companions; the account data export
includes companions and device sessions.

**Coverage and config**
- `GET /api/rx-coverage?mine=1`: only coverage of the caller's linked
companions (401 when logged out, 403 for a device token). With `gaps=1`
(#2172) the reply carries no `gaps` member under `mine=1`, because the
track query takes one companion and cannot narrow to a set yet
(`TestRxCoverageMineOmitsGaps`).
- `clientRxCoverage.requireLinkedCompanion` (default off) is read and
reported in `/api/config/client`, which also announces
`userManagement.companionLinking`, so CoreDrive RX shows its login only
where linking exists. The ingestor side is part 3.
- CORS: for origins in `corsAllowedOrigins`, the device-token routes
alone also allow POST/PUT/DELETE and the `Authorization` and
`Content-Type` headers. No credentialed CORS. Documented in
`config.example.json`.
- OpenAPI and `docs/api-spec.md` cover the new routes.

## Verification

- 26 new tests in `cmd/server` and `internal/sigvalidate`, among them:
`TestCompanionLinkFlow`, `TestCompanionLinkRejections` (signature by
another key, malformed signature, challenge bound to another pubkey,
unknown challenge; reuse and expiry are covered by the store tests in
#2174), `TestCompanionTransfer`,
`TestCompanionTransferMailIgnoresNotificationSettings`,
`TestBearerScopedRoutes`, `TestBearerIgnoredWithCookie`,
`TestDeviceTokenSharesLoginRateLimit`, `TestCORSBearerRoutes`,
`TestCompanionRoutesAbsentWhenOff`, `TestRxCoverageMine`,
`TestRxCoverageMineOmitsGaps` (fails without the `mine == nil` guard),
`TestVerifyMessage`.
- `cmd/server`, `internal/sigvalidate` and `internal/users`: `go vet`
and `go test ./...` green, `gofmt` clean.
- The linking flow runs on analyzer.on8ar.eu since 9 October 2026 with
CoreDrive RX v1.19.0 (a real companion linked through the signed
challenge).

## Not in this PR

- The ingestor's linked-only filter, the account page (Devices,
Companions), the "My coverage" toggle and the user docs: part 3.
- Per-user broker credentials and per-user API keys (non-goals in the
spec).

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-10 18:20:49 +02:00

103 lines
3.6 KiB
Go

package main
import (
"net/http"
"strings"
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/meshcore-analyzer/users"
)
// rxOrigin is a CoreDrive RX deployment on another origin than testBase.
const rxOrigin = "https://rx.example.net"
func bearer(tok string) reqMod { return header("Authorization", "Bearer "+tok) }
// deviceToken logs in like CoreDrive RX: from a foreign origin, no cookie.
func (f *authFixture) deviceToken(t *testing.T, email, password, name string) deviceTokenResponse {
t.Helper()
w := f.do("POST", "/api/auth/device-token", deviceTokenRequest{Email: email, Password: password, DeviceName: name},
header("Origin", rxOrigin))
expectStatus(t, w, http.StatusOK)
return decode[deviceTokenResponse](t, w)
}
func TestDeviceTokenIssue(t *testing.T) {
f := newAuthFixture(t)
alice := f.registerAndActivate(t, "alice@example.org", "Alice", pw)
got := f.deviceToken(t, "alice@example.org", pw, " Pixel\x07 8 ")
if got.Token == "" || got.User.ID != alice.me.ID || got.User.DisplayName != "Alice" {
t.Fatalf("device-token response = %+v", got)
}
exp, err := time.Parse(time.RFC3339, got.ExpiresAt)
if err != nil || exp.Before(time.Now().Add(users.DeviceSessionTTL-time.Hour)) {
t.Fatalf("expiresAt = %q, %v", got.ExpiresAt, err)
}
sess, err := f.st.LookupSession(got.Token)
if err != nil || sess.Kind != users.SessionKindDevice || sess.Label != "Pixel 8" ||
!sess.HasScope(deviceScopeRX) || sess.HasScope("admin") {
t.Fatalf("stored device session = %+v, %v", sess, err)
}
if w := f.serve("GET", "/api/auth/device-token", nil); w.Code == http.StatusOK {
t.Fatal("GET answered 200")
}
entries, err := f.st.AuditFor(alice.me.ID, 20)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
for _, e := range entries {
if e.Action == "user.login" && e.Detail["via"] == "device" && e.Detail["device"] == "Pixel 8" {
return
}
}
t.Fatalf("no device login audit row in %+v", entries)
}
func TestDeviceTokenFailuresMatchLogin(t *testing.T) {
f := newAuthFixture(t)
alice := f.registerAndActivate(t, "alice@example.org", "Alice", pw)
for _, req := range []deviceTokenRequest{
{Email: "alice@example.org", Password: "wrong password here", DeviceName: "x"},
{Email: "nobody@example.org", Password: pw, DeviceName: "x"},
{Email: "not an address", Password: pw, DeviceName: "x"},
} {
w := f.do("POST", "/api/auth/device-token", req)
expectStatus(t, w, http.StatusUnauthorized)
if !strings.Contains(w.Body.String(), msgBadLogin) {
t.Fatalf("%s: body %s, want the login message", req.Email, w.Body.String())
}
}
entries, _ := f.st.AuditFor(alice.me.ID, 20)
failed := 0
for _, e := range entries {
if e.Action == "user.login.failed" && e.Detail["reason"] == "wrong_password" {
failed++
}
}
if failed != 1 {
t.Fatalf("failed-login audit rows = %d, want 1: %+v", failed, entries)
}
list, _ := f.st.ListSessions(alice.me.ID)
for _, s := range list {
if s.Kind == users.SessionKindDevice {
t.Fatalf("a refused login created a device session: %+v", s)
}
}
}
// Device-token attempts and browser logins draw from the same buckets, so
// the endpoint is no way around the login rate limit.
func TestDeviceTokenSharesLoginRateLimit(t *testing.T) {
f := newAuthFixture(t)
f.registerAndActivate(t, "alice@example.org", "Alice", pw)
for i := 0; i < 10; i++ {
f.do("POST", "/api/auth/login", loginRequest{Email: "alice@example.org", Password: "wrong password here"})
}
w := f.do("POST", "/api/auth/device-token", deviceTokenRequest{Email: "alice@example.org", Password: pw, DeviceName: "x"})
expectStatus(t, w, http.StatusTooManyRequests)
if w.Header().Get("Retry-After") == "" {
t.Fatal("429 without Retry-After")
}
}