mirror of
https://github.com/Kpa-clawbot/meshcore-analyzer.git
synced 2026-10-12 10:57:17 +00:00
Part 2 of 3 for #2173 (companion linking): the server routes, bearer auth and the link handshake. Builds on #2174 (merged); `upstream/master` is merged in, so the diff shows only this part. Everything here is behind `userManagement.enabled` and answers 404 with it off. ## Changes in this PR **Device tokens and bearer auth** - `POST /api/auth/device-token`: email + password returns a bearer token, stored as a `kind = 'device'` session with a label. Same failure answers and the same rate limit as login. - Server-enforced scope for a bearer token: `/api/auth/me`, `/api/auth/logout`, `/api/account/companions*`, `/api/account/settings`. Everything else answers 403. - A bearer header only counts when there is no session cookie, so an auth proxy that adds its own `Authorization` header does not hide a logged-in browser. Cookies never accept a device token. - The sessions list on the account API carries `kind` and `label`; logout with a bearer token revokes that device. **Linking a companion** - `POST /api/account/companions/challenge` `{pubkey}` returns `{challenge, expiresAt, host}`: 32 random bytes, single use, 5 minutes, bound to the caller and the pubkey. - `POST /api/account/companions` `{pubkey, challenge, signature, name}`: the signature is the companion's Ed25519 signature over `corescope-link:<host>:<challenge>` (`internal/sigvalidate.VerifyMessage`). The challenge is consumed in every case. - A companion linked to another account moves to the caller (the newest proof wins). Both users get a `companion.transfer` audit row and the previous owner a mail. That mail is a security notice: it is sent whatever the node notification settings are. - `GET /api/account/companions` (with `lastSeenAt` from `client_receptions`) and `DELETE /api/account/companions/{pubkey}`. - Linking does not touch the synced `meshcore-my-nodes`: a companion is not a node to monitor. - Admin user detail lists linked companions; the account data export includes companions and device sessions. **Coverage and config** - `GET /api/rx-coverage?mine=1`: only coverage of the caller's linked companions (401 when logged out, 403 for a device token). With `gaps=1` (#2172) the reply carries no `gaps` member under `mine=1`, because the track query takes one companion and cannot narrow to a set yet (`TestRxCoverageMineOmitsGaps`). - `clientRxCoverage.requireLinkedCompanion` (default off) is read and reported in `/api/config/client`, which also announces `userManagement.companionLinking`, so CoreDrive RX shows its login only where linking exists. The ingestor side is part 3. - CORS: for origins in `corsAllowedOrigins`, the device-token routes alone also allow POST/PUT/DELETE and the `Authorization` and `Content-Type` headers. No credentialed CORS. Documented in `config.example.json`. - OpenAPI and `docs/api-spec.md` cover the new routes. ## Verification - 26 new tests in `cmd/server` and `internal/sigvalidate`, among them: `TestCompanionLinkFlow`, `TestCompanionLinkRejections` (signature by another key, malformed signature, challenge bound to another pubkey, unknown challenge; reuse and expiry are covered by the store tests in #2174), `TestCompanionTransfer`, `TestCompanionTransferMailIgnoresNotificationSettings`, `TestBearerScopedRoutes`, `TestBearerIgnoredWithCookie`, `TestDeviceTokenSharesLoginRateLimit`, `TestCORSBearerRoutes`, `TestCompanionRoutesAbsentWhenOff`, `TestRxCoverageMine`, `TestRxCoverageMineOmitsGaps` (fails without the `mine == nil` guard), `TestVerifyMessage`. - `cmd/server`, `internal/sigvalidate` and `internal/users`: `go vet` and `go test ./...` green, `gofmt` clean. - The linking flow runs on analyzer.on8ar.eu since 9 October 2026 with CoreDrive RX v1.19.0 (a real companion linked through the signed challenge). ## Not in this PR - The ingestor's linked-only filter, the account page (Devices, Companions), the "My coverage" toggle and the user docs: part 3. - Per-user broker credentials and per-user API keys (non-goals in the spec). --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
484 lines
16 KiB
Go
484 lines
16 KiB
Go
package main
|
|
|
|
import (
|
|
"context"
|
|
"database/sql"
|
|
"encoding/json"
|
|
"log"
|
|
"net/http"
|
|
"sort"
|
|
"strconv"
|
|
"strings"
|
|
"time"
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
// scanCoverageRows reads (lat,lon,snr,rssi,heard_key,rx_at) rows into coverageRow values.
|
|
func scanCoverageRows(rows *sql.Rows) ([]coverageRow, error) {
|
|
out := []coverageRow{}
|
|
for rows.Next() {
|
|
var lat, lon float64
|
|
var snr sql.NullFloat64
|
|
var rssi sql.NullInt64
|
|
var heardKey, rxAt sql.NullString
|
|
if err := rows.Scan(&lat, &lon, &snr, &rssi, &heardKey, &rxAt); err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
cr := coverageRow{Lat: lat, Lon: lon, HeardKey: strings.ToLower(heardKey.String), RxAt: rxAt.String}
|
|
if snr.Valid {
|
|
v := snr.Float64
|
|
cr.SNR = &v
|
|
}
|
|
if rssi.Valid {
|
|
v := int(rssi.Int64)
|
|
cr.RSSI = &v
|
|
}
|
|
out = append(out, cr)
|
|
}
|
|
return out, rows.Err()
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// heardKeyResolverFor builds a nodeResolver for exactly the distinct heard_keys
|
|
// present in rows, resolving them all in one batched query instead of one query
|
|
// per key (the previous per-key resolver was N+1 on the read connection). Maps a
|
|
// heard_key to (pubkey, name) on a unique, non-hidden match; to (heardKey, "")
|
|
// otherwise. nil when there's no DB.
|
|
func (s *Server) heardKeyResolverFor(rows []coverageRow) nodeResolver {
|
|
if s.db == nil || s.db.conn == nil {
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
keys := make([]string, 0, len(rows))
|
|
seen := map[string]bool{}
|
|
for _, r := range rows {
|
|
if r.HeardKey != "" && !seen[r.HeardKey] {
|
|
seen[r.HeardKey] = true
|
|
keys = append(keys, r.HeardKey)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
resolved := s.batchResolveHeardKeys(keys)
|
|
return func(heardKey string) (string, string) {
|
|
if v, ok := resolved[heardKey]; ok {
|
|
return v[0], v[1]
|
|
}
|
|
return heardKey, ""
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// batchResolveHeardKeys resolves many heard_keys (2-3 byte prefixes or full
|
|
// pubkeys) to their canonical (pubkey, name) in a single round-trip per chunk: a
|
|
// UNION ALL of one LIMIT-2 prefix lookup each, so per-key work stays bounded
|
|
// (2 rows) and the whole set costs one query, not N. A unique match returns
|
|
// [pubkey, name]; unknown / ambiguous / blacklisted / hidden-prefix keys (#15,
|
|
// #1181) return [heardKey, ""].
|
|
func (s *Server) batchResolveHeardKeys(keys []string) map[string][2]string {
|
|
res := make(map[string][2]string, len(keys))
|
|
valid := make([]string, 0, len(keys))
|
|
seen := map[string]bool{}
|
|
for _, k := range keys {
|
|
if k == "" || seen[k] {
|
|
continue
|
|
}
|
|
seen[k] = true
|
|
if !hexPrefixRe.MatchString(k) {
|
|
res[k] = [2]string{k, ""}
|
|
continue
|
|
}
|
|
valid = append(valid, k)
|
|
}
|
|
// SQLITE_MAX_COMPOUND_SELECT is 500 by default; chunk well under it.
|
|
const chunk = 200
|
|
for i := 0; i < len(valid); i += chunk {
|
|
end := i + chunk
|
|
if end > len(valid) {
|
|
end = len(valid)
|
|
}
|
|
batch := valid[i:end]
|
|
parts := make([]string, len(batch))
|
|
args := make([]interface{}, 0, len(batch)*2)
|
|
for j, k := range batch {
|
|
// Parameterized: the prefix flows in as bound args, never interpolated,
|
|
// so this stays injection-safe regardless of how hexPrefixRe later
|
|
// evolves. The per-prefix LIMIT 2 lives in a subquery because a bare
|
|
// LIMIT on a UNION ALL term is a SQLite syntax error.
|
|
parts[j] = "SELECT * FROM (SELECT ? AS pfx, public_key, COALESCE(name,'') AS nm FROM nodes WHERE public_key LIKE ? LIMIT 2)"
|
|
args = append(args, k, k+"%")
|
|
}
|
|
rows, err := s.db.conn.Query(strings.Join(parts, " UNION ALL "), args...)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
// Don't fail the request, but don't fail silently either: a swallowed
|
|
// error here presents as "every name is ambiguous" with no signal.
|
|
log.Printf("WARN batchResolveHeardKeys: %v", err)
|
|
for _, k := range batch {
|
|
res[k] = [2]string{k, ""}
|
|
}
|
|
continue
|
|
}
|
|
type agg struct {
|
|
pk, name string
|
|
cnt int
|
|
}
|
|
acc := map[string]*agg{}
|
|
for rows.Next() {
|
|
var pfx, pk, nm string
|
|
if err := rows.Scan(&pfx, &pk, &nm); err != nil {
|
|
continue
|
|
}
|
|
a := acc[pfx]
|
|
if a == nil {
|
|
a = &agg{}
|
|
acc[pfx] = a
|
|
}
|
|
a.cnt++
|
|
a.pk, a.name = pk, nm
|
|
}
|
|
rows.Close()
|
|
for _, k := range batch {
|
|
a := acc[k]
|
|
if a != nil && a.cnt == 1 && !s.cfg.IsBlacklisted(a.pk) && !s.cfg.IsNameHidden(a.name) {
|
|
res[k] = [2]string{a.pk, a.name}
|
|
} else {
|
|
res[k] = [2]string{k, ""}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return res
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// resolveHeardKey resolves a single heard_key (2-3 byte prefix or full pubkey)
|
|
// to its canonical (pubkey, name), or (heardKey, "") when unknown / ambiguous /
|
|
// hidden. Thin wrapper over batchResolveHeardKeys so there is one code path.
|
|
func (s *Server) resolveHeardKey(heardKey string) (string, string) {
|
|
v := s.batchResolveHeardKeys([]string{heardKey})[heardKey]
|
|
if v[0] == "" && v[1] == "" {
|
|
return heardKey, "" // empty/unresolved → echo the key
|
|
}
|
|
return v[0], v[1]
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// queryCoverageFiltered returns coverage rows within a bbox, optionally filtered
|
|
// by heard node (prefix/pubkey), contributing client (rx_pubkey), and time window
|
|
// (days; 0 = all time). Powers the global and per-observer coverage maps.
|
|
// rxIn, when non-nil, keeps only receptions by those companions (rx_pubkey,
|
|
// lowercase); an empty non-nil rxIn matches nothing.
|
|
func (s *Server) queryCoverageFiltered(node, rx string, rxIn []string, days int, b bbox) ([]coverageRow, error) {
|
|
if rxIn != nil && len(rxIn) == 0 {
|
|
return nil, nil
|
|
}
|
|
where := []string{"lat BETWEEN ? AND ?", "lon BETWEEN ? AND ?"}
|
|
args := []interface{}{b.MinLat, b.MaxLat, b.MinLon, b.MaxLon}
|
|
if node != "" {
|
|
// Sargable heard_key IN-list (see coverageHeardKeyCandidates) so the
|
|
// (heard_key, …) composite index is used instead of a substr() scan (#5).
|
|
cands := coverageHeardKeyCandidates(node)
|
|
where = append(where, "heard_key IN ("+sqlPlaceholders(len(cands))+")")
|
|
for _, c := range cands {
|
|
args = append(args, c)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if rx != "" {
|
|
where = append(where, "rx_pubkey = ?")
|
|
args = append(args, strings.ToLower(rx))
|
|
}
|
|
if len(rxIn) > 0 {
|
|
where = append(where, "rx_pubkey IN ("+sqlPlaceholders(len(rxIn))+")")
|
|
for _, pk := range rxIn {
|
|
args = append(args, pk)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if days > 0 {
|
|
since := time.Now().UTC().AddDate(0, 0, -days).Format(time.RFC3339)
|
|
where = append(where, "rx_at >= ?")
|
|
args = append(args, since)
|
|
}
|
|
rows, err := s.db.conn.Query("SELECT lat, lon, snr, rssi, heard_key, rx_at FROM client_receptions WHERE "+strings.Join(where, " AND "), args...)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
defer rows.Close()
|
|
return scanCoverageRows(rows)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// handleRxCoverage serves global (or per-observer via ?rx=) coverage as GeoJSON
|
|
// hexbins, over a time window. ?node= also works (same as the per-node endpoint).
|
|
// requireClientRxCoverage writes a 404 and returns false when the opt-in
|
|
// client-RX coverage feature is disabled, so the coverage endpoints read as
|
|
// "not found" instead of serving data on deployments that haven't enabled it.
|
|
func (s *Server) requireClientRxCoverage(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) bool {
|
|
// Routes are registered unconditionally, so guard against a nil server/cfg
|
|
// (e.g. handlers exercised in isolation) rather than panicking (#4).
|
|
// ClientRxCoverageEnabled is itself nil-receiver-safe.
|
|
if s == nil || s.cfg == nil || !s.cfg.ClientRxCoverageEnabled() {
|
|
http.NotFound(w, r)
|
|
return false
|
|
}
|
|
return true
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (s *Server) handleRxCoverage(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
|
|
if !s.requireClientRxCoverage(w, r) {
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
var mine []string
|
|
if r.URL.Query().Get("mine") == "1" {
|
|
var ok bool
|
|
if mine, ok = s.myCompanionPubkeys(w, r); !ok {
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
b, ok := parseBBox(r.URL.Query().Get("bbox"))
|
|
if !ok {
|
|
http.Error(w, "bbox required as minLat,minLon,maxLat,maxLon", http.StatusBadRequest)
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
if s.db == nil || s.db.conn == nil {
|
|
http.Error(w, "unavailable", http.StatusServiceUnavailable)
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
days := clampDays(atoiDefault(r.URL.Query().Get("days"), 7))
|
|
z, _ := strconv.Atoi(r.URL.Query().Get("z"))
|
|
node, rx := r.URL.Query().Get("node"), r.URL.Query().Get("rx")
|
|
rows, err := s.queryCoverageFiltered(node, rx, mine, days, b)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
http.Error(w, "query failed", http.StatusInternalServerError)
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
fc := aggregateCoverage(rows, zoomToHexRes(z), s.heardKeyResolverFor(rows))
|
|
// "Nothing received" cells need the track, so only with the RF sample
|
|
// stream on; with ?node= the question would be "this node not heard",
|
|
// which these cells do not answer. Not with ?mine=1 either: the track
|
|
// query cannot narrow to a set of companions yet.
|
|
if r.URL.Query().Get("gaps") == "1" && node == "" && mine == nil && s.cfg.ClientRfSamplesEnabled() {
|
|
track, err := s.queryTrackPoints(rx, days, b)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
http.Error(w, "query failed", http.StatusInternalServerError)
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
fc.Gaps, fc.GapsTruncated = aggregateGaps(track, rows, zoomToHexRes(z))
|
|
}
|
|
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
|
|
json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(fc)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// myCompanionPubkeys resolves ?mine=1 to the caller's linked companions
|
|
// (never nil, so an empty list filters everything out). Browser session
|
|
// only: 404 with user management off, 403 for a bearer token (coverage is
|
|
// outside its scope), 401 without a session.
|
|
func (s *Server) myCompanionPubkeys(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) ([]string, bool) {
|
|
if s.auth == nil {
|
|
http.NotFound(w, r)
|
|
return nil, false
|
|
}
|
|
if _, ok := bearerToken(r); ok {
|
|
writeBearerFail(w, http.StatusForbidden)
|
|
return nil, false
|
|
}
|
|
u, _ := s.auth.currentUser(w, r)
|
|
if u == nil {
|
|
writeError(w, http.StatusUnauthorized, "not logged in")
|
|
return nil, false
|
|
}
|
|
links, err := s.auth.st.ListCompanionLinks(u.ID)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
log.Printf("[users] coverage mine for user #%d: %v", u.ID, err)
|
|
http.Error(w, "query failed", http.StatusInternalServerError)
|
|
return nil, false
|
|
}
|
|
out := make([]string, 0, len(links))
|
|
for _, l := range links {
|
|
out = append(out, l.Pubkey)
|
|
}
|
|
return out, true
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// --- Leaderboard (top mobile observers) ---
|
|
|
|
type LeaderObserver struct {
|
|
Pubkey string `json:"pubkey"`
|
|
Name string `json:"name"`
|
|
Receptions int `json:"receptions"`
|
|
Nodes int `json:"nodes"`
|
|
Cells int `json:"cells"` // distinct fixed-res hex cells covered
|
|
Score float64 `json:"score"` // frontier-weighted coverage score
|
|
}
|
|
type RxLeaderboardResp struct {
|
|
Days int `json:"days"`
|
|
Observers []LeaderObserver `json:"observers"`
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// leaderboardHexRes is the fixed hex resolution used to bucket receptions into
|
|
// "cells visited" for the frontier-weighted score. ~150 m ground cells at our
|
|
// latitude: coarse enough that a parked node's GPS jitter stays in one cell,
|
|
// fine enough that real driving paints many. Independent of the coverage map's
|
|
// zoom-dependent render resolution so the ranking is stable across views.
|
|
const leaderboardHexRes = 13
|
|
|
|
// leaderboardScanCap bounds how many rows the leaderboard aggregates in memory.
|
|
// The endpoint is unauthenticated (only requireClientRxCoverage), and the Go-side
|
|
// rarity weighting can't push the GROUP BY into SQLite, so without a cap a wide
|
|
// window on a busy network would stream the whole table into maps. At the cap we
|
|
// log and return a partial (best-effort) ranking rather than OOM (#review r2).
|
|
const leaderboardScanCap = 500000
|
|
|
|
// rxLeaderboard ranks mobile observers by frontier-weighted cell coverage over
|
|
// the time window. Each distinct cell an observer covers contributes
|
|
// 1/(observers covering that cell): a cell only they reached weighs 1.0, a cell
|
|
// shared by N observers weighs 1/N. This rewards expanding the map's edge and is
|
|
// spam-proof — a stationary node covers exactly one cell regardless of how many
|
|
// receptions it logs. Bucketing + the rarity weight can't be expressed in SQL,
|
|
// so we aggregate the window's rows in Go (bounded by leaderboardScanCap).
|
|
func (s *Server) rxLeaderboard(ctx context.Context, days, limit int) ([]LeaderObserver, error) {
|
|
since := time.Now().UTC().AddDate(0, 0, -days).Format(time.RFC3339)
|
|
// Name preference: the node's advertised name, else the companion's
|
|
// self-reported name (client_observers), else empty (UI shows the prefix).
|
|
// Hard LIMIT bounds memory; ORDER BY rx_at DESC so a truncated window keeps
|
|
// the most recent receptions.
|
|
rows, err := s.db.conn.QueryContext(ctx, `
|
|
SELECT cr.rx_pubkey, COALESCE(NULLIF(n.name,''), NULLIF(co.name,''), ''),
|
|
cr.lat, cr.lon, cr.heard_key
|
|
FROM client_receptions cr
|
|
LEFT JOIN nodes n ON n.public_key = cr.rx_pubkey
|
|
LEFT JOIN client_observers co ON co.pubkey = cr.rx_pubkey
|
|
WHERE cr.rx_at >= ?
|
|
ORDER BY cr.rx_at DESC
|
|
LIMIT ?`, since, leaderboardScanCap)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
defer rows.Close()
|
|
|
|
type agg struct {
|
|
name string
|
|
receptions int
|
|
cells map[string]struct{}
|
|
nodes map[string]struct{}
|
|
}
|
|
obsAgg := map[string]*agg{}
|
|
cellObservers := map[string]map[string]struct{}{} // cell -> set of rx_pubkey
|
|
|
|
scanned := 0
|
|
for rows.Next() {
|
|
// Honour client cancellation/timeout on the long scan (checked in batches
|
|
// to avoid a per-row context mutex on up to 500k rows).
|
|
if scanned&2047 == 0 && ctx.Err() != nil {
|
|
return nil, ctx.Err()
|
|
}
|
|
var pk, name, heardKey string
|
|
var lat, lon float64
|
|
if err := rows.Scan(&pk, &name, &lat, &lon, &heardKey); err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
scanned++
|
|
a := obsAgg[pk]
|
|
if a == nil {
|
|
a = &agg{name: name, cells: map[string]struct{}{}, nodes: map[string]struct{}{}}
|
|
obsAgg[pk] = a
|
|
}
|
|
a.receptions++
|
|
a.nodes[heardKey] = struct{}{}
|
|
cell := hexCellAt(lat, lon, leaderboardHexRes)
|
|
a.cells[cell] = struct{}{}
|
|
set := cellObservers[cell]
|
|
if set == nil {
|
|
set = map[string]struct{}{}
|
|
cellObservers[cell] = set
|
|
}
|
|
set[pk] = struct{}{}
|
|
}
|
|
if err := rows.Err(); err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
if scanned >= leaderboardScanCap {
|
|
log.Printf("[rx-leaderboard] scan hit cap %d over %dd window; ranking is partial (most-recent rows)", leaderboardScanCap, days)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Per-cell observer counts EXCLUDING blacklisted contributors, so an operator
|
|
// of a blacklisted node parked in a cell can't silently dilute everyone else's
|
|
// frontier weight (#review r2). Name-hidden (not blacklisted) observers are
|
|
// legitimate contributors and still count.
|
|
cellCount := make(map[string]int, len(cellObservers))
|
|
for cell, set := range cellObservers {
|
|
n := 0
|
|
for pk := range set {
|
|
if !s.cfg.IsObserverBlacklisted(pk) && !s.cfg.IsBlacklisted(pk) {
|
|
n++
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
cellCount[cell] = n
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
out := make([]LeaderObserver, 0, len(obsAgg))
|
|
for pk, a := range obsAgg {
|
|
var score float64
|
|
for cell := range a.cells {
|
|
if c := cellCount[cell]; c > 0 {
|
|
score += 1.0 / float64(c)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
out = append(out, LeaderObserver{
|
|
Pubkey: pk,
|
|
Name: a.name,
|
|
Receptions: a.receptions,
|
|
Nodes: len(a.nodes),
|
|
Cells: len(a.cells),
|
|
Score: score,
|
|
})
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Rank by frontier score; ties broken by raw receptions then pubkey so the
|
|
// order is deterministic (keeps same-location fixtures stable).
|
|
sort.Slice(out, func(i, j int) bool {
|
|
if out[i].Score != out[j].Score {
|
|
return out[i].Score > out[j].Score
|
|
}
|
|
if out[i].Receptions != out[j].Receptions {
|
|
return out[i].Receptions > out[j].Receptions
|
|
}
|
|
return out[i].Pubkey < out[j].Pubkey
|
|
})
|
|
|
|
// Identity hiding parity (#1727 r2): drop observer-blacklisted contributors,
|
|
// blank node-blacklisted / hidden-prefix names, cap at limit. nil cfg ⇒ no-ops.
|
|
filtered := make([]LeaderObserver, 0, limit)
|
|
for _, o := range out {
|
|
if s.cfg.IsObserverBlacklisted(o.Pubkey) {
|
|
continue
|
|
}
|
|
if s.cfg.IsBlacklisted(o.Pubkey) || s.cfg.IsNameHidden(o.Name) {
|
|
o.Name = ""
|
|
}
|
|
filtered = append(filtered, o)
|
|
if len(filtered) >= limit {
|
|
break
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return filtered, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (s *Server) handleRxLeaderboard(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
|
|
if !s.requireClientRxCoverage(w, r) {
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
if s.db == nil || s.db.conn == nil {
|
|
http.Error(w, "unavailable", http.StatusServiceUnavailable)
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
days := clampDays(atoiDefault(r.URL.Query().Get("days"), 7))
|
|
limit := atoiDefault(r.URL.Query().Get("limit"), 20)
|
|
if limit < 1 || limit > 100 {
|
|
limit = 20
|
|
}
|
|
obs, err := s.rxLeaderboard(r.Context(), days, limit)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
http.Error(w, "query failed", http.StatusInternalServerError)
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
|
|
json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(RxLeaderboardResp{Days: days, Observers: obs})
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func atoiDefault(s string, d int) int {
|
|
if n, err := strconv.Atoi(strings.TrimSpace(s)); err == nil {
|
|
return n
|
|
}
|
|
return d
|
|
}
|