Files
meshcore-analyzer/qa/scripts/blacklist-test.sh
T
Anupam MedirattaandClaude Opus 5 de237fc29c fix(qa): bind TEST_PUBKEY as a SQLite parameter instead of interpolating it (#1982)
Closes #1977. Supersedes #1952. Follow-up filed as #1983.

## What §10.2 did

```bash
q="SELECT COUNT(*) FROM transmissions WHERE from_node = '$TEST_PUBKEY';"
qq=$(printf %q "$q")
if ! count=$(ssh_t "docker exec … sqlite3 … $qq" 2>/dev/null); then
  count=$(ssh_t "sqlite3 … $qq" 2>/dev/null || echo "")
fi
```

The injection is not reachable today — `TEST_PUBKEY` is hex-gated and
the
script `exit 2`s before the SQL is built. The problem is that the SQL
layer's
safety rests entirely on that outer gate rather than on the SQL layer
itself.
#1952 proposed doubling embedded quotes; that is string escaping, not
parameterisation, which is why it was withdrawn in favour of this.

## What this does

Per the four points in the sign-off on #1977:

**1. Bind the value.** A constant `SELECT` and a bound `:pubkey`, fed to
sqlite3 on stdin. The SQL no longer crosses the remote shell as a
command
word, so there is no `printf %q` on the query at all any more.

**Why hex rather than `.parameter set :pk '<value>'`.** Dot-command
arguments
are split on whitespace, so a payload containing a space produces too
many
arguments — and sqlite3 responds by printing the `.parameter` help to
**stdout**, exiting **0**, and leaving `:pk` **unbound**. `COUNT(*)`
then
returns 0, which reads exactly like a passing security fix. `-bail` does
not
catch it. Verified on 3.51.0:

```
$ printf ".parameter set :pk '' OR 1=1 --'\nSELECT COUNT(*) FROM transmissions WHERE from_node = :pk;\n" \
    | sqlite3 -bail ptest.db
.parameter CMD ...       Manage SQL parameter bindings     # <- help, on stdout
   …
0                                                          # <- :pk never bound
$ echo $?
0
```

`.parameter set :pk 1+1` also binds the integer `2` — the value is
evaluated
as an SQL expression and only falls back to a text literal when
evaluation
fails. So interpolating into the `.parameter set` line trades one hazard
for
another.

Hex-encoding removes the quoting layer instead of adding one: the value
is
bound as `cast(x'<hex>' as text)`, so its contribution to the SQL text
is
drawn from the alphabet `[0-9a-f]` only. Nothing to quote, no tokenizer
arity
hazard, and it holds for **arbitrary** input rather than only for
hex-gated
input — which is the point.

Verified against a fixture table holding two rows, one of them
`deadbeef`:

| value | result | exit |
|---|---|---|
| `deadbeef`, bound as `cast(x'6465616462656566' as text)` | `1` | 0 |
| `' OR 1=1 --`, bound the same way | `0` | 0 |
| `' OR 1=1 --`, interpolated the current way | `2` (whole table) | 0 |
| query against a DB with no `transmissions` table, `-bail` | `Parse
error … no such table` on **stderr** | **1** |

**2. Probe the capability, not a version.** `resolve_sqlite_runner`
binds
`corescope-probe-ok` and asserts it comes back — a round trip, not a
bare
`.parameter init`, so the positive control runs against the operator's
actual
binary rather than one we pin. If neither the container nor the host
qualifies,
it fails loudly and names what is needed:

```
  ❌ retain-failed: no sqlite3 able to bind a parameter on the target
     tried: docker exec -i corescope-prod sqlite3, then sqlite3 on runner@example
     need:  the sqlite3 CLI reachable over ssh, supporting '.parameter set'
OCI runtime exec failed: exec: "sqlite3": executable file not found in $PATH
bash: line 1: sqlite3: command not found
```

There is deliberately **no** interpolating fallback. That would leave
the
vulnerable path in place under a nicer name.

**3. The hex gate is kept**, with its comment updated to say why: for
the SQL
layer it is now defence in depth rather than the only guard. Redundant
is not
the same as wrong.

**4. The exit status and stderr survive.** `-batch -bail -init /dev/null
-noheader -list` (stop at the first SQL error; ignore the operator's
`~/.sqliterc`, where a stray `.mode` would make the count unparseable;
stdout
is exactly the number). Query stderr is captured and printed on failure
rather
than sent to `/dev/null`, so a broken query is distinguishable from a
legitimately empty result. Probe stderr is collected too, and printed
only if
*both* probes fail — the container miss is the known-normal case, so
surfacing
it on every run would be noise.

## Also fixed

An existing double-count in §10.2: the `TARGET_DB_PATH unset` branch
incremented `$fails` and then left `count=""`, so the generic branch
incremented it a **second** time for the same failure.
`read_retain_count` now
gives §10.2 exactly one increment point. Opportunistic cleanup in a file
already being touched (AGENTS.md line 318).

## Tests

New `qa/scripts/test-blacklist-sql.sh`, wired into the `go-test` job. 24
assertions, modelled on `scripts/staging/test-disk-monitor.sh`.

Both directions are asserted, because a zero from a command that failed
proves
nothing:

- **Positive control** — `deadbeef` still returns its row (`1`, exit 0),
and so
  does `cafebabe`; an absent pubkey returns `0`.
- **Negative** — `' OR 1=1 --` returns `0` while the table demonstrably
holds
2 rows, and the old interpolated form is asserted to leak all `2`. That
last
  assertion is what makes the `0` above worth something.
- **Error surfacing** — the same SQL against a DB with no
`transmissions` table
  exits non-zero with a message on stderr and nothing on stdout.
- **Alphabet** — `sql_hex_literal` output matches `^x'[0-9a-f]*'$` for
the SQL
payloads, a backslash, `$(id)` / backticks, an embedded newline,
`héllo`, and
a 4096-byte repetitive string. That last one is a regression guard for
`od
  -v`: without the flag `od` collapses repeated identical lines to `*`.
- `run_sqlite` with no resolved runner refuses rather than guessing.

Group 2 skips loudly (rather than silently) if `sqlite3` is not on PATH;
group
1 needs no sqlite3 and always runs.

**Mutation-tested** — each of these breaks the suite, so the assertions
have
teeth:

| mutation | caught by |
|---|---|
| restore full interpolation | `injection payload → 0 rows — expected
'0' got '2'` |
| naive `.parameter set '%s'` | `expected '0' got '.parameter CMD ...'`
|
| drop `od -v` | alphabet failure on `*`, plus `expected '8192' got
'33'` |

Commit 1 is a behaviour-neutral refactor that moves the imperative body
into
`main()` behind a `BASH_SOURCE` guard, so the test can source the script
and
exercise individual helpers. Same idiom as
`scripts/staging/disk-monitor.sh:99`.

## Verification

- `bash qa/scripts/test-blacklist-sql.sh` → 24 passed, 0 failed
- `bash -n` on both scripts
- All three runtime paths exercised end to end with PATH shims for
  `ssh`/`docker`/`sqlite3` against a real fixture DB: success
  (`sqlite3 runner: host`, count 2), query failure (classified message +
`Parse error … no such table`, `fails=1`), and no-capability (the loud
block
  above, both probe stderrs, `fails=1` — not 2)
- The new step lands inside `go-test`, which runs when
`changes.outputs.code ==
  'true'`; `qa/scripts/*.sh` does not match that job's
  `^docs/|[.]md$|^LICENSE$` documentation filter, so it is not skipped

## Deliberately out of scope

- **The `docker exec` branch is dead on current images** → filed as
#1983. The
app container has no `sqlite3` at all: `Dockerfile:15` is pure-Go SQLite
with
  no CGO, and the `apk add` installs only `mosquitto mosquitto-clients
supervisor caddy wget`. So the host "fallback" is the only path that has
ever
executed, silently, because both branches discarded stderr. This change
keeps
both branches and merely makes the outcome visible (`sqlite3 runner: …`
on
  every run).
- **`-readonly` on the target DB.** Tempting, and verified compatible
with
  `.parameter` (the binding table lives in the TEMP database), but a WAL
database needing journal recovery can refuse a read-only open. Adding it
here
risks exactly the "trades an unreachable injection for a script that
does not
  run" outcome flagged in the #1952 thread. Worth its own issue.
- **The other `2>/dev/null` sites** in this file, which also sit
awkwardly with
`qa/README.md`'s "Don't silence stderr". Only the §10.2 lines named in
the
  sign-off are touched.

🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-09 15:37:40 +02:00

392 lines
16 KiB
Bash
Executable File

#!/usr/bin/env bash
# blacklist-test.sh — verify nodeBlacklist hides a pubkey from API surface
# while retaining its packets in the DB. Implements QA plan §10.1 + §10.2.
#
# Usage:
# blacklist-test.sh BASELINE_URL TARGET_URL
#
# BASELINE_URL is currently unused for assertions but kept as a positional
# arg for parity with other qa-suite scripts (always called with two URLs).
#
# Required env (target host control + test data):
# TEST_NODE_PUBKEY — hex pubkey of a real, currently-visible node on TARGET_URL
# TARGET_SSH_HOST — e.g. runner@example
# TARGET_SSH_KEY — path to ssh private key (default: /root/.ssh/id_ed25519)
# TARGET_CONFIG_PATH — absolute path to config.json on the target
# TARGET_CONTAINER — docker container name on the target
# Optional env:
# TARGET_DB_PATH — sqlite db path on the target (for §10.2 sqlite probe)
# ADMIN_API_TOKEN — if /api/admin/transmissions exists, use it instead of ssh+sqlite
# (read from env, not argv — never appears in ps)
# CURL_TIMEOUT — per-request curl timeout, seconds (default 60)
# RESTART_WAIT_S — max wait for /api/stats after restart (default 120)
#
# Distinguishes:
# ssh-failed → cannot reach/control target
# restart-stuck → /api/stats not 200 within RESTART_WAIT_S
# hide-failed → blacklisted pubkey still surfaced via API (§10.1 fail)
# retain-failed → blacklisted pubkey absent from DB (§10.2 fail), or the
# §10.2 probe could not run at all — no sqlite3 on the target
# able to bind a parameter. The message names what is needed;
# there is no fallback to interpolated SQL.
# teardown-failed→ post-test removal did not restore listing
#
# Exit code = number of failures (0 = pass).
# PUBLIC repo: zero PII — no real pubkeys, IPs, or hostnames as defaults.
#
# Structure: helpers live at top level and the imperative body lives in main(),
# so test-blacklist-sql.sh can source this file and exercise individual helpers
# without running the suite. Same idiom as scripts/staging/disk-monitor.sh.
set -uo pipefail
SSH_OPTS=() # populated by main() from TARGET_SSH_KEY
ssh_t() { ssh "${SSH_OPTS[@]}" "$TARGET_SSH_HOST" "$@"; }
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Teardown — MANDATORY in all exit paths.
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
teardown() {
local rc=$?
if [[ "$TEARDOWN_DONE" == "1" ]]; then rm -rf "$TMP"; exit "$rc"; fi
TEARDOWN_DONE=1
echo "=== teardown: removing $TEST_PUBKEY from nodeBlacklist ==="
if remove_from_blacklist && restart_target && wait_for_stats; then
if node_visible; then
echo " ✅ teardown ok — node returned to listings"
else
echo " ❌ teardown-failed: node still hidden after removal"
rc=$((rc + 1))
fi
else
echo " ❌ teardown-failed: could not restore config / restart / stats"
rc=$((rc + 1))
fi
rm -rf "$TMP"
exit "$rc"
}
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Helpers
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
fetch_code() {
local url="$1" out="$2"
curl -s -m "$CURL_TIMEOUT" -o "$out" -w "%{http_code}" "$url" 2>/dev/null || echo "000"
}
wait_for_stats() {
local deadline code
echo " waiting up to ${RESTART_WAIT_S}s for $TARGET_URL/api/stats ..."
deadline=$(( $(date +%s) + RESTART_WAIT_S ))
while (( $(date +%s) < deadline )); do
code=$(fetch_code "$TARGET_URL/api/stats" "$TMP/stats.json")
if [[ "$code" == "200" ]]; then echo " stats OK"; return 0; fi
sleep 3
done
echo " ❌ restart-stuck: /api/stats never returned 200"
return 1
}
restart_target() {
echo " restarting container $TARGET_CONTAINER ..."
# TARGET_CONTAINER is validated above; still quote defensively.
if ! ssh_t "docker restart $(printf %q "$TARGET_CONTAINER")" >/dev/null; then
echo " ❌ ssh-failed: docker restart failed"
return 1
fi
return 0
}
# Mutate config.json on target. Values pass via env (printf %q + single-quoted
# heredoc) so $TEST_PUBKEY etc. never enter the remote shell as code.
set_blacklist_state() {
local mode="$1" # add | remove
ssh_t "CFG=$(printf %q "$TARGET_CONFIG_PATH") PK=$(printf %q "$TEST_PUBKEY") MODE=$(printf %q "$mode") bash -s" <<'REMOTE'
set -euo pipefail
TMP="$(mktemp)"
trap 'rm -f "$TMP"' EXIT
if command -v jq >/dev/null; then
if [ "$MODE" = "add" ]; then
jq --arg pk "$PK" '.nodeBlacklist = ((.nodeBlacklist // []) + [$pk] | unique)' "$CFG" > "$TMP"
else
jq --arg pk "$PK" '.nodeBlacklist = ((.nodeBlacklist // []) - [$pk])' "$CFG" > "$TMP"
fi
else
python3 - "$CFG" "$PK" "$MODE" "$TMP" <<'PY'
import json, sys
cfg, pk, mode, out = sys.argv[1:]
with open(cfg) as f: d = json.load(f)
bl = list(dict.fromkeys(d.get("nodeBlacklist") or []))
if mode == "add":
if pk not in bl: bl.append(pk)
else:
bl = [x for x in bl if x != pk]
d["nodeBlacklist"] = bl
with open(out, "w") as f: json.dump(d, f, indent=2)
PY
fi
# Preserve mode and ownership; mv across same FS is atomic.
chmod --reference="$CFG" "$TMP" 2>/dev/null || true
chown --reference="$CFG" "$TMP" 2>/dev/null || true
mv "$TMP" "$CFG"
trap - EXIT
REMOTE
local rc=$?
if (( rc != 0 )); then
echo " ❌ ssh-failed: could not edit $TARGET_CONFIG_PATH ($mode)"
return 1
fi
return 0
}
add_to_blacklist() { set_blacklist_state add; }
remove_from_blacklist() { set_blacklist_state remove; }
node_visible() {
# Returns 0 if the pubkey is currently visible via API.
local code
code=$(fetch_code "$TARGET_URL/api/nodes/$TEST_PUBKEY" "$TMP/node.json")
if [[ "$code" == "200" ]]; then return 0; fi
fetch_code "$TARGET_URL/api/nodes?limit=10000" "$TMP/nodes.json" >/dev/null
if grep -qF -- "\"$TEST_PUBKEY\"" "$TMP/nodes.json" 2>/dev/null; then
return 0
fi
return 1
}
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
# §10.2 DB probe — bind the pubkey, do not interpolate it (issue #1977)
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Batch flags, all in service of "the count is parseable and errors are visible":
# -bail stop at the first SQL error instead of running on
# -init /dev/null ignore the operator's ~/.sqliterc — a stray .mode there
# would make the count unparseable
# -noheader -list stdout is exactly the number, nothing else
SQLITE_ARGS=(-batch -bail -init /dev/null -noheader -list)
# Round-trip probe token. The value is arbitrary; it only has to come back intact.
SQLITE_PROBE_TOKEN="corescope-probe-ok"
SQLITE_RUNNER="" # "container" | "host", set by resolve_sqlite_runner
RETAIN_COUNT="" # set by read_retain_count
# Hex-encode a value for embedding in SQL as a blob literal.
#
# Why hex rather than quoting: the output alphabet is [0-9a-f], so no byte the
# caller passes can terminate a string literal or add a dot-command argument.
# That holds for arbitrary input, which is the point — the SQL layer stops
# depending on main()'s hex gate in order to be safe.
#
# `od -v` is load-bearing: without it od collapses runs of identical lines to
# '*' and long repetitive values encode wrongly.
sql_hex_literal() {
printf "x'%s'" "$(printf '%s' "$1" | od -An -v -tx1 | tr -d ' \n')"
}
# SQL for the §10.2 count, fed to sqlite3 on stdin. The SELECT text is a
# constant; the pubkey arrives as a bound parameter.
#
# Note the nested cast rather than `.parameter set :pubkey '<value>'`:
# dot-command arguments are split on whitespace, so a value containing a space
# (e.g. "' OR 1=1 --") makes sqlite3 print the .parameter help to STDOUT, exit
# 0, and leave :pubkey unbound. COUNT(*) then returns 0 — which reads exactly
# like a passing security fix. -bail does not catch it either.
transmission_count_sql() {
printf '.parameter init\n'
printf '.parameter set :pubkey "cast(%s as text)"\n' "$(sql_hex_literal "$1")"
printf 'SELECT COUNT(*) FROM transmissions WHERE from_node = :pubkey;\n'
}
# Capability probe: bind a known value and read it back. A version number only
# implies that .parameter works; binding something and getting it back proves it
# on the binary actually in front of us, which is the operator's, not ours.
sqlite_probe_sql() {
printf '.parameter init\n'
printf '.parameter set :probe "cast(%s as text)"\n' "$(sql_hex_literal "$SQLITE_PROBE_TOKEN")"
printf 'SELECT :probe;\n'
}
# Find a sqlite3 that can bind a parameter — in the container first, then on the
# host. Sets SQLITE_RUNNER; returns 1 if neither qualifies. There is deliberately
# no interpolating fallback: that would leave the vulnerable path in place under
# a nicer name.
#
# Probe stderr is collected rather than discarded, but only printed if BOTH
# probes fail. The container miss is the known-normal case — the app image has
# no sqlite3 (pure-Go driver, no CGO; Dockerfile:15) — so surfacing it on every
# run would be noise.
resolve_sqlite_runner() {
local probe out
probe=$(sqlite_probe_sql)
SQLITE_RUNNER=""
out=$(ssh_t "docker exec -i $(printf %q "$TARGET_CONTAINER") sqlite3 ${SQLITE_ARGS[*]} :memory:" \
<<<"$probe" 2>>"$TMP/sqlite-probe.err")
if [[ "$out" == "$SQLITE_PROBE_TOKEN" ]]; then SQLITE_RUNNER="container"; return 0; fi
out=$(ssh_t "sqlite3 ${SQLITE_ARGS[*]} :memory:" <<<"$probe" 2>>"$TMP/sqlite-probe.err")
if [[ "$out" == "$SQLITE_PROBE_TOKEN" ]]; then SQLITE_RUNNER="host"; return 0; fi
return 1
}
# Run SQL from stdin against TARGET_DB_PATH via the resolved runner. Stderr is
# left alone so the caller can capture it, and the exit status is sqlite3's.
# The SQL crosses on stdin, so only the container name and db path still need
# printf %q for the remote shell. docker exec needs -i to attach stdin.
run_sqlite() {
case "$SQLITE_RUNNER" in
container) ssh_t "docker exec -i $(printf %q "$TARGET_CONTAINER") sqlite3 ${SQLITE_ARGS[*]} $(printf %q "$TARGET_DB_PATH")" ;;
host) ssh_t "sqlite3 ${SQLITE_ARGS[*]} $(printf %q "$TARGET_DB_PATH")" ;;
*) echo "run_sqlite: no runner resolved" >&2; return 127 ;;
esac
}
# Read the retained-transmission count into RETAIN_COUNT. Prints a classified
# "retain-failed" line and returns 1 on failure, so §10.2 has exactly one place
# that increments $fails.
read_retain_count() {
RETAIN_COUNT=""
local code
if [[ -n "$ADMIN_API_TOKEN" ]]; then
# Read auth header from stdin so the token never enters argv (ps-safe).
code=$(printf 'header = "Authorization: Bearer %s"\n' "$ADMIN_API_TOKEN" | \
curl -s -m "$CURL_TIMEOUT" -K - -o "$TMP/admin.json" -w "%{http_code}" \
"$TARGET_URL/api/admin/transmissions?from_node=$TEST_PUBKEY&count=1" 2>/dev/null || echo "000")
if [[ "$code" == "200" ]]; then
RETAIN_COUNT=$(jq -r '.count // ((.transmissions // []) | length)' "$TMP/admin.json" 2>/dev/null || echo "")
fi
if [[ -n "$RETAIN_COUNT" ]]; then return 0; fi
fi
if [[ -z "$TARGET_DB_PATH" ]]; then
echo " ❌ retain-failed: TARGET_DB_PATH unset and no ADMIN_API_TOKEN — cannot probe"
return 1
fi
if ! resolve_sqlite_runner; then
echo " ❌ retain-failed: no sqlite3 able to bind a parameter on the target"
echo " tried: docker exec -i $TARGET_CONTAINER sqlite3, then sqlite3 on $TARGET_SSH_HOST"
echo " need: the sqlite3 CLI reachable over ssh, supporting '.parameter set'"
cat "$TMP/sqlite-probe.err" >&2
return 1
fi
echo " sqlite3 runner: $SQLITE_RUNNER"
if ! RETAIN_COUNT=$(run_sqlite <<<"$(transmission_count_sql "$TEST_PUBKEY")" 2>"$TMP/sqlite.err"); then
echo " ❌ retain-failed: sqlite3 query failed via $SQLITE_RUNNER"
cat "$TMP/sqlite.err" >&2
RETAIN_COUNT=""
return 1
fi
return 0
}
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
# main
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
main() {
BASELINE_URL="${1:-}"
TARGET_URL="${2:-}"
if [[ -z "$BASELINE_URL" || -z "$TARGET_URL" ]]; then
echo "usage: $0 BASELINE_URL TARGET_URL (TEST_NODE_PUBKEY+TARGET_* via env)" >&2
exit 2
fi
TEST_PUBKEY="${TEST_NODE_PUBKEY:-}"
TARGET_SSH_HOST="${TARGET_SSH_HOST:-}"
TARGET_SSH_KEY="${TARGET_SSH_KEY:-/root/.ssh/id_ed25519}"
TARGET_CONFIG_PATH="${TARGET_CONFIG_PATH:-}"
TARGET_CONTAINER="${TARGET_CONTAINER:-}"
TARGET_DB_PATH="${TARGET_DB_PATH:-}"
ADMIN_API_TOKEN="${ADMIN_API_TOKEN:-}"
if [[ -z "$TEST_PUBKEY" || -z "$TARGET_SSH_HOST" || -z "$TARGET_CONFIG_PATH" || -z "$TARGET_CONTAINER" ]]; then
echo "error: TEST_NODE_PUBKEY, TARGET_SSH_HOST, TARGET_CONFIG_PATH, TARGET_CONTAINER are required" >&2
exit 2
fi
# Hard input validation — these strings are interpolated into the remote shell.
# §10.2's SQL binds TEST_PUBKEY as a parameter rather than interpolating it, so
# for the SQL layer this gate is defence in depth rather than the only guard
# (issue #1977). Keep it: redundant is not the same as wrong.
# Pubkey must be hex (MeshCore pubkeys are hex-encoded ed25519 prefixes).
if ! [[ "$TEST_PUBKEY" =~ ^[0-9a-fA-F]+$ ]]; then
echo "error: TEST_NODE_PUBKEY must be hex (got: redacted)" >&2
exit 2
fi
# Container name must match docker's allowed chars: [a-zA-Z0-9][a-zA-Z0-9_.-]*
if ! [[ "$TARGET_CONTAINER" =~ ^[a-zA-Z0-9][a-zA-Z0-9_.-]*$ ]]; then
echo "error: TARGET_CONTAINER has illegal chars" >&2
exit 2
fi
# Config path must be an absolute, sane path (no spaces, quotes, $, ;, etc.).
if ! [[ "$TARGET_CONFIG_PATH" =~ ^/[A-Za-z0-9_./-]+$ ]]; then
echo "error: TARGET_CONFIG_PATH must be a sane absolute path" >&2
exit 2
fi
if [[ -n "$TARGET_DB_PATH" ]] && ! [[ "$TARGET_DB_PATH" =~ ^/[A-Za-z0-9_./-]+$ ]]; then
echo "error: TARGET_DB_PATH must be a sane absolute path" >&2
exit 2
fi
CURL_TIMEOUT="${CURL_TIMEOUT:-60}"
RESTART_WAIT_S="${RESTART_WAIT_S:-120}"
SSH_OPTS=(-i "$TARGET_SSH_KEY" -o StrictHostKeyChecking=accept-new -o ConnectTimeout=15 -o BatchMode=yes)
TMP=$(mktemp -d)
fails=0
TEARDOWN_DONE=0
trap teardown EXIT INT TERM
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# §10.1 — hide
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
echo "=== §10.1 add $TEST_PUBKEY to nodeBlacklist ==="
if ! add_to_blacklist; then fails=$((fails+1)); exit "$fails"; fi
if ! restart_target; then fails=$((fails+1)); exit "$fails"; fi
if ! wait_for_stats; then fails=$((fails+1)); exit "$fails"; fi
detail_code=$(fetch_code "$TARGET_URL/api/nodes/$TEST_PUBKEY" "$TMP/detail.json")
list_code=$(fetch_code "$TARGET_URL/api/nodes?limit=10000" "$TMP/list.json")
in_list=0
if [[ "$list_code" == "200" ]] && grep -qF -- "\"$TEST_PUBKEY\"" "$TMP/list.json"; then
in_list=1
fi
if [[ "$detail_code" == "404" || "$in_list" == "0" ]]; then
echo " ✅ hide ok: detail=$detail_code in_list=$in_list"
else
echo " ❌ hide-failed: detail=$detail_code in_list=$in_list — pubkey still surfaced"
fails=$((fails+1))
fi
topo_code=$(fetch_code "$TARGET_URL/api/topology" "$TMP/topo.json")
if [[ "$topo_code" != "200" ]]; then
echo " ⚠️ /api/topology HTTP $topo_code — skipping topology assertion"
elif grep -qF -- "$TEST_PUBKEY" "$TMP/topo.json"; then
echo " ❌ hide-failed: /api/topology references blacklisted pubkey"
fails=$((fails+1))
else
echo " ✅ topology clean"
fi
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# §10.2 — DB retain
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
echo "=== §10.2 verify packets retained in DB ==="
if ! read_retain_count; then
# read_retain_count already printed the classified reason. Counting here and
# nowhere else: the old code incremented $fails for the "TARGET_DB_PATH
# unset" case and then again for the empty count it left behind.
fails=$((fails+1))
elif [[ "$RETAIN_COUNT" =~ ^[0-9]+$ ]] && (( RETAIN_COUNT > 0 )); then
echo " ✅ DB retains $RETAIN_COUNT packets from $TEST_PUBKEY"
else
echo " ❌ retain-failed: count=$RETAIN_COUNT (expected > 0)"
fails=$((fails+1))
fi
echo "=== summary: $fails failure(s) before teardown ==="
# trap handles teardown + exit
exit "$fails"
}
# Only run main when executed directly (not when sourced by tests).
if [ "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}" = "${0}" ]; then
main "$@"
fi