Files
meshcore-analyzer/cmd/server/websocket.go
T
efitenandClaude Opus 5 1ffaad8eb1 feat(#1794): per-IP limits and a deny list on the /ws upgrade (#1974)
Closes #1794. Follow-up to #1793, decided **before** the upgrade because
the handshake is the resource being protected.

- Deny list of addresses and CIDRs → 403
- Per-IP concurrent connection cap → 403
- Per-IP upgrade rate limit over a rolling minute → **429**, not 403: a
temporary refusal should not read as "never come back"
- Rejection counters split by cause in `/api/stats` under `websocket`

### The decision this feature lives or dies on

Most CoreScope installs sit behind nginx, Caddy, Traefik or an ingress.
`cdn_detection.go` says so in as many words: it deliberately excludes
`X-Forwarded-For` from its CDN signals precisely because *every*
reverse-proxied install sets it. For those deployments `r.RemoteAddr` is
the proxy, `127.0.0.1` for every visitor on earth. A per-IP cap keyed on
that address protects nobody and hands the sixth legitimate browser tab
a 403. That is a self-inflicted outage wearing the costume of hardening.

So:

- **`X-Forwarded-For` is believed only from an address listed in
`webSocket.trustedProxies`.** From anywhere else it is
attacker-supplied, and trusting it would let anyone mint a fresh source
IP per connection, which is strictly worse than having no limit at all.
- **When the peer looks like a local reverse proxy and no
`trustedProxies` is set, the per-IP limits are skipped**, and one
warning names the setting that fixes it. Silently refusing real users is
the worse failure.
- **The deny list still applies there**, because it is the operator's
explicit instruction rather than an inference.

That is the answer to @mcode6726's question on the thread: it is neither
"always the socket address" nor "always the header", and the operator
decides which by naming their proxy.

### Two deliberate departures from the issue body

**`maxConnsPerIP` ships as 0 (off), not 5.** Carrier-grade NAT puts
thousands of unrelated mobile subscribers behind a single public IPv4. A
cap of 5 refuses real visitors on phones while a scraper simply rents
more addresses: all of the cost, none of the benefit.
`upgradesPerMinPerIP` ships at **30 and on**, because that one *is* safe
under CGNAT: a real client upgrades a handful of times per minute even
while reconnecting, so 30 leaves ordinary traffic untouched while
flattening a reconnect loop. A pointer type distinguishes "unset" from
an explicit `0` that turns it off.

**The default deny list is not shipped.** The thread proposed seeding 44
CIDRs for one VPS provider after a single scraper was seen at
`23.111.177.6`. I have left it out: blanket-blocking a hosting provider
by default breaks legitimate operators who host there, is undiscoverable
by the person locked out (they see a bare 403), and ages badly as ranges
get reassigned. The mechanism is here and `config.example.json` shows
exactly how to configure it, so any operator who wants that list can
have it in one line. If you want it shipped as a default anyway, that is
your call as maintainer and it is a one-line change.

### Verification

19 tests, including all five the issue specifies as TDD requirements,
each marked with the issue's own wording. Beyond those five:

- a **bare address** in the deny list works, not just CIDR form.
Operators write `1.2.3.4`, and silently ignoring that would be the worst
possible failure for a deny list: it looks configured and blocks nothing
- an unparseable deny entry is skipped and logged, not fatal. One typo
must not take the server down
- one client behind a trusted proxy does **not** exhaust another
client's budget behind the same proxy, which is the entire point of
honouring XFF
- changing a forged XFF from an untrusted peer buys no fresh budget
- `release` frees a slot and is **idempotent**, because `Unregister` can
run twice for one client and double-crediting would leak slots
- a **rejected** upgrade does not consume rate budget, or a retrying
client could never recover once its window cleared
- limits skipped for loopback and private peers; deny list applies
anyway
- a nil limiter allows everything, so a `Hub` built without
`ConfigureLimits` behaves exactly as before
- idle per-IP state is collected, while a record with a live connection
never is

Full `cmd/server` suite green, `gofmt` clean.

### Not done

- No runtime config reload; restart required. Listed as optional in the
issue.
- No `WS_DENY_IPS` env override. Also listed as optional.
- From the OWASP expansion in the first comment: `maxPayload` and the
idle/read timeout are **already in master** (`SetReadLimit`,
`SetReadDeadline`). The ping/pong heartbeat is not, and is not in this
PR either; it is a separate change to the read/write pumps and belongs
in its own review.

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-06 21:11:29 +02:00

381 lines
10 KiB
Go

package main
import (
"encoding/json"
"log"
"net/http"
"net/url"
"strings"
"sync"
"time"
"github.com/gorilla/websocket"
)
// Hub manages WebSocket clients and broadcasts.
type Hub struct {
mu sync.RWMutex
clients map[*Client]bool
upgrader websocket.Upgrader
allowedOrigins []string // exact-match allowlist for /ws CheckOrigin (see SetAllowedOrigins)
limits *wsLimiter // #1794: per-IP caps and deny list; nil allows everything
}
// SetAllowedOrigins configures the exact-match origin allowlist consulted by
// the WebSocket upgrader's CheckOrigin. The "*" wildcard is deliberately NOT
// honored here (it IS honored by the HTTP CORS middleware): OWASP's
// WebSocket Security Cheat Sheet recommends an explicit allowlist for CSWSH
// defense. If "*" appears in the slice, it is ignored and a startup WARN is
// logged once per call.
//
// See: https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/WebSocket_Security_Cheat_Sheet.html
func (h *Hub) SetAllowedOrigins(origins []string) {
h.mu.Lock()
defer h.mu.Unlock()
h.allowedOrigins = append(h.allowedOrigins[:0], origins...)
for _, o := range origins {
if o == "*" {
log.Println(`[ws] WARNING: CORSAllowedOrigins contains "*" — CORS allows any origin for XHR, but /ws upgrade enforces explicit allowlist only (OWASP CSWSH guidance). Add specific origins to allow cross-origin WebSocket clients.`)
break
}
}
}
// checkOrigin is the gorilla/websocket Upgrader.CheckOrigin hook. Rules:
// - empty Origin header → allow (non-browser client; rate-limit / IP gate
// is handled separately, see #1794).
// - Origin host == request Host (same-origin) → allow.
// - Origin in allowedOrigins by exact case-insensitive match → allow.
// - "*" in allowedOrigins is ignored (see SetAllowedOrigins).
// - anything else → reject (gorilla returns 403).
func (h *Hub) checkOrigin(r *http.Request) bool {
origin := r.Header.Get("Origin")
if origin == "" {
return true
}
u, err := url.Parse(origin)
if err != nil {
return false
}
if strings.EqualFold(u.Host, r.Host) {
return true
}
h.mu.RLock()
allowed := h.allowedOrigins
h.mu.RUnlock()
for _, o := range allowed {
if o == "*" {
continue // deliberately not honored — see SetAllowedOrigins
}
if strings.EqualFold(o, origin) {
return true
}
}
return false
}
// Client is a single WebSocket connection.
type Client struct {
conn *websocket.Conn
send chan []byte
closeOnce sync.Once
// release returns this connection's slot to the per-IP concurrent cap
// (#1794). Always non-nil so Unregister needs no nil check; it is a no-op
// when limits are disabled.
release func()
}
// ConfigureLimits installs the #1794 transport limits. Called once at
// startup, before the listener binds, so no upgrade can race a half-built
// limiter. Passing zero values for both caps leaves only the deny list
// active, which is a legitimate configuration.
func (h *Hub) ConfigureLimits(maxConnsPerIP, upgradesPerMin int, trustedProxies, deny []string) {
l := newWSLimiter()
l.maxConnsPerIP = maxConnsPerIP
l.upgradesPerMin = upgradesPerMin
l.trustedProxies = parseCIDRList(trustedProxies, "webSocket.trustedProxies")
l.denyNets = parseCIDRList(deny, "webSocket.deny")
h.mu.Lock()
h.limits = l
h.mu.Unlock()
if len(l.denyNets) > 0 {
log.Printf("[ws] deny list active: %d network(s)", len(l.denyNets))
}
if len(l.trustedProxies) == 0 && (maxConnsPerIP > 0 || upgradesPerMin > 0) {
log.Printf("[ws] per-IP limits configured with no trustedProxies: they apply only to " +
"directly-connected clients. Behind a reverse proxy, set webSocket.trustedProxies.")
}
}
func NewHub() *Hub {
h := &Hub{
clients: make(map[*Client]bool),
}
h.upgrader = websocket.Upgrader{
ReadBufferSize: 1024,
WriteBufferSize: 4096,
CheckOrigin: h.checkOrigin,
}
return h
}
func (h *Hub) ClientCount() int {
h.mu.RLock()
defer h.mu.RUnlock()
return len(h.clients)
}
func (h *Hub) Register(c *Client) {
h.mu.Lock()
h.clients[c] = true
h.mu.Unlock()
log.Printf("[ws] client connected (%d total)", h.ClientCount())
}
func (h *Hub) Unregister(c *Client) {
h.mu.Lock()
if _, ok := h.clients[c]; ok {
delete(h.clients, c)
c.closeOnce.Do(func() { close(c.send) })
}
h.mu.Unlock()
// #1794: outside the lock — release takes the limiter's own mutex, and
// holding two locks in one order here and the other order elsewhere is how
// deadlocks are made. Idempotent, so a double Unregister cannot over-credit.
if c.release != nil {
c.release()
}
log.Printf("[ws] client disconnected (%d total)", h.ClientCount())
}
// Close gracefully disconnects all WebSocket clients.
func (h *Hub) Close() {
h.mu.Lock()
for c := range h.clients {
c.conn.WriteControl(
websocket.CloseMessage,
websocket.FormatCloseMessage(websocket.CloseGoingAway, "server shutting down"),
time.Now().Add(3*time.Second),
)
c.closeOnce.Do(func() { close(c.send) })
delete(h.clients, c)
}
h.mu.Unlock()
log.Println("[ws] all clients disconnected")
}
// Broadcast sends a message to all connected clients.
func (h *Hub) Broadcast(msg interface{}) {
data, err := json.Marshal(msg)
if err != nil {
log.Printf("[ws] marshal error: %v", err)
return
}
h.mu.RLock()
defer h.mu.RUnlock()
for c := range h.clients {
select {
case c.send <- data:
default:
// Client buffer full — drop
}
}
}
// ServeWS handles the WebSocket upgrade and runs the client.
func (h *Hub) ServeWS(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
// #1794: decide BEFORE the upgrade. Rejecting afterwards would already
// have allocated the connection and completed the handshake, which is the
// resource this is meant to protect.
ok, reason, key, release := h.limits.allow(r)
if !ok {
status := http.StatusForbidden
if reason == wsRejectRate {
// 429 tells a well-behaved client to back off; 403 would read as
// "never come back" for what is a temporary refusal.
status = http.StatusTooManyRequests
}
log.Printf("[ws] reject ip=%s reason=%s", key, reason)
http.Error(w, "websocket upgrade refused", status)
return
}
conn, err := h.upgrader.Upgrade(w, r, nil)
if err != nil {
log.Printf("[ws] upgrade error: %v", err)
release() // the slot was charged above and this connection never happened
return
}
client := &Client{
conn: conn,
send: make(chan []byte, 256),
release: release,
}
h.Register(client)
go client.writePump()
go client.readPump(h)
}
// wsOrStatic upgrades WebSocket requests at any path, serves static files otherwise.
func wsOrStatic(hub *Hub, static http.Handler) http.Handler {
return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
if strings.EqualFold(r.Header.Get("Upgrade"), "websocket") {
hub.ServeWS(w, r)
return
}
static.ServeHTTP(w, r)
})
}
func (c *Client) readPump(hub *Hub) {
defer func() {
hub.Unregister(c)
c.conn.Close()
}()
c.conn.SetReadLimit(512)
c.conn.SetReadDeadline(time.Now().Add(60 * time.Second))
c.conn.SetPongHandler(func(string) error {
c.conn.SetReadDeadline(time.Now().Add(60 * time.Second))
return nil
})
for {
_, _, err := c.conn.ReadMessage()
if err != nil {
break
}
}
}
func (c *Client) writePump() {
ticker := time.NewTicker(30 * time.Second)
defer func() {
ticker.Stop()
c.conn.Close()
}()
for {
select {
case message, ok := <-c.send:
c.conn.SetWriteDeadline(time.Now().Add(10 * time.Second))
if !ok {
c.conn.WriteMessage(websocket.CloseMessage, []byte{})
return
}
if err := c.conn.WriteMessage(websocket.TextMessage, message); err != nil {
return
}
case <-ticker.C:
c.conn.SetWriteDeadline(time.Now().Add(10 * time.Second))
if err := c.conn.WriteMessage(websocket.PingMessage, nil); err != nil {
return
}
}
}
}
// Poller watches for new transmissions in SQLite and broadcasts them.
type Poller struct {
db *DB
hub *Hub
store *PacketStore // optional: if set, new transmissions are ingested into memory
interval time.Duration
stop chan struct{}
}
func NewPoller(db *DB, hub *Hub, interval time.Duration) *Poller {
return &Poller{db: db, hub: hub, interval: interval, stop: make(chan struct{})}
}
func (p *Poller) Start() {
lastID := p.db.GetMaxTransmissionID()
lastObsID := p.db.GetMaxObservationID()
// If the store already loaded data, use its max IDs as a floor.
// This prevents replaying the entire DB when the DB query fails
// (e.g., corrupted DB returns 0 from COALESCE).
if p.store != nil {
if storeMax := p.store.MaxTransmissionID(); storeMax > lastID {
lastID = storeMax
}
if storeMaxObs := p.store.MaxObservationID(); storeMaxObs > lastObsID {
lastObsID = storeMaxObs
}
}
log.Printf("[poller] starting from transmission ID %d, obs ID %d, interval %v", lastID, lastObsID, p.interval)
ticker := time.NewTicker(p.interval)
defer ticker.Stop()
for {
select {
case <-ticker.C:
if p.store != nil {
// Ingest new transmissions into in-memory store and broadcast
newTxs, newMax := p.store.IngestNewFromDB(lastID, 100)
if newMax > lastID {
lastID = newMax
}
// Ingest new observations for existing transmissions (fixes #174)
nextObsID := lastObsID
if err := p.db.conn.QueryRow(`
SELECT COALESCE(MAX(id), ?) FROM (
SELECT id FROM observations
WHERE id > ?
ORDER BY id ASC
LIMIT 500
)`, lastObsID, lastObsID).Scan(&nextObsID); err != nil {
nextObsID = lastObsID
}
newObs := p.store.IngestNewObservations(lastObsID, 500)
if nextObsID > lastObsID {
lastObsID = nextObsID
}
if len(newTxs) > 0 {
log.Printf("[broadcast] sending %d packets to %d clients (lastID now %d)", len(newTxs), p.hub.ClientCount(), lastID)
}
for _, tx := range newTxs {
p.hub.Broadcast(WSMessage{
Type: "packet",
Data: tx,
})
}
for _, obs := range newObs {
p.hub.Broadcast(WSMessage{
Type: "packet",
Data: obs,
})
}
} else {
// Fallback: direct DB query (used when store is nil, e.g. tests)
newTxs, err := p.db.GetNewTransmissionsSince(lastID, 100)
if err != nil {
log.Printf("[poller] error: %v", err)
continue
}
for _, tx := range newTxs {
id, _ := tx["id"].(int)
if id > lastID {
lastID = id
}
// Copy packet fields for the nested packet (avoids circular ref)
pkt := make(map[string]interface{}, len(tx))
for k, v := range tx {
pkt[k] = v
}
tx["packet"] = pkt
p.hub.Broadcast(WSMessage{
Type: "packet",
Data: tx,
})
}
}
case <-p.stop:
return
}
}
}
func (p *Poller) Stop() {
close(p.stop)
}