Files
meshcore-analyzer/qa/scripts
Anupam MedirattaandClaude Opus 5 de237fc29c fix(qa): bind TEST_PUBKEY as a SQLite parameter instead of interpolating it (#1982)
Closes #1977. Supersedes #1952. Follow-up filed as #1983.

## What §10.2 did

```bash
q="SELECT COUNT(*) FROM transmissions WHERE from_node = '$TEST_PUBKEY';"
qq=$(printf %q "$q")
if ! count=$(ssh_t "docker exec … sqlite3 … $qq" 2>/dev/null); then
  count=$(ssh_t "sqlite3 … $qq" 2>/dev/null || echo "")
fi
```

The injection is not reachable today — `TEST_PUBKEY` is hex-gated and
the
script `exit 2`s before the SQL is built. The problem is that the SQL
layer's
safety rests entirely on that outer gate rather than on the SQL layer
itself.
#1952 proposed doubling embedded quotes; that is string escaping, not
parameterisation, which is why it was withdrawn in favour of this.

## What this does

Per the four points in the sign-off on #1977:

**1. Bind the value.** A constant `SELECT` and a bound `:pubkey`, fed to
sqlite3 on stdin. The SQL no longer crosses the remote shell as a
command
word, so there is no `printf %q` on the query at all any more.

**Why hex rather than `.parameter set :pk '<value>'`.** Dot-command
arguments
are split on whitespace, so a payload containing a space produces too
many
arguments — and sqlite3 responds by printing the `.parameter` help to
**stdout**, exiting **0**, and leaving `:pk` **unbound**. `COUNT(*)`
then
returns 0, which reads exactly like a passing security fix. `-bail` does
not
catch it. Verified on 3.51.0:

```
$ printf ".parameter set :pk '' OR 1=1 --'\nSELECT COUNT(*) FROM transmissions WHERE from_node = :pk;\n" \
    | sqlite3 -bail ptest.db
.parameter CMD ...       Manage SQL parameter bindings     # <- help, on stdout
   …
0                                                          # <- :pk never bound
$ echo $?
0
```

`.parameter set :pk 1+1` also binds the integer `2` — the value is
evaluated
as an SQL expression and only falls back to a text literal when
evaluation
fails. So interpolating into the `.parameter set` line trades one hazard
for
another.

Hex-encoding removes the quoting layer instead of adding one: the value
is
bound as `cast(x'<hex>' as text)`, so its contribution to the SQL text
is
drawn from the alphabet `[0-9a-f]` only. Nothing to quote, no tokenizer
arity
hazard, and it holds for **arbitrary** input rather than only for
hex-gated
input — which is the point.

Verified against a fixture table holding two rows, one of them
`deadbeef`:

| value | result | exit |
|---|---|---|
| `deadbeef`, bound as `cast(x'6465616462656566' as text)` | `1` | 0 |
| `' OR 1=1 --`, bound the same way | `0` | 0 |
| `' OR 1=1 --`, interpolated the current way | `2` (whole table) | 0 |
| query against a DB with no `transmissions` table, `-bail` | `Parse
error … no such table` on **stderr** | **1** |

**2. Probe the capability, not a version.** `resolve_sqlite_runner`
binds
`corescope-probe-ok` and asserts it comes back — a round trip, not a
bare
`.parameter init`, so the positive control runs against the operator's
actual
binary rather than one we pin. If neither the container nor the host
qualifies,
it fails loudly and names what is needed:

```
  ❌ retain-failed: no sqlite3 able to bind a parameter on the target
     tried: docker exec -i corescope-prod sqlite3, then sqlite3 on runner@example
     need:  the sqlite3 CLI reachable over ssh, supporting '.parameter set'
OCI runtime exec failed: exec: "sqlite3": executable file not found in $PATH
bash: line 1: sqlite3: command not found
```

There is deliberately **no** interpolating fallback. That would leave
the
vulnerable path in place under a nicer name.

**3. The hex gate is kept**, with its comment updated to say why: for
the SQL
layer it is now defence in depth rather than the only guard. Redundant
is not
the same as wrong.

**4. The exit status and stderr survive.** `-batch -bail -init /dev/null
-noheader -list` (stop at the first SQL error; ignore the operator's
`~/.sqliterc`, where a stray `.mode` would make the count unparseable;
stdout
is exactly the number). Query stderr is captured and printed on failure
rather
than sent to `/dev/null`, so a broken query is distinguishable from a
legitimately empty result. Probe stderr is collected too, and printed
only if
*both* probes fail — the container miss is the known-normal case, so
surfacing
it on every run would be noise.

## Also fixed

An existing double-count in §10.2: the `TARGET_DB_PATH unset` branch
incremented `$fails` and then left `count=""`, so the generic branch
incremented it a **second** time for the same failure.
`read_retain_count` now
gives §10.2 exactly one increment point. Opportunistic cleanup in a file
already being touched (AGENTS.md line 318).

## Tests

New `qa/scripts/test-blacklist-sql.sh`, wired into the `go-test` job. 24
assertions, modelled on `scripts/staging/test-disk-monitor.sh`.

Both directions are asserted, because a zero from a command that failed
proves
nothing:

- **Positive control** — `deadbeef` still returns its row (`1`, exit 0),
and so
  does `cafebabe`; an absent pubkey returns `0`.
- **Negative** — `' OR 1=1 --` returns `0` while the table demonstrably
holds
2 rows, and the old interpolated form is asserted to leak all `2`. That
last
  assertion is what makes the `0` above worth something.
- **Error surfacing** — the same SQL against a DB with no
`transmissions` table
  exits non-zero with a message on stderr and nothing on stdout.
- **Alphabet** — `sql_hex_literal` output matches `^x'[0-9a-f]*'$` for
the SQL
payloads, a backslash, `$(id)` / backticks, an embedded newline,
`héllo`, and
a 4096-byte repetitive string. That last one is a regression guard for
`od
  -v`: without the flag `od` collapses repeated identical lines to `*`.
- `run_sqlite` with no resolved runner refuses rather than guessing.

Group 2 skips loudly (rather than silently) if `sqlite3` is not on PATH;
group
1 needs no sqlite3 and always runs.

**Mutation-tested** — each of these breaks the suite, so the assertions
have
teeth:

| mutation | caught by |
|---|---|
| restore full interpolation | `injection payload → 0 rows — expected
'0' got '2'` |
| naive `.parameter set '%s'` | `expected '0' got '.parameter CMD ...'`
|
| drop `od -v` | alphabet failure on `*`, plus `expected '8192' got
'33'` |

Commit 1 is a behaviour-neutral refactor that moves the imperative body
into
`main()` behind a `BASH_SOURCE` guard, so the test can source the script
and
exercise individual helpers. Same idiom as
`scripts/staging/disk-monitor.sh:99`.

## Verification

- `bash qa/scripts/test-blacklist-sql.sh` → 24 passed, 0 failed
- `bash -n` on both scripts
- All three runtime paths exercised end to end with PATH shims for
  `ssh`/`docker`/`sqlite3` against a real fixture DB: success
  (`sqlite3 runner: host`, count 2), query failure (classified message +
`Parse error … no such table`, `fails=1`), and no-capability (the loud
block
  above, both probe stderrs, `fails=1` — not 2)
- The new step lands inside `go-test`, which runs when
`changes.outputs.code ==
  'true'`; `qa/scripts/*.sh` does not match that job's
  `^docs/|[.]md$|^LICENSE$` documentation filter, so it is not skipped

## Deliberately out of scope

- **The `docker exec` branch is dead on current images** → filed as
#1983. The
app container has no `sqlite3` at all: `Dockerfile:15` is pure-Go SQLite
with
  no CGO, and the `apk add` installs only `mosquitto mosquitto-clients
supervisor caddy wget`. So the host "fallback" is the only path that has
ever
executed, silently, because both branches discarded stderr. This change
keeps
both branches and merely makes the outcome visible (`sqlite3 runner: …`
on
  every run).
- **`-readonly` on the target DB.** Tempting, and verified compatible
with
  `.parameter` (the binding table lives in the TEMP database), but a WAL
database needing journal recovery can refuse a read-only open. Adding it
here
risks exactly the "trades an unreachable injection for a script that
does not
  run" outcome flagged in the #1952 thread. Worth its own issue.
- **The other `2>/dev/null` sites** in this file, which also sit
awkwardly with
`qa/README.md`'s "Don't silence stderr". Only the §10.2 lines named in
the
  sign-off are touched.

🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-09 15:37:40 +02:00
..