Files
meshcore-analyzer/internal/users/password.go
T
efitenandClaude Opus 5.5 d232072f85 feat: optional user accounts (part A: foundation) (#2129)
Part A of #2128: optional, off-by-default user accounts. With the
feature off nothing changes; with it on, visitors can register and log
in, and admins manage users and use the operator actions without the API
key.

PR #2130 (settings sync) builds on this one. The two are meant to be
merged together.

## The situation

- Operator actions (geofilter save and prune, backup, perf reset) need
the shared `apiKey`. There is no per-person right.
- Nothing in CoreScope knows who a visitor is, so the requests in #2128
that need that (#1835, #2092, #1508, #730) have nothing to build on.

## What this PR adds

**Two new Go modules**
- `internal/users`: a separate `users.db` (SQLite through
`modernc.org/sqlite`) with users, sessions, single-use tokens, an audit
log and a mail log. Passwords use argon2id.
- `internal/mailer`: a `Mailer` interface with a Brevo client (send,
delivery events, webhook parsing) and an in-memory fake for tests.

**Server (`cmd/server`)**, active only with `userManagement.enabled`
- 24 routes, all documented in OpenAPI under the `users` tag
([`auth_routes.go`](https://github.com/efiten/CoreScope/blob/feat/user-management/cmd/server/auth_routes.go)):
  - auth: register, activate, login, logout, me, forgot, reset;
- account: profile, password, email change with confirmation, sessions,
self-delete;
- admin: list, detail, disable, enable, delete, role, resend activation,
manual activation, mail status refresh;
  - a Brevo webhook, registered only when `mail.webhookSecret` is set.
- `requireAdmin` replaces `requireAPIKey` at the 7 operator call sites:
the API key **or** an admin session. With the feature off it is the old
API-key gate (`TestRequireAdminWithoutUserManagementIsAPIKeyGate`).
- `/api/config/client` gets `userManagement: {enabled: true}` only when
the service started; with the feature off the response is
byte-identical.

**Frontend**
- `auth.js` (header account control, request helper that adds the CSRF
header), `account.js` (login, register, activate, forgot, reset, confirm
email, my account), `admin-users.js` (`#/admin/users`, deep-linked
filters), `account.css` (theme tokens only).
- On phones the top-bar control is hidden, so a conditional entry goes
into the bottom-nav "More" sheet and the nav drawer.
- The customizer geofilter tab and the Perf "Reset stats" button use the
admin session when there is one.

**Config.** A `userManagement` block (`config.example.json`,
[`docs/user-guide/accounts.md`](https://github.com/efiten/CoreScope/blob/feat/user-management/docs/user-guide/accounts.md)).
The Brevo key can come from `CORESCOPE_BREVO_API_KEY`. The server
refuses to start when the block is enabled but incomplete.

## Security choices

- Session cookie `cs_session`: HttpOnly, SameSite=Lax, Secure when
`publicBaseUrl` is https. Every cookie-authenticated state change needs
the `X-CS-CSRF` header and a matching Origin.
- Activation needs the token **and** the account password. Without the
password, an attacker who keeps re-registering a known address could get
the owner to activate an account that carries the attacker's password.
- Register, forgot and email change answer identically for known and
unknown addresses. A password reset ends all sessions, a password change
ends all other sessions, and both end outstanding email-change links.
- Rate limits: login 10 per 15 minutes, register and forgot 5 per hour,
per IP and per address. The bucket count is capped. `trustedProxies`
makes the per-IP limits see real client IPs behind a proxy.
- Server logs carry `#<user id>`, never addresses, tokens or passwords;
mail-provider error texts are redacted before logging.

## Performance

No change to an existing hot path with the feature off. With it on:
- One `users.db` lookup per authenticated request (session by token
hash).
- The admin user table rebuilds its `tbody` on each filter change.
`users.List` caps the result at 1000 rows (`internal/users/users.go`),
which bounds the rebuild.
- `map[string]interface{}` in `openapi.go`: 79 before, 78 after.

## Verification

- `internal/users`, `internal/mailer` and `cmd/server`: `go vet` and `go
test -race` pass locally. 121 new Go tests.
- `cmd/server` with `-tags e2etest`: vet and the e2e hook tests pass.
- `sh test-all.sh` exits 0. `tests/unit/test-user-management-ui.js`: 67
passing (vm, real modules).
- `tests/e2e/test-user-management-e2e.js` (6 steps) passed locally
against an `e2etest` build with the fake mailer and against a
feature-off build. CI builds the `e2etest` binary and runs the suite on
a second server (`deploy.yml`).
- On a staging instance with a real Brevo key: register, activation mail
delivered, activate, admin table, "Refresh status" showing sent,
deferred, delivered, opened and clicked.

## Not in this PR

- Settings sync (#2130), the admin dashboard, approval flows and
notifications (parts B to E of #2128).
- A `requireReadAuth` mode (#1835). Sessions from this PR are what such
a mode would accept.
- Binary size and build time with `modernc.org/sqlite` linked next to
`mattn/go-sqlite3` were not measured. Their driver names do not collide.
#1992 discusses the driver choice.
- No Brevo webhook was configured on staging; delivery status there came
from "Refresh status".

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-07 09:25:29 +02:00

84 lines
2.7 KiB
Go

package users
import (
"crypto/rand"
"crypto/subtle"
"encoding/base64"
"errors"
"fmt"
"strings"
"sync"
"golang.org/x/crypto/argon2"
)
// argon2id parameters: OWASP's minimum recommendation (19 MiB, 2 passes,
// 1 lane). They are encoded in every hash, so raising them later only
// affects new hashes.
const (
argonTime uint32 = 2
argonMemory uint32 = 19 * 1024
argonThreads uint8 = 1
argonKeyLen uint32 = 32
argonSaltLen = 16
)
// HashPassword returns a PHC-format argon2id hash.
func HashPassword(password string) (string, error) {
salt := make([]byte, argonSaltLen)
if _, err := rand.Read(salt); err != nil {
return "", fmt.Errorf("users: salt: %w", err)
}
key := argon2.IDKey([]byte(password), salt, argonTime, argonMemory, argonThreads, argonKeyLen)
b64 := base64.RawStdEncoding
return fmt.Sprintf("$argon2id$v=%d$m=%d,t=%d,p=%d$%s$%s",
argon2.Version, argonMemory, argonTime, argonThreads,
b64.EncodeToString(salt), b64.EncodeToString(key)), nil
}
// VerifyPassword checks password against a PHC argon2id hash in constant time.
func VerifyPassword(encoded, password string) (bool, error) {
parts := strings.Split(encoded, "$")
if len(parts) != 6 || parts[0] != "" || parts[1] != "argon2id" {
return false, errors.New("users: unsupported password hash format")
}
var version int
if _, err := fmt.Sscanf(parts[2], "v=%d", &version); err != nil || version != argon2.Version {
return false, errors.New("users: unsupported argon2 version")
}
var m, t uint32
var p uint8
if _, err := fmt.Sscanf(parts[3], "m=%d,t=%d,p=%d", &m, &t, &p); err != nil {
return false, fmt.Errorf("users: bad argon2 parameters: %w", err)
}
b64 := base64.RawStdEncoding
salt, err := b64.DecodeString(parts[4])
if err != nil {
return false, fmt.Errorf("users: bad salt: %w", err)
}
want, err := b64.DecodeString(parts[5])
if err != nil || len(want) == 0 {
return false, errors.New("users: bad key")
}
if t < 1 || p < 1 || m < 8*uint32(p) || m > 1<<20 || len(salt) < 8 || len(want) < 16 || len(want) > 64 {
return false, errors.New("users: argon2 parameters out of range")
}
if fmt.Sprintf("m=%d,t=%d,p=%d", m, t, p) != parts[3] {
return false, errors.New("users: malformed argon2 parameters")
}
got := argon2.IDKey([]byte(password), salt, t, m, p, uint32(len(want)))
return subtle.ConstantTimeCompare(got, want) == 1, nil
}
var (
dummyOnce sync.Once
dummyHash string
)
// BurnPasswordCheck runs a full hash comparison against a fixed dummy hash,
// so a login for an unknown address costs as much as one for a real account.
func BurnPasswordCheck(password string) {
dummyOnce.Do(func() { dummyHash, _ = HashPassword("corescope-dummy-password") })
_, _ = VerifyPassword(dummyHash, password)
}