Files
meshcore-analyzer/cmd/server/auth_service.go
T
efitenandClaude Opus 5.5 2456762179 feat: account data export and users.db backup (#2141)
A small follow-up to parts A to E of #2128: users can download all data
the instance holds about them, and the server backs up `users.db`.

Stacked on #2140. Review the commits after that branch.

## The situation

- An instance with accounts holds personal data, but a user has no way
to get a copy (GDPR articles 15 and 20). Self-delete already exists.
- `users.db` is the only file the server writes, and nothing backs it
up: `GET /api/backup` snapshots the analyzer database only.

## What this PR adds

**Data export.** `GET /api/account/export` and a "Download my data"
button on the account page give one JSON file with:
- the profile, including activation and a pending email change;
- sessions (times and user agent);
- synced settings, own proposals, notification prefs and watches;
- audit rows where the user is actor or target, with other accounts as
an id only;
- the mail log.

Password hash, session and link tokens and the unsubscribe token are
left out: they are credentials. Each export is audited as `user.export`.

**users.db backup**
- Daily `VACUUM INTO` snapshots through `internal/users`, on by default
when user management is on. They go to `backups/` next to `users.db`,
the 7 newest are kept, the directory is 0700 and the files 0600.
Rotation only touches `users-<timestamp>.db` files and never the
snapshot it just wrote. Config: `userManagement.backup {enabled, dir,
keep}`.
- `GET /api/admin/users-backup`: an admin downloads a fresh snapshot to
keep off the server; audited as `user.backup`.
- `docs/user-guide/accounts.md` gains a restore procedure. It covers
what a restore brings back (accounts deleted after the snapshot, old
passwords, revoked sessions) and how to clean that up afterwards.

Spec:
[`docs/specs/2026-10-08-account-export-and-users-backup-design.md`](https://github.com/efiten/CoreScope/blob/feat/account-export-backup/docs/specs/2026-10-08-account-export-and-users-backup-design.md).

## Verification

- `internal/users` with `-race` and the `cmd/server` suite pass locally,
30 new Go tests. The file-mode tests skip on Windows.
- `sh test-all.sh` exits 0; the XSS gate in diff mode passes.
- User-management E2E: 27 of 27 steps locally.
- On our production instance since 8 October 2026; the first snapshot
there was 143 kB.

## Not in this PR

- Importing an export into another instance.
- Off-site upload of the snapshots. The admin download covers that by
hand.

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-08 22:16:49 +02:00

250 lines
7.5 KiB
Go

package main
import (
"log"
"os"
"path/filepath"
"sync"
"sync/atomic"
"time"
"github.com/meshcore-analyzer/mailer"
"github.com/meshcore-analyzer/users"
)
// authService is the optional user-management layer. Server.auth is nil
// unless userManagement.enabled, and nothing in this file runs then.
type authService struct {
st *users.Store
mail mailer.Mailer
set *userMgmtSettings
ipr *wsLimiter // only its clientIP rule is used
login *rateLimiter
signup *rateLimiter // register, forgot, self-service resend
hook *rateLimiter
settingsPut *rateLimiter // PUT /api/account/settings, per user
// approved is the snapshot of approved hashtag channel names, filled at
// construction and reloaded from users.db after every proposal decision.
// approvedMu serialises the reloads so an older read never replaces a
// newer one.
approvedMu sync.Mutex
approved atomic.Pointer[[]string]
// notify evaluates node notifications; nil unless
// userManagement.notifications.enabled.
notify *notifier
warnIndistinct sync.Once
stop chan struct{}
stopOnce sync.Once
wg sync.WaitGroup // the janitor and the notifier
auditWG sync.WaitGroup // in-flight auditAsync writes
}
func newAuthService(set *userMgmtSettings, st *users.Store, m mailer.Mailer) *authService {
a := &authService{
st: st, mail: m, set: set,
ipr: &wsLimiter{trustedProxies: set.trustedProxies},
login: newRateLimiter(10, 15*time.Minute),
signup: newRateLimiter(5, time.Hour),
hook: newRateLimiter(600, time.Minute),
settingsPut: newRateLimiter(60, time.Hour),
stop: make(chan struct{}),
}
a.refreshApproved()
return a
}
// initUserManagement builds s.auth when the feature is on. Call it after
// NewServer and before RegisterRoutes. measurementDBPath is passed to
// users.Open as a forbidden path, so users.db can never be the analyzer DB.
func (s *Server) initUserManagement(measurementDBPath string) error {
if !s.cfg.UserManagementEnabled() {
return nil
}
set, err := resolveUserManagement(s.cfg.UserManagement, measurementDBPath, os.Getenv)
if err != nil {
return err
}
st, err := users.Open(set.dbPath, measurementDBPath)
if err != nil {
return err
}
var m mailer.Mailer
if set.provider == "fake" {
m = &mailer.Fake{}
} else {
m = mailer.NewBrevo(set.brevoAPIKey, set.fromEmail, set.fromName)
}
s.auth = newAuthService(set, st, m)
s.auth.logStartup()
s.auth.wg.Add(1)
go func() {
defer s.auth.wg.Done()
s.auth.janitor(time.Hour)
}()
if set.notify.enabled {
s.auth.notify = newNotifier(s.auth, serverNotifySource{s: s}, time.Now)
s.auth.wg.Add(1)
go func() {
defer s.auth.wg.Done()
s.auth.notify.loop(s.auth.stop, set.notify.interval)
}()
log.Printf("[notify] node notifications enabled: every %s, at most %d mails per user and %d in total per 24 hours",
set.notify.interval, set.notify.perUserPerDay, set.notify.maxMailsPerDay)
}
return nil
}
// closeUserManagement stops the janitor and closes users.db. Safe when off.
func (s *Server) closeUserManagement() {
if s.auth == nil {
return
}
s.auth.stopOnce.Do(func() {
close(s.auth.stop)
s.auth.wg.Wait()
s.auth.waitAudits()
if err := s.auth.st.Close(); err != nil {
log.Printf("[users] close: %v", err)
}
})
}
func (a *authService) logStartup() {
log.Printf("[users] user management enabled: db=%s, %d config admin(s), webhook=%v",
absForLog(a.set.dbPath), len(a.set.adminEmails), a.set.webhookSecret != "")
admins, err := a.st.List(users.ListFilter{Role: users.RoleAdmin})
if err != nil {
log.Printf("[users] list admins: %v", err)
return
}
for _, u := range admins {
if !a.isConfigAdmin(u.Email) {
log.Printf("[users] note: admin #%d is not in adminEmails (promoted in the UI, or removed from config)", u.ID)
}
}
}
func (a *authService) janitor(every time.Duration) {
t := time.NewTicker(every)
defer t.Stop()
for {
a.prune()
a.maybeBackup(time.Now())
select {
case <-a.stop:
return
case <-t.C:
}
}
}
func (a *authService) prune() {
if _, err := a.st.PruneStalePending(48 * time.Hour); err != nil {
log.Printf("[users] prune pending: %v", err)
}
if _, err := a.st.PruneExpiredSessions(); err != nil {
log.Printf("[users] prune sessions: %v", err)
}
if _, err := a.st.PruneTokens(7 * 24 * time.Hour); err != nil {
log.Printf("[users] prune tokens: %v", err)
}
if _, err := a.st.PruneMail(90 * 24 * time.Hour); err != nil {
log.Printf("[users] prune mail log: %v", err)
}
// Login rows only; every other audit action is kept (admin-dashboard spec).
if _, err := a.st.PruneAudit([]string{"user.login", "user.login.failed"}, 90*24*time.Hour); err != nil {
log.Printf("[users] prune login audit: %v", err)
}
if _, err := a.st.PruneProposals(proposalRetention); err != nil {
log.Printf("[users] prune proposals: %v", err)
}
a.login.gc()
a.signup.gc()
a.hook.gc()
a.settingsPut.gc()
}
func (a *authService) isConfigAdmin(email string) bool { return a.set.adminEmails[email] }
// refreshApproved reloads the approved hashtag channel names from users.db,
// oldest approval first and capped at maxApproved like the ingestor. The
// mutex spans the read and the store, so concurrent decisions cannot leave
// an older read in place. A failure is logged and keeps the previous
// snapshot. No-op with proposals off.
func (a *authService) refreshApproved() {
if !a.set.proposals.enabled {
return
}
a.approvedMu.Lock()
defer a.approvedMu.Unlock()
list, err := a.st.ApprovedSubjects(users.KindHashtagChannel, a.set.proposals.maxApproved)
if err != nil {
log.Printf("[users] load approved channels: %v", err)
return
}
a.approved.Store(&list)
}
// approvedChannels returns the current snapshot; never nil.
func (a *authService) approvedChannels() []string {
if p := a.approved.Load(); p != nil {
return *p
}
return []string{}
}
// roleFor is the role an address gets on activation.
func (a *authService) roleFor(email string) users.Role {
if a.isConfigAdmin(email) {
return users.RoleAdmin
}
return users.RoleUser
}
func (a *authService) audit(actor *int64, action string, target *int64, detail map[string]string) {
if err := a.st.Audit(actor, action, target, detail); err != nil {
log.Printf("[users] audit %s: %v", action, err)
}
}
// auditAsync writes an audit row in the background, so neither the write
// nor a locked users.db delays the response. Best-effort: a failure is
// logged by a.audit, and a row is lost if the process stops first.
func (a *authService) auditAsync(actor *int64, action string, target *int64, detail map[string]string) {
a.auditWG.Add(1)
go func() {
defer a.auditWG.Done()
a.audit(actor, action, target, detail)
}()
}
// waitAudits blocks until every auditAsync write has finished.
func (a *authService) waitAudits() { a.auditWG.Wait() }
func idPtr(id int64) *int64 { return &id }
// invalidateTokens burns uid's outstanding links of each purpose. A failure
// is logged (user id only) and returned; callers answer 500.
func (a *authService) invalidateTokens(op string, uid int64, ps ...users.Purpose) error {
for _, p := range ps {
if err := a.st.InvalidateTokens(uid, p); err != nil {
log.Printf("[users] %s: invalidate %s tokens for user #%d: %v", op, p, uid, err)
return err
}
}
return nil
}
// absForLog resolves path for a log line, so a relative users.db path shows
// which file it means; the path as given when it cannot be resolved.
func absForLog(path string) string {
if abs, err := filepath.Abs(path); err == nil {
return abs
}
return path
}