mirror of
https://github.com/Kpa-clawbot/meshcore-analyzer.git
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efitenandClaude Opus 5.5
b2cda21a27
Part 2 of 3 for #2173 (companion linking): the server routes, bearer auth and the link handshake. Builds on #2174 (merged); `upstream/master` is merged in, so the diff shows only this part. Everything here is behind `userManagement.enabled` and answers 404 with it off. ## Changes in this PR **Device tokens and bearer auth** - `POST /api/auth/device-token`: email + password returns a bearer token, stored as a `kind = 'device'` session with a label. Same failure answers and the same rate limit as login. - Server-enforced scope for a bearer token: `/api/auth/me`, `/api/auth/logout`, `/api/account/companions*`, `/api/account/settings`. Everything else answers 403. - A bearer header only counts when there is no session cookie, so an auth proxy that adds its own `Authorization` header does not hide a logged-in browser. Cookies never accept a device token. - The sessions list on the account API carries `kind` and `label`; logout with a bearer token revokes that device. **Linking a companion** - `POST /api/account/companions/challenge` `{pubkey}` returns `{challenge, expiresAt, host}`: 32 random bytes, single use, 5 minutes, bound to the caller and the pubkey. - `POST /api/account/companions` `{pubkey, challenge, signature, name}`: the signature is the companion's Ed25519 signature over `corescope-link:<host>:<challenge>` (`internal/sigvalidate.VerifyMessage`). The challenge is consumed in every case. - A companion linked to another account moves to the caller (the newest proof wins). Both users get a `companion.transfer` audit row and the previous owner a mail. That mail is a security notice: it is sent whatever the node notification settings are. - `GET /api/account/companions` (with `lastSeenAt` from `client_receptions`) and `DELETE /api/account/companions/{pubkey}`. - Linking does not touch the synced `meshcore-my-nodes`: a companion is not a node to monitor. - Admin user detail lists linked companions; the account data export includes companions and device sessions. **Coverage and config** - `GET /api/rx-coverage?mine=1`: only coverage of the caller's linked companions (401 when logged out, 403 for a device token). With `gaps=1` (#2172) the reply carries no `gaps` member under `mine=1`, because the track query takes one companion and cannot narrow to a set yet (`TestRxCoverageMineOmitsGaps`). - `clientRxCoverage.requireLinkedCompanion` (default off) is read and reported in `/api/config/client`, which also announces `userManagement.companionLinking`, so CoreDrive RX shows its login only where linking exists. The ingestor side is part 3. - CORS: for origins in `corsAllowedOrigins`, the device-token routes alone also allow POST/PUT/DELETE and the `Authorization` and `Content-Type` headers. No credentialed CORS. Documented in `config.example.json`. - OpenAPI and `docs/api-spec.md` cover the new routes. ## Verification - 26 new tests in `cmd/server` and `internal/sigvalidate`, among them: `TestCompanionLinkFlow`, `TestCompanionLinkRejections` (signature by another key, malformed signature, challenge bound to another pubkey, unknown challenge; reuse and expiry are covered by the store tests in #2174), `TestCompanionTransfer`, `TestCompanionTransferMailIgnoresNotificationSettings`, `TestBearerScopedRoutes`, `TestBearerIgnoredWithCookie`, `TestDeviceTokenSharesLoginRateLimit`, `TestCORSBearerRoutes`, `TestCompanionRoutesAbsentWhenOff`, `TestRxCoverageMine`, `TestRxCoverageMineOmitsGaps` (fails without the `mine == nil` guard), `TestVerifyMessage`. - `cmd/server`, `internal/sigvalidate` and `internal/users`: `go vet` and `go test ./...` green, `gofmt` clean. - The linking flow runs on analyzer.on8ar.eu since 9 October 2026 with CoreDrive RX v1.19.0 (a real companion linked through the signed challenge). ## Not in this PR - The ingestor's linked-only filter, the account page (Devices, Companions), the "My coverage" toggle and the user docs: part 3. - Per-user broker credentials and per-user API keys (non-goals in the spec). --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
44 lines
1.5 KiB
Go
44 lines
1.5 KiB
Go
package main
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import (
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"net/http"
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"testing"
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)
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// LookupSession returns a session of any kind, so a device token sent as
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// the session cookie must be refused by the cookie path.
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func TestDeviceTokenIsNotACookieSession(t *testing.T) {
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f := newAuthFixture(t)
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alice := f.registerAndActivate(t, "alice@example.org", "Alice", pw)
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raw, _, err := f.st.CreateDeviceSession(alice.me.ID, "Pixel", []string{"rx"}, "")
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatal(err)
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}
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forged := &client{cookie: &http.Cookie{Name: sessionCookieName, Value: raw}}
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for _, p := range []string{"/api/auth/me", "/api/account/sessions", "/api/account/settings"} {
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if w := f.do("GET", p, nil, as(forged)); w.Code != http.StatusUnauthorized {
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t.Errorf("GET %s with a device token as cookie = %d, want 401", p, w.Code)
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}
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}
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}
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func TestSessionsListKindAndLabel(t *testing.T) {
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f := newAuthFixture(t)
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alice := f.registerAndActivate(t, "alice@example.org", "Alice", pw)
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if _, _, err := f.st.CreateDeviceSession(alice.me.ID, "Pixel 8", []string{"rx"}, "CoreDriveRX/1.0"); err != nil {
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t.Fatal(err)
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}
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w := f.do("GET", "/api/account/sessions", nil, as(alice))
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expectStatus(t, w, http.StatusOK)
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byKind := map[string]sessionJSON{}
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for _, s := range decode[[]sessionJSON](t, w) {
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byKind[s.Kind] = s
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}
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if web, ok := byKind["web"]; !ok || web.Label != "" || !web.Current {
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t.Fatalf("web session = %+v (present %v)", web, ok)
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}
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if dev, ok := byKind["device"]; !ok || dev.Label != "Pixel 8" || dev.Current || dev.UserAgent != "CoreDriveRX/1.0" {
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t.Fatalf("device session = %+v (present %v)", dev, ok)
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}
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}
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