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Part 2 of 3 for #2173 (companion linking): the server routes, bearer auth and the link handshake. Builds on #2174 (merged); `upstream/master` is merged in, so the diff shows only this part. Everything here is behind `userManagement.enabled` and answers 404 with it off. ## Changes in this PR **Device tokens and bearer auth** - `POST /api/auth/device-token`: email + password returns a bearer token, stored as a `kind = 'device'` session with a label. Same failure answers and the same rate limit as login. - Server-enforced scope for a bearer token: `/api/auth/me`, `/api/auth/logout`, `/api/account/companions*`, `/api/account/settings`. Everything else answers 403. - A bearer header only counts when there is no session cookie, so an auth proxy that adds its own `Authorization` header does not hide a logged-in browser. Cookies never accept a device token. - The sessions list on the account API carries `kind` and `label`; logout with a bearer token revokes that device. **Linking a companion** - `POST /api/account/companions/challenge` `{pubkey}` returns `{challenge, expiresAt, host}`: 32 random bytes, single use, 5 minutes, bound to the caller and the pubkey. - `POST /api/account/companions` `{pubkey, challenge, signature, name}`: the signature is the companion's Ed25519 signature over `corescope-link:<host>:<challenge>` (`internal/sigvalidate.VerifyMessage`). The challenge is consumed in every case. - A companion linked to another account moves to the caller (the newest proof wins). Both users get a `companion.transfer` audit row and the previous owner a mail. That mail is a security notice: it is sent whatever the node notification settings are. - `GET /api/account/companions` (with `lastSeenAt` from `client_receptions`) and `DELETE /api/account/companions/{pubkey}`. - Linking does not touch the synced `meshcore-my-nodes`: a companion is not a node to monitor. - Admin user detail lists linked companions; the account data export includes companions and device sessions. **Coverage and config** - `GET /api/rx-coverage?mine=1`: only coverage of the caller's linked companions (401 when logged out, 403 for a device token). With `gaps=1` (#2172) the reply carries no `gaps` member under `mine=1`, because the track query takes one companion and cannot narrow to a set yet (`TestRxCoverageMineOmitsGaps`). - `clientRxCoverage.requireLinkedCompanion` (default off) is read and reported in `/api/config/client`, which also announces `userManagement.companionLinking`, so CoreDrive RX shows its login only where linking exists. The ingestor side is part 3. - CORS: for origins in `corsAllowedOrigins`, the device-token routes alone also allow POST/PUT/DELETE and the `Authorization` and `Content-Type` headers. No credentialed CORS. Documented in `config.example.json`. - OpenAPI and `docs/api-spec.md` cover the new routes. ## Verification - 26 new tests in `cmd/server` and `internal/sigvalidate`, among them: `TestCompanionLinkFlow`, `TestCompanionLinkRejections` (signature by another key, malformed signature, challenge bound to another pubkey, unknown challenge; reuse and expiry are covered by the store tests in #2174), `TestCompanionTransfer`, `TestCompanionTransferMailIgnoresNotificationSettings`, `TestBearerScopedRoutes`, `TestBearerIgnoredWithCookie`, `TestDeviceTokenSharesLoginRateLimit`, `TestCORSBearerRoutes`, `TestCompanionRoutesAbsentWhenOff`, `TestRxCoverageMine`, `TestRxCoverageMineOmitsGaps` (fails without the `mine == nil` guard), `TestVerifyMessage`. - `cmd/server`, `internal/sigvalidate` and `internal/users`: `go vet` and `go test ./...` green, `gofmt` clean. - The linking flow runs on analyzer.on8ar.eu since 9 October 2026 with CoreDrive RX v1.19.0 (a real companion linked through the signed challenge). ## Not in this PR - The ingestor's linked-only filter, the account page (Devices, Companions), the "My coverage" toggle and the user docs: part 3. - Per-user broker credentials and per-user API keys (non-goals in the spec). --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
103 lines
3.6 KiB
Go
103 lines
3.6 KiB
Go
package main
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import (
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"net/http"
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"strings"
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"testing"
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"time"
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"github.com/meshcore-analyzer/users"
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)
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// rxOrigin is a CoreDrive RX deployment on another origin than testBase.
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const rxOrigin = "https://rx.example.net"
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func bearer(tok string) reqMod { return header("Authorization", "Bearer "+tok) }
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// deviceToken logs in like CoreDrive RX: from a foreign origin, no cookie.
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func (f *authFixture) deviceToken(t *testing.T, email, password, name string) deviceTokenResponse {
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t.Helper()
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w := f.do("POST", "/api/auth/device-token", deviceTokenRequest{Email: email, Password: password, DeviceName: name},
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header("Origin", rxOrigin))
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expectStatus(t, w, http.StatusOK)
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return decode[deviceTokenResponse](t, w)
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}
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func TestDeviceTokenIssue(t *testing.T) {
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f := newAuthFixture(t)
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alice := f.registerAndActivate(t, "alice@example.org", "Alice", pw)
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got := f.deviceToken(t, "alice@example.org", pw, " Pixel\x07 8 ")
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if got.Token == "" || got.User.ID != alice.me.ID || got.User.DisplayName != "Alice" {
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t.Fatalf("device-token response = %+v", got)
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}
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exp, err := time.Parse(time.RFC3339, got.ExpiresAt)
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if err != nil || exp.Before(time.Now().Add(users.DeviceSessionTTL-time.Hour)) {
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t.Fatalf("expiresAt = %q, %v", got.ExpiresAt, err)
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}
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sess, err := f.st.LookupSession(got.Token)
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if err != nil || sess.Kind != users.SessionKindDevice || sess.Label != "Pixel 8" ||
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!sess.HasScope(deviceScopeRX) || sess.HasScope("admin") {
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t.Fatalf("stored device session = %+v, %v", sess, err)
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}
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if w := f.serve("GET", "/api/auth/device-token", nil); w.Code == http.StatusOK {
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t.Fatal("GET answered 200")
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}
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entries, err := f.st.AuditFor(alice.me.ID, 20)
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatal(err)
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}
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for _, e := range entries {
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if e.Action == "user.login" && e.Detail["via"] == "device" && e.Detail["device"] == "Pixel 8" {
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return
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}
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}
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t.Fatalf("no device login audit row in %+v", entries)
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}
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func TestDeviceTokenFailuresMatchLogin(t *testing.T) {
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f := newAuthFixture(t)
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alice := f.registerAndActivate(t, "alice@example.org", "Alice", pw)
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for _, req := range []deviceTokenRequest{
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{Email: "alice@example.org", Password: "wrong password here", DeviceName: "x"},
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{Email: "nobody@example.org", Password: pw, DeviceName: "x"},
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{Email: "not an address", Password: pw, DeviceName: "x"},
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} {
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w := f.do("POST", "/api/auth/device-token", req)
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expectStatus(t, w, http.StatusUnauthorized)
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if !strings.Contains(w.Body.String(), msgBadLogin) {
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t.Fatalf("%s: body %s, want the login message", req.Email, w.Body.String())
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}
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}
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entries, _ := f.st.AuditFor(alice.me.ID, 20)
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failed := 0
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for _, e := range entries {
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if e.Action == "user.login.failed" && e.Detail["reason"] == "wrong_password" {
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failed++
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}
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}
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if failed != 1 {
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t.Fatalf("failed-login audit rows = %d, want 1: %+v", failed, entries)
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}
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list, _ := f.st.ListSessions(alice.me.ID)
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for _, s := range list {
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if s.Kind == users.SessionKindDevice {
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t.Fatalf("a refused login created a device session: %+v", s)
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}
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}
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}
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// Device-token attempts and browser logins draw from the same buckets, so
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// the endpoint is no way around the login rate limit.
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func TestDeviceTokenSharesLoginRateLimit(t *testing.T) {
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f := newAuthFixture(t)
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f.registerAndActivate(t, "alice@example.org", "Alice", pw)
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for i := 0; i < 10; i++ {
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f.do("POST", "/api/auth/login", loginRequest{Email: "alice@example.org", Password: "wrong password here"})
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}
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w := f.do("POST", "/api/auth/device-token", deviceTokenRequest{Email: "alice@example.org", Password: pw, DeviceName: "x"})
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expectStatus(t, w, http.StatusTooManyRequests)
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if w.Header().Get("Retry-After") == "" {
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t.Fatal("429 without Retry-After")
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}
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}
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