Files
meshcore-analyzer/cmd/server/auth_session.go
T
efitenandClaude Opus 5.5 d232072f85 feat: optional user accounts (part A: foundation) (#2129)
Part A of #2128: optional, off-by-default user accounts. With the
feature off nothing changes; with it on, visitors can register and log
in, and admins manage users and use the operator actions without the API
key.

PR #2130 (settings sync) builds on this one. The two are meant to be
merged together.

## The situation

- Operator actions (geofilter save and prune, backup, perf reset) need
the shared `apiKey`. There is no per-person right.
- Nothing in CoreScope knows who a visitor is, so the requests in #2128
that need that (#1835, #2092, #1508, #730) have nothing to build on.

## What this PR adds

**Two new Go modules**
- `internal/users`: a separate `users.db` (SQLite through
`modernc.org/sqlite`) with users, sessions, single-use tokens, an audit
log and a mail log. Passwords use argon2id.
- `internal/mailer`: a `Mailer` interface with a Brevo client (send,
delivery events, webhook parsing) and an in-memory fake for tests.

**Server (`cmd/server`)**, active only with `userManagement.enabled`
- 24 routes, all documented in OpenAPI under the `users` tag
([`auth_routes.go`](https://github.com/efiten/CoreScope/blob/feat/user-management/cmd/server/auth_routes.go)):
  - auth: register, activate, login, logout, me, forgot, reset;
- account: profile, password, email change with confirmation, sessions,
self-delete;
- admin: list, detail, disable, enable, delete, role, resend activation,
manual activation, mail status refresh;
  - a Brevo webhook, registered only when `mail.webhookSecret` is set.
- `requireAdmin` replaces `requireAPIKey` at the 7 operator call sites:
the API key **or** an admin session. With the feature off it is the old
API-key gate (`TestRequireAdminWithoutUserManagementIsAPIKeyGate`).
- `/api/config/client` gets `userManagement: {enabled: true}` only when
the service started; with the feature off the response is
byte-identical.

**Frontend**
- `auth.js` (header account control, request helper that adds the CSRF
header), `account.js` (login, register, activate, forgot, reset, confirm
email, my account), `admin-users.js` (`#/admin/users`, deep-linked
filters), `account.css` (theme tokens only).
- On phones the top-bar control is hidden, so a conditional entry goes
into the bottom-nav "More" sheet and the nav drawer.
- The customizer geofilter tab and the Perf "Reset stats" button use the
admin session when there is one.

**Config.** A `userManagement` block (`config.example.json`,
[`docs/user-guide/accounts.md`](https://github.com/efiten/CoreScope/blob/feat/user-management/docs/user-guide/accounts.md)).
The Brevo key can come from `CORESCOPE_BREVO_API_KEY`. The server
refuses to start when the block is enabled but incomplete.

## Security choices

- Session cookie `cs_session`: HttpOnly, SameSite=Lax, Secure when
`publicBaseUrl` is https. Every cookie-authenticated state change needs
the `X-CS-CSRF` header and a matching Origin.
- Activation needs the token **and** the account password. Without the
password, an attacker who keeps re-registering a known address could get
the owner to activate an account that carries the attacker's password.
- Register, forgot and email change answer identically for known and
unknown addresses. A password reset ends all sessions, a password change
ends all other sessions, and both end outstanding email-change links.
- Rate limits: login 10 per 15 minutes, register and forgot 5 per hour,
per IP and per address. The bucket count is capped. `trustedProxies`
makes the per-IP limits see real client IPs behind a proxy.
- Server logs carry `#<user id>`, never addresses, tokens or passwords;
mail-provider error texts are redacted before logging.

## Performance

No change to an existing hot path with the feature off. With it on:
- One `users.db` lookup per authenticated request (session by token
hash).
- The admin user table rebuilds its `tbody` on each filter change.
`users.List` caps the result at 1000 rows (`internal/users/users.go`),
which bounds the rebuild.
- `map[string]interface{}` in `openapi.go`: 79 before, 78 after.

## Verification

- `internal/users`, `internal/mailer` and `cmd/server`: `go vet` and `go
test -race` pass locally. 121 new Go tests.
- `cmd/server` with `-tags e2etest`: vet and the e2e hook tests pass.
- `sh test-all.sh` exits 0. `tests/unit/test-user-management-ui.js`: 67
passing (vm, real modules).
- `tests/e2e/test-user-management-e2e.js` (6 steps) passed locally
against an `e2etest` build with the fake mailer and against a
feature-off build. CI builds the `e2etest` binary and runs the suite on
a second server (`deploy.yml`).
- On a staging instance with a real Brevo key: register, activation mail
delivered, activate, admin table, "Refresh status" showing sent,
deferred, delivered, opened and clicked.

## Not in this PR

- Settings sync (#2130), the admin dashboard, approval flows and
notifications (parts B to E of #2128).
- A `requireReadAuth` mode (#1835). Sessions from this PR are what such
a mode would accept.
- Binary size and build time with `modernc.org/sqlite` linked next to
`mattn/go-sqlite3` were not measured. Their driver names do not collide.
#1992 discusses the driver choice.
- No Brevo webhook was configured on staging; delivery status there came
from "Refresh status".

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-07 09:25:29 +02:00

133 lines
4.1 KiB
Go

package main
import (
"net/http"
"net/url"
"strings"
"time"
"github.com/meshcore-analyzer/users"
)
const (
sessionCookieName = "cs_session"
csrfHeader = "X-CS-CSRF"
)
func (a *authService) setSessionCookie(w http.ResponseWriter, raw string, expires time.Time) {
http.SetCookie(w, &http.Cookie{
Name: sessionCookieName, Value: raw, Path: "/",
Expires: expires, MaxAge: int(time.Until(expires).Seconds()),
HttpOnly: true, Secure: a.set.secureCookie, SameSite: http.SameSiteLaxMode,
})
}
func (a *authService) clearSessionCookie(w http.ResponseWriter) {
http.SetCookie(w, &http.Cookie{Name: sessionCookieName, Value: "", Path: "/", MaxAge: -1,
HttpOnly: true, Secure: a.set.secureCookie, SameSite: http.SameSiteLaxMode})
}
// currentUser returns the active user behind the session cookie, or nils.
// A session last seen more than a day ago is extended (sliding expiry)
// and its cookie re-issued.
func (a *authService) currentUser(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) (*users.User, *users.Session) {
c, err := r.Cookie(sessionCookieName)
if err != nil || c.Value == "" {
return nil, nil
}
sess, err := a.st.LookupSession(c.Value)
if err != nil {
return nil, nil
}
u, err := a.st.GetByID(sess.UserID)
if err != nil || u.Status != users.StatusActive {
return nil, nil
}
if time.Since(sess.LastSeenAt) > 24*time.Hour {
if err := a.st.ExtendSession(sess.ID, a.set.sessionTTL); err == nil {
a.setSessionCookie(w, c.Value, time.Now().Add(a.set.sessionTTL))
}
}
return u, sess
}
// originOK requires the request's Origin (or, if absent, Referer) to be the
// configured publicBaseUrl's origin.
func (a *authService) originOK(r *http.Request) bool {
want := a.set.baseURL.Scheme + "://" + a.set.baseURL.Host
if o := r.Header.Get("Origin"); o != "" {
return strings.EqualFold(o, want)
}
if ref := r.Header.Get("Referer"); ref != "" {
u, err := url.Parse(ref)
return err == nil && strings.EqualFold(u.Scheme+"://"+u.Host, want)
}
return false
}
func (a *authService) csrfOK(r *http.Request, sess *users.Session) bool {
return a.originOK(r) && constantTimeEqual(r.Header.Get(csrfHeader), sess.CSRFToken)
}
func isSafeMethod(m string) bool { return m == http.MethodGet || m == http.MethodHead }
type authedHandler func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, u *users.User, sess *users.Session)
// withUser requires a logged-in active user; state-changing methods must
// also pass the origin + CSRF-token check.
func (s *Server) withUser(h authedHandler) http.HandlerFunc {
return func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
u, sess := s.auth.currentUser(w, r)
if u == nil {
writeError(w, http.StatusUnauthorized, "not logged in")
return
}
if !isSafeMethod(r.Method) && !s.auth.csrfOK(r, sess) {
writeError(w, http.StatusForbidden, "CSRF check failed")
return
}
h(w, r, u, sess)
}
}
// adminSessionOK is the one place that decides whether a session user may
// act as admin: state-changing methods must pass the origin + CSRF check,
// and the role must be admin. It writes the 403 itself when not.
func (a *authService) adminSessionOK(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, u *users.User, sess *users.Session) bool {
if !isSafeMethod(r.Method) && !a.csrfOK(r, sess) {
writeError(w, http.StatusForbidden, "CSRF check failed")
return false
}
if u.Role != users.RoleAdmin {
writeError(w, http.StatusForbidden, "admin role required")
return false
}
return true
}
// withAdmin requires a logged-in admin (see adminSessionOK).
func (s *Server) withAdmin(h authedHandler) http.HandlerFunc {
return func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
u, sess := s.auth.currentUser(w, r)
if u == nil {
writeError(w, http.StatusUnauthorized, "not logged in")
return
}
if !s.auth.adminSessionOK(w, r, u, sess) {
return
}
h(w, r, u, sess)
}
}
// requireOrigin guards unauthenticated state-changing endpoints (login CSRF).
func (s *Server) requireOrigin(h http.HandlerFunc) http.HandlerFunc {
return func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
if !s.auth.originOK(r) {
writeError(w, http.StatusForbidden, "request origin not allowed")
return
}
h(w, r)
}
}