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Part A of #2128: optional, off-by-default user accounts. With the feature off nothing changes; with it on, visitors can register and log in, and admins manage users and use the operator actions without the API key. PR #2130 (settings sync) builds on this one. The two are meant to be merged together. ## The situation - Operator actions (geofilter save and prune, backup, perf reset) need the shared `apiKey`. There is no per-person right. - Nothing in CoreScope knows who a visitor is, so the requests in #2128 that need that (#1835, #2092, #1508, #730) have nothing to build on. ## What this PR adds **Two new Go modules** - `internal/users`: a separate `users.db` (SQLite through `modernc.org/sqlite`) with users, sessions, single-use tokens, an audit log and a mail log. Passwords use argon2id. - `internal/mailer`: a `Mailer` interface with a Brevo client (send, delivery events, webhook parsing) and an in-memory fake for tests. **Server (`cmd/server`)**, active only with `userManagement.enabled` - 24 routes, all documented in OpenAPI under the `users` tag ([`auth_routes.go`](https://github.com/efiten/CoreScope/blob/feat/user-management/cmd/server/auth_routes.go)): - auth: register, activate, login, logout, me, forgot, reset; - account: profile, password, email change with confirmation, sessions, self-delete; - admin: list, detail, disable, enable, delete, role, resend activation, manual activation, mail status refresh; - a Brevo webhook, registered only when `mail.webhookSecret` is set. - `requireAdmin` replaces `requireAPIKey` at the 7 operator call sites: the API key **or** an admin session. With the feature off it is the old API-key gate (`TestRequireAdminWithoutUserManagementIsAPIKeyGate`). - `/api/config/client` gets `userManagement: {enabled: true}` only when the service started; with the feature off the response is byte-identical. **Frontend** - `auth.js` (header account control, request helper that adds the CSRF header), `account.js` (login, register, activate, forgot, reset, confirm email, my account), `admin-users.js` (`#/admin/users`, deep-linked filters), `account.css` (theme tokens only). - On phones the top-bar control is hidden, so a conditional entry goes into the bottom-nav "More" sheet and the nav drawer. - The customizer geofilter tab and the Perf "Reset stats" button use the admin session when there is one. **Config.** A `userManagement` block (`config.example.json`, [`docs/user-guide/accounts.md`](https://github.com/efiten/CoreScope/blob/feat/user-management/docs/user-guide/accounts.md)). The Brevo key can come from `CORESCOPE_BREVO_API_KEY`. The server refuses to start when the block is enabled but incomplete. ## Security choices - Session cookie `cs_session`: HttpOnly, SameSite=Lax, Secure when `publicBaseUrl` is https. Every cookie-authenticated state change needs the `X-CS-CSRF` header and a matching Origin. - Activation needs the token **and** the account password. Without the password, an attacker who keeps re-registering a known address could get the owner to activate an account that carries the attacker's password. - Register, forgot and email change answer identically for known and unknown addresses. A password reset ends all sessions, a password change ends all other sessions, and both end outstanding email-change links. - Rate limits: login 10 per 15 minutes, register and forgot 5 per hour, per IP and per address. The bucket count is capped. `trustedProxies` makes the per-IP limits see real client IPs behind a proxy. - Server logs carry `#<user id>`, never addresses, tokens or passwords; mail-provider error texts are redacted before logging. ## Performance No change to an existing hot path with the feature off. With it on: - One `users.db` lookup per authenticated request (session by token hash). - The admin user table rebuilds its `tbody` on each filter change. `users.List` caps the result at 1000 rows (`internal/users/users.go`), which bounds the rebuild. - `map[string]interface{}` in `openapi.go`: 79 before, 78 after. ## Verification - `internal/users`, `internal/mailer` and `cmd/server`: `go vet` and `go test -race` pass locally. 121 new Go tests. - `cmd/server` with `-tags e2etest`: vet and the e2e hook tests pass. - `sh test-all.sh` exits 0. `tests/unit/test-user-management-ui.js`: 67 passing (vm, real modules). - `tests/e2e/test-user-management-e2e.js` (6 steps) passed locally against an `e2etest` build with the fake mailer and against a feature-off build. CI builds the `e2etest` binary and runs the suite on a second server (`deploy.yml`). - On a staging instance with a real Brevo key: register, activation mail delivered, activate, admin table, "Refresh status" showing sent, deferred, delivered, opened and clicked. ## Not in this PR - Settings sync (#2130), the admin dashboard, approval flows and notifications (parts B to E of #2128). - A `requireReadAuth` mode (#1835). Sessions from this PR are what such a mode would accept. - Binary size and build time with `modernc.org/sqlite` linked next to `mattn/go-sqlite3` were not measured. Their driver names do not collide. #1992 discusses the driver choice. - No Brevo webhook was configured on staging; delivery status there came from "Refresh status". --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
133 lines
4.1 KiB
Go
133 lines
4.1 KiB
Go
package main
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import (
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"net/http"
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"net/url"
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"strings"
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"time"
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"github.com/meshcore-analyzer/users"
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)
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const (
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sessionCookieName = "cs_session"
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csrfHeader = "X-CS-CSRF"
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)
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func (a *authService) setSessionCookie(w http.ResponseWriter, raw string, expires time.Time) {
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http.SetCookie(w, &http.Cookie{
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Name: sessionCookieName, Value: raw, Path: "/",
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Expires: expires, MaxAge: int(time.Until(expires).Seconds()),
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HttpOnly: true, Secure: a.set.secureCookie, SameSite: http.SameSiteLaxMode,
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})
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}
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func (a *authService) clearSessionCookie(w http.ResponseWriter) {
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http.SetCookie(w, &http.Cookie{Name: sessionCookieName, Value: "", Path: "/", MaxAge: -1,
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HttpOnly: true, Secure: a.set.secureCookie, SameSite: http.SameSiteLaxMode})
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}
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// currentUser returns the active user behind the session cookie, or nils.
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// A session last seen more than a day ago is extended (sliding expiry)
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// and its cookie re-issued.
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func (a *authService) currentUser(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) (*users.User, *users.Session) {
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c, err := r.Cookie(sessionCookieName)
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if err != nil || c.Value == "" {
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return nil, nil
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}
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sess, err := a.st.LookupSession(c.Value)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, nil
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}
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u, err := a.st.GetByID(sess.UserID)
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if err != nil || u.Status != users.StatusActive {
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return nil, nil
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}
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if time.Since(sess.LastSeenAt) > 24*time.Hour {
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if err := a.st.ExtendSession(sess.ID, a.set.sessionTTL); err == nil {
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a.setSessionCookie(w, c.Value, time.Now().Add(a.set.sessionTTL))
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}
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}
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return u, sess
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}
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// originOK requires the request's Origin (or, if absent, Referer) to be the
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// configured publicBaseUrl's origin.
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func (a *authService) originOK(r *http.Request) bool {
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want := a.set.baseURL.Scheme + "://" + a.set.baseURL.Host
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if o := r.Header.Get("Origin"); o != "" {
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return strings.EqualFold(o, want)
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}
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if ref := r.Header.Get("Referer"); ref != "" {
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u, err := url.Parse(ref)
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return err == nil && strings.EqualFold(u.Scheme+"://"+u.Host, want)
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}
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return false
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}
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func (a *authService) csrfOK(r *http.Request, sess *users.Session) bool {
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return a.originOK(r) && constantTimeEqual(r.Header.Get(csrfHeader), sess.CSRFToken)
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}
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func isSafeMethod(m string) bool { return m == http.MethodGet || m == http.MethodHead }
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type authedHandler func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, u *users.User, sess *users.Session)
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// withUser requires a logged-in active user; state-changing methods must
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// also pass the origin + CSRF-token check.
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func (s *Server) withUser(h authedHandler) http.HandlerFunc {
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return func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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u, sess := s.auth.currentUser(w, r)
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if u == nil {
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writeError(w, http.StatusUnauthorized, "not logged in")
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return
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}
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if !isSafeMethod(r.Method) && !s.auth.csrfOK(r, sess) {
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writeError(w, http.StatusForbidden, "CSRF check failed")
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return
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}
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h(w, r, u, sess)
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}
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}
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// adminSessionOK is the one place that decides whether a session user may
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// act as admin: state-changing methods must pass the origin + CSRF check,
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// and the role must be admin. It writes the 403 itself when not.
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func (a *authService) adminSessionOK(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, u *users.User, sess *users.Session) bool {
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if !isSafeMethod(r.Method) && !a.csrfOK(r, sess) {
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writeError(w, http.StatusForbidden, "CSRF check failed")
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return false
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}
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if u.Role != users.RoleAdmin {
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writeError(w, http.StatusForbidden, "admin role required")
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return false
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}
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return true
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}
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// withAdmin requires a logged-in admin (see adminSessionOK).
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func (s *Server) withAdmin(h authedHandler) http.HandlerFunc {
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return func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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u, sess := s.auth.currentUser(w, r)
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if u == nil {
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writeError(w, http.StatusUnauthorized, "not logged in")
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return
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}
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if !s.auth.adminSessionOK(w, r, u, sess) {
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return
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}
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h(w, r, u, sess)
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}
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}
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// requireOrigin guards unauthenticated state-changing endpoints (login CSRF).
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func (s *Server) requireOrigin(h http.HandlerFunc) http.HandlerFunc {
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return func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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if !s.auth.originOK(r) {
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writeError(w, http.StatusForbidden, "request origin not allowed")
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return
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}
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h(w, r)
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}
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}
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