Files
meshcore-analyzer/cmd/server/auth_service.go
T
efitenandClaude Opus 5.5 d29957fbdc feat(observer-logins): lock the shared login out of migrated observers (#2348)
Follow-up to #2306 / #2319. With personal observer logins, a migrated
observer still is not safe from the shared login: the hook answers
`ignore` for the shared login, so EMQX's built-in database lets it
publish under any observer's topic, including one whose owner has moved
to a personal login. This PR lets an operator close that per migrated
observer, before the shared login is removed altogether.

## Changes

**users.db v8.** `observer_bindings.confirmed_at`: the moment the
owner's personal login first published under that pubkey.
- An auto-bind (the owner's first publish) is confirmed at once.
- An admin assignment stays unconfirmed until the owner's login
publishes under that pubkey; that publish sets it.
- Reassigning to another user or unbinding clears it; reassigning to the
same owner keeps it.
- Migration: existing `auto` rows get `confirmed_at = bound_at`, `admin`
rows stay NULL.

**Config.** `userManagement.observerLogins.sharedUsernames` (default
empty): the broker's shared login names. A name starting with `obs_` is
refused at startup.

**Authz hook.** For a login in `sharedUsernames`, a publish under
`meshcore/<x>/<pubkey>/...` is denied when that pubkey's binding is
confirmed, whatever the number of topic segments (the ingestor
attributes `meshcore/<x>/<pubkey>` and longer topics to that pubkey).
Logged as `publish denied: user=<name> observer=<8 hex>: confirmed
owner`. Every other request from a shared login keeps `ignore`, so the
built-in database decides as before. Personal logins are unchanged.

An orphaned binding (owner account deleted) does not count as confirmed.

**Admin.** The observers table of the Observer logins tab gets a
Confirmed column; the bindings JSON gets `confirmedAt`.

**Docs.** `docs/observer-mqtt-logins.md`: "Locking the shared login out
of migrated observers" (what it denies, how to see `confirmedAt`, the
risk below). `config.example.json` has the key.

## Risk for operators

An observer that is confirmed but still runs a second uploader on the
shared login loses that second uploader once its name is in
`sharedUsernames`. The deny log line names the observer.

## Tests

- `internal/users`: v7 to v8 migration on a real v7 database, auto
confirm, admin assignment then owner confirm, non-owner and repeated
confirm, reassign clears, orphan reassign.
- `cmd/server`: the decision table (confirmed, unconfirmed, unbound,
non-publish), topics with 3, 4 and 5+ segments, trailing slash, empty
and `client` iata, lowercase key; owner publish confirms, confirm
failure still allows and retries; reassign, unbind and user removal
clear the flag; the index load against a real store; config validation;
the hook and admin endpoints end to end.
- `tests/e2e/test-user-management-e2e.js`: the Confirmed column for an
auto-bound observer.
- Local: `internal/users`, `cmd/server` (two Windows-only tests skipped,
as on master) and `cmd/ingestor` green. The E2E assertion was not run
locally; CI runs it.

## Not in this PR

- Using `confirmed_at` for verified `/neighbors` reports: a separate PR,
built on #2300.
- Removing the shared login: still an operator step after migration.

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-28 19:10:41 +01:00

286 lines
8.8 KiB
Go

package main
import (
"log"
"os"
"path/filepath"
"sync"
"sync/atomic"
"time"
"github.com/meshcore-analyzer/mailer"
"github.com/meshcore-analyzer/users"
)
// authService is the optional user-management layer. Server.auth is nil
// unless userManagement.enabled, and nothing in this file runs then.
type authService struct {
st *users.Store
mail mailer.Mailer
set *userMgmtSettings
ipr *wsLimiter // only its clientIP rule is used
login *rateLimiter
signup *rateLimiter // register, forgot, self-service resend
hook *rateLimiter
settingsPut *rateLimiter // PUT /api/account/settings, per user
companion *rateLimiter // companion challenge + link, per IP and per user
// approved is the snapshot of approved hashtag channel names, filled at
// construction and reloaded from users.db after every proposal decision.
// approvedMu serialises the reloads so an older read never replaces a
// newer one.
approvedMu sync.Mutex
approved atomic.Pointer[[]string]
// notify evaluates node notifications; nil unless
// userManagement.notifications.enabled.
notify *notifier
// obsIdx answers the broker hooks; nil unless observerLogins.enabled
// (or when its load failed, see newAuthService).
obsIdx *observerLoginIndex
touches authTouches
// sealbox seals and opens the stored observer passwords; nil when the
// feature is off or the key is unusable.
sealbox *users.SecretBox
now func() time.Time
warnIndistinct sync.Once
stop chan struct{}
stopOnce sync.Once
wg sync.WaitGroup // the janitor and the notifier
auditWG sync.WaitGroup // in-flight auditAsync writes
}
func newAuthService(set *userMgmtSettings, st *users.Store, m mailer.Mailer) *authService {
a := &authService{
st: st, mail: m, set: set,
ipr: &wsLimiter{trustedProxies: set.trustedProxies},
login: newRateLimiter(10, 15*time.Minute),
signup: newRateLimiter(5, time.Hour),
hook: newRateLimiter(600, time.Minute),
settingsPut: newRateLimiter(60, time.Hour),
companion: newRateLimiter(60, time.Hour),
stop: make(chan struct{}),
now: time.Now,
}
a.refreshApproved()
if set.observerLogins.enabled {
// No error return here: a failed load leaves obsIdx nil, the hook
// routes answer 503 and the broker falls back to its own users.
idx, err := newObserverLoginIndex(st, set.observerLogins.sharedUsernames)
if err != nil {
log.Printf("[observer-logins] load logins: %v", err)
} else {
a.obsIdx = idx
}
if a.sealbox, err = users.NewSecretBox(set.observerLogins.key); err != nil {
log.Printf("[observer-logins] secret box: %v", err)
a.sealbox = nil
}
}
return a
}
// initUserManagement builds s.auth when the feature is on. Call it after
// NewServer and before RegisterRoutes. measurementDBPath is passed to
// users.Open as a forbidden path, so users.db can never be the analyzer DB.
func (s *Server) initUserManagement(measurementDBPath string) error {
if !s.cfg.UserManagementEnabled() {
if s.cfg.ClientRxRequireLinkedCompanionSet() {
log.Printf("[users] clientRxCoverage.requireLinkedCompanion is set but userManagement is off: the setting is ignored")
}
return nil
}
set, err := resolveUserManagement(s.cfg.UserManagement, measurementDBPath, os.Getenv)
if err != nil {
return err
}
st, err := users.Open(set.dbPath, measurementDBPath)
if err != nil {
return err
}
var m mailer.Mailer
switch set.provider {
case "fake":
m = &mailer.Fake{}
case "postal":
m = mailer.NewPostal(set.postalBaseURL, set.postalAPIKey, set.fromEmail, set.fromName)
default:
m = mailer.NewBrevo(set.brevoAPIKey, set.fromEmail, set.fromName)
}
s.auth = newAuthService(set, st, m)
s.auth.logStartup()
s.auth.wg.Add(1)
go func() {
defer s.auth.wg.Done()
s.auth.janitor(time.Hour)
}()
if set.notify.enabled {
s.auth.notify = newNotifier(s.auth, serverNotifySource{s: s}, time.Now)
s.auth.wg.Add(1)
go func() {
defer s.auth.wg.Done()
s.auth.notify.loop(s.auth.stop, set.notify.interval)
}()
log.Printf("[notify] node notifications enabled: every %s, at most %d mails per user and %d in total per 24 hours",
set.notify.interval, set.notify.perUserPerDay, set.notify.maxMailsPerDay)
}
return nil
}
// closeUserManagement stops the janitor and closes users.db. Safe when off.
func (s *Server) closeUserManagement() {
if s.auth == nil {
return
}
s.auth.stopOnce.Do(func() {
close(s.auth.stop)
s.auth.wg.Wait()
s.auth.waitAudits()
if err := s.auth.st.Close(); err != nil {
log.Printf("[users] close: %v", err)
}
})
}
func (a *authService) logStartup() {
log.Printf("[users] user management enabled: db=%s, %d config admin(s), webhook=%v",
absForLog(a.set.dbPath), len(a.set.adminEmails), a.set.webhookSecret != "")
admins, err := a.st.List(users.ListFilter{Role: users.RoleAdmin})
if err != nil {
log.Printf("[users] list admins: %v", err)
return
}
for _, u := range admins {
if !a.isConfigAdmin(u.Email) {
log.Printf("[users] note: admin #%d is not in adminEmails (promoted in the UI, or removed from config)", u.ID)
}
}
}
func (a *authService) janitor(every time.Duration) {
t := time.NewTicker(every)
defer t.Stop()
for {
a.prune()
a.maybeBackup(time.Now())
select {
case <-a.stop:
return
case <-t.C:
}
}
}
func (a *authService) prune() {
if _, err := a.st.PruneStalePending(48 * time.Hour); err != nil {
log.Printf("[users] prune pending: %v", err)
}
if _, err := a.st.PruneExpiredSessions(); err != nil {
log.Printf("[users] prune sessions: %v", err)
}
if _, err := a.st.PruneLinkChallenges(); err != nil {
log.Printf("[users] prune link challenges: %v", err)
}
if _, err := a.st.PruneTokens(7 * 24 * time.Hour); err != nil {
log.Printf("[users] prune tokens: %v", err)
}
if _, err := a.st.PruneMail(90 * 24 * time.Hour); err != nil {
log.Printf("[users] prune mail log: %v", err)
}
// Login rows only; every other audit action is kept (admin-dashboard spec).
if _, err := a.st.PruneAudit([]string{"user.login", "user.login.failed"}, 90*24*time.Hour); err != nil {
log.Printf("[users] prune login audit: %v", err)
}
if _, err := a.st.PruneProposals(proposalRetention); err != nil {
log.Printf("[users] prune proposals: %v", err)
}
a.login.gc()
a.signup.gc()
a.hook.gc()
a.settingsPut.gc()
a.companion.gc()
}
func (a *authService) isConfigAdmin(email string) bool { return a.set.adminEmails[email] }
// refreshApproved reloads the approved hashtag channel names from users.db,
// oldest approval first and capped at maxApproved like the ingestor. The
// mutex spans the read and the store, so concurrent decisions cannot leave
// an older read in place. A failure is logged and keeps the previous
// snapshot. No-op with proposals off.
func (a *authService) refreshApproved() {
if !a.set.proposals.enabled {
return
}
a.approvedMu.Lock()
defer a.approvedMu.Unlock()
list, err := a.st.ApprovedSubjects(users.KindHashtagChannel, a.set.proposals.maxApproved)
if err != nil {
log.Printf("[users] load approved channels: %v", err)
return
}
a.approved.Store(&list)
}
// approvedChannels returns the current snapshot; never nil.
func (a *authService) approvedChannels() []string {
if p := a.approved.Load(); p != nil {
return *p
}
return []string{}
}
// roleFor is the role an address gets on activation.
func (a *authService) roleFor(email string) users.Role {
if a.isConfigAdmin(email) {
return users.RoleAdmin
}
return users.RoleUser
}
func (a *authService) audit(actor *int64, action string, target *int64, detail map[string]string) {
if err := a.st.Audit(actor, action, target, detail); err != nil {
log.Printf("[users] audit %s: %v", action, err)
}
}
// auditAsync writes an audit row in the background, so neither the write
// nor a locked users.db delays the response. Best-effort: a failure is
// logged by a.audit, and a row is lost if the process stops first.
func (a *authService) auditAsync(actor *int64, action string, target *int64, detail map[string]string) {
a.auditWG.Add(1)
go func() {
defer a.auditWG.Done()
a.audit(actor, action, target, detail)
}()
}
// waitAudits blocks until every auditAsync write has finished.
func (a *authService) waitAudits() { a.auditWG.Wait() }
func idPtr(id int64) *int64 { return &id }
// invalidateTokens burns uid's outstanding links of each purpose. A failure
// is logged (user id only) and returned; callers answer 500.
func (a *authService) invalidateTokens(op string, uid int64, ps ...users.Purpose) error {
for _, p := range ps {
if err := a.st.InvalidateTokens(uid, p); err != nil {
log.Printf("[users] %s: invalidate %s tokens for user #%d: %v", op, p, uid, err)
return err
}
}
return nil
}
// absForLog resolves path for a log line, so a relative users.db path shows
// which file it means; the path as given when it cannot be resolved.
func absForLog(path string) string {
if abs, err := filepath.Abs(path); err == nil {
return abs
}
return path
}