From c62a05ee5b683107ca9a83f2c6555487d76d96df Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Gabriele Gristina Date: Thu, 12 Nov 2026 01:02:04 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 1/3] MIFARE reader commands keep the emulator memory The device side of the MIFARE reader commands freed the BigBuf with BigBuf_free(), and many also cleared it with BigBuf_Clear_ext(). BigBuf_free() drops the emulator memory, so the next emulator access allocates a new zeroed one, and BigBuf_Clear_ext() zeroes it. A dump loaded with `hf mf eload` was gone after `hf mf rdbl`, `hf mf fchk`, `hf 14a info` and other reader commands. These routines now use BigBuf_free_keep_EM() and BigBuf_Clear_keep_EM(), as the simulators do. Not fixed, because there is no RDV4 here to test them: the four BigBuf_free() calls under WITH_FLASH. On a device with flash memory the flash dictionary check (`--mem`) and MifareChkKeys_file() still drop the emulator memory. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 --- CHANGELOG.md | 1 + armsrc/iso14443a.c | 10 +++---- armsrc/mifarecmd.c | 72 +++++++++++++++++++++++----------------------- 3 files changed, 42 insertions(+), 41 deletions(-) diff --git a/CHANGELOG.md b/CHANGELOG.md index 66a64e1fa..3eaae8cf4 100644 --- a/CHANGELOG.md +++ b/CHANGELOG.md @@ -3,6 +3,7 @@ All notable changes to this project will be documented in this file. This project uses the changelog in accordance with [keepchangelog](http://keepachangelog.com/). Please use this to write notable changes, which is not the same as git commit log... ## [unreleased][unreleased] +- Fixed `hf mf rdbl`, `hf mf fchk`, `hf 14a info` and other MIFARE reader commands - the emulator memory is kept instead of being reset to zeros (@matrix) - Update Amiibo database (@tpglitch) - Changed `lf pcf7931 write` - write is verified via the tag's read after write, retried up to 3 times, failures are reported (@GiacoBot) - Changed `lf pcf7931 reader` - prints blocks 0-7 in order and decodes PAC, password, write protection and selection; handles partial selections, new `--rfb` param (@GiacoBot) diff --git a/armsrc/iso14443a.c b/armsrc/iso14443a.c index 661a1d9fe..60ae59369 100644 --- a/armsrc/iso14443a.c +++ b/armsrc/iso14443a.c @@ -4655,8 +4655,8 @@ void ReaderMifare(bool first_try, uint8_t block, uint8_t keytype) { iso14443a_setup(FPGA_HF_ISO14443A_READER_MOD); - BigBuf_free(); - BigBuf_Clear_ext(false); + BigBuf_free_keep_EM(); + BigBuf_Clear_keep_EM(); set_tracing(true); uint8_t mf_auth[4] = { keytype, block, 0x00, 0x00 }; @@ -4985,8 +4985,8 @@ void DetectNACKbug(void) { // Mifare Classic's random generator repeats every 2^16 cycles (and so do the nonces). int32_t sync_cycles = PRNG_SEQUENCE_LENGTH; - BigBuf_free(); - BigBuf_Clear_ext(false); + BigBuf_free_keep_EM(); + BigBuf_Clear_keep_EM(); set_tracing(true); iso14443a_setup(FPGA_HF_ISO14443A_READER_MOD); @@ -5200,7 +5200,7 @@ void DetectNACKbug(void) { num_to_bytes(i, 2, data + 2); reply_ng(CMD_HF_MIFARE_NACK_DETECT, status, data, 4); - BigBuf_free(); + BigBuf_free_keep_EM(); hf_field_off(); set_tracing(false); } diff --git a/armsrc/mifarecmd.c b/armsrc/mifarecmd.c index 810ecbbfa..4278e8bee 100644 --- a/armsrc/mifarecmd.c +++ b/armsrc/mifarecmd.c @@ -203,7 +203,7 @@ OUT: FpgaWriteConfWord(FPGA_MAJOR_MODE_OFF); LEDsoff(); set_tracing(false); - BigBuf_free(); + BigBuf_free_keep_EM(); return retval; } @@ -250,7 +250,7 @@ OUT: FpgaWriteConfWord(FPGA_MAJOR_MODE_OFF); LEDsoff(); set_tracing(false); - BigBuf_free(); + BigBuf_free_keep_EM(); return retval; } @@ -499,8 +499,8 @@ out: if (foundkeys || packet->lastchunk) { set_tracing(false); FpgaWriteConfWord(FPGA_MAJOR_MODE_OFF); - BigBuf_free(); - BigBuf_Clear_ext(false); + BigBuf_free_keep_EM(); + BigBuf_Clear_keep_EM(); } g_dbglevel = oldbg; } @@ -582,8 +582,8 @@ void MifareUReadCard(mful_readblock_t *packet) { iso14443a_setup(FPGA_HF_ISO14443A_READER_LISTEN); // free eventually allocated BigBuf memory - BigBuf_free(); - BigBuf_Clear_ext(false); + BigBuf_free_keep_EM(); + BigBuf_Clear_keep_EM(); set_tracing(true); // params @@ -676,7 +676,7 @@ void MifareUReadCard(mful_readblock_t *packet) { reply_ng(CMD_HF_MIFAREU_READCARD, PM3_SUCCESS, (uint8_t *)&payload, sizeof(payload)); LEDsoff(); - BigBuf_free(); + BigBuf_free_keep_EM(); set_tracing(false); } @@ -1014,8 +1014,8 @@ void MifareAcquireNonces(const mf_acquire_nonces_t *payload) { LED_A_ON(); LED_C_OFF(); - BigBuf_free(); - BigBuf_Clear_ext(false); + BigBuf_free_keep_EM(); + BigBuf_Clear_keep_EM(); set_tracing(true); if (initialize) { @@ -1143,8 +1143,8 @@ void MifareAcquireEncryptedNonces(const mf_acquire_nonces_t *payload) { LED_A_ON(); LED_C_OFF(); - BigBuf_free(); - BigBuf_Clear_ext(false); + BigBuf_free_keep_EM(); + BigBuf_Clear_keep_EM(); set_tracing(false); if (initialize) { @@ -1310,8 +1310,8 @@ int MifareAcquireStaticEncryptedNonces(uint32_t flags, const uint8_t *key, bool LED_A_ON(); LED_C_OFF(); - BigBuf_free(); - BigBuf_Clear_ext(false); + BigBuf_free_keep_EM(); + BigBuf_Clear_keep_EM(); set_tracing(false); iso14443a_setup(FPGA_HF_ISO14443A_READER_LISTEN); @@ -1597,8 +1597,8 @@ void MifareNested(uint8_t blockNo, uint8_t keyType, uint8_t targetBlockNo, uint8 iso14443a_setup(FPGA_HF_ISO14443A_READER_LISTEN); // free eventually allocated BigBuf memory - BigBuf_free(); - BigBuf_Clear_ext(false); + BigBuf_free_keep_EM(); + BigBuf_Clear_keep_EM(); set_tracing(true); @@ -1847,8 +1847,8 @@ void MifareStaticNested(uint8_t blockNo, uint8_t keyType, uint8_t targetBlockNo, iso14443a_setup(FPGA_HF_ISO14443A_READER_LISTEN); // free eventually allocated BigBuf memory - BigBuf_free(); - BigBuf_Clear_ext(false); + BigBuf_free_keep_EM(); + BigBuf_Clear_keep_EM(); set_tracing(true); int8_t isOK = PM3_ESOFT; // reply_ng() takes int8_t, match it @@ -2301,8 +2301,8 @@ out: if (foundkeys == allkeys || lastchunk) { set_tracing(false); FpgaWriteConfWord(FPGA_MAJOR_MODE_OFF); - BigBuf_free(); - BigBuf_Clear_ext(false); + BigBuf_free_keep_EM(); + BigBuf_Clear_keep_EM(); } g_dbglevel = oldbg; return; @@ -2527,8 +2527,8 @@ OUT: reply_ng(CMD_HF_MIFARE_CHKKEYS_FAST, PM3_EMALLOC, NULL, 0); set_tracing(false); FpgaWriteConfWord(FPGA_MAJOR_MODE_OFF); - BigBuf_free(); - BigBuf_Clear_ext(false); + BigBuf_free_keep_EM(); + BigBuf_Clear_keep_EM(); g_dbglevel = oldbg; return; } @@ -2542,8 +2542,8 @@ OUT: set_tracing(false); FpgaWriteConfWord(FPGA_MAJOR_MODE_OFF); - BigBuf_free(); - BigBuf_Clear_ext(false); + BigBuf_free_keep_EM(); + BigBuf_Clear_keep_EM(); // special trick ecfill if (use_flashmem && foundkeys == allkeys) { @@ -3328,7 +3328,7 @@ void MifareCIdent(bool is_mfc, uint8_t keytype, uint8_t *key) { if (g_dbglevel >= DBG_ERROR) DbpString("Magic ident: failed to allocate buffers"); reply_ng(CMD_HF_MIFARE_CIDENT, PM3_EMALLOC, NULL, 0); switch_off(); - BigBuf_free(); + BigBuf_free_keep_EM(); return; } @@ -3531,7 +3531,7 @@ void MifareCIdent(bool is_mfc, uint8_t keytype, uint8_t *key) { reply_ng(CMD_HF_MIFARE_CIDENT, PM3_SUCCESS, (uint8_t *)&flag, sizeof(uint16_t)); // turns off OnSuccessMagic(); - BigBuf_free(); + BigBuf_free_keep_EM(); } void MifareHasStaticNonce(void) { @@ -3593,7 +3593,7 @@ OUT: reply_ng(CMD_HF_MIFARE_STATIC_NONCE, retval, data, sizeof(data)); // turns off OnSuccessMagic(); - BigBuf_free(); + BigBuf_free_keep_EM(); crypto1_deinit(pcs); } @@ -3801,7 +3801,7 @@ OUT: reply_ng(CMD_HF_MIFARE_STATIC_ENCRYPTED_NONCE, retval, data, sizeof(data)); // turns off OnSuccessMagic(); - BigBuf_free(); + BigBuf_free_keep_EM(); } void OnSuccessMagic(void) { @@ -3853,7 +3853,7 @@ void MifareGen3UID(uint8_t uidlen, uint8_t *uid) { if (old_uid == NULL || cmd == NULL || card_info == NULL) { if (g_dbglevel >= DBG_ERROR) DbpString("Gen3 UID: failed to allocate buffers"); reply_ng(CMD_HF_MIFARE_GEN3UID, PM3_EMALLOC, NULL, 0); - BigBuf_free(); + BigBuf_free_keep_EM(); return; } @@ -3882,7 +3882,7 @@ OUT: reply_ng(CMD_HF_MIFARE_GEN3UID, retval, old_uid, uidlen); // turns off OnSuccessMagic(); - BigBuf_free(); + BigBuf_free_keep_EM(); } void MifareGen3Blk(uint8_t block_len, uint8_t *block) { @@ -3897,7 +3897,7 @@ void MifareGen3Blk(uint8_t block_len, uint8_t *block) { if (cmd == NULL || card_info == NULL) { if (g_dbglevel >= DBG_ERROR) DbpString("Gen3 blk: failed to allocate buffers"); reply_ng(CMD_HF_MIFARE_GEN3BLK, PM3_EMALLOC, NULL, 0); - BigBuf_free(); + BigBuf_free_keep_EM(); return; } @@ -3955,7 +3955,7 @@ OUT: reply_ng(CMD_HF_MIFARE_GEN3BLK, retval, &cmd[sizeof(block_cmd)], MIFARE_BLOCK_SIZE); // turns off OnSuccessMagic(); - BigBuf_free(); + BigBuf_free_keep_EM(); } void MifareGen3Freez(void) { @@ -3979,7 +3979,7 @@ OUT: reply_ng(CMD_HF_MIFARE_GEN3FREEZ, retval, NULL, 0); // turns off OnSuccessMagic(); - BigBuf_free(); + BigBuf_free_keep_EM(); } void MifareG4ReadBlk(uint8_t blockno, uint8_t *pwd, uint8_t workFlags) { @@ -4055,7 +4055,7 @@ OUT: set_tracing(false); } - BigBuf_free(); + BigBuf_free_keep_EM(); } void MifareG4WriteBlk(uint8_t blockno, uint8_t *pwd, uint8_t *data, uint8_t workFlags) { @@ -4138,7 +4138,7 @@ OUT: set_tracing(false); } - BigBuf_free(); + BigBuf_free_keep_EM(); } void MifareSetMod(uint8_t *datain) { @@ -4160,7 +4160,7 @@ void MifareSetMod(uint8_t *datain) { if (uid == NULL || buf == NULL || par == NULL) { if (g_dbglevel >= DBG_ERROR) DbpString("SetMod: failed to allocate buffers"); reply_ng(CMD_HF_MIFARE_SETMOD, PM3_EMALLOC, NULL, 0); - BigBuf_free(); + BigBuf_free_keep_EM(); return; } @@ -4206,7 +4206,7 @@ void MifareSetMod(uint8_t *datain) { FpgaWriteConfWord(FPGA_MAJOR_MODE_OFF); LEDsoff(); - BigBuf_free(); + BigBuf_free_keep_EM(); } From eab887680f32b6c7b1842d3c087fbe17d6960b45 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: iceman1001 Date: Thu, 12 Nov 2026 07:41:20 +0700 Subject: [PATCH 2/3] iso14_apdu: ISO 14443-4 error recovery; hf mfdes: honest check results Fixes #3787. `hf mfdes chk` could print "No keys found", exit 0, and miss keys that are on the card. Two conflated results caused it. DesfireAuthenticate() returned 7 both when the PICC answered the 2nd auth frame with AUTHENTICATION_ERROR, a real wrong key, and when the exchange got no answer at all. Every card error collapses to PM3_EAPDU_FAIL in the send layer, so the code could not tell them apart. The dictionary loop read "no answer" as a confirmed wrong key: no retry, no resync, candidate counted as tested. A lost 2nd frame also left the PICC waiting for it with a 14443-4 block number no longer matching ours, so the next candidate drew 91CA and was lost too. AuthCheckDesfire() reported every failed SelectApplication as "AID does not exist", so a lost SELECT response skipped a whole application. On a DESFire EV1 here that dropped the one application holding the keys in 2 of 5 runs. respcode stays 0xFF when no status byte arrives, and that is the discriminator both places now use. A candidate the PICC gave no verdict on is retried after a reselect; what still cannot be covered is counted and reported, so `hf mfdes chk` prints "Search was not exhaustive" and returns PM3_EPARTIAL instead of success. `hf mfdes detect` had the same conflation. The auth result codes are named in desfirecore.h now instead of bare integers. Naming the `res < 7` bound showed it also matched PM3_SUCCESS, so a found key triggered a field drop and reselect, and was lost entirely if that reselect failed. Codes 1 and 7 no longer carry a transmit failure, so their strings say what they mean: a wrong key reported "Sending auth response (2nd frame) failed" before. iso14_apdu() gains the ISO/IEC 14443-4 7.5.6 PCD error recovery it never had. A lost or damaged answer is a transmission error, not a dead link: R(NAK) asks the PICC to send its last block again, and an R(ACK) back means it never got ours, so the block is repeated. Two rounds. The CRC is checked before the block number is toggled now, so a damaged frame can no longer desync the link, and `hw status` reports how often a frame had to be asked for again and how often that did not help. Also fixed on the way: a -3 return from the WTX loop left the extended timeout in place for the next exchange, and a negative iso14_apdu() return was assigned into a uint16_t length, making reply_ng() send a PM3_EOVFLOW frame. Tested on hardware with a DESFire EV1 against both platforms. PM5 before: 3 of 5 runs found the keys. PM5 after: 23 of 24, the one miss a 14443-3 activation failure before any APDU. RDV4: 6 of 6 before, 10 of 10 after. The counter shows why they differ, same card and client: RDV4 needed 0 retransmissions in ~5000 exchanges, the PM5 0 to 80 per ~500 depending on the run, always in the reader to card direction. The recovery hides that, it does not fix it. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 --- CHANGELOG.md | 3 + armsrc/appmain.c | 6 + armsrc/iso14443a.c | 142 +++++++++++++++++++----- armsrc/iso14443a.h | 1 + client/src/cmdhfmfdes.c | 187 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++------ client/src/mifare/desfirecore.c | 176 ++++++++++++++++-------------- client/src/mifare/desfirecore.h | 46 ++++++++ 7 files changed, 420 insertions(+), 141 deletions(-) diff --git a/CHANGELOG.md b/CHANGELOG.md index 66a64e1fa..730a5cf43 100644 --- a/CHANGELOG.md +++ b/CHANGELOG.md @@ -3,6 +3,9 @@ All notable changes to this project will be documented in this file. This project uses the changelog in accordance with [keepchangelog](http://keepachangelog.com/). Please use this to write notable changes, which is not the same as git commit log... ## [unreleased][unreleased] +- Added ISO/IEC 14443-4 error recovery to the reader - a lost or damaged answer is asked for again with R(NAK) instead of failing the exchange, `hw status` reports how often that was needed (@iceman1001) +- Fixed `hf mfdes chk` - an exchange the card never answered is no longer counted as a wrong key or as a missing application, such candidates are retried and what stays uncovered is reported instead of hiding behind "No keys found" (@iceman1001) +- Fixed `hf mfdes detect` - an exchange the card never answered is no longer counted as a wrong key (@iceman1001) - Update Amiibo database (@tpglitch) - Changed `lf pcf7931 write` - write is verified via the tag's read after write, retried up to 3 times, failures are reported (@GiacoBot) - Changed `lf pcf7931 reader` - prints blocks 0-7 in order and decodes PAC, password, write protection and selection; handles partial selections, new `--rfb` param (@GiacoBot) diff --git a/armsrc/appmain.c b/armsrc/appmain.c index ba1444a45..597677101 100644 --- a/armsrc/appmain.c +++ b/armsrc/appmain.c @@ -803,6 +803,12 @@ static void SendStatus(uint32_t wait) { Dbprintf(" ToSendMax........... %d", ts->max); Dbprintf(" ToSend BUFFERSIZE... %d", TOSEND_BUFFER_SIZE); +#ifdef WITH_ISO14443a + uint32_t retrans = 0, retrans_lost = 0; + iso14_get_retrans(&retrans, &retrans_lost); + Dbprintf(" 14443-4 retrans..... %u asked, %u still lost", retrans, retrans_lost); +#endif + #ifdef CHIP_AT91SAM7S while ((AT91C_BASE_PMC->PMC_MCFR & AT91C_CKGR_MAINRDY) == 0); // Wait for MAINF value to become available... diff --git a/armsrc/iso14443a.c b/armsrc/iso14443a.c index 661a1d9fe..f3cc57feb 100644 --- a/armsrc/iso14443a.c +++ b/armsrc/iso14443a.c @@ -4214,6 +4214,82 @@ b8 b7 b6 b5 b4 b3 b2 b1 b5,b6 = 00 - DESELECT 11 - WTX */ +// ISO/IEC 14443-4 7.5.6 leaves the retransmission count to the PCD. Two extra +// tries cover a lost frame without stretching a dead link into seconds. +#define ISO14_MAX_RETRANS 2 + +// how often a frame had to be asked for again, and how often that did not +// help. `hw status` reports both: recovered losses are otherwise invisible +static uint32_t iso14_retrans; +static uint32_t iso14_retrans_lost; + +void iso14_get_retrans(uint32_t *retrans, uint32_t *lost) { + *retrans = iso14_retrans; + *lost = iso14_retrans_lost; +} + +// Did a 14443-4 block survive the air? PCB + CRC is the shortest legal one. +static bool iso14_block_valid(const uint8_t *data, uint16_t len) { + return (len >= 3 && CheckCrc14A(data, len)); +} + +// Is this block an answer to the block we just sent? The PICC echoes our +// block number, so a mismatch is a frame from another step of the exchange and +// must not be handed to the caller as data. S-blocks carry no block number. +static bool iso14_answer_valid(const uint8_t *data, uint16_t len) { + + if (iso14_block_valid(data, len) == false) { + return false; + } + + if ((data[0] & 0xC0) == 0xC0) { // S-block, e.g. WTX + return true; + } + + if ((data[0] & 0xD0) == 0x90) { // R(NAK), never an answer + return false; + } + + return ((data[0] & 0x01) == iso14_pcb_blocknum); +} + +// ISO/IEC 14443-4 7.5.6 error recovery. A lost or damaged answer is a +// transmission error, not a dead link. R(NAK) asks the PICC to send its last +// block again, which costs nothing when the loss was ours to begin with; if +// that brings back no usable answer the PICC never got `block`, so repeat it. +// Returns the answer length, 0 when the link stays silent, -3 on user abort. +static int iso14_recover(const uint8_t *block, uint16_t block_len, uint8_t *data, uint16_t data_len) { + + for (uint8_t i = 0; i < ISO14_MAX_RETRANS; i++) { + + if (BUTTON_PRESS() || data_available()) { + return -3; + } + + iso14_retrans++; + + uint8_t nak[3] = {0x00, 0x00, 0x00}; + nak[0] = 0xB2 | iso14_pcb_blocknum; // r-block + NAK + AddCrc14A(nak, 1); + ReaderTransmit(nak, sizeof(nak), NULL); + + uint16_t len = ReaderReceive(data, data_len, parity_array); + if (iso14_answer_valid(data, len)) { + return len; + } + + ReaderTransmit(block, block_len, NULL); + + len = ReaderReceive(data, data_len, parity_array); + if (iso14_answer_valid(data, len)) { + return len; + } + } + + iso14_retrans_lost++; + return 0; +} + int iso14_apdu(uint8_t *cmd, uint16_t cmd_len, bool send_chaining, void *data, uint16_t data_len, uint8_t *res) { // PCB(1) + APDU + CRC(2) has to fit inside one ISO14443 frame, which is // also the limit ReaderTransmit() can encode into the tosend buffer. @@ -4222,6 +4298,7 @@ int iso14_apdu(uint8_t *cmd, uint16_t cmd_len, bool send_chaining, void *data, u } uint8_t real_cmd[MAX_FRAME_SIZE] = {0}; + uint16_t real_cmd_len = cmd_len + 3; if (cmd_len) { // ISO 14443 APDU frame: PCB [CID] [NAD] APDU CRC PCB=0x02 @@ -4239,26 +4316,31 @@ int iso14_apdu(uint8_t *cmd, uint16_t cmd_len, bool send_chaining, void *data, u } AddCrc14A(real_cmd, cmd_len + 1); - ReaderTransmit(real_cmd, cmd_len + 3, NULL); + ReaderTransmit(real_cmd, real_cmd_len, NULL); // tearoff occurred if (tearoff_hook() == PM3_ETEAROFF) { return -1; } - size_t len = ReaderReceive(data, data_len, parity_array); uint8_t *data_bytes = (uint8_t *) data; + uint16_t len = ReaderReceive(data, data_len, parity_array); - if (len == 0) { - return 0; // DATA LINK ERROR + if (iso14_block_valid(data_bytes, len) == false) { + int rc = iso14_recover(real_cmd, real_cmd_len, data_bytes, data_len); + if (rc <= 0) { + return rc; // 0 - DATA LINK ERROR, -3 - aborted + } + len = rc; } uint32_t save_iso14a_timeout = iso14a_get_timeout(); // S-Block WTX - while (len && ((data_bytes[0] & 0xF2) == 0xF2)) { + while ((data_bytes[0] & 0xF2) == 0xF2) { if (BUTTON_PRESS() || data_available()) { + iso14a_set_timeout(save_iso14a_timeout); return -3; } @@ -4281,15 +4363,25 @@ int iso14_apdu(uint8_t *cmd, uint16_t cmd_len, bool send_chaining, void *data, u // retrieve the result again (with increased timeout) len = ReaderReceive(data_bytes, data_len, parity_array); + if (iso14_block_valid(data_bytes, len) == false) { + int rc = iso14_recover(real_cmd, real_cmd_len, data_bytes, data_len); + if (rc <= 0) { + iso14a_set_timeout(save_iso14a_timeout); + return rc; // 0 - DATA LINK ERROR, -3 - aborted + } + len = rc; + } } iso14a_set_timeout(save_iso14a_timeout); + // the CRC was checked on the way in, so a damaged frame can no longer + // toggle the block number + // if we received an I- or R(ACK)-Block with a block number equal to the // current block number, toggle the current block number - if (len >= 3 // PCB+CRC = 3 bytes - && ((data_bytes[0] & 0xC0) == 0 // I-Block - || (data_bytes[0] & 0xD0) == 0x80) // R-Block with ACK bit set to 0 + if (((data_bytes[0] & 0xC0) == 0 // I-Block + || (data_bytes[0] & 0xD0) == 0x80) // R-Block with ACK bit set to 0 && (data_bytes[0] & 0x01) == iso14_pcb_blocknum) { // equal block numbers iso14_pcb_blocknum ^= 1; } @@ -4299,16 +4391,10 @@ int iso14_apdu(uint8_t *cmd, uint16_t cmd_len, bool send_chaining, void *data, u *res = data_bytes[0]; } - if (len >= 3 && !CheckCrc14A(data_bytes, len)) { - return -1; - } - - if (len) { - // cut frame byte - len -= 1; - for (int i = 0; i < len; i++) { - data_bytes[i] = data_bytes[i + 1]; - } + // cut frame byte + len -= 1; + for (uint16_t i = 0; i < len; i++) { + data_bytes[i] = data_bytes[i + 1]; } return len; @@ -4430,14 +4516,18 @@ void ReaderIso14443a(PacketCommandNG *c) { FpgaDisableTracing(); uint8_t res = 0; - arg0 = iso14_apdu( - cmd, - len, - ((param & ISO14A_SEND_CHAINING) == ISO14A_SEND_CHAINING), - buf, - ISO14A_RESP_MAXLEN, - &res - ); + int apdu_len = iso14_apdu( + cmd, + len, + ((param & ISO14A_SEND_CHAINING) == ISO14A_SEND_CHAINING), + buf, + ISO14A_RESP_MAXLEN, + &res + ); + + // an error carries no data. Letting it through as a length would + // reply with a bogus frame size + arg0 = (apdu_len > 0) ? apdu_len : 0; response->len = arg0; response->sel = res; diff --git a/armsrc/iso14443a.h b/armsrc/iso14443a.h index 05253f36b..3b2954c3e 100644 --- a/armsrc/iso14443a.h +++ b/armsrc/iso14443a.h @@ -187,6 +187,7 @@ uint32_t iso14a_last_rx_start(void); void iso14443a_setup(uint8_t fpga_minor_mode); int iso14_apdu(uint8_t *cmd, uint16_t cmd_len, bool send_chaining, void *data, uint16_t data_len, uint8_t *res); +void iso14_get_retrans(uint32_t *retrans, uint32_t *lost); int iso14443a_select_card(uint8_t *uid_ptr, iso14a_card_select_t *p_card, uint32_t *cuid_ptr, bool anticollision, uint8_t num_cascades, bool no_rats); int iso14443a_select_cardEx(uint8_t *uid_ptr, iso14a_card_select_t *p_card, uint32_t *cuid_ptr, bool anticollision, uint8_t num_cascades, bool no_rats, diff --git a/client/src/cmdhfmfdes.c b/client/src/cmdhfmfdes.c index 2ca030b4c..b0e213b07 100644 --- a/client/src/cmdhfmfdes.c +++ b/client/src/cmdhfmfdes.c @@ -67,6 +67,8 @@ #define MAX_KEYS_LIST_LEN 1024 // how many errors in a row from the card before we give up on a key number #define MFDES_CHK_MAX_ERRORS 10 +// extra tries for a candidate the PICC gave no verdict on +#define MFDES_CHK_MAX_RETRY 2 // bundled dictionary used when no -f is given #define MFDES_DEFAULT_DICT "mfdes_default_keys" #define MFDES_BRUTEAID_RESELECT_ATTEMPTS 5 @@ -1395,8 +1397,56 @@ static void DesChkPrependKey(uint8_t *keyList, size_t stride, uint32_t *keyListL *keyListLen = len + 1; } +// What a dictionary check could not cover. Either one makes the search +// non-exhaustive, so "No keys found" alone would be a misleading result. +typedef struct { + uint32_t untested; // candidate authentications the PICC gave no verdict on + uint32_t skippedaid; // applications that could not be selected at all +} desfire_chk_gaps_t; + +// Select `aid`, retrying while the exchange fails on the link. PM3_EAPDU_FAIL +// is the PICC itself answering, so that one is final: the application really +// isn't there. Anything else is a lost exchange and worth another try. +static int DesChkSelectAID(DesfireContext_t *dctx, uint32_t aid) { + + int res = PM3_ESOFT; + + for (uint8_t attempt = 0; attempt <= MFDES_CHK_MAX_RETRY; attempt++) { + + res = DesfireSelectAIDHex(dctx, aid, false, 0); + if (res == PM3_SUCCESS || res == PM3_EAPDU_FAIL) { + break; + } + + DropField(); + } + + return res; +} + +// Did the PICC rule on this candidate key? Only AUTHENTICATION_ERROR is it +// refusing the key. No status byte at all, no answer content or an aborted +// exchange means the key was never evaluated, and leaves the PICC waiting for +// the second auth frame with a 14443-4 block number that no longer matches +// ours. Only a reselect clears both. +static bool DesChkNoVerdict(int res, uint8_t respcode) { + + if (res == DESFIRE_AUTH_NO_ANSWER || + res == DESFIRE_AUTH_NO_DATA1 || + res == DESFIRE_AUTH_NO_DATA2) { + return true; + } + + if (res == DESFIRE_AUTH_TX1_FAIL) { + return (respcode == MFDES_E_COMMAND_ABORTED); + } + + return (res == DESFIRE_AUTH_TX2_FAIL && respcode != MFDES_E_AUTHENTICATION_ERROR); +} + // Try every key in `keyList` against every key number the `usedkeys` map marks as -// in use on the currently selected application. Found keys are stored in `found`. +// in use on the currently selected application. Found keys are stored in `found`, +// and `gaps` collects what could not be covered. // Returns PM3_SUCCESS, or an error when the application can no longer be selected. static int AuthCheckDesfireKeyType(DesfireContext_t *dctx, DesfireSecureChannel secureChannel, @@ -1406,7 +1456,8 @@ static int AuthCheckDesfireKeyType(DesfireContext_t *dctx, const uint8_t *keyList, size_t keyListStride, uint32_t keyListLen, const int *usedkeys, desfire_app_keys_t *found, - bool *result) { + bool *result, + desfire_chk_gaps_t *gaps) { size_t keylen = desfire_get_key_length(keytype); @@ -1422,9 +1473,37 @@ static int AuthCheckDesfireKeyType(DesfireContext_t *dctx, const uint8_t *key = &keyList[curkey * keyListStride]; - DesfireSetKeyNoClear(dctx, keyno, keytype, (uint8_t *)key); + int res = 0; + bool noverdict = false; + + for (uint8_t attempt = 0; ; attempt++) { + + DesfireSetKeyNoClear(dctx, keyno, keytype, (uint8_t *)key); + + res = DesfireAuthenticate(dctx, secureChannel, false); + if (res == PM3_SUCCESS) { + break; + } + + noverdict = DesChkNoVerdict(res, dctx->lastRespCode); + + // the card gave up before the crypto stage, so the channel is + // gone and the application has to be selected again + if (DESFIRE_AUTH_PRE_CRYPTO(res) || noverdict) { + DropField(); + int selres = DesChkSelectAID(dctx, curaid); + if (selres != PM3_SUCCESS) { + // whatever is left of this application goes unchecked + gaps->skippedaid++; + return selres; + } + } + + if (noverdict == false || attempt >= MFDES_CHK_MAX_RETRY) { + break; + } + } - int res = DesfireAuthenticate(dctx, secureChannel, false); if (res == PM3_SUCCESS) { // the AID is already on the "Checking aid" line above PrintAndLogEx(SUCCESS, "Found " _GREEN_("%s") " Key %02u... " _GREEN_("%s"), @@ -1440,37 +1519,40 @@ static int AuthCheckDesfireKeyType(DesfireContext_t *dctx, break; } - // anything below 7 means the card gave up before the crypto stage, - // the channel is gone and the application has to be selected again - if (res < 7) { - DropField(); - int selres = DesfireSelectAIDHex(dctx, curaid, false, 0); - if (selres != PM3_SUCCESS) { - return selres; + // the retries are spent and the card still gave no verdict, so this + // candidate stays unchecked and the search is not exhaustive + if (noverdict) { + gaps->untested++; + if (g_debugMode) { + PrintAndLogEx(DEBUG, "AID 0x%06X, %s key %02u... no verdict on %s, [%d] %s", + curaid, keytypestr, keyno, sprint_hex_inrow(key, keylen), + res, DesfireAuthErrorToStr(res)); } } - // 4 - answer length doesn't match the algo - // 50 - PICC didn't answer AES, 51 - PICC didn't answer LRP // the application doesn't use this key type, skip the rest of it - if (res == 4 || res == 50 || res == 51) { + if (res == DESFIRE_AUTH_RNDB_LEN || + res == DESFIRE_AUTH_NO_AES || + res == DESFIRE_AUTH_NO_LRP) { return PM3_SUCCESS; } - // 3 - invalid key number. Every key fails the same way, but the + // invalid key number. Every key fails the same way, but the // remaining key numbers are still worth checking - if (res == 3) { + if (res == DESFIRE_AUTH_NO_FRAME) { break; } - // 1, 2, 5, 6 - transmit or local crypto error. Carry on with the next - // key and only give up on this key number after a run of them - if (res < 7) { + // a transmit or local crypto error. Carry on with the next key and + // only give up on this key number after a run of them + if (DESFIRE_AUTH_PRE_CRYPTO(res) || noverdict) { errcount++; if (errcount > MFDES_CHK_MAX_ERRORS) { if (g_debugMode) { PrintAndLogEx(DEBUG, "AID 0x%06X, %s key %02u... too many errors from card, skipping", curaid, keytypestr, keyno); } + // the rest of the list is never tried against this key number + gaps->untested += keyListLen - curkey - 1; break; } } else { @@ -1491,13 +1573,22 @@ static int AuthCheckDesfire(DesfireContext_t *dctx, bool autoschann, desfire_app_keys_t *found, bool *result, + desfire_chk_gaps_t *gaps, bool verbose) { uint32_t curaid = (aid[0] & 0xFF) + ((aid[1] & 0xFF) << 8) + ((aid[2] & 0xFF) << 16); - int res = DesfireSelectAIDHex(dctx, curaid, false, 0); + int res = DesChkSelectAID(dctx, curaid); if (res != PM3_SUCCESS) { - PrintAndLogEx(ERR, "AID 0x%06X does not exist.", curaid); + + // only the PICC answering is proof that the application isn't there + if (res == PM3_EAPDU_FAIL) { + PrintAndLogEx(ERR, "AID 0x%06X does not exist.", curaid); + } else { + PrintAndLogEx(ERR, "AID 0x%06X, can't select it, keys " _YELLOW_("not checked"), curaid); + gaps->skippedaid++; + } + DropField(); return PM3_ESOFT; } @@ -1542,7 +1633,8 @@ static int AuthCheckDesfire(DesfireContext_t *dctx, DesfireCheckAuthCommands(ISW6bAID, curaid, NULL, 0, &authCmdCheck); if (authCmdCheck.checked == false) { - PrintAndLogEx(ERR, "AID 0x%06X, could not get key settings", curaid); + PrintAndLogEx(ERR, "AID 0x%06X, could not get key settings, keys " _YELLOW_("not checked"), curaid); + gaps->skippedaid++; DropField(); return PM3_ESOFT; } @@ -1574,9 +1666,10 @@ static int AuthCheckDesfire(DesfireContext_t *dctx, } // the probe dropped the field behind us - res = DesfireSelectAIDHex(dctx, curaid, false, 0); + res = DesChkSelectAID(dctx, curaid); if (res != PM3_SUCCESS) { - PrintAndLogEx(ERR, "AID 0x%06X, can't re-select after the auth command probe", curaid); + PrintAndLogEx(ERR, "AID 0x%06X, can't re-select after the auth command probe, keys " _YELLOW_("not checked"), curaid); + gaps->skippedaid++; DropField(); return PM3_ESOFT; } @@ -1627,9 +1720,10 @@ static int AuthCheckDesfire(DesfireContext_t *dctx, uselrp = DesfireCheckAuthCmd(ISW6bAID, curaid, 0, MFDES_AUTHENTICATE_EV2F, true); // the probe dropped the field behind us - res = DesfireSelectAIDHex(dctx, curaid, false, 0); + res = DesChkSelectAID(dctx, curaid); if (res != PM3_SUCCESS) { - PrintAndLogEx(ERR, "AID 0x%06X, can't re-select after the LRP probe", curaid); + PrintAndLogEx(ERR, "AID 0x%06X, can't re-select after the LRP probe, keys " _YELLOW_("not checked"), curaid); + gaps->skippedaid++; DropField(); return PM3_ESOFT; } @@ -1678,7 +1772,7 @@ static int AuthCheckDesfire(DesfireContext_t *dctx, res = AuthCheckDesfireKeyType(dctx, secureChannel, curaid, checks[i].keytype, checks[i].name, checks[i].list, checks[i].stride, checks[i].len, - usedkeys, found, result); + usedkeys, found, result, gaps); if (res != PM3_SUCCESS) { DropField(); return res; @@ -1855,6 +1949,7 @@ static int CmdHF14aDesChk(const char *Cmd) { } bool result = false; + desfire_chk_gaps_t gaps = {0}; uint8_t app_ids[DESFIRE_MAX_APP_COUNT * 3] = {0}; size_t app_ids_len = 0; @@ -2064,6 +2159,7 @@ static int CmdHF14aDesChk(const char *Cmd) { autoschann, found, &foundKeyThisRound, + &gaps, verbose ); @@ -2084,6 +2180,25 @@ static int CmdHF14aDesChk(const char *Cmd) { PrintAndLogEx(WARNING, "No keys found"); } + // neither a candidate the PICC never ruled on nor an application that could + // not be selected is a tested candidate + if (gaps.untested || gaps.skippedaid) { + + PrintAndLogEx(WARNING, "Search was " _YELLOW_("not exhaustive")); + + if (gaps.untested) { + PrintAndLogEx(WARNING, " %u candidate%s got no verdict from the card", + gaps.untested, (gaps.untested == 1) ? "" : "s"); + } + + if (gaps.skippedaid) { + PrintAndLogEx(WARNING, " %u application%s could not be selected", + gaps.skippedaid, (gaps.skippedaid == 1) ? "" : "s"); + } + + PrintAndLogEx(HINT, "Hint: reposition the card and run the check again"); + } + // save keys to json if ((jsonnamelen > 0) && result) { DropField(); @@ -2107,7 +2222,9 @@ static int CmdHF14aDesChk(const char *Cmd) { free(dump); DropField(); - return PM3_SUCCESS; + + // an incomplete search must not look like a completed one to a script + return (gaps.untested || gaps.skippedaid) ? PM3_EPARTIAL : PM3_SUCCESS; } static int CmdHF14ADesList(const char *Cmd) { @@ -2123,13 +2240,15 @@ static int DesfireAuthCheck(DesfireContext_t *dctx, DesfireISOSelectWay way, uin return PM3_SUCCESS; } - // 4 - the challenge the PICC sent is the wrong length for this algo - // 50 - PICC didn't answer AES, 51 - PICC didn't answer LRP - // the application holds no key of this type, so every key in the list fails - // the same way and there is nothing to learn from trying the rest - bool wrongalgo = (res == 4 || res == 50 || res == 51); + // the challenge was the wrong length for this algo, or the PICC didn't + // answer AES / LRP at all: the application holds no key of this type, so + // every key in the list fails the same way and there is nothing to learn + // from trying the rest + bool wrongalgo = (res == DESFIRE_AUTH_RNDB_LEN || + res == DESFIRE_AUTH_NO_AES || + res == DESFIRE_AUTH_NO_LRP); - if (res < 7) { + if (DESFIRE_AUTH_PRE_CRYPTO(res) || DesChkNoVerdict(res, dctx->lastRespCode)) { DropField(); if (DesfireSelect(dctx, way, appID, NULL) != PM3_SUCCESS) { return -10; diff --git a/client/src/mifare/desfirecore.c b/client/src/mifare/desfirecore.c index d5906c076..eea7d25a6 100644 --- a/client/src/mifare/desfirecore.c +++ b/client/src/mifare/desfirecore.c @@ -245,59 +245,61 @@ const char *DesfireGetErrorString(int res, uint16_t *sw) { const char *DesfireAuthErrorToStr(int error) { switch (error) { - case 1: - return "Sending auth command failed"; - case 2: + case DESFIRE_AUTH_TX1_FAIL: + return "Authentication failed. PICC rejected the auth command"; + case DESFIRE_AUTH_NO_DATA1: return "Authentication failed. No data received"; - case 3: + case DESFIRE_AUTH_NO_FRAME: return "Authentication failed. Invalid key number."; - case 4: + case DESFIRE_AUTH_RNDB_LEN: return "Authentication failed. Length of answer doesn't match algo length"; - case 5: + case DESFIRE_AUTH_SETKEY_DEC: return "mbedtls_aes_setkey_dec failed"; - case 6: + case DESFIRE_AUTH_SETKEY_ENC: return "mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc failed"; - case 7: - return "Sending auth response (2nd frame) failed"; - case 8: + case DESFIRE_AUTH_TX2_FAIL: + return "Authentication failed. PICC rejected the 2nd auth frame"; + case DESFIRE_AUTH_NO_DATA2: return "Authentication failed. Card timeout."; - case 9: + case DESFIRE_AUTH_NOT_OK: return "Authentication failed."; - case 10: + case DESFIRE_AUTH_SETKEY_DEC2: return "mbedtls_aes_setkey_dec failed"; - case 11: + case DESFIRE_AUTH_RNDA_MISMATCH: return "Authentication failed. Cannot verify Session Key."; - case 12: + case DESFIRE_AUTH_CMAC_FAIL: return "Authentication failed. Cannot verify CMAC."; - case 50: + case DESFIRE_AUTH_NO_AES: return "PICC returned not an AES answer"; - case 51: + case DESFIRE_AUTH_NO_LRP: return "PICC returned not an LRP answer"; - case 100: + case DESFIRE_AUTH_NO_ANSWER: + return "Authentication inconclusive. PICC gave no status byte"; + case DESFIRE_AUTH_NO_METHOD: return "Can't find auth method for provided channel parameters."; - case 200: + case DESFIRE_AUTH_SELECT_FAIL: return "Can't select application."; - case 201: + case DESFIRE_AUTH_NO_CHANNEL: return "Authentication returned no error but channel not authenticated."; - case 202: + case DESFIRE_AUTH_SELECT_ISO_FAIL: return "Can't select application by ISO ID."; - case 203: + case DESFIRE_AUTH_SELECT_EF_FAIL: return "Can't select file by ISO ID."; - case 301: + case DESFIRE_AUTH_ISO_CHAL: return "ISO Get challenge error."; - case 302: + case DESFIRE_AUTH_ISO_CHAL_LEN: return "ISO Get challenge returned wrong length."; - case 303: + case DESFIRE_AUTH_ISO_ENC_RND1: return "Crypto encode piccrnd1 error."; - case 304: + case DESFIRE_AUTH_ISO_EXT_AUTH: return "External authenticate error."; - case 305: + case DESFIRE_AUTH_ISO_INT_AUTH: return "Internal authenticate error."; - case 306: + case DESFIRE_AUTH_ISO_INT_LEN: return "Internal authenticate returned wrong length."; - case 307: + case DESFIRE_AUTH_ISO_DEC_RND2: return "Crypto decode piccrnd2 error."; - case 308: + case DESFIRE_AUTH_ISO_RND_FAIL: return "Random numbers don't match. Authentication failed."; default: break; @@ -1193,7 +1195,7 @@ int DesfireSelectAndAuthenticateEx(DesfireContext_t *dctx, DesfireSecureChannel res = DesfireAnticollision(verbose); if (res != PM3_SUCCESS) { PrintAndLogEx(FAILED, "Desfire anticollision " _RED_("failed")); - return 200; + return DESFIRE_AUTH_SELECT_FAIL; } if (verbose) { @@ -1204,7 +1206,7 @@ int DesfireSelectAndAuthenticateEx(DesfireContext_t *dctx, DesfireSecureChannel res = DesfireSelectAIDHex(dctx, aid, false, 0); if (res != PM3_SUCCESS) { PrintAndLogEx(FAILED, "Desfire %s select " _RED_("failed"), DesfireWayIDStr(ISW6bAID, aid)); - return 200; + return DESFIRE_AUTH_SELECT_FAIL; } if (verbose) { @@ -1229,8 +1231,8 @@ int DesfireSelectAndAuthenticateEx(DesfireContext_t *dctx, DesfireSecureChannel PrintAndLogEx(INFO, "Desfire " _GREEN_("authenticated")); } } else { - PrintAndLogEx(FAILED, "Desfire %s authentication " _RED_("failed") ". Result [%d] %s", DesfireWayIDStr(ISW6bAID, aid), 201, DesfireAuthErrorToStr(201)); - return 201; + PrintAndLogEx(FAILED, "Desfire %s authentication " _RED_("failed") ". Result [%d] %s", DesfireWayIDStr(ISW6bAID, aid), DESFIRE_AUTH_NO_CHANNEL, DesfireAuthErrorToStr(DESFIRE_AUTH_NO_CHANNEL)); + return DESFIRE_AUTH_NO_CHANNEL; } } @@ -1260,7 +1262,7 @@ int DesfireSelectAndAuthenticateW(DesfireContext_t *dctx, DesfireSecureChannel s if (res == PM3_ECARDEXCHANGE || res == PM3_ETIMEOUT || res == PM3_ERFTRANS) { return res; } - return 200; + return DESFIRE_AUTH_SELECT_FAIL; } if (verbose) { @@ -1281,7 +1283,7 @@ int DesfireSelectAndAuthenticateW(DesfireContext_t *dctx, DesfireSecureChannel s if (res == PM3_ECARDEXCHANGE || res == PM3_ETIMEOUT || res == PM3_ERFTRANS) { return res; } - return 200; + return DESFIRE_AUTH_SELECT_FAIL; } if (verbose) { @@ -1297,7 +1299,7 @@ int DesfireSelectAndAuthenticateW(DesfireContext_t *dctx, DesfireSecureChannel s if (res == PM3_ECARDEXCHANGE || res == PM3_ETIMEOUT || res == PM3_ERFTRANS) { return res; } - return 202; + return DESFIRE_AUTH_SELECT_ISO_FAIL; } if (verbose) { PrintAndLogEx(INFO, "%s is " _GREEN_("selected"), DesfireWayIDStr(way, id)); @@ -1312,7 +1314,7 @@ int DesfireSelectAndAuthenticateW(DesfireContext_t *dctx, DesfireSecureChannel s if (res == PM3_ECARDEXCHANGE || res == PM3_ETIMEOUT || res == PM3_ERFTRANS) { return res; } - return 202; + return DESFIRE_AUTH_SELECT_ISO_FAIL; } if (verbose) { @@ -1331,7 +1333,7 @@ int DesfireSelectAndAuthenticateW(DesfireContext_t *dctx, DesfireSecureChannel s if (res == PM3_ECARDEXCHANGE || res == PM3_ETIMEOUT || res == PM3_ERFTRANS) { return res; } - return 200; + return DESFIRE_AUTH_SELECT_FAIL; } if (verbose) { @@ -1347,7 +1349,7 @@ int DesfireSelectAndAuthenticateW(DesfireContext_t *dctx, DesfireSecureChannel s if (res == PM3_ECARDEXCHANGE || res == PM3_ETIMEOUT || res == PM3_ERFTRANS) { return res; } - return 202; + return DESFIRE_AUTH_SELECT_ISO_FAIL; } if (verbose) { PrintAndLogEx(INFO, "%s is " _GREEN_("selected"), DesfireWayIDStr(way, id)); @@ -1361,7 +1363,7 @@ int DesfireSelectAndAuthenticateW(DesfireContext_t *dctx, DesfireSecureChannel s if (res == PM3_ECARDEXCHANGE || res == PM3_ETIMEOUT || res == PM3_ERFTRANS) { return res; } - return 203; + return DESFIRE_AUTH_SELECT_EF_FAIL; } if (verbose) { @@ -1381,8 +1383,8 @@ int DesfireSelectAndAuthenticateW(DesfireContext_t *dctx, DesfireSecureChannel s PrintAndLogEx(INFO, "Desfire " _GREEN_("authenticated")); } } else { - PrintAndLogEx(FAILED, "Desfire %s authentication " _RED_("failed") ". Result [%d] %s", DesfireWayIDStr(way, id), 201, DesfireAuthErrorToStr(201)); - return 201; + PrintAndLogEx(FAILED, "Desfire %s authentication " _RED_("failed") ". Result [%d] %s", DesfireWayIDStr(way, id), DESFIRE_AUTH_NO_CHANNEL, DesfireAuthErrorToStr(DESFIRE_AUTH_NO_CHANNEL)); + return DESFIRE_AUTH_NO_CHANNEL; } } @@ -1428,7 +1430,7 @@ static int DesfireAuthenticateEV1(DesfireContext_t *dctx, DesfireSecureChannel s } size_t recv_len = 0; - uint8_t respcode = 0; + uint8_t respcode = 0xFF; uint8_t recv_data[256] = {0}; if (verbose) @@ -1437,15 +1439,17 @@ static int DesfireAuthenticateEV1(DesfireContext_t *dctx, DesfireSecureChannel s // Let's send our auth command int res = DesfireExchangeEx(false, dctx, subcommand, &dctx->keyNum, 1, &respcode, recv_data, &recv_len, false, 0); if (res != PM3_SUCCESS) { - return 1; + // 0xFF means no status byte came back at all. The PICC said nothing + // about the key, so the attempt is inconclusive and not a refusal + return (respcode == 0xFF) ? 60 : 1; } if (!recv_len) { - return 2; + return DESFIRE_AUTH_NO_DATA1; } if (respcode != MFDES_ADDITIONAL_FRAME) { - return 3; + return DESFIRE_AUTH_NO_FRAME; } uint32_t expectedlen = 8; @@ -1454,7 +1458,7 @@ static int DesfireAuthenticateEV1(DesfireContext_t *dctx, DesfireSecureChannel s } if (recv_len != expectedlen) { - return 4; + return DESFIRE_AUTH_RNDB_LEN; } // Part 2 @@ -1509,15 +1513,17 @@ static int DesfireAuthenticateEV1(DesfireContext_t *dctx, DesfireSecureChannel s res = DesfireExchangeEx(false, dctx, MFDES_ADDITIONAL_FRAME, both, bothlen, &respcode, recv_data, &recv_len, false, 0); if (res != PM3_SUCCESS) { - return 7; + // a wrong key is the PICC answering this frame with AUTHENTICATION_ERROR. + // No status byte at all is a lost exchange, not a verdict on the key + return (respcode == 0xFF) ? 60 : 7; } if (!recv_len) { - return 8; + return DESFIRE_AUTH_NO_DATA2; } if (respcode != MFDES_S_OPERATION_OK) { - return 9; + return DESFIRE_AUTH_NOT_OK; } // Part 4 @@ -1542,7 +1548,7 @@ static int DesfireAuthenticateEV1(DesfireContext_t *dctx, DesfireSecureChannel s PrintAndLogEx(DEBUG, "Expected_RndA : %s", sprint_hex(RndA, rndlen)); PrintAndLogEx(DEBUG, "Generated_RndA : %s", sprint_hex(encRndA, rndlen)); } - return 11; + return DESFIRE_AUTH_RNDA_MISMATCH; } } @@ -1576,7 +1582,7 @@ static int DesfireAuthenticateEV2(DesfireContext_t *dctx, DesfireSecureChannel s uint8_t *key = dctx->key; size_t recv_len = 0; - uint8_t respcode = 0; + uint8_t respcode = 0xFF; uint8_t recv_data[256] = {0}; if (verbose) @@ -1586,25 +1592,27 @@ static int DesfireAuthenticateEV2(DesfireContext_t *dctx, DesfireSecureChannel s uint8_t cdata[] = {dctx->keyNum, 0x00}; int res = DesfireExchangeEx(false, dctx, subcommand, cdata, (firstauth) ? sizeof(cdata) : 1, &respcode, recv_data, &recv_len, false, 0); if (res != PM3_SUCCESS) { - return 1; + // 0xFF means no status byte came back at all. The PICC said nothing + // about the key, so the attempt is inconclusive and not a refusal + return (respcode == 0xFF) ? 60 : 1; } if (!recv_len) { - return 2; + return DESFIRE_AUTH_NO_DATA1; } if (respcode != MFDES_ADDITIONAL_FRAME) { - return 3; + return DESFIRE_AUTH_NO_FRAME; } size_t rdataindx = 0; if (recv_len != CRYPTO_AES_BLOCK_SIZE) { if (recv_len == CRYPTO_AES_BLOCK_SIZE + 1) { if (recv_data[0] != 0x00) - return 50; + return DESFIRE_AUTH_NO_AES; rdataindx = 1; } else { - return 4; + return DESFIRE_AUTH_RNDB_LEN; } } @@ -1613,7 +1621,7 @@ static int DesfireAuthenticateEV2(DesfireContext_t *dctx, DesfireSecureChannel s // Part 3 if (aes_decode(IV, key, encRndB, RndB, CRYPTO_AES_BLOCK_SIZE)) - return 5; + return DESFIRE_AUTH_SETKEY_DEC; if (g_debugMode > 1) { PrintAndLogEx(DEBUG, "encRndB: %s", sprint_hex(encRndB, CRYPTO_AES_BLOCK_SIZE)); @@ -1634,29 +1642,31 @@ static int DesfireAuthenticateEV2(DesfireContext_t *dctx, DesfireSecureChannel s } if (aes_encode(IV, key, tmp, both, CRYPTO_AES_BLOCK_SIZE * 2)) - return 6; + return DESFIRE_AUTH_SETKEY_ENC; if (g_debugMode > 1) { PrintAndLogEx(DEBUG, "EncBoth: %s", sprint_hex(both, CRYPTO_AES_BLOCK_SIZE * 2)); } res = DesfireExchangeEx(false, dctx, MFDES_ADDITIONAL_FRAME, both, CRYPTO_AES_BLOCK_SIZE * 2, &respcode, recv_data, &recv_len, false, 0); if (res != PM3_SUCCESS) { - return 7; + // a wrong key is the PICC answering this frame with AUTHENTICATION_ERROR. + // No status byte at all is a lost exchange, not a verdict on the key + return (respcode == 0xFF) ? 60 : 7; } if (!recv_len) { - return 8; + return DESFIRE_AUTH_NO_DATA2; } if (respcode != MFDES_S_OPERATION_OK) { - return 9; + return DESFIRE_AUTH_NOT_OK; } // Part 4 uint8_t data[32] = {0}; if (aes_decode(IV, key, recv_data, data, recv_len)) - return 10; + return DESFIRE_AUTH_SETKEY_DEC2; // rotate rndA to check memcpy(rotRndA, RndA, CRYPTO_AES_BLOCK_SIZE); @@ -1669,7 +1679,7 @@ static int DesfireAuthenticateEV2(DesfireContext_t *dctx, DesfireSecureChannel s PrintAndLogEx(DEBUG, "Expected_RndA' : %s", sprint_hex(rotRndA, CRYPTO_AES_BLOCK_SIZE)); PrintAndLogEx(DEBUG, "Generated_RndA' : %s", sprint_hex(recRndA, CRYPTO_AES_BLOCK_SIZE)); } - return 11; + return DESFIRE_AUTH_RNDA_MISMATCH; } if (firstauth) { @@ -1706,10 +1716,10 @@ static int DesfireAuthenticateISO(DesfireContext_t *dctx, DesfireSecureChannel s size_t xlen = 0; int res = DesfireISOGetChallenge(dctx, dctx->keyType, piccrnd, &xlen); if (res != PM3_SUCCESS) - return 301; + return DESFIRE_AUTH_ISO_CHAL; if (xlen != rndlen) - return 302; + return DESFIRE_AUTH_ISO_CHAL_LEN; uint8_t both[32] = {0}; memcpy(both, hostrnd, rndlen); @@ -1722,17 +1732,17 @@ static int DesfireAuthenticateISO(DesfireContext_t *dctx, DesfireSecureChannel s // external authenticate res = DesfireISOExternalAuth(dctx, dctx->appSelected, dctx->keyNum, dctx->keyType, both); if (res != PM3_SUCCESS) - return 304; + return DESFIRE_AUTH_ISO_EXT_AUTH; // internal authenticate uint8_t rnddata[64] = {0}; xlen = 0; res = DesfireISOInternalAuth(dctx, dctx->appSelected, dctx->keyNum, dctx->keyType, hostrnd2, rnddata, &xlen); if (res != PM3_SUCCESS) - return 305; + return DESFIRE_AUTH_ISO_INT_AUTH; if (xlen != rndlen * 2) - return 306; + return DESFIRE_AUTH_ISO_INT_LEN; // decode rnddata uint8_t piccrnd2[64] = {0}; @@ -1740,7 +1750,7 @@ static int DesfireAuthenticateISO(DesfireContext_t *dctx, DesfireSecureChannel s // check if (memcmp(hostrnd2, &piccrnd2[rndlen], rndlen) != 0) - return 308; + return DESFIRE_AUTH_ISO_RND_FAIL; DesfireGenSessionKeyEV1(hostrnd, piccrnd2, dctx->keyType, dctx->sessionKeyEnc); DesfireClearIV(dctx); @@ -1763,7 +1773,7 @@ static int DesfireAuthenticateLRP(DesfireContext_t *dctx, DesfireSecureChannel s uint8_t *key = dctx->key; size_t recv_len = 0; - uint8_t respcode = 0; + uint8_t respcode = 0xFF; uint8_t recv_data[256] = {0}; if (verbose) @@ -1773,23 +1783,25 @@ static int DesfireAuthenticateLRP(DesfireContext_t *dctx, DesfireSecureChannel s uint8_t cdata[] = {dctx->keyNum, 0x01, 0x02}; int res = DesfireExchangeEx(false, dctx, subcommand, cdata, (firstauth) ? sizeof(cdata) : 1, &respcode, recv_data, &recv_len, false, 0); if (res != PM3_SUCCESS) { - return 1; + // 0xFF means no status byte came back at all. The PICC said nothing + // about the key, so the attempt is inconclusive and not a refusal + return (respcode == 0xFF) ? 60 : 1; } if (!recv_len) { - return 2; + return DESFIRE_AUTH_NO_DATA1; } if (respcode != MFDES_ADDITIONAL_FRAME) { - return 3; + return DESFIRE_AUTH_NO_FRAME; } if (recv_len != CRYPTO_AES_BLOCK_SIZE + 1) { - return 4; + return DESFIRE_AUTH_RNDB_LEN; } if (recv_data[0] != 0x01) - return 51; + return DESFIRE_AUTH_NO_LRP; // PICC return RndB in plain memcpy(RndB, &recv_data[1], 16); @@ -1820,15 +1832,17 @@ static int DesfireAuthenticateLRP(DesfireContext_t *dctx, DesfireSecureChannel s res = DesfireExchangeEx(false, dctx, MFDES_ADDITIONAL_FRAME, both, CRYPTO_AES_BLOCK_SIZE * 2, &respcode, recv_data, &recv_len, false, 0); if (res != PM3_SUCCESS) { - return 7; + // a wrong key is the PICC answering this frame with AUTHENTICATION_ERROR. + // No status byte at all is a lost exchange, not a verdict on the key + return (respcode == 0xFF) ? 60 : 7; } if (!recv_len) { - return 8; + return DESFIRE_AUTH_NO_DATA2; } if (respcode != MFDES_S_OPERATION_OK) { - return 9; + return DESFIRE_AUTH_NOT_OK; } // Part 4 @@ -1851,7 +1865,7 @@ static int DesfireAuthenticateLRP(DesfireContext_t *dctx, DesfireSecureChannel s PrintAndLogEx(DEBUG, "Expected cmac : %s", sprint_hex(recCMAC, CRYPTO_AES_BLOCK_SIZE)); PrintAndLogEx(DEBUG, "Generated cmac : %s", sprint_hex(cmac, CRYPTO_AES_BLOCK_SIZE)); } - return 12; + return DESFIRE_AUTH_CMAC_FAIL; } // decode data @@ -1913,7 +1927,7 @@ int DesfireAuthenticate(DesfireContext_t *dctx, DesfireSecureChannel secureChann if (secureChannel == DACLRP) return DesfireAuthenticateLRP(dctx, secureChannel, (DesfireIsAuthenticated(dctx) == false), verbose); - return 100; + return DESFIRE_AUTH_NO_METHOD; } bool DesfireCheckAuthCmd(DesfireISOSelectWay way, uint32_t appID, uint8_t keyNum, uint8_t authcmd, bool checklrp) { diff --git a/client/src/mifare/desfirecore.h b/client/src/mifare/desfirecore.h index 194d18207..f62887f15 100644 --- a/client/src/mifare/desfirecore.h +++ b/client/src/mifare/desfirecore.h @@ -28,6 +28,52 @@ #define DESFIRE_TX_FRAME_MAX_LEN 54 #define DESFIRE_BUFFER_SIZE 65538 +// DesfireAuthenticate() / DesfireSelectAndAuthenticate*() result codes. +// PM3_SUCCESS means authenticated; everything else names the stage that did +// not complete. The numbers are printed to the user, so they stay put. +// +// first auth frame, the one carrying the key number +#define DESFIRE_AUTH_TX1_FAIL 1 // PICC answered with an error status +#define DESFIRE_AUTH_NO_DATA1 2 // answered without data +#define DESFIRE_AUTH_NO_FRAME 3 // answer wasn't ADDITIONAL_FRAME +#define DESFIRE_AUTH_RNDB_LEN 4 // RndB length doesn't match the algo +#define DESFIRE_AUTH_SETKEY_DEC 5 // mbedtls_aes_setkey_dec failed +#define DESFIRE_AUTH_SETKEY_ENC 6 // mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc failed +// second auth frame, the one carrying RndA + RndB'. A wrong key is the PICC +// answering this one with AUTHENTICATION_ERROR +#define DESFIRE_AUTH_TX2_FAIL 7 // PICC answered with an error status +#define DESFIRE_AUTH_NO_DATA2 8 // answered without data +#define DESFIRE_AUTH_NOT_OK 9 // answer status wasn't OPERATION_OK +#define DESFIRE_AUTH_SETKEY_DEC2 10 // mbedtls_aes_setkey_dec failed +#define DESFIRE_AUTH_RNDA_MISMATCH 11 // session key can't be verified +#define DESFIRE_AUTH_CMAC_FAIL 12 // CMAC can't be verified +// the application holds no key of this type +#define DESFIRE_AUTH_NO_AES 50 // PICC didn't answer AES +#define DESFIRE_AUTH_NO_LRP 51 // PICC didn't answer LRP +// no status byte came back at all, so the PICC said nothing about the key. +// Inconclusive: not the same as the PICC refusing it +#define DESFIRE_AUTH_NO_ANSWER 60 +#define DESFIRE_AUTH_NO_METHOD 100 // no auth method for these parameters +// select / channel +#define DESFIRE_AUTH_SELECT_FAIL 200 +#define DESFIRE_AUTH_NO_CHANNEL 201 // no error, yet not authenticated +#define DESFIRE_AUTH_SELECT_ISO_FAIL 202 +#define DESFIRE_AUTH_SELECT_EF_FAIL 203 +// ISO mode authentication +#define DESFIRE_AUTH_ISO_CHAL 301 // get challenge error +#define DESFIRE_AUTH_ISO_CHAL_LEN 302 // get challenge wrong length +#define DESFIRE_AUTH_ISO_ENC_RND1 303 // crypto encode piccrnd1 error +#define DESFIRE_AUTH_ISO_EXT_AUTH 304 // external authenticate error +#define DESFIRE_AUTH_ISO_INT_AUTH 305 // internal authenticate error +#define DESFIRE_AUTH_ISO_INT_LEN 306 // internal authenticate wrong length +#define DESFIRE_AUTH_ISO_DEC_RND2 307 // crypto decode piccrnd2 error +#define DESFIRE_AUTH_ISO_RND_FAIL 308 // random numbers don't match + +// true for the codes that end the exchange before the second auth frame goes +// out: no secure channel was established and the application has to be +// selected again +#define DESFIRE_AUTH_PRE_CRYPTO(res) ((res) >= DESFIRE_AUTH_TX1_FAIL && (res) < DESFIRE_AUTH_TX2_FAIL) + enum DesfireISOSelectControlEnum { ISSMFDFEF = 0x00, ISSChildDF = 0x01, From 8b285eef7511f4221367e3100b6365e6e217fe65 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Gabriele Gristina Date: Thu, 12 Nov 2026 01:45:17 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 3/3] MifareChkKeys: give up on a card that stops answering MifareChkKeys() retried a failed selection forever and checked neither the button nor USB, so a card that stopped answering kept the device in the loop until a power cycle. It now replies PM3_ECARDEXCHANGE after 11 failed selections in a row and PM3_EOPABORTED on the button or a new command. The first key is retried too and select result 3 counts as a failure. hf mf staticnested, the static nested step of hf mf autopwn and hf mf sen stop on PM3_ECARDEXCHANGE. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 --- CHANGELOG.md | 2 ++ armsrc/mifarecmd.c | 38 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++------- client/src/cmdhfmf.c | 9 ++++++++ client/src/cmdhfmfsen.c | 8 +++---- client/src/mifare/mifarehost.c | 2 +- 5 files changed, 47 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-) diff --git a/CHANGELOG.md b/CHANGELOG.md index 66a64e1fa..e6d9fab62 100644 --- a/CHANGELOG.md +++ b/CHANGELOG.md @@ -3,6 +3,8 @@ All notable changes to this project will be documented in this file. This project uses the changelog in accordance with [keepchangelog](http://keepachangelog.com/). Please use this to write notable changes, which is not the same as git commit log... ## [unreleased][unreleased] +- Fixed `hf mf chk`, `hf mf staticnested` and other key checks - a card that stops answering no longer locks the device (@matrix) +- Changed `hf mf staticnested` and `hf mf autopwn` - say "Card stopped answering" when the card is lost (@matrix) - Update Amiibo database (@tpglitch) - Changed `lf pcf7931 write` - write is verified via the tag's read after write, retried up to 3 times, failures are reported (@GiacoBot) - Changed `lf pcf7931 reader` - prints blocks 0-7 in order and decodes PAC, password, write protection and selection; handles partial selections, new `--rfb` param (@GiacoBot) diff --git a/armsrc/mifarecmd.c b/armsrc/mifarecmd.c index 810ecbbfa..8c1af754c 100644 --- a/armsrc/mifarecmd.c +++ b/armsrc/mifarecmd.c @@ -2577,6 +2577,9 @@ OUT: g_dbglevel = oldbg; } +// selections in a row MifareChkKeys() may lose before it gives up on the card +#define CHK_SELECT_RETRIES 10 + void MifareChkKeys(uint8_t *datain, uint8_t reserved_mem) { FpgaWriteConfWord(FPGA_MAJOR_MODE_OFF); @@ -2627,16 +2630,33 @@ void MifareChkKeys(uint8_t *datain, uint8_t reserved_mem) { set_tracing(false); + // a card that stops answering ends the check instead of holding the device in the retry + int16_t status = PM3_SUCCESS; + uint8_t select_fails = 0; + for (uint16_t i = 0; i < key_count; i++) { + // Allow button press / usb cmd to interrupt device + if (BUTTON_PRESS() || data_available()) { + status = PM3_EOPABORTED; + break; + } + + WDT_HIT(); + + // 0 is no card, 3 an ATQA without anticollision bits: both leave nothing selected + int sel; // Iceman: use piwi's faster nonce collecting part in hardnested. if (have_uid == false) { // need a full select cycle to get the uid first iso14a_card_select_t card_info; - if (iso14443a_select_card(uid, &card_info, &cuid, true, 0, true) == false) { + sel = iso14443a_select_card(uid, &card_info, &cuid, true, 0, true); + if (sel != 1 && sel != 2) { if (g_dbglevel >= DBG_ERROR) Dbprintf("ChkKeys: Can't select card (ALL)"); - if (i) { - --i; // try same key once again + if (++select_fails > CHK_SELECT_RETRIES) { + status = PM3_ECARDEXCHANGE; + break; } + --i; // try same key once again, 0 wraps and the loop brings it back continue; } switch (card_info.uidlen) { @@ -2654,14 +2674,18 @@ void MifareChkKeys(uint8_t *datain, uint8_t reserved_mem) { } have_uid = true; } else { // no need for anticollision. We can directly select the card - if (iso14443a_select_card(uid, NULL, NULL, false, cascade_levels, true) == false) { + sel = iso14443a_select_card(uid, NULL, NULL, false, cascade_levels, true); + if (sel != 1 && sel != 2) { if (g_dbglevel >= DBG_ERROR) Dbprintf("ChkKeys: Can't select card (UID)"); - if (i) { - --i; // try same key once again + if (++select_fails > CHK_SELECT_RETRIES) { + status = PM3_ECARDEXCHANGE; + break; } + --i; // try same key once again, 0 wraps and the loop brings it back continue; } } + select_fails = 0; key = bytes_to_num(datain + i * 6, 6); if (mifare_classic_auth(pcs, cuid, blockNo, keyType, key, AUTH_FIRST)) { @@ -2677,7 +2701,7 @@ void MifareChkKeys(uint8_t *datain, uint8_t reserved_mem) { LED_B_ON(); crypto1_deinit(pcs); - reply_ng(CMD_HF_MIFARE_CHKKEYS, PM3_SUCCESS, (uint8_t *)&keyresult, sizeof(keyresult)); + reply_ng(CMD_HF_MIFARE_CHKKEYS, status, (uint8_t *)&keyresult, sizeof(keyresult)); FpgaWriteConfWord(FPGA_MAJOR_MODE_OFF); LEDsoff(); set_tracing(false); diff --git a/client/src/cmdhfmf.c b/client/src/cmdhfmf.c index e8c1d6efa..e54d7329f 100644 --- a/client/src/cmdhfmf.c +++ b/client/src/cmdhfmf.c @@ -2653,6 +2653,9 @@ static int CmdHF14AMfNestedStatic(const char *Cmd) { case PM3_EOPABORTED : PrintAndLogEx(WARNING, "aborted via keyboard."); break; + case PM3_ECARDEXCHANGE : + PrintAndLogEx(FAILED, "Card stopped answering"); + break; case PM3_ESOFT : // No any key found? // Try to force decryption using measured nonce instead of automatic detection (some card types may misjudge) @@ -3961,6 +3964,12 @@ tryStaticnested: free(fptr); return isOK; } + case PM3_ECARDEXCHANGE: { + PrintAndLogEx(FAILED, "\nCard stopped answering"); + free(e_sector); + free(fptr); + return isOK; + } case PM3_ESOFT: { PrintAndLogEx(WARNING, "No key found, next try..."); force_detect_dist = 1; diff --git a/client/src/cmdhfmfsen.c b/client/src/cmdhfmfsen.c index 5682b5cba..35f6baa6e 100644 --- a/client/src/cmdhfmfsen.c +++ b/client/src/cmdhfmfsen.c @@ -862,7 +862,7 @@ static int fm11_collect_nonces_from_default_key_fallback(const fm11_keylist_t *d } PrintAndLogEx(WARNING, "Initial key did not collect nonce evidence, continuing dictionary search"); } - if (res == PM3_ETIMEOUT || res == PM3_EOPABORTED) { + if (res == PM3_ETIMEOUT || res == PM3_EOPABORTED || res == PM3_ECARDEXCHANGE) { retval = res; break; } @@ -2384,7 +2384,7 @@ normal_out: fm11_print_key_hit_row(nonce_count, sec32, kt, keys_found[sec32][kt], found_key); break; } - if (res == PM3_ETIMEOUT || res == PM3_EOPABORTED) { + if (res == PM3_ETIMEOUT || res == PM3_EOPABORTED || res == PM3_ECARDEXCHANGE) { retval = res; break; } @@ -2663,7 +2663,7 @@ static int fm11_verify_candidates(uint8_t real_sec, uint8_t key_type, const fm11 real_sec, key_type ? 'B' : 'A'); return PM3_ESOFT; } - if (res == PM3_EOPABORTED) { + if (res == PM3_EOPABORTED || res == PM3_ECARDEXCHANGE) { fm11_sen_clear_inplace(); return res; } @@ -3432,7 +3432,7 @@ int HFMFSENRecover(bool keep_nonces, bool no_oob, bool reader_mode, bool offline } total_candidates = fm11_count_unfound_candidates(candidates, found_key); - } else if (res == PM3_ETIMEOUT || res == PM3_EOPABORTED) { + } else if (res == PM3_ETIMEOUT || res == PM3_EOPABORTED || res == PM3_ECARDEXCHANGE) { retval = res; goto out; } else { diff --git a/client/src/mifare/mifarehost.c b/client/src/mifare/mifarehost.c index 3c05f8b64..29f2a0752 100644 --- a/client/src/mifare/mifarehost.c +++ b/client/src/mifare/mifarehost.c @@ -992,7 +992,7 @@ int mf_static_nested(uint8_t blockNo, uint8_t keyType, uint8_t *key, uint8_t trg sprint_hex_inrow(resultKey, MIFARE_KEY_SIZE) ); return PM3_SUCCESS; - } else if (res == PM3_ETIMEOUT || res == PM3_EOPABORTED) { + } else if (res == PM3_ETIMEOUT || res == PM3_EOPABORTED || res == PM3_ECARDEXCHANGE) { PrintAndLogEx(NORMAL, ""); free(mem); return res;