diff --git a/lib/tdeck_ui/UI/LXMF/UIManager.cpp b/lib/tdeck_ui/UI/LXMF/UIManager.cpp
index f40dc827..a0885c47 100644
--- a/lib/tdeck_ui/UI/LXMF/UIManager.cpp
+++ b/lib/tdeck_ui/UI/LXMF/UIManager.cpp
@@ -168,6 +168,62 @@ uint64_t monotonicMillis() {
     return static_cast<uint64_t>(esp_timer_get_time() / 1000LL);
 }
 
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// App-only diagnostic: on-demand identity acquisition for unknown LXMF
+// sources (mirrors Sideband's "Query Network For Keys" button).
+//
+// When an LXMF message arrives from a source whose RNS identity has not been
+// learned, the router accepts the message but UIManager::on_message_received
+// skips location ingest for unauthenticated senders. Nothing in the firmware
+// ever triggered the identity learning that microLXMF's comment at
+// LXMRouter.cpp:1267 expects ("signature will be validated later if the
+// source identity is learned via announce"). This fires a bounded
+// RNS path request — the exact mechanism of Sideband's
+// RNS.Transport.request_path — so any peer that already knows the source's
+// key (the hub, a phone, or another node) can answer with the cached
+// announce. The next message from that peer then validates and plots.
+//
+// Rate-limited per source hash (5 min) and globally (64 entries) to keep
+// opportunistic-flood cost to zero in the steady state. Diagnostic for the
+// missing-map-pin investigation; remove with the other ingest diagnostics
+// once the root cause is closed.
+namespace {
+struct KeyRequestState {
+    std::vector<std::pair<std::string, uint64_t>> last_requested;
+};
+KeyRequestState s_key_request_state;
+
+void request_key_for_unknown_source(const ::LXMF::LXMessage& message) {
+    if (message.unverified_reason() !=
+        ::LXMF::Type::Message::SOURCE_UNKNOWN) {
+        return;  // Bad signature is not recoverable by asking the network.
+    }
+    const RNS::Bytes& source_hash = message.source_hash();
+    if (source_hash.size() != Telemetry::PEER_ID_SIZE) {
+        return;
+    }
+    const std::string source_hex = source_hash.toHex();
+    const uint64_t now = monotonicMillis();
+    const static constexpr uint64_t kKeyRequestIntervalMillis = 5 * 60 * 1000;
+    for (auto& e : s_key_request_state.last_requested) {
+        if (e.first == source_hex) {
+            if (now < e.second + kKeyRequestIntervalMillis) {
+                return;  // Recently requested — wait for the answer to land.
+            }
+            e.second = now;  // Expired — re-request below.
+            break;
+        }
+    }
+    if (s_key_request_state.last_requested.size() >= 64U) {
+        s_key_request_state.last_requested.erase(s_key_request_state.last_requested.begin());
+    }
+    s_key_request_state.last_requested.emplace_back(source_hex, now);
+    INFO(("Requesting network keys for unknown LXMF source " +
+          source_hex.substr(0, 8) + "...").c_str());
+    Transport::request_path(source_hash);
+}
+}  // namespace
+
 bool peerIdFromHash(const Bytes& hash, Telemetry::PeerId& output) {
     if (hash.size() != Telemetry::PEER_ID_SIZE) return false;
     std::memcpy(output.bytes, hash.data(), Telemetry::PEER_ID_SIZE);
@@ -1585,6 +1641,14 @@ void UIManager::on_message_received(::LXMF::LXMessage& message) {
     pyxis_test_hook_record_rx(message);
 #endif
 
+    // Diagnostic: unauthenticated messages are accepted by the router but
+    // skipped below for location ingest. Ask the network for the source's
+    // key (Sideband "request keys" equivalent) so the NEXT message from
+    // this peer can validate and be plotted.
+    if (!message.signature_validated()) {
+        request_key_for_unknown_source(message);
+    }
+
     // Classify authenticated location fields before any conversation write.
     // Raw field keys and values are MessagePack spans retained by LXMessage.
     Telemetry::InboundLocationMessage inbound{};