From 6c68d6834761013134fb653cb389325a2f2f9926 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: epoberezkin Date: Tue, 3 Dec 2024 18:53:47 +0000 Subject: [PATCH] deploy: b9777c92a519c4e18aae8274bda989ce14577bc3 --- ...10-simplex-network-v6-2-servers-by-flux-business-chats.html | 3 --- 1 file changed, 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/blog/20241210-simplex-network-v6-2-servers-by-flux-business-chats.html b/blog/20241210-simplex-network-v6-2-servers-by-flux-business-chats.html index 2c78aa1bfc..21a076e97f 100644 --- a/blog/20241210-simplex-network-v6-2-servers-by-flux-business-chats.html +++ b/blog/20241210-simplex-network-v6-2-servers-by-flux-business-chats.html @@ -409,9 +409,6 @@ window.addEventListener('scroll',changeHeaderBg);

Thank you,

Evgeny

SimpleX Chat founder

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[1] You can also to self-host your own SimpleX servers on Flux decentralized cloud.

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[2] The probability of connection being de-anonymized and the number of random server choices follow this equation: (1 - s ^ 2) ^ n = 1 - p, where s is the share of attacker-controlled servers in the network, n is the number of random choices of entry and exit nodes for the circuit, and p is the probability of both entry and exit nodes, and the connection privacy being compromised. Substituting 0.02 (2%) for s, 0.5 (50%) for p, and solving this equation for n we obtain that 1733 random circuits have 50% probability of privacy being compromised.

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Also see this presentation about Tor, specifically the approximate calculations on page 76, and also Tor project post about the changes that made attack on hidden service anonymity harder, but still viable in case the it is used for a long time.