A communication system where only the communicating parties can read the messages. It is designed to protect message content from any potential eavesdroppers – telecom and Internet providers, malicious actors, and also the provider of the communication service.
End-to-end encryption requires agreeing cryptographic keys between the sender and the recipient in a way that no eavesdroppers can access the agreed keys. See key agreement protocol. This key exchange can be compromised via man-in-the-middle attack, particularly if key exchange happens via the same communication provider and no out-of-band channel is used to verify key exchange.
Also known as perfect forward secrecy, it is a feature of a key agreement protocol that ensures that session keys will not be compromised even if long-term secrets used in the session key exchange are compromised. Forward secrecy protects past sessions against future compromises of session or long-term keys.
The quality of the end-to-end encryption scheme allowing to recover security against a passive attacker who observes encrypted messages after compromising one (or both) of the parties. Also known as recovery from compromise or break-in recovery. Double-ratchet algorithm has this quality.
The attack when the attacker secretly relays and possibly alters the communications between two parties who believe that they are directly communicating with each other.
This attack can be used to compromise end-to-end encryption by intercepting public keys during key exchange, substituting them with the attacker's keys, and then intercepting and re-encrypting all messages, without altering their content. With this attack, while the attacker does not change message content, but she can read the messages, while the communicating parties believe the messages are end-to-end encrypted.
Such attack is possible with any system that uses the same channel for key exchange as used to send messages - it includes almost all communication systems except SimpleX, where the initial public key is always passed out-of-band. Even with SimpleX, the attacker may intercept and substitute the key sent via another channel, gaining access to communication. This risk is substantially lower, as attacker does not know in advance which channel will be used to pass the key.
To mitigate such attack the communicating parties must verify the integrity of key exchange - SimpleX and many other messaging apps, e.g. Signal and WhatsApp, have the feature that allows it.
Also known as content padding, it is the process of adding data to the beginning or the end of a message prior to encryption. Padding conceals the actual message size from any eavesdroppers. SimpleX has several encryption layers, and prior to each encryption the content is padded to a fixed size.
Also known as key exchange, it is a process of agreeing cryptographic keys between the sender and the recipient(s) of the message. It is required for end-to-end encryption to work. Unless it is possible to secure the key exchange via some second factor, e.g. security code verification, it can be vulnerable to man-in-the-middle attack.
Also known as key exchange, it is a process of agreeing cryptographic keys between the sender and the recipient(s) of the message. It is required for end-to-end encryption to work. Unless it is possible to secure the key exchange via some second factor, e.g. security code verification, it can be vulnerable to man-in-the-middle attack.
The attack when the attacker secretly relays and possibly alters the communications between two parties who believe that they are directly communicating with each other.
This attack can be used to compromise end-to-end encryption by intercepting public keys during key exchange, substituting them with the attacker's keys, and then intercepting and re-encrypting all messages, without altering their content. With this attack, while the attacker does not change message content, but she can read the messages, while the communicating parties believe the messages are end-to-end encrypted.
Such attack is possible with any system that uses the same channel for key exchange as used to send messages - it includes almost all communication systems except SimpleX, where the initial public key is always passed out-of-band. Even with SimpleX, the attacker may intercept and substitute the key sent via another channel, gaining access to communication. This risk is substantially lower, as attacker does not know in advance which channel will be used to pass the key.
To mitigate such attack the communicating parties must verify the integrity of key exchange - SimpleX and many other messaging apps, e.g. Signal and WhatsApp, have the feature that allows it.
A technique for anonymous communication over a computer network that uses multiple layers of message encryption, analogous to the layers of an onion. The encrypted data is transmitted through a series of network nodes called "onion routers," each of which "peels" away a single layer, revealing the data's next destination. The sender remains anonymous because each intermediary knows only the location of the immediately preceding and following nodes.
The most widely used onion network is Tor.
Some elements of SimpleX network use similar ideas in their design - different addresses for the same resource used by different parties, and additional encryption layers. Currently though, SimpleX messaging protocol does not protect sender network address, as the relay server is chosen by the recipient. The delivery relays chosen by sender that are planned for the future would make SimpleX design closer to onion routing.
Nodes in the overlay network can be thought of as being connected by virtual or logical links, each of which corresponds to a path, perhaps through many physical links, in the underlying network. Tor, for example, is an overlay network on top of IP network, which in its turn is also an overlay network over some underlying physical network.
SimpleX Clients also form a network using SMP relays and IP or some other overlay network (e.g., Tor), to communicate with each other. SMP relays, on another hand, do not form a network.
The property of the cryptographic or communication system that allows the recipient of the message to prove to any third party that the sender identified by some cryptographic key sent the message. It is the opposite to repudiation. While in some context non-repudiation may be desirable (e.g., for contractually binding messages), in the context of private communications it may be undesirable.
The property of the cryptographic or communication system that allows the sender of the message to plausibly deny having sent the message, because while the recipient can verify that the message was sent by the sender, they cannot prove it to any third party - the recipient has a technical ability to forge the same encrypted message. This is an important quality of private communications, as it allows to have the conversation that can later be denied, similarly to having a private face-to-face conversation.
See also non-repudiation.
Generalizing the definition from NIST Digital Identity Guidelines, it is an opaque unguessable identifier generated by a service used to access a resource by only one party.
In the context of SimpleX network, these are the identifiers generated by SMP relays to access anonymous messaging queues, with a separate identifier (and access credential) for each accessing party: recipient, sender and and optional notifications subscriber. The same approach is used by XFTP relays to access file chunks, with separate identifiers (and access credentials) for sender and each recipient.
Peer-to-peer (P2P) is the network architecture when participants have equal rights and communicate directly via a general purpose transport or overlay network. Unlike client-server architecture, all peers in a P2P network both provide and consume the resources. In the context of messaging, P2P architecture usually means that the messages are sent between peers, without user accounts or messages being stored on any servers. Examples are Tox, Briar, Cwtch and many others.
The advantage is that the participants do not depend on any servers. There are multiple downsides to that architecture, such as no asynchronous message delivery, the need for network-wide peer addresses, possibility of network-wide attacks, that are usually mitigated only by using a centralized authority. These disadvantages are avoided with proxied P2P architecture.
Network topology of the communication system when peers communicate via proxies that do not form the network themselves. Such design is used in Pond, that has a fixed home server for each user, and in SimpleX, that uses multiple relays providing temporary connections.
Also known as perfect forward secrecy, it is a feature of a key agreement protocol that ensures that session keys will not be compromised even if long-term secrets used in the session key exchange are compromised. Forward secrecy protects past sessions against future compromises of session or long-term keys.
Any of the proposed cryptographic systems or algorithms that are thought to be secure against an attack by a quantum computer. It appears that as of 2025 there is no system or algorithm that is proven to be secure against such attacks, or even to be secure against attacks by massively parallel conventional computers, so a general recommendation is to use post-quantum hybrid cryptography - combining post-quantum and traditional algorigthms.
Any of the proposed cryptographic systems or algorithms that are thought to be secure against an attack by a quantum computer. It appears that as of 2025 there is no system or algorithm that is proven to be secure against such attacks, or even to be secure against attacks by massively parallel conventional computers, so a general recommendation is to use post-quantum hybrid cryptography - combining post-quantum and traditional algorigthms.
The quality of the end-to-end encryption scheme allowing to recover security against a passive attacker who observes encrypted messages after compromising one (or both) of the parties. Also known as recovery from compromise or break-in recovery. Double-ratchet algorithm has this quality.
In a communication system it refers to anything that uniquely identifies the users to the network. Depending on the communication network, it can be a phone number, email address, username, public key or a random opaque identifier. Most messaging networks rely on some form of user identity. SimpleX appears to be the only messaging network that does not rely on any kind of user identity - see this comparison.