Tap on your user profile image in the upper left-hand of the screen.
If you have more than one profile, tap the current profile again or choose Settings.
Your profile settings
This section is labelled "You" in the app settings.
Your active profile
Tap on your avatar/name to update your current profile names and avatar.
Display name cannot have any spaces and it is recommended to use latin characters and numbers to make it easier to type these names to the users who use SimpleX Chat for the terminal (CLI).
Please note: When you save your profile, the update will be sent to all your contacts (excluding the contacts with whom your incognito profiles were shared). If you have a large number of contacts it can take several seconds.
Your chat profiles
This page allows adding and configuring your chat profiles. Please see Your chat profiles for more details.
Incognito
This feature is unique to SimpleX Chat – it is independent from chat profiles.
When "Incognito” is turned on, your current profile name and image are NOT shared with your new contacts. It allows connections with other people without any shared data – when you make new connections or join groups via a link a new random profile name will be generated for each contact or group.
This page allows you to create a long term address that can be used by other people to connect with you. Unlike 1-time invitation links, these addresses can be used many times, that makes them good to share online, e.g. on other social media platforms.
When people connect to you via this address, you will receive a connection request that you can accept or reject. You can configure an automatic acceptance of connection request and an automatic welcome message that will be sent to the new contacts.
If you start receiving too many requests via this address it is always safe to remove it – all the connections you created via this address will remain active, as this address is not used to deliver the messages.
This page allows to configure the chat preferences that would apply to all contacts - they can be changed separately for each contact:
disappearing messages - to allow disappearing messages in the conversations with you, only if your contacts allow them.
delete for everyone - to allow irreversible message deletion (by default messages are marked as deleted, not fully deleted). "Yes" setting would allow it only if they allow it for you, and "Always" - even if they don't allow.
voice messages - to allow sending voice messages.
To set chat preferences in each contact, tap contact name on top of the conversation and then choose "Contact preferences".
Group owners can set similar preferences for their groups, when the group is created or later: tap group name on top of the conversation and then choose "Group preferences".
Your app settings
This section is labelled "Settings" in the app settings.
Notifications
This page allows to configure the notifications mode: instant, periodic or only when the app is running. There are some differences in how these options work on iOS and Android. Please read more in this post about how notifications work.
You can also configure whether the message preview is shown when the message arrives.
Please note: For instant and periodic notifications to work on Android, you need to disable power optimization when prompted by the app, or later via the settings. Also, some variants of Android system require additional settings, for example MIU system on Xiaomi phones requires to enable "Auto start" for the app for the notification service to work. Please read Don't kill my app guide for any settings that may be required on your device.
Also, currently instant notifications have the highest battery consumption - we are working to reduce it to be less or the same as for periodic notifications.
Network & servers
This page allows to configure your own SMP relays and change other network settings.
SMP servers
By default, the app has preset relays configured – you can change them to your own.
This page also allows testing the connection with the servers.
This option makes the app connect via a SOCKS proxy that should be provided by some other app running on your device.
The most typical use for this is to run Orbot app that provides a SOCKS proxy to connect via Tor network, but it can be some other app and it can proxy connections via some other Overlay network.
Use .onion hosts
Android
Use .onion hosts option is only available when Use SOCKS proxy is enabled. You can choose:
no: never use .onion hosts. Choose this option if your SOCKS proxy does not connect via Tor network.
when available (default): when SOCKS proxy is enabled the app assumes that it provides connections via Tor network and use .onion host addresses when SMP relays include them in their configuration.
required: always use .onion hosts. Choose this option if your SOCKS proxy connects via Tor network and you want to avoid connections without Tor. In this case, if the SMP relay address does not include .onion host, the connection will fail.
iOS
While iOS does not support SOCKS proxies, you can install Orbot app that works as VPN provider. You can choose:
no (default): do not use .onion hosts. Choose this option if you do not use Orbot or if you use VPN that proxies connections via some other overlay network.
when available: use .onion host addresses when SMP relays include them in their configuration. Orbot VPN must be enabled for this option to work.
required: always use .onion hosts. Choose this option if you use Orbot VPN and you want to avoid connections without Tor. In this case, if the SMP relay address does not include .onion host, the connection will fail. If you use this option, you can enable "Disable Orbot for non-onion traffic" option in Orbot settings making the rest of your device traffic to not use Tor.
Please note VPN on iOS can send some traffic to the usual network, if, for example, VPN app crashes. You can configure enable always-on VPN mode on managed iOS devices, but this is not applicable to most individual devices.
Transport isolation (BETA)
This option is only available if you have enabled developer tools.
If your network is slow, and connections to the servers keep failing (you would see a spinner on your contacts), please increase TCP and protocol timeouts in this page.
Privacy and security
SimpleX Lock
SimpleX Lock when enabled requires to pass the device authentication when you open the app or use some security- or privacy-sensitive features.
You will be offered to enable it after you open the app a few times.
This option affects how the links to connect to other SimpleX users or to join groups are shown in the conversations. You can choose between:
description (default): only the link description and server host name are shown. The link won't be opened in the browser.
full link: the full link is shown. The link will still not be opened in the browser.
via browser: the full link is shown, and it will be opened in the browser. In this case, if the link domain is different from simplex.chat, the link will be shown in red color, as it might be malicious.
This section has information on how to use the app and the links to connect to the team. Please use Send questions and ideas to connect to us via the chat to ask any questions, make any suggestions and report any issues.
Support SimpleX Chat
contribute - the link to the information about how to contribute and to donate to the project.
rate the app - rate and review it on the App Store or Play Store - your feedback helps a lot.
star on GitHub - that also helps us grow very much.
Thank you for your support!
Developer tools
This page has options that normally are only needed for app developers and can be used to debug the app in case something is not working.
Chat console
Here you can see and use console command with the chat core. None of this information is sent over the network, this is an internal communication between different parts of the app.
Please be careful - some of the commands can disrupt app functioning, only use them if you know what you are doing or were instructed by the team.
Please note: the log in console can contain what looks like errors. Unless you experience any issues in the app UI, these errors should not be considered as the app malfunction - they are likely to be normal and expected behavior.
Confirm database upgrades
This option is off by default - the app database is migrated to the new version without any confirmations. Starting from v4.6.2 these migrations are reversible - you can rollback to the previous version(s) of the app (not earlier than v4.6.1). If you want to be asked a confirmation every time database is upgraded you may enable this option - this is not recommended, as it happens almost on every app update, and should not cause any concerns.
Show developer options
This option currently enables Transport isolation mode option and also enables showing database IDs in contacts, groups and group members to simplify debugging via console commands.
Address portability
Similarly to phone number portability (the ability of the customer to transfer the service to another provider without changing the number), the address portability means the ability of a communication service customer to change the service provider without changing the service address. Many federated networks support SRV records to provide address portability, but allowing service users to set up their own domains for the addresses is not as commonly supported by the available server and client software as for email.
Federated network
Federated network is provided by several entities that agree upon the standards and operate the network collectively. This allows the users to choose their provider, that will hold their account, their messaging history and contacts, and communicate with other providers' servers on behalf of the user. The examples are email, XMPP, Matrix and Mastodon.
The advantage of that design is that there is no single organization that all users depend on, and the standards are more difficult to change, unless it benefits all users. There are several disadvantages: 1) the innovation is slower, 2) each user account still depends on a single organization, and in most cases can't move to another provider without changing their network address – there is no address portability, 3) the security and privacy are inevitably worse than with the centralized networks.
The credential that allows proving something, e.g. the right to access some resource, without identifying the user. This credential can either be generated by a trusted party or by the user themselves and provided together with the request to create the resource. The first approach creates some centralized dependency in most cases. The second approach does not require any trust - this is used in SimpleX network to authorize access to the messaging queues.
In a wide sense, blockchain means a sequence of blocks of data, where each block contains a cryptographic hash of the previous block, thus providing integrity to the whole chain. Blockchains are used in many communication and information storage systems to provide integrity and immutability of the data. For example, BluRay disks use blockchain. SimpleX messaging queues also use blockchain - each message includes the hash of the previous message, to ensure the integrity – if any message is modified it will be detected by the recipient when the next message is received. Blockchains are a subset of Merkle directed acyclic graphs.
In a more narrow sense, particularly in media, blockchain is used to refer specifically to distributed ledger, where each record also includes the hash of the previous record, but the blocks have to be agreed by the participating peers using some consensus protocol.
Also known as Merkle DAG, a data structure based on a general graph structure where node contains the cryptographic hashes of the previous nodes that point to it. Merkle trees are a subset of Merkle DAGs - in this case each leaf contains a cryptographic hash of the parent.
This structure by design allows to verify the integrity of the whole structure by computing its hashes and comparing with the hashes included in the nodes, in the same way as with blockchain.
The motivation to use DAG in distributed environments instead of a simpler linear blockchain is to allow concurrent additions, when there is no requirement for a single order of added items. Merkle DAG is used, for example, in IPFS and will be used in decentralized SimpleX groups.
Also known as break-in recovery, it is the quality of the end-to-end encryption scheme allowing to recover security against a passive attacker who observes encrypted messages after compromising one (or both) of the parties. Also known as recovery from compromise or break-in recovery. Double-ratchet algorithm has this quality.
Double Ratchet algorithm provides perfect forward secrecy and post-compromise security. It is designed by Signal, and used in SimpleX Chat and many other secure messengers. Most experts consider it the state-of-the-art encryption protocol in message encryption.
Centralized network
Centralized networks are provided or controlled by a single entity. The examples are Threema, Signal, WhatsApp and Telegram. The advantage of that design is that the provider can innovate faster, and has a centralized approach to security. But the disadvantage is that the provider can change or discontinue the service, and leak, sell or disclose in some other way all users' data, including who they are connected with.
Content padding
Also known as content padding, it is the process of adding data to the beginning or the end of a message prior to encryption. Padding conceals the actual message size from any eavesdroppers. SimpleX has several encryption layers, and prior to each encryption the content is padded to a fixed size.
Decentralized network is often used to mean "the network based on decentralized blockchain". In its original meaning, decentralized network means that there is no central authority or any other point of centralization in the network, other than network protocols specification. The advantage of decentralized networks is that they are resilient to censorship and to the provider going out of business. The disadvantage is that they are often slower to innovate, and the security may be worse than with the centralized network.
The examples of decentralized networks are email, web, DNS, XMPP, Matrix, BitTorrent, etc. All these examples have a shared global application-level address space. Cryptocurrency blockchains not only have a shared address space, but also a shared state, so they are more centralized than email. Tor network also has a shared global address space, but also a central authority. SimpleX network does not have a shared application-level address space (it relies on the shared transport-level addresses - SMP relay hostnames or IP addresses), and it does not have any central authority or any shared state.
Defense in depth
Originally, it is a military strategy that seeks to delay rather than prevent the advance of an attacker, buying time and causing additional casualties by yielding space.
In information security, defense in depth represents the use of multiple computer security techniques to help mitigate the risk of one component of the defense being compromised or circumvented. An example could be anti-virus software installed on individual workstations when there is already virus protection on the firewalls and servers within the same environment.
SimpleX network applies defense in depth approach to security by having multiple layers for the communication security and privacy:
additional layer of end-to-end encryption for each messaging queue and another encryption layer of encryption from the server to the recipient inside TLS to prevent correlation by ciphertext,
TLS with only strong ciphers allowed,
mitigation of man-in-the-middle attack on client-server connection via server offline certificate verification,
mitigation of replay attacks via signing over transport channel binding,
multiple layers of message padding to reduce efficiency of traffic analysis,
mitigation of man-in-the-middle attack on client-client out-of-band channel when sending the invitation,
rotation of delivery queues to reduce efficiency of traffic analysis,
A communication system where only the communicating parties can read the messages. It is designed to protect message content from any potential eavesdroppers – telecom and Internet providers, malicious actors, and also the provider of the communication service.
End-to-end encryption requires agreeing cryptographic keys between the sender and the recipient in a way that no eavesdroppers can access the agreed keys. See key agreement protocol. This key exchange can be compromised via man-in-the-middle attack, particularly if key exchange happens via the same communication provider and no out-of-band channel is used to verify key exchange.
Also known as perfect forward secrecy, it is a feature of a key agreement protocol that ensures that session keys will not be compromised even if long-term secrets used in the session key exchange are compromised. Forward secrecy protects past sessions against future compromises of session or long-term keys.
Also known as break-in recovery, it is the quality of the end-to-end encryption scheme allowing to recover security against a passive attacker who observes encrypted messages after compromising one (or both) of the parties. Also known as recovery from compromise or break-in recovery. Double-ratchet algorithm has this quality.
Man-in-the-middle attack
The attack when the attacker secretly relays and possibly alters the communications between two parties who believe that they are directly communicating with each other.
This attack can be used to compromise end-to-end encryption by intercepting public keys during key exchange, substituting them with the attacker's keys, and then intercepting and re-encrypting all messages, without altering their content. With this attack, while the attacker does not change message content, but she can read the messages, while the communicating parties believe the messages are end-to-end encrypted.
Such attack is possible with any system that uses the same channel for key exchange as used to send messages - it includes almost all communication systems except SimpleX, where the initial public key is always passed out-of-band. Even with SimpleX, the attacker may intercept and substitute the key sent via another channel, gaining access to communication. This risk is substantially lower, as attacker does not know in advance which channel will be used to pass the key.
To mitigate such attack the communicating parties must verify the integrity of key exchange - SimpleX and many other messaging apps, e.g. Signal and WhatsApp, have the feature that allows it.
Also known as content padding, it is the process of adding data to the beginning or the end of a message prior to encryption. Padding conceals the actual message size from any eavesdroppers. SimpleX has several encryption layers, and prior to each encryption the content is padded to a fixed size.
Also known as key exchange, it is a process of agreeing cryptographic keys between the sender and the recipient(s) of the message. It is required for end-to-end encryption to work.
Also known as key exchange, it is a process of agreeing cryptographic keys between the sender and the recipient(s) of the message. It is required for end-to-end encryption to work.
The attack when the attacker secretly relays and possibly alters the communications between two parties who believe that they are directly communicating with each other.
This attack can be used to compromise end-to-end encryption by intercepting public keys during key exchange, substituting them with the attacker's keys, and then intercepting and re-encrypting all messages, without altering their content. With this attack, while the attacker does not change message content, but she can read the messages, while the communicating parties believe the messages are end-to-end encrypted.
Such attack is possible with any system that uses the same channel for key exchange as used to send messages - it includes almost all communication systems except SimpleX, where the initial public key is always passed out-of-band. Even with SimpleX, the attacker may intercept and substitute the key sent via another channel, gaining access to communication. This risk is substantially lower, as attacker does not know in advance which channel will be used to pass the key.
To mitigate such attack the communicating parties must verify the integrity of key exchange - SimpleX and many other messaging apps, e.g. Signal and WhatsApp, have the feature that allows it.
A technique for anonymous communication over a computer network that uses multiple layers of message encryption, analogous to the layers of an onion. The encrypted data is transmitted through a series of network nodes called "onion routers," each of which "peels" away a single layer, revealing the data's next destination. The sender remains anonymous because each intermediary knows only the location of the immediately preceding and following nodes.
Some elements of SimpleX network use similar ideas in their design - different addresses for the same resource used by different parties, and additional encryption layers. Currently though, SimpleX messaging protocol does not protect sender network address, as the relay server is chosen by the recipient. The delivery relays chosen by sender that are planned for the future would make SimpleX design closer to onion routing.
Nodes in the overlay network can be thought of as being connected by virtual or logical links, each of which corresponds to a path, perhaps through many physical links, in the underlying network. Tor, for example, is an overlay network on top of IP network, which in its turn is also an overlay network over some underlying physical network.
Overlay network
Nodes in the overlay network can be thought of as being connected by virtual or logical links, each of which corresponds to a path, perhaps through many physical links, in the underlying network. Tor, for example, is an overlay network on top of IP network, which in its turn is also an overlay network over some underlying physical network.
SimpleX Clients also form a network using SMP relays and IP or some other overlay network (e.g., Tor), to communicate with each other. SMP relays, on another hand, do not form a network.
The property of the cryptographic or communication system that allows the recipient of the message to prove to any third party that the sender identified by some cryptographic key sent the message. It is the opposite to repudiation. While in some context non-repudiation may be desirable (e.g., for contractually binding messages), in the context of private communications it may be undesirable.
The property of the cryptographic or communication system that allows the sender of the message to plausibly deny having sent the message, because while the recipient can verify that the message was sent by the sender, they cannot prove it to any third party - the recipient has a technical ability to forge the same encrypted message. This is an important quality of private communications, as it allows to have the conversation that can later be denied, similarly to having a private face-to-face conversation.
Generalizing the definition from NIST Digital Identity Guidelines, it is an opaque unguessable identifier generated by a service used to access a resource by only one party.
In the context of SimpleX network, these are the identifiers generated by SMP relays to access anonymous messaging queues, with a separate identifier (and access credential) for each accessing party: recipient, sender and and optional notifications subscriber. The same approach is used by XFTP relays to access file chunks, with separate identifiers (and access credentials) for sender and each recipient.
Peer-to-peer
Peer-to-peer (P2P) is the network architecture when participants have equal rights and communicate directly via a general purpose transport or overlay network. Unlike client-server architecture, all peers in a P2P network both provide and consume the resources. In the context of messaging, P2P architecture usually means that the messages are sent between peers, without user accounts or messages being stored on any servers. Examples are Tox, Briar, Cwtch and many others.
The advantage is that the participants do not depend on any servers. There are multiple downsides to that architecture, such as no asynchronous message delivery, the need for network-wide peer addresses, possibility of network-wide attacks, that are usually mitigated only by using a centralized authority. These disadvantages are avoided with proxied P2P architecture.
Network topology of the communication system when peers communicate via proxies that do not form the network themselves. Such design is used in Pond, that has a fixed home server for each user, and in SimpleX, that uses multiple relays providing temporary connections.
Perfect forward secrecy
Also known as perfect forward secrecy, it is a feature of a key agreement protocol that ensures that session keys will not be compromised even if long-term secrets used in the session key exchange are compromised. Forward secrecy protects past sessions against future compromises of session or long-term keys.
Any of the proposed cryptographic systems or algorithms that are thought to be secure against an attack by a quantum computer. It appears that as of 2023 there is no system or algorithm that is proven to be secure against such attacks, or even to be secure against attacks by massively parallel conventional computers, so a general recommendation is to use post-quantum cryptographic systems in combination with the traditional cryptographic systems.
Also known as break-in recovery, it is the quality of the end-to-end encryption scheme allowing to recover security against a passive attacker who observes encrypted messages after compromising one (or both) of the parties. Also known as recovery from compromise or break-in recovery. Double-ratchet algorithm has this quality.
User identity
In a communication system it refers to anything that uniquely identifies the users to the network. Depending on the communication network, it can be a phone number, email address, username, public key or a random opaque identifier. Most messaging networks rely on some form of user identity. SimpleX appears to be the only messaging network that does not rely on any kind of user identity - see this comparison.