Stávající chatovací platformy a protokoly mají některé nebo všechny následující problémy:
Nedostatek soukromí uživatelského profilu a kontaktů (soukromí metadat).
Žádná ochrana (nebo pouze volitelná ochrana) implementací E2EE před útoky MITM prostřednictvím poskytovatele.
Nevyžádané zprávy (spam a zneužití).
Chybějící vlastnictví a ochrana dat.
Složitost použití všech necentralizovaných protokolů pro netechnické uživatele.
Koncentrace komunikace v malém počtu centralizovaných platforem činí řešení těchto problémů poměrně obtížným.
Navrhované řešení
Navrhovaný zásobník protokolů řeší tyto problémy tím, že zprávy i kontakty jsou uloženy pouze v klientských zařízeních, čímž se role serverů omezuje na pouhé zprostředkovatele zpráv, kteří vyžadují pouze autorizaci zpráv odesílaných do front, ale NEvyžadují autentizaci uživatelů - chráněny jsou nejen zprávy, ale i metadata, protože uživatelé nemají přiřazeny žádné identifikátory - na rozdíl od jiných platforem.
Více informací o cílech a technickém návrhu platformy naleznete v dokumentu SimpleX whitepaper.
Proč používat SimpleX
Jedinečný přístup SimpleX k ochraně soukromí a zabezpečení
Každý by měl dbát na soukromí a bezpečnost své komunikace - i obyčejné konverzace vás mohou ohrozit.
Úplné soukromí vaší identity, profilu, kontaktů a metadat.
Na rozdíl od všech ostatních existujících platforem pro zasílání zpráv nemá SimpleX žádné identifikátory přiřazené uživatelům - k identifikaci svých uživatelů nepoužívá telefonní čísla (jako Signal nebo WhatsApp), adresy založené na doméně (jako e-mail, XMPP nebo Matrix), uživatelská jména (jako Telegram), veřejné klíče nebo dokonce náhodná čísla (jako všechny ostatní messengery) - ani nevíme, kolik lidí SimpleX používá.
K doručování zpráv místo identifikátorů uživatelů, které používají všechny ostatní platformy, používá SimpleX adresy jednosměrných (simplexních) front zpráv. Používání služby SimpleX je jako mít pro každý kontakt jinou e-mailovou adresu nebo telefonní číslo, ale bez starostí se správou všech těchto adres. V blízké budoucnosti budou aplikace SimpleX také automaticky měnit fronty zpráv a přesouvat konverzace z jednoho serveru na druhý, aby uživatelům poskytly ještě lepší soukromí.
Tento přístup chrání soukromí toho, s kým komunikujete, a skrývá ho před servery platformy SimpleX a před jakýmikoli pozorovateli. Své soukromí můžete dále zlepšit nastavením přístupu k síti tak, abyste se k serverům SimpleX připojovali prostřednictvím některé překryvné transportní sítě, např. sítě Tor.
Nejlepší ochrana proti spamu a zneužití
Protože na platformě SimpleX nemáte žádný identifikátor, nelze vás kontaktovat, pokud nesdílíte odkaz s jednorázovou pozvánkou nebo volitelnou dočasnou uživatelskou adresu. I v případě volitelných uživatelských adres je sice lze využít k zasílání nevyžádaných kontaktů, ale můžete je změnit nebo zcela odstranit, aniž byste přišli o jakékoli spojení.
Úplné vlastnictví, kontrola a zabezpečení vašich údajů
SimpleX ukládá všechna uživatelská data v klientských zařízeních, zprávy jsou pouze dočasně uchovávány na relay serverech SimpleX, dokud nejsou přijaty.
Používáme přenosný formát databáze, který lze použít na všech podporovaných zařízeních - brzy přidáme možnost exportovat databázi chatu z mobilní aplikace, aby ji bylo možné použít na jiném zařízení.
Na rozdíl od serverů federativních sítí (e-mail, XMPP nebo Matrix) servery SimpleX neukládají uživatelské účty, pouze předávají zprávy příjemcům, čímž chrání soukromí obou stran. Mezi odesílaným a přijímaným provozem serveru nejsou žádné společné identifikátory ani šifrované zprávy, a to díky dodatečné vrstvě šifrování doručovaných zpráv. Pokud tedy kdokoli sleduje provoz serveru, nemůže snadno zjistit, kdo s kým komunikuje (známé útoky na korelaci provozu viz SimpleX whitepaper).
Uživatelé vlastní síť SimpleX
Můžete používat SimpleX s vlastními servery a přitom komunikovat s lidmi, kteří používají servery předkonfigurované v aplikacích nebo jakékoli jiné servery SimpleX.
Platforma SimpleX používá otevřený protokol a poskytuje SDK pro vytváření chatovacích botů, což umožňuje implementaci služeb, s nimiž mohou uživatelé komunikovat prostřednictvím aplikací SimpleX Chat - opravdu se těšíme, jaké služby SimpleX bude možné vytvořit.
Pokud uvažujete o vývoji s platformou SimpleX, ať už jde o služby chatovacích botů pro uživatele aplikací SimpleX, nebo o integraci knihovny SimpleX Chat do vašich mobilních aplikací, obraťte se na nás pro případné rady a podporu.
Srovnání s jinými protokoly
SimpleX chat
Signal, big platforms
XMPP, Matrix
P2P protocols
Vyžaduje uživatelské identifikátory
Ne = private
Ano1
Ano2
Yes3
Možnost MITM útoku
Žádná = bezpečné
Ano4
Ano
Ano
Závislost na DNS
Ne = neumlčitelné
Ano
Ano
Ne
Single operator or network
Ne = decentralizované
Ano
Ne
Ano5
Centrální součást nebo jiný celosíťový útok
Ne = neumlčitelné
Ano
Ano2
Ano6
Obvykle na základě telefonního čísla, v některých případech na základě uživatelských jmen.
Založeno na DNS.
Veřejný klíč nebo jiné globálně jedinečné ID.
Pokud jsou servery provozovatele kompromitovány.
Sítě P2P a sítě založené na kryptoměnách jsou sice distribuované, ale nejsou decentralizované - fungují jako jediná síť s jediným jmenným prostorem uživatelských adres.
Sítě P2P mají buď centrální autoritu, nebo může být kompromitována celá síť - viz následující část.
Existuje několik protokolů P2P pro chatování/zprávy a jejich implementací, jejichž cílem je vyřešit problém soukromí a centralizace, ale mají svůj vlastní soubor problémů, kvůli kterým jsou méně spolehlivé než navrhovaný návrh, složitější na implementaci a analýzu a zranitelnější vůči útokům.
Sítě P2P používají k směrování zpráv/požadavků v síti některou variantu DHT. Implementace DHT mají složité návrhy, které musí vyvažovat spolehlivost, záruku doručení a latenci. Navrhovaný návrh má lepší záruky doručení i nižší latenci (zpráva je předávána vícekrát paralelně, pokaždé přes jeden uzel, přičemž se používají servery vybrané příjemcem, zatímco v sítích P2P je zpráva předávána přes O(log N) uzlů postupně, přičemž se používají uzly vybrané algoritmem).
Navrhovaný návrh na rozdíl od většiny sítí P2P nemá žádné globální identifikátory uživatelů, a to ani dočasné.
P2P samo o sobě neřeší problém útoku MITM a většina existujících řešení nepoužívá pro počáteční výměnu klíčů zprávy mimo pásmo. Navrhované řešení využívá pro počáteční výměnu klíčů zprávy mimo pásmo nebo v některých případech již existující bezpečná a důvěryhodná spojení.
Implementace P2P mohou být blokovány některými poskytovateli internetu (jako například BitTorrent). Navrhovaný návrh je transportně agnostický - může fungovat přes standardní webové protokoly a servery mohou být nasazeny na stejných doménách jako webové stránky.
Všechny známé sítě P2P jsou pravděpodobně zranitelné vůči Sybilovu útoku, protože každý uzel je zjistitelný a síť funguje jako celek. Známá opatření ke snížení pravděpodobnosti Sybilova útoku buď vyžadují centralizovanou složku, nebo nákladný proof of work. Navrhovaný návrh naopak nemá žádnou zjistitelnost serverů - servery nejsou propojeny, nejsou známy navzájem ani všem klientům. Síť SimpleX je fragmentovaná a funguje jako několik izolovaných spojení. To znemožňuje útoky na celou síť SimpleX - i když jsou některé servery kompromitovány, ostatní části sítě mohou fungovat normálně a postižení klienti mohou přejít na používání jiných serverů, aniž by ztratili kontakty nebo zprávy.
Sítě P2P jsou pravděpodobně zranitelné vůči útoku DRDoS. V navrhovaném návrhu klienti pouze předávají provoz ze známého důvěryhodného spojení a nelze je použít k odrážení a zesilování provozu v celé síti.
Address portability
Similarly to phone number portability (the ability of the customer to transfer the service to another provider without changing the number), the address portability means the ability of a communication service customer to change the service provider without changing the service address. Many federated networks support SRV records to provide address portability, but allowing service users to set up their own domains for the addresses is not as commonly supported by the available server and client software as for email.
Federated network
Federated network is provided by several entities that agree upon the standards and operate the network collectively. This allows the users to choose their provider, that will hold their account, their messaging history and contacts, and communicate with other providers' servers on behalf of the user. The examples are email, XMPP, Matrix and Mastodon.
The advantage of that design is that there is no single organization that all users depend on, and the standards are more difficult to change, unless it benefits all users. There are several disadvantages: 1) the innovation is slower, 2) each user account still depends on a single organization, and in most cases can't move to another provider without changing their network address – there is no address portability, 3) the security and privacy are inevitably worse than with the centralized networks.
The credential that allows proving something, e.g. the right to access some resource, without identifying the user. This credential can either be generated by a trusted party or by the user themselves and provided together with the request to create the resource. The first approach creates some centralized dependency in most cases. The second approach does not require any trust - this is used in SimpleX network to authorize access to the messaging queues.
In a wide sense, blockchain means a sequence of blocks of data, where each block contains a cryptographic hash of the previous block, thus providing integrity to the whole chain. Blockchains are used in many communication and information storage systems to provide integrity and immutability of the data. For example, BluRay disks use blockchain. SimpleX messaging queues also use blockchain - each message includes the hash of the previous message, to ensure the integrity – if any message is modified it will be detected by the recipient when the next message is received. Blockchains are a subset of Merkle directed acyclic graphs.
In a more narrow sense, particularly in media, blockchain is used to refer specifically to distributed ledger, where each record also includes the hash of the previous record, but the blocks have to be agreed by the participating peers using some consensus protocol.
Also known as Merkle DAG, a data structure based on a general graph structure where node contains the cryptographic hashes of the previous nodes that point to it. Merkle trees are a subset of Merkle DAGs - in this case each leaf contains a cryptographic hash of the parent.
This structure by design allows to verify the integrity of the whole structure by computing its hashes and comparing with the hashes included in the nodes, in the same way as with blockchain.
The motivation to use DAG in distributed environments instead of a simpler linear blockchain is to allow concurrent additions, when there is no requirement for a single order of added items. Merkle DAG is used, for example, in IPFS and will be used in decentralized SimpleX groups.
Also known as break-in recovery, it is the quality of the end-to-end encryption scheme allowing to recover security against a passive attacker who observes encrypted messages after compromising one (or both) of the parties. Also known as recovery from compromise or break-in recovery. Double-ratchet algorithm has this quality.
Double Ratchet algorithm provides perfect forward secrecy and post-compromise security. It is designed by Signal, and used in SimpleX Chat and many other secure messengers. Most experts consider it the state-of-the-art encryption protocol in message encryption.
Centralized network
Centralized networks are provided or controlled by a single entity. The examples are Threema, Signal, WhatsApp and Telegram. The advantage of that design is that the provider can innovate faster, and has a centralized approach to security. But the disadvantage is that the provider can change or discontinue the service, and leak, sell or disclose in some other way all users' data, including who they are connected with.
Content padding
Also known as content padding, it is the process of adding data to the beginning or the end of a message prior to encryption. Padding conceals the actual message size from any eavesdroppers. SimpleX has several encryption layers, and prior to each encryption the content is padded to a fixed size.
Decentralized network is often used to mean "the network based on decentralized blockchain". In its original meaning, decentralized network means that there is no central authority or any other point of centralization in the network, other than network protocols specification. The advantage of decentralized networks is that they are resilient to censorship and to the provider going out of business. The disadvantage is that they are often slower to innovate, and the security may be worse than with the centralized network.
The examples of decentralized networks are email, web, DNS, XMPP, Matrix, BitTorrent, etc. All these examples have a shared global application-level address space. Cryptocurrency blockchains not only have a shared address space, but also a shared state, so they are more centralized than email. Tor network also has a shared global address space, but also a central authority. SimpleX network does not have a shared application-level address space (it relies on the shared transport-level addresses - SMP relay hostnames or IP addresses), and it does not have any central authority or any shared state.
Defense in depth
Originally, it is a military strategy that seeks to delay rather than prevent the advance of an attacker, buying time and causing additional casualties by yielding space.
In information security, defense in depth represents the use of multiple computer security techniques to help mitigate the risk of one component of the defense being compromised or circumvented. An example could be anti-virus software installed on individual workstations when there is already virus protection on the firewalls and servers within the same environment.
SimpleX network applies defense in depth approach to security by having multiple layers for the communication security and privacy:
additional layer of end-to-end encryption for each messaging queue and another encryption layer of encryption from the server to the recipient inside TLS to prevent correlation by ciphertext,
TLS with only strong ciphers allowed,
mitigation of man-in-the-middle attack on client-server connection via server offline certificate verification,
mitigation of replay attacks via signing over transport channel binding,
multiple layers of message padding to reduce efficiency of traffic analysis,
mitigation of man-in-the-middle attack on client-client out-of-band channel when sending the invitation,
rotation of delivery queues to reduce efficiency of traffic analysis,
A communication system where only the communicating parties can read the messages. It is designed to protect message content from any potential eavesdroppers – telecom and Internet providers, malicious actors, and also the provider of the communication service.
End-to-end encryption requires agreeing cryptographic keys between the sender and the recipient in a way that no eavesdroppers can access the agreed keys. See key agreement protocol. This key exchange can be compromised via man-in-the-middle attack, particularly if key exchange happens via the same communication provider and no out-of-band channel is used to verify key exchange.
Also known as perfect forward secrecy, it is a feature of a key agreement protocol that ensures that session keys will not be compromised even if long-term secrets used in the session key exchange are compromised. Forward secrecy protects past sessions against future compromises of session or long-term keys.
Also known as break-in recovery, it is the quality of the end-to-end encryption scheme allowing to recover security against a passive attacker who observes encrypted messages after compromising one (or both) of the parties. Also known as recovery from compromise or break-in recovery. Double-ratchet algorithm has this quality.
Man-in-the-middle attack
The attack when the attacker secretly relays and possibly alters the communications between two parties who believe that they are directly communicating with each other.
This attack can be used to compromise end-to-end encryption by intercepting public keys during key exchange, substituting them with the attacker's keys, and then intercepting and re-encrypting all messages, without altering their content. With this attack, while the attacker does not change message content, but she can read the messages, while the communicating parties believe the messages are end-to-end encrypted.
Such attack is possible with any system that uses the same channel for key exchange as used to send messages - it includes almost all communication systems except SimpleX, where the initial public key is always passed out-of-band. Even with SimpleX, the attacker may intercept and substitute the key sent via another channel, gaining access to communication. This risk is substantially lower, as attacker does not know in advance which channel will be used to pass the key.
To mitigate such attack the communicating parties must verify the integrity of key exchange - SimpleX and many other messaging apps, e.g. Signal and WhatsApp, have the feature that allows it.
Also known as content padding, it is the process of adding data to the beginning or the end of a message prior to encryption. Padding conceals the actual message size from any eavesdroppers. SimpleX has several encryption layers, and prior to each encryption the content is padded to a fixed size.
Also known as key exchange, it is a process of agreeing cryptographic keys between the sender and the recipient(s) of the message. It is required for end-to-end encryption to work.
Also known as key exchange, it is a process of agreeing cryptographic keys between the sender and the recipient(s) of the message. It is required for end-to-end encryption to work.
The attack when the attacker secretly relays and possibly alters the communications between two parties who believe that they are directly communicating with each other.
This attack can be used to compromise end-to-end encryption by intercepting public keys during key exchange, substituting them with the attacker's keys, and then intercepting and re-encrypting all messages, without altering their content. With this attack, while the attacker does not change message content, but she can read the messages, while the communicating parties believe the messages are end-to-end encrypted.
Such attack is possible with any system that uses the same channel for key exchange as used to send messages - it includes almost all communication systems except SimpleX, where the initial public key is always passed out-of-band. Even with SimpleX, the attacker may intercept and substitute the key sent via another channel, gaining access to communication. This risk is substantially lower, as attacker does not know in advance which channel will be used to pass the key.
To mitigate such attack the communicating parties must verify the integrity of key exchange - SimpleX and many other messaging apps, e.g. Signal and WhatsApp, have the feature that allows it.
A technique for anonymous communication over a computer network that uses multiple layers of message encryption, analogous to the layers of an onion. The encrypted data is transmitted through a series of network nodes called "onion routers," each of which "peels" away a single layer, revealing the data's next destination. The sender remains anonymous because each intermediary knows only the location of the immediately preceding and following nodes.
Some elements of SimpleX network use similar ideas in their design - different addresses for the same resource used by different parties, and additional encryption layers. Currently though, SimpleX messaging protocol does not protect sender network address, as the relay server is chosen by the recipient. The delivery relays chosen by sender that are planned for the future would make SimpleX design closer to onion routing.
Nodes in the overlay network can be thought of as being connected by virtual or logical links, each of which corresponds to a path, perhaps through many physical links, in the underlying network. Tor, for example, is an overlay network on top of IP network, which in its turn is also an overlay network over some underlying physical network.
SimpleX Clients also form a network using SMP relays and IP or some other overlay network (e.g., Tor), to communicate with each other. SMP relays, on another hand, do not form a network.
The property of the cryptographic or communication system that allows the recipient of the message to prove to any third party that the sender identified by some cryptographic key sent the message. It is the opposite to repudiation. While in some context non-repudiation may be desirable (e.g., for contractually binding messages), in the context of private communications it may be undesirable.
The property of the cryptographic or communication system that allows the sender of the message to plausibly deny having sent the message, because while the recipient can verify that the message was sent by the sender, they cannot prove it to any third party - the recipient has a technical ability to forge the same encrypted message. This is an important quality of private communications, as it allows to have the conversation that can later be denied, similarly to having a private face-to-face conversation.
Generalizing the definition from NIST Digital Identity Guidelines, it is an opaque unguessable identifier generated by a service used to access a resource by only one party.
In the context of SimpleX network, these are the identifiers generated by SMP relays to access anonymous messaging queues, with a separate identifier (and access credential) for each accessing party: recipient, sender and and optional notifications subscriber. The same approach is used by XFTP relays to access file chunks, with separate identifiers (and access credentials) for sender and each recipient.
Peer-to-peer
Peer-to-peer (P2P) is the network architecture when participants have equal rights and communicate directly via a general purpose transport or overlay network. Unlike client-server architecture, all peers in a P2P network both provide and consume the resources. In the context of messaging, P2P architecture usually means that the messages are sent between peers, without user accounts or messages being stored on any servers. Examples are Tox, Briar, Cwtch and many others.
The advantage is that the participants do not depend on any servers. There are multiple downsides to that architecture, such as no asynchronous message delivery, the need for network-wide peer addresses, possibility of network-wide attacks, that are usually mitigated only by using a centralized authority. These disadvantages are avoided with proxied P2P architecture.
Network topology of the communication system when peers communicate via proxies that do not form the network themselves. Such design is used in Pond, that has a fixed home server for each user, and in SimpleX, that uses multiple relays providing temporary connections.
Perfect forward secrecy
Also known as perfect forward secrecy, it is a feature of a key agreement protocol that ensures that session keys will not be compromised even if long-term secrets used in the session key exchange are compromised. Forward secrecy protects past sessions against future compromises of session or long-term keys.
Any of the proposed cryptographic systems or algorithms that are thought to be secure against an attack by a quantum computer. It appears that as of 2023 there is no system or algorithm that is proven to be secure against such attacks, or even to be secure against attacks by massively parallel conventional computers, so a general recommendation is to use post-quantum cryptographic systems in combination with the traditional cryptographic systems.
Also known as break-in recovery, it is the quality of the end-to-end encryption scheme allowing to recover security against a passive attacker who observes encrypted messages after compromising one (or both) of the parties. Also known as recovery from compromise or break-in recovery. Double-ratchet algorithm has this quality.
User identity
In a communication system it refers to anything that uniquely identifies the users to the network. Depending on the communication network, it can be a phone number, email address, username, public key or a random opaque identifier. Most messaging networks rely on some form of user identity. SimpleX appears to be the only messaging network that does not rely on any kind of user identity - see this comparison.
