simplex-store-service runs the whole store service as one process, two lanes: a SimpleX chat bot that answers service RPC over a double-ratchet contact address, and — only when --service-config names a store_service.ini — the badge-codes web checkout (BTCPay and Stripe payment, code issuance, the poller). Without --service-config the web listener does not start at all; the process still runs the chat side and nothing else.

The wire protocol for the RPC side is docs/protocol/badges-rpc.md. The web checkout is specified in plans/badges-codes/2026-08-27-badge-codes.md, whose §9 is the store_service.ini reference, with the implementation plan in plans/badges-codes/2026-08-31-service-btcpay.md. Earlier plans (2026-07-30-supporter-badges-v3-ux.md, 2026-07-31-badges-core-implementation.md, 2026-08-04-badges-mvp-scope.md) predate the web checkout and describe the RPC-only scaffold this service started as.

At this stage the service:

creates a double-ratchet contact address on first start (service RPC requires DR, see docs/protocol/badges-rpc.md),
listens for service requests (CEvtServiceRequest) on that address, rejects a request whose purchaseKey is not the key the agent verified the signature against, and answers redeemBadgeCode,
issues redemption codes, storing only their SHA-256 in its code table,
does not accept contact requests: the address is for RPC only,
in service mode with [group] in the ini, manages one SimpleX group and serves /issue, /bulk and /revoke in it (see Issuing codes),
in service mode with --service-config, also serves the built web app (npm run build in web/) and, on the hosts in names_hosts, the names site (see Deployment), POST /api/invoice and GET /api/invoice/:id, the BTCPay and Stripe webhook routes, and a payment poller, seeding its price/offer catalog on every start,
owns the sx_badge_service_-prefixed tables and its own migrations table (sx_badge_service_migrations).

Every other command answers unsupported_version, or unknown_purchase_key when the key that signed it is not one the service has stored — every command but redeemBadgeCode needs a purchase that already exists.

Build

Build prerequisites and the general contribution flow are in docs/CONTRIBUTING.md.

cabal build exe:simplex-store-service

Run

simplex-store-service --help

default (no --run-cli): background service mode, no interactive terminal.
--run-cli: interactive CLI that also processes service requests (mirrors simplex-directory-service --run-cli). This mode is the chat/RPC side and the // commands below: it starts no web listener and no poller, and serves no group commands, whatever --service-config says. It still updates a code's group message when the code is redeemed or revoked.
--no-address: skip address creation on start-up (for operators who provision the address themselves). The service cannot sign credentials without an issuer key and refuses to start without one:
--issuer-key-idx IDX — the index the apps find the matching public key under (badgePublicKeys in ChatConfig).
--issuer-secret SECRET — the issuer secret from simplex-chat badge keygen.

The service checks the secret against the configured public key at that index and refuses to start if they disagree: credentials signed with the wrong key cannot be verified by any client, and the codes redeemed against them would be spent for nothing.

The key can come from store_service.ini instead:

[issuer]
index = 1
private_key = <secret from `simplex-chat badge keygen`>

index is the index clients verify against (badgePublicKeys in ChatConfig), and private_key is the secret that signs. Both are required, and the key is checked at startup like the flags. Rotating is a change to both and a restart, once clients trust the new index.

The command line wins over the file when both --issuer-key-idx and --issuer-secret are given. Note that a secret passed as a flag is visible to every user on the machine through ps, where one in the ini is only as readable as the file: store_service.ini is gitignored and already holds the provider API keys and webhook secrets.

Other options:

--service-config INI_FILE: path to store_service.ini. Omit it to run the chat/RPC side only; the process never starts a web listener without it, and never starts one under --run-cli, which parses and validates the whole file ([listener] static_dir included) but uses only its [issuer] section. An issuer key is still required either way.
--service-name NAME: the bot's display name, without *s or spaces (default SimpleX Badges).
--client-service: use the client service certificate.
also accepts the standard SimpleX Chat core options — database path, SMP/XFTP servers, --socks-proxy, --log-level/-l, and the rest — run simplex-store-service --help for the complete list.

Running the web checkout

store_service.ini holds the listener bind address and static_dir, an optional [btcpay] section (omitting it disables Bitcoin and Monero), an optional [stripe] section (omitting it disables card payments), an optional [group] section (omitting it turns off the group's commands, though a group created earlier still has its code messages updated), the poll cadence, and optional [names] and [chain] sections for the names store (omitting both turns it off), whose [chain] service_key is the gas key. store_service.ini.example is the committed template; store_service.ini itself is gitignored, since a real one holds API keys and webhook secrets.

The full walkthrough is in web/README.md. Short version:

cd apps/simplex-store-service/web && npm install && npm run build && cd ../../..
cp apps/simplex-store-service/store_service.ini.example apps/simplex-store-service/store_service.ini
cabal run simplex-store-service -- \
  --issuer-key-idx IDX --issuer-secret SECRET \
  --service-config apps/simplex-store-service/store_service.ini

IDX and SECRET must be one of the issuer keys clients already ship, not a fresh simplex-chat badge keygen pair: startup refuses a key no client could verify against.

trust_forwarded_for decides what the rate limiter counts. Behind a reverse proxy it must be on, or every request keys on the proxy's address and the whole service shares one bucket of 60 reads and 5 checkouts a minute. Where the listener is reached directly it must be off, because then the header is whatever the caller wrote. The last entry is the one read, which is the one a proxy appends.

The BTCPay API key needs four permissions, each scoped to the one store: cancreateinvoice and canviewinvoices for checkout and the poller, canviewstoresettings to log the store's live payment methods at startup, and canmodifyinvoices so POST /api/invoice/:id/cancel can invalidate an invoice at BTCPay rather than only in this store.

Give the service a BTCPay store of its own, and a Stripe account of its own if card payments are on. The poller lists every invoice and payment intent of the last three days or so, and one it did not create and cannot read is reported in a warning once an hour until it falls out of that window.

Card payments (Stripe)

An optional [stripe] section enables the card lane; omitting it disables card payments and POST /api/invoice answers provider_unavailable for a card order, the same as an absent [btcpay] does for Bitcoin and Monero. Its keys:

secret_key — a restricted key (rk_...), never a full secret key (sk_...). Grant it PaymentIntents: write, to create and cancel intents, plus Charges: read — the poller reads an intent with expand[]=latest_charge, and Stripe rejects the whole read if the key lacks read on an expanded object (settlement then falls back to the slower list pass).
publishable_key (pk_...) — the public key the browser mounts the Payment Element with.
webhook_secret (whsec_...) — the signing secret of the /webhooks/stripe endpoint, configured in the Stripe Dashboard alongside it.
session_minutes — how many minutes an unpaid card order stays open (1 to 1440, default 60). Ten minutes after that, the service cancels the payment at Stripe, and retries if that fails. If the order is over 72 hours old and the cancel has kept failing for an hour, the service marks it expired and logs an error. Check such orders in the Stripe Dashboard. After a restart, the hour starts again.

The service fills publishable_key into the shell at boot: the built index.html ships with an empty <meta id="stripe-publishable-key" name="stripe-publishable-key" content=""> (web/public/index.html), and the listener serves a copy with the configured key substituted in, so the ini is the only place the key is set. The names site's shell carries the same meta without the id, and is filled the same way. With no [stripe] section the pristine (empty) shell is served and the page shows its development stand-in card form. The dev mock (web/mock/server.py) does the same substitution from $STRIPE_PUBLISHABLE_KEY, since it runs without an ini.

POST /webhooks/stripe verifies Stripe-Signature against webhook_secret and queues a read, the same hint-only role as POST /webhooks/btcpay: the poller carries authority, so an unverified or unreadable delivery costs nothing but a log line. A delivery signed more than 15 minutes away from the server's clock is refused with a warning, so keep the clock synced (NTP).

The reverse proxy in front of this service must send a Content-Security-Policy that allows Stripe.js and its iframes, since Stripe forbids bundling or self-hosting its script:

script-src 'self' https://js.stripe.com https://*.js.stripe.com;
frame-src https://js.stripe.com https://*.js.stripe.com https://hooks.stripe.com

The full policies of both sites are in Caddy.

Stripe Link must be disabled in the Dashboard. Left on, it needs link.com in the CSP above and reintroduces an email prompt of its own, which this design otherwise avoids.

Enable card only; do not enable redirect-based methods (iDEAL, Bancontact, PayPal, and the rest) in the Dashboard. The embedded checkout sends no return_url, which Stripe requires the moment a redirect-based method is offered, so enabling one makes every checkout fail to create. The service pins the Stripe API version it was built against, so the account's default version does not affect the card lane.

The checkout endpoints

The browser in web/ is the only client of the /api routes; the two webhooks below are the providers', one each for BTCPay and Stripe. The invoice id is the only credential for reading or cancelling an order: it is 16 random bytes, it travels in the path, and anything that logs request paths logs it. It is also what the buyer is shown as their reference and asked to quote, so support sees it: losing it lets someone cancel an invoice, which is why the code, which lets them take the badge, is never printed until the service says the invoice is paid. The service keeps it out of its own logs, which name the provider's reference instead.

Route	Answers
`POST /api/invoice`	`{invoiceId, badgeType, months, amount, currency, expiresAt}` plus a destination: `clientSecret` for a card, or `address`, `cryptoAmount`, `cryptoCurrency`. Refuses with `code_conflict`, `catalog_changed`, `bad_request`, `provider_unavailable` or `rate_limited`.
`GET /api/invoice/:id`	`{status, badgeType, months, amount, currency, expiresAt}` and the same destination — no `invoiceId`, since the caller already has it — plus `amountPaid`, `cryptoAmountPaid`, `cryptoAmountDue`, `paidInFull`, `settledAt` and `requiredConfirmations` once each has a value. Never the code, which this service has never seen.
`GET /api/invoice/:id?wait=<status>&seenPaid=<figure>&seenFull=<0\|1>`	The same, held for up to 30 seconds while the invoice's status is still `<status>` and its payment is the one the caller says it has rendered. `wait=paid` and any value that is not a status answer at once, since neither can change. A status the caller has not seen, or a payment it has not seen, answers at once — the provider's verdict counts as much as the figure, because Monero reports an invoice as confirming while its figures are still zero. A request that omits `seenPaid` holds on the status alone.
`POST /api/invoice/:id/cancel`	Invalidates an open invoice at the provider and expires it here. Refuses a settled or expired one with `not_open`, and one that already holds a payment with `funded`. The provider is told first, and a payment landing in between does not keep the invoice open: nothing can reach that address any more, so the row is expired either way and the poller settles or reports what arrived.
`POST /webhooks/btcpay`	Verifies `BTCPay-Sig` over the bytes as received and queues a read. A hint only: the poller is what carries authority, so an unverified or unreadable delivery costs nothing but a log line.
`POST /webhooks/stripe`	Verifies `Stripe-Signature` over the bytes as received and queues a read. The card lane's equivalent of the row above, and a hint just the same: the poller carries authority, so an unverified or unreadable delivery costs nothing but a log line.

Every /api refusal is {"error": "<code>"}. Besides the codes above, any of them can answer internal, an unknown id answers not_found, and a wrong verb answers method_not_allowed — ten codes in all, which is what the browser's WIRE_ERROR_CODES lists. The two webhook routes are the exception: each answers 200, 400 or 413 with an empty body, because its provider is the only caller and nothing it could read would change what the route does. A wrong verb on any route, those two included, answers method_not_allowed.

Deployment

scripts/store-service/ holds the production deployment: the image (Dockerfile, built from the repository root), compose.yml, the ini template store_service.ini.example and the egress rule egress.sh. The service runs with +client_postgres and host networking; one Caddy serves both sites from the folders the service exports at boot and proxies the API to it.

Upgrading from the badge service

The rename to StoreService changed what the operator runs:

Before	After
`scripts/badge-service/`	`scripts/store-service/`
compose service `badge-service`, image `simplex-badge-service`	compose service `store-service`, image `simplex-store-service`
`badge_service.ini`, mounted at `/etc/simplex-badge-service/badge_service.ini`	`store_service.ini`, mounted at `/etc/simplex-store-service/store_service.ini`
the binary `simplex-badge-service`	`simplex-store-service`

Move badge_service.ini to scripts/store-service/store_service.ini, and point Caddy's badges root at scripts/store-service/web, which the service fills at boot. Then start the new service with

docker compose up -d --build --remove-orphans

from scripts/store-service/. Without --remove-orphans the old badge-service container keeps running beside the new one, on the same port and database. The database badge_service, BADGE_DB_CONN, the sx_badge_service_ tables and the chat database prefix simplex_badge_service are unchanged.

Two sites

The image carries the badges build at /srv/web (static_dir). The names site (simplex.domains) is configured beside it in [listener]. The image does not build the names site yet, so mount a names build into the container for names_static_dir until it does.

names_static_dir: the names build, the directory npm run build writes in the names webapp (dist/);
names_export_dir: where the service writes the names site at boot, with the Stripe publishable key in its shell, as webapp_export_dir is for the badges site. compose.yml bind-mounts ./names there (/srv/names-export), and ./web at /srv/webapp;
names_hosts: the comma-separated hosts the names site is served on when serve_webapp = on.

The service refuses to start with names_hosts or names_export_dir but no names_static_dir.

With serve_webapp = on (all in one), the listener picks the site by the request's Host, in lower case and without its port or a trailing dot (an IPv6 literal whole, in brackets), as names_hosts entries are read: a host in names_hosts gets the names site, any other host or none the badges site. Every path outside /api/ and /webhooks/ is a file of the chosen site, / and /index.html its shell. The API answers on every host.

Caddy

The Caddyfile is not in this repository. Its two host blocks, with the exported folders at /srv/store-service/web and /srv/store-service/names and the listener at 127.0.0.1:8080:

badges.simplex.chat {
	encode zstd gzip
	handle /api/* {
		reverse_proxy 127.0.0.1:8080
	}
	handle /webhooks/* {
		reverse_proxy 127.0.0.1:8080
	}
	handle {
		root * /srv/store-service/web
		file_server
	}
	@shell path / /index.html /sw.js
	header @shell Cache-Control "no-cache"
	header /assets/* {
		Cache-Control "public, max-age=31536000, immutable"
		match status 2xx
	}
	header Content-Security-Policy "default-src 'self'; script-src 'self' https://js.stripe.com https://*.js.stripe.com; frame-src https://js.stripe.com https://*.js.stripe.com https://hooks.stripe.com; connect-src 'self' https://api.stripe.com; img-src 'self' https://*.stripe.com; frame-ancestors 'self' https://simplex.chat https://*.simplex.chat"
}

simplex.domains {
	encode zstd gzip
	handle /api/* {
		reverse_proxy 127.0.0.1:8080
	}
	handle {
		root * /srv/store-service/names
		file_server
	}
	@shell path / /index.html /sw.js
	header @shell Cache-Control "no-cache"
	header /assets/* {
		Cache-Control "public, max-age=31536000, immutable"
		match status 2xx
	}
	header /manifest.webmanifest Content-Type "application/manifest+json"
	@media path /fonts/* /img/*
	header @media {
		Cache-Control "public, max-age=86400"
		match status 2xx
	}
	header {
		Content-Security-Policy "default-src 'self'; script-src 'self' 'sha256-i5ar+ITNdQiucbmin4/AN6DAY5LbAWeq3at+RiFoUoY=' 'sha256-Jhsw0wf9pI4icAxqab9mIjf34YdecDZeLVN+/KVZW+4=' https://js.stripe.com https://*.js.stripe.com; frame-src https://js.stripe.com https://*.js.stripe.com https://hooks.stripe.com; connect-src 'self' https://api.stripe.com; img-src 'self' data: https://*.stripe.com; style-src 'self'; frame-ancestors 'none'; base-uri 'none'; form-action 'none'"
		Strict-Transport-Security "max-age=63072000; includeSubDomains"
		X-Content-Type-Options "nosniff"
		Referrer-Policy "strict-origin-when-cross-origin"
		Cross-Origin-Opener-Policy "same-origin-allow-popups"
	}
}

Both sites call /api/* on their own origin, so there is no CORS.
/webhooks/* is proxied on badges.simplex.chat only. BTCPay and Stripe send every event there, names payments included.
The shell and /sw.js are no-cache, since they name the build's hashed files, and Caddy's file_server sends no Cache-Control of its own. /assets/* file names carry a content hash. The long lifetimes apply to found files only, so a missing asset is not cached for a year.
file_server sends no type for .webmanifest, which the names site's manifest needs.
The badges policy is web/README.md's. The names policy is the names webapp's (its README, "Hosting"), with https://*.stripe.com added to img-src beside data:, which the link profiles' pictures need. Its two hashes are those of the inline theme and font-preload scripts in the names index.html, and change with them. It allows no inline style.
Stripe.js runs on simplex.domains itself, in the document that keeps the owner codes and prepaid codes in localStorage. The owner accepted this on 2026-10-20, rather than a Checkout redirect or a separate card origin. Scripts and frames are allowed only from this origin and Stripe's hosts.

Egress rule

The link previews check a link's hosts before the chat core fetches it, but the core resolves the host again when it connects, so a name that changes its answer in between (DNS rebinding) can reach a private address. The guard is a firewall rule: the service's new outbound connections to unspecified, private, CGNAT, loopback, link-local, benchmarking, multicast and reserved IPv4 ranges, and to unique-local, link-local, site-local and multicast IPv6 ranges (with IPv4-mapped, IPv4-compatible and NAT64 forms of the IPv4 ones), are rejected, and so are those to any of the host's own addresses, public ones included, since a rebinding name can answer with them too and reach whatever listens on the host. The exceptions are the endpoints the service is configured to use, on their ports: the RPC node ([chain] rpc_url), BTCPay ([btcpay] host), the database and the DNS resolvers in /etc/resolv.conf. Replies on connections already open, such as Caddy's requests, pass, and so does IPv6 neighbour discovery on the link.

egress.sh writes this as the chain STORE_SERVICE_EGRESS in iptables and ip6tables, and rebuilds it on every run. With compose's host networking it matches the service's user in OUTPUT (-m owner --uid-owner). That rule covers every process of that user on the host, so the service must run as a dedicated user. --uid is required, and the script refuses a uid whose host account has a login shell (anything but nologin or false). Compose's USER_UID default of 1000 is often the operator's own login, so create a user for the service and run compose with its ids, set as USER_UID and USER_GID in scripts/store-service/.env; they are build arguments too, so rebuild the image:

sudo useradd --system --no-create-home --shell /usr/sbin/nologin simplex-store
id simplex-store
mkdir -p web names
sudo chown -R simplex-store:simplex-store web names
sudo chown simplex-store store_service.ini && sudo chmod 600 store_service.ini
docker compose up -d --build --remove-orphans

On a Docker bridge network instead, --bridge <interface> matches traffic from that network's bridge interface in DOCKER-USER (traffic forwarded to other hosts) and INPUT (the host's own addresses), and needs no --uid. The script refuses an interface that is not a bridge or that holds a default route (a bridge carrying the host's uplink, such as br0 or vmbr0, whose inbound connections it would refuse), and stops when DOCKER-USER is missing (Docker's nftables backend, "iptables": false or "ip6tables": false in its daemon config, or Docker not started yet): the forwarded traffic would then pass unfiltered. Docker before 27 creates the IPv6 DOCKER-USER only with both "ip6tables": true and "experimental": true. The interface is docker0 for the default network; for another, it is the network's com.docker.network.bridge.name option when set, else br- and the first 12 characters of its id:

docker network inspect -f '{{.Id}} {{index .Options "com.docker.network.bridge.name"}}' <network>

Install it as root from scripts/store-service/, here for a service uid of 998. --db defaults to the environment's BADGE_DB_CONN, else to compose's default (postgresql://simplex@127.0.0.1:5432/badge_service); sudo drops the environment, so pass it when compose runs with another value:

sudo ./egress.sh --dry-run --uid 998
sudo ./egress.sh --uid 998
sudo ./egress.sh --check --uid 998

--dry-run prints the iptables-restore input an install would commit, read against the current rules, and changes nothing; read the allowed endpoints in it.
--check exits 1 and names what differs unless every rule is in place, the chain holds nothing else, and each jump is the first rule of its chain.
Names are resolved when the rule is installed: run it again after changing the ini, the database string or the resolvers, and after a private endpoint's address changes. A name the host cannot resolve (a container name) stops the install; pass its address with --allow ADDRESS:PORT, as for any other endpoint the service needs, such as a SOCKS proxy.
Every address of this host is refused unless allowed, public ones included. An SMP or XFTP server on the same host, which the service reaches by its public name, needs --allow <name>:<port> (5223 for SMP, 443 for XFTP by default), as does anything else on this host the service connects to.
The DNS resolvers allowed are those in --resolv-conf (default /etc/resolv.conf). With host networking that is what the service queries, systemd-resolved's stub included. On a bridge network of a host with systemd-resolved, Docker sends the containers' queries to the upstream servers in /run/systemd/resolve/resolv.conf, so pass that file.
On a bridge network every container on it is matched, and the service cannot open connections to another container there unless it is listed with --allow. Give the service a network of its own.
The rules do not survive a reboot. Run the script at boot after Docker and DNS are up, from a unit ordered after docker.service and network-online.target: the names in the ini must resolve, and bridge mode needs Docker's DOCKER-USER. The service is unguarded from its start until then. With host networking, saving the rules with netfilter-persistent restores them before Docker starts.

Check it by hand from inside the container, once the service runs. Each check below fails when the rule is missing:

docker compose exec store-service bash -c ': </dev/tcp/10.255.255.1/80'

With host networking:

docker compose exec store-service bash -c ': </dev/tcp/127.0.0.1/8080'
docker compose exec store-service bash -c ': </dev/tcp/127.0.0.1/5432 && echo allowed'

On a bridge network, with the network's gateway (the host's address on it) and a port the host listens on for every address, such as Caddy's 443:

docker network inspect -f '{{(index .IPAM.Config 0).Gateway}}' <network>
docker compose exec store-service bash -c ': </dev/tcp/<gateway>/443'

A refused connection answers Connection refused at once, sent by the rule. Without the rule the connection to 10.255.255.1 waits for a timeout instead, and the one to 127.0.0.1:8080 (the service's own listener) or to the gateway connects.
allowed is printed for the database. With the RPC node on this host, the same command with its port (8545 for a local reth) prints it too.

sudo ./egress.sh --remove --uid 998 (or --bridge <interface>) deletes the jumps an install adds for that user or network, then the chain, in iptables and ip6tables. Running it again changes nothing, and --check then reports the chain absent.

The gas key

[chain] service_key is the registrar key: an Ethereum account (EOA) that sends every names transaction, commit to the controller, registerWithCredit to the sponsor, and the owners' record edits (setTextWithSig, clearRecordsWithSig) to the resolver. It pays only their gas, in ETH. The names' rent is spent from its allowance on the sponsor, in USD, which the guardian sets. It holds no names.

The commands use Foundry's cast (getfoundry.sh, checked with 1.5.1) from scripts/store-service/ on the service host, against the node at [chain] rpc_url, with the addresses from [chain]:

RPC=<rpc_url>
CONTROLLER=<controller>
SPONSOR=<sponsor>

Create the key

cast wallet new

Successfully created new keypair.
Address:     0x955C54a660fA233247D47b3f90C5713bA7ADD98B
Private key: 0x3f77…ba3e

Copy the private key into [chain] as service_key = 0x… (0x and 64 hex digits) with sudoedit store_service.ini, then clear the screen. The ini holds the only copy. It is gitignored, every *.ini is kept out of the image, and compose mounts it read-only. Keep it owned by the service user with mode 600 (see Egress rule). The service never logs the key; keep it out of shell history, logs and tickets too.

Find its address

cast wallet new printed it. Check that the ini holds the same key:

cast wallet address "$(sudo sed -n 's/^service_key *= *//p' store_service.ini)"

It prints the address (0x and 40 hex digits). The commands below that need a key read it from the ini the same way, so it stays out of the shell history, but it is in cast's arguments, visible to ps, while cast runs.

REGISTRAR=<the address>

Grant the allowance

Only the guardian, the controller's beneficiary, can set the allowance:

cast call $CONTROLLER 'beneficiary()(address)' --rpc-url $RPC

The guardian sends this call to $SPONSOR, with no value, from whatever wallet holds its key. Its calldata, here for $1,000:

cast calldata 'setRegistrarAllowance(address,uint256)' $REGISTRAR $(cast parse-units 1000)

0x7f8ac8b8000000000000000000000000b2590b3a4fa5bedda803f5f1f605803438c3f71e00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000003635c9adc5dea00000

From a key, with cast (--interactive prompts for the key; --ledger signs on a Ledger instead):

cast send $SPONSOR 'setRegistrarAllowance(address,uint256)' $REGISTRAR $(cast parse-units 1000) --rpc-url $RPC --interactive

From a multisig such as Safe: submit that calldata to the sponsor address as a transaction with value 0 in the Safe app.

Then anyone can check the result:

cast call $SPONSOR 'registrarAllowance(address)(uint256)' $REGISTRAR --rpc-url $RPC

1000000000000000000000 [1e21]

The amount is in attoUSD: dollars × 10^18, or cents × 10^16. cast parse-units 1000 gives $1,000.
It replaces the allowance and does not add to it. To top it up, read what is left and send the new total.
Zero is the kill switch: setRegistrarAllowance($REGISTRAR, 0) stops every register from that key in one transaction. A sender that is not the guardian is refused with NotBeneficiary.
Each register spends the name's list price (rentPriceUSD, base plus premium) for its whole duration, the free days before [names] term_start included. For example, 2 years of a name of 8 letters or more:
```
cast call $CONTROLLER 'rentPriceUSD(string,uint256)((uint256,uint256))' examplename 63072000 --rpc-url $RPC
```
```
(100000000000000000000 [1e20], 0)
```

Fund the key

Send ETH on the chain of [chain] chain_id from any wallet, and top it up the same way. With cast:

cast send $REGISTRAR --value 1ether --rpc-url $RPC --interactive

The gas below was measured on a local anvil deployment of the contracts (the names webapp's dev/deploy.ts), with a 63-letter label and links of 4096 bytes, the most the service accepts:

Transaction	Gas limit	Gas used	Limit × 100 gwei
`commit`	58,983	53,521	0.0059 ETH
`registerWithCredit`, no links	568,116	504,408	0.0568 ETH
`registerWithCredit`, one link	3,673,412	3,489,551	0.3673 ETH
`registerWithCredit`, two links	6,791,417	6,467,815	0.6791 ETH
`setTextWithSig`, a new link	3,026,449	3,026,449	0.3026 ETH
`setTextWithSig`, a link replacing one	462,289	462,289	0.0462 ETH
`setTextWithSig`, a link removed	698,644	558,916	0.0699 ETH
`clearRecordsWithSig`	80,312	80,312	0.0080 ETH

The service sets each transaction's gas limit to its estimate and its max fee to at most max_fee_per_gas (default 100 gwei). The node accepts a transaction only while the balance covers its limit × max fee, so the last column is what each one needs held. What it is charged is gas used × the block's base fee plus tip, usually far less.
An order is one commit and one register: 0.6850 ETH at the cap with two links, 0.0627 ETH with none. The expected orders × 0.6850 ETH, plus 0.3026 ETH per expected link edit, pays for all of them even at the cap. The figures scale with max_fee_per_gas.
gas_limit_cap (default 8,000,000) must stay above 6,791,417: a transaction whose estimate is above it is not sent.

Check the balance and transactions in flight

cast balance $REGISTRAR --ether --rpc-url $RPC
cast nonce $REGISTRAR --block latest --rpc-url $RPC
cast nonce $REGISTRAR --block pending --rpc-url $RPC

The balance prints as 1.000000000000000000. The latest nonce counts the key's mined transactions, and the pending one adds those waiting in the node's pool; the difference is what is in flight. The same reads through JSON-RPC answer in hex wei and hex counts ({"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"result":"0xde0b6b3a7640000"}, which cast to-unit 0xde0b6b3a7640000 ether prints as 1):

curl -s -X POST -H 'content-type: application/json' --data '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"eth_getBalance","params":["<address>","latest"]}' $RPC
curl -s -X POST -H 'content-type: application/json' --data '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"eth_getTransactionCount","params":["<address>","latest"]}' $RPC
curl -s -X POST -H 'content-type: application/json' --data '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"eth_getTransactionCount","params":["<address>","pending"]}' $RPC

A transaction the node refused is in neither count. The service's own list is the pending rows of its transactions table, here with compose's default database and schema:

psql "postgresql://simplex@127.0.0.1:5432/badge_service" -c "SELECT registrar_nonce, kind, sent_at FROM simplex_v1_chat_schema.sx_badge_service_name_transactions WHERE status = 'pending' ORDER BY registrar_nonce"

When funds or the allowance run out

docker compose logs store-service shows:

[ERROR …] names sender: nonce <n>: not sent: …, with the node's insufficient funds message, when the key cannot pay. The transaction is saved and sent again every few seconds, so funding the key is enough and needs no restart. The line is logged again only when the node's message changes.
[ERROR …] names worker: registration <id> failed: the registrar's allowance on the sponsor is used up; the guardian raises it with setRegistrarAllowance when the sponsor refuses a register with InsufficientAllowance. The order is failed; a code order keeps its code for Try again.
[WARN …] names sender: the latest block needs <wei> wei per gas, above max_fee_per_gas <cap>; the transaction waits when fees are above the cap. Nothing is signed until they fall.
[WARN …] names sender: nonce <n>: not replaced: a replacement would pay over max_fee_per_gas <cap> when a transaction stuck in the pool cannot be bumped within the cap.

Rotate the key

The service resumes its saved transactions at start and gives new ones nonces after theirs. Those are signed by the key that sent them, so started on another key it would give that key's transactions nonces it has not reached, and they would never be mined. Rotate only with no pending row:

Create the new key in a copy of the ini, which git ignores as it does every store_service.ini, check its address, fund it, and have the guardian grant it an allowance, as above:

sudo install -d -m 700 next && sudo cp -p store_service.ini next/store_service.ini
cast wallet new
sudoedit next/store_service.ini
cast wallet address "$(sudo sed -n 's/^service_key *= *//p' next/store_service.ini)"

Stop the service and count the pending rows:

docker compose stop store-service
psql "postgresql://simplex@127.0.0.1:5432/badge_service" -tAc "SELECT count(*) FROM simplex_v1_chat_schema.sx_badge_service_name_transactions WHERE status = 'pending'"

On anything but 0, docker compose start store-service on the old key, let them settle (confirmations blocks after they are mined), and repeat this step.

Keep the old ini for step 5, put the new one in place, start, and check the address it runs with:

sudo install -d -m 700 prev && sudo cp -p store_service.ini prev/store_service.ini
sudo cp next/store_service.ini store_service.ini
docker compose start store-service
cast wallet address "$(sudo sed -n 's/^service_key *= *//p' store_service.ini)"

The guardian zeroes the old key's allowance (OLD is its address), sending this calldata as in Grant the allowance, then anyone checks it reads 0:
```
cast calldata 'setRegistrarAllowance(address,uint256)' $OLD 0
cast call $SPONSOR 'registrarAllowance(address)(uint256)' $OLD --rpc-url $RPC
```

Send the old key's ETH back, keeping 0.003 ETH for the fee (21,000 gas at 100 gwei is 0.0021 ETH), then delete both copies:

cast balance $OLD --ether --rpc-url $RPC
cast send <your wallet> --value <balance - 0.003>ether --rpc-url $RPC --private-key "$(sudo sed -n 's/^service_key *= *//p' prev/store_service.ini)"
sudo rm -r prev next

Issuing codes

Operators issue codes two ways: from the service's own command line in --run-cli mode, and from the managed group in service mode. Both are commands to a running process, so no second process touches the service's database.

From the command line

The command is sent to the running service in --run-cli mode, not a way to start it:

//issue <badge_type> [months] [paid|unpaid|free]
//issue supporter 12
//issue name <length> [years <Y>] [paid|unpaid|free]
//issue name 7 years 5

months defaults to 1 and must be between 1 and 255; the status defaults to free and records whether the code was sold (paid), is awaiting payment (unpaid), or was issued by an operator (free). Redemption refuses an unpaid code with payment_pending: the web checkout writes the code row when the invoice is created, and settlement is what marks it paid.

//issue name makes a prepaid name code (SN<length>-…): it pays for one name of at least <length> letters, 6 to 63, for years years, 2 to 10 (default 2). The status is as above: an order refuses an unpaid name code with payment_pending.

The code is printed once and only its SHA-256 is stored, so a code that is not copied when it is shown cannot be recovered.

A code that leaked, or that was refunded, is withdrawn the same way, badge and name codes alike:

//revoke <code>

A revoked code answers redemption with code_invalid, as if it had never existed, so its holder learns nothing from trying. A client that redeemed it before the revoke still gets its own badge back when it asks again. Revoking it again answers "already revoked" and fixes its group message if the first revoke didn't. A code with no uses left can't be revoked, because its badges were already given out, and the command answers with an error. A multi-use code with uses left can be revoked, which stops the uses that remain.

Core parses //... into CustomChatCommand and leaves it to the service's preCmdHook, which is why issuing codes lives in the service rather than in core.

From the group

With [group] in store_service.ini, the service manages one group and serves three commands in it: /issue <type> [months <M>] [uses <N>] and /bulk <type> [months <M>] count <B> for moderators and above, /revoke <code> for admins and owners. months is 1 to 255, uses 1 to 1000 and count 1 to 100; a value outside these gets the usage reply. The name forms are /issue name <length> [years <Y>] and /bulk name <length> [years <Y>] count <B>, with the bounds of //issue name; a name code issued in the group is single-use and free. /revoke takes badge codes only: withdraw a name code with //revoke in --run-cli mode. A member's role is checked as the service last saw it, so a command sent by a moderator just demoted or removed can still run if it reaches the service first; revoke any code the service posts for them after the change. uses above 1 makes a multi-use code, tracked by a group message showing its remaining uses and the time of the last one; when every use is redeemed, the same message says so. Every reply carrying a code is read by every member, since the group has no private lane, so a code issued there is only as private as its least trusted member. Those replies are also kept as plain text in the service's chat database, so a copy of the database holds every code issued in the group. Keep the group's visible history off: with it on, each new member receives recent messages, and the codes in them, when they join. A multi-use code's message carries the code, and every redemption edits it or, after a day, posts it again; either way every current member receives it, so a member who joined after the code was issued gets the code while it still has uses left. A message replaced by a new post stays in the group with its old count. Keep disappearing messages off in the group and set no message TTL for the service's chats: a code's message that expires is treated as deleted and never posted again, so its counter stops. Every member can see when each use of a multi-use code was redeemed: the message shows the time of the last one, and its edit times show the rest. /revoke <code> names the code in an ordinary group message, so every member holds it before the service reads the command, and the code stays redeemable until the service acts on it — for the whole of any downtime. Revoke a code that is not already public in the group, a refunded one above all, with //revoke in --run-cli mode. A /revoke <code> with nothing after the code, from a member below admin, is answered that the code was not revoked and is now visible to the group. A group command the service received but had not run when it stopped, or received while it ran in --run-cli mode, is dropped with no reply, so resend it, or use //revoke.

The first member to join through the link is promoted to owner, so the operator joins before sharing it. Keep the service an owner too: below owner it cannot update the group's command menu, and below author it cannot post codes or replies. A failed promotion is logged at once, and an owner who left is logged at the next start or join. Then make the member you choose owner with the /mr command that the log line names, in --run-cli mode; the service never promotes anyone once the first promotion was attempted.

The join link logged when the group is created stays valid: anyone who has it can join later, as a member, and read every code posted or edited from then on. That includes a removed member, who can rejoin through it, so removing a member does not stop them seeing new codes. Keep the log that holds it private. The link is also stored in the group_link column of sx_badge_service_group, where it can be read again.

If an owner deletes the group, or removes the service from it, the service logs an error on start and stops serving the group. To create a new group, stop the service, delete the row, and start it again: with SQLite, run DELETE FROM sx_badge_service_group; on the <prefix>_chat.db file (~/.simplex/simplex_badge_service_chat.db by default), opened with sqlcipher and the database key if one is set; with PostgreSQL, run DELETE FROM <schema-prefix>_chat_schema.sx_badge_service_group; (simplex_v1_chat_schema by default). Multi-use codes issued in the old group stay redeemable, but their messages there are no longer updated, so revoke with //revoke any that should not stay live.

The group is identified by the single sx_badge_service_group row. Rolling back past the 20260918_badge_group_ops migration drops that table, so a later re-upgrade creates a second group and orphans the first one with its members and roles; multi-use codes come back single-use with their claims re-derived, and outstanding trackers come back unanchored. Redeemed credentials are preserved and no code becomes redeemable again, though while the old version runs, only the holder whose credential ends last gets it back on a retry, and any other holder of a multi-use code gets code_used; every holder of a revoked code gets code_invalid. Rolling back means re-creating and re-sharing the group; delete the orphaned one with /d #'<old local name>' in --run-cli mode, as its join link still works and its messages hold every code posted there.

The configured display_name and description apply only to the group the service creates. Editing them later is logged as not applied and changes nothing.

README.md Unescape Escape

SimpleX store service