mirror of
https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq.git
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Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/master' into sh/queue-map-leak
# Conflicts: # tests/CoreTests/MsgStoreTests.hs # tests/SMPProxyTests.hs
This commit is contained in:
+136
-115
@@ -2435,62 +2435,66 @@ enqueueMessageB c reqs = do
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cfg <- asks config
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(_, reqMids) <- unsafeWithStore c $ \db -> do
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mapAccumLM (\ids r -> storeSentMsg db cfg ids r `E.catchAny` \e -> (ids,) <$> handleInternal e) IM.empty reqs
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forME reqMids $ \((csqs_, _, _, _), InternalId msgId, pqSecr) -> forM csqs_ $ \(cData, sq :| sqs) -> do
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submitPendingMsg c sq
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let sqs' = filter (isActiveSndQ cData) sqs
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pure ((msgId, pqSecr), if null sqs' then Nothing else Just (sqs', msgId))
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forME reqMids $ submitSentMsg c
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where
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storeSentMsg ::
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DB.Connection ->
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AgentConfig ->
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IntMap (Maybe Int64, AMessage) ->
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Either AgentErrorType (Either AgentErrorType (ConnData, NonEmpty SndQueue), Maybe PQEncryption, MsgFlags, ValueOrRef AMessage) ->
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IO (IntMap (Maybe Int64, AMessage), Either AgentErrorType ((Either AgentErrorType (ConnData, NonEmpty SndQueue), Maybe PQEncryption, MsgFlags, ValueOrRef AMessage), InternalId, PQEncryption))
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storeSentMsg db cfg aMessageIds = \case
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Left e -> pure (aMessageIds, Left e)
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Right req@(csqs_, pqEnc_, msgFlags, mbr) -> case mbr of
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VRValue i_ aMessage -> case i_ >>= (`IM.lookup` aMessageIds) of
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Just _ -> pure (aMessageIds, Left $ INTERNAL "enqueueMessageB: storeSentMsg duplicate saved message body")
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Nothing -> do
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(mbId_, r) <- case csqs_ of
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Left e -> pure (Nothing, Left e)
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Right (cData, sq :| _) -> do
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mbId <- createSndMsgBody db aMessage
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(Just mbId,) <$> storeSentMsg_ cData sq mbId aMessage
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let aMessageIds' = maybe id (`IM.insert` (mbId_, aMessage)) i_ aMessageIds
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pure (aMessageIds', r)
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VRRef i -> case csqs_ of
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Left e -> pure $ (aMessageIds, Left e)
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Right (cData, sq :| _) -> case IM.lookup i aMessageIds of
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Just (Just mbId, aMessage) -> (aMessageIds,) <$> storeSentMsg_ cData sq mbId aMessage
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Just (Nothing, aMessage) -> do
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mbId <- createSndMsgBody db aMessage
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let aMessageIds' = IM.insert i (Just mbId, aMessage) aMessageIds
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(aMessageIds',) <$> storeSentMsg_ cData sq mbId aMessage
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Nothing -> pure (aMessageIds, Left $ INTERNAL "enqueueMessageB: storeSentMsg missing saved message body id")
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where
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storeSentMsg_ cData@ConnData {connId} sq sndMsgBodyId aMessage = fmap (first storeError) $ runExceptT $ do
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let AgentConfig {e2eEncryptVRange} = cfg
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internalTs <- liftIO getCurrentTime
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(internalId, internalSndId, prevMsgHash) <- ExceptT $ updateSndIds db connId
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-- We need to do pre-flight encoding that is not stored in database
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-- to calculate its hash and remember it on connection (createSndMsg -> updateSndMsgHash)
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-- to enable next enqueue.
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-- (As encoding is different per connection, we can't store shared body, so it's repeated on delivery)
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let agentMsgStr = encodeAgentMsgStr aMessage internalSndId prevMsgHash
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internalHash = C.sha256Hash agentMsgStr
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currentE2EVersion = maxVersion e2eEncryptVRange
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(mek, paddedLen, pqEnc) <- agentRatchetEncryptHeader db cData e2eEncAgentMsgLength pqEnc_ currentE2EVersion
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withExceptT (SEAgentError . cryptoError) $ CR.rcCheckCanPad paddedLen agentMsgStr
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let msgType = aMessageType aMessage
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-- msgBody is empty, because snd_messages record is linked to snd_message_bodies
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msgData = SndMsgData {internalId, internalSndId, internalTs, msgType, msgFlags, msgBody = "", pqEncryption = pqEnc, internalHash, prevMsgHash, sndMsgPrepData_ = Just SndMsgPrepData {encryptKey = mek, paddedLen, sndMsgBodyId}}
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liftIO $ createSndMsg db connId msgData
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liftIO $ createSndMsgDelivery db sq internalId
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pure (req, internalId, pqEnc)
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handleInternal :: E.SomeException -> IO (Either AgentErrorType b)
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handleInternal = pure . Left . INTERNAL . show
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submitSentMsg :: AgentClient -> ((Either AgentErrorType (ConnData, NonEmpty SndQueue), Maybe PQEncryption, MsgFlags, ValueOrRef AMessage), InternalId, PQEncryption) -> AM' (Either AgentErrorType ((AgentMsgId, PQEncryption), Maybe ([SndQueue], AgentMsgId)))
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submitSentMsg c ((csqs_, _, _, _), InternalId msgId, pqSecr) = forM csqs_ $ \(cData, sq :| sqs) -> do
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submitPendingMsg c sq
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let sqs' = filter (isActiveSndQ cData) sqs
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pure ((msgId, pqSecr), if null sqs' then Nothing else Just (sqs', msgId))
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storeSentMsg ::
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DB.Connection ->
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AgentConfig ->
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IntMap (Maybe Int64, AMessage) ->
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Either AgentErrorType (Either AgentErrorType (ConnData, NonEmpty SndQueue), Maybe PQEncryption, MsgFlags, ValueOrRef AMessage) ->
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IO (IntMap (Maybe Int64, AMessage), Either AgentErrorType ((Either AgentErrorType (ConnData, NonEmpty SndQueue), Maybe PQEncryption, MsgFlags, ValueOrRef AMessage), InternalId, PQEncryption))
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storeSentMsg db cfg aMessageIds = \case
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Left e -> pure (aMessageIds, Left e)
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Right req@(csqs_, pqEnc_, msgFlags, mbr) -> case mbr of
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VRValue i_ aMessage -> case i_ >>= (`IM.lookup` aMessageIds) of
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Just _ -> pure (aMessageIds, Left $ INTERNAL "enqueueMessageB: storeSentMsg duplicate saved message body")
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Nothing -> do
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(mbId_, r) <- case csqs_ of
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Left e -> pure (Nothing, Left e)
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Right (cData, sq :| _) -> do
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mbId <- createSndMsgBody db aMessage
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(Just mbId,) <$> storeSentMsg_ cData sq mbId aMessage
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let aMessageIds' = maybe id (`IM.insert` (mbId_, aMessage)) i_ aMessageIds
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pure (aMessageIds', r)
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VRRef i -> case csqs_ of
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Left e -> pure $ (aMessageIds, Left e)
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Right (cData, sq :| _) -> case IM.lookup i aMessageIds of
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Just (Just mbId, aMessage) -> (aMessageIds,) <$> storeSentMsg_ cData sq mbId aMessage
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Just (Nothing, aMessage) -> do
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mbId <- createSndMsgBody db aMessage
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let aMessageIds' = IM.insert i (Just mbId, aMessage) aMessageIds
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(aMessageIds',) <$> storeSentMsg_ cData sq mbId aMessage
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Nothing -> pure (aMessageIds, Left $ INTERNAL "enqueueMessageB: storeSentMsg missing saved message body id")
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where
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storeSentMsg_ cData@ConnData {connId} sq sndMsgBodyId aMessage = fmap (first storeError) $ runExceptT $ do
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let AgentConfig {e2eEncryptVRange} = cfg
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internalTs <- liftIO getCurrentTime
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(internalId, internalSndId, prevMsgHash) <- ExceptT $ updateSndIds db connId
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-- We need to do pre-flight encoding that is not stored in database
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-- to calculate its hash and remember it on connection (createSndMsg -> updateSndMsgHash)
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-- to enable next enqueue.
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-- (As encoding is different per connection, we can't store shared body, so it's repeated on delivery)
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let agentMsgStr = encodeAgentMsgStr aMessage internalSndId prevMsgHash
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internalHash = C.sha256Hash agentMsgStr
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currentE2EVersion = maxVersion e2eEncryptVRange
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(mek, paddedLen, pqEnc) <- agentRatchetEncryptHeader db cData e2eEncAgentMsgLength pqEnc_ currentE2EVersion
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withExceptT (SEAgentError . cryptoError) $ CR.rcCheckCanPad paddedLen agentMsgStr
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let msgType = aMessageType aMessage
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-- msgBody is empty, because snd_messages record is linked to snd_message_bodies
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msgData = SndMsgData {internalId, internalSndId, internalTs, msgType, msgFlags, msgBody = "", pqEncryption = pqEnc, internalHash, prevMsgHash, sndMsgPrepData_ = Just SndMsgPrepData {encryptKey = mek, paddedLen, sndMsgBodyId}}
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liftIO $ createSndMsg db connId msgData
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liftIO $ createSndMsgDelivery db sq internalId
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pure (req, internalId, pqEnc)
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encodeAgentMsgStr :: AMessage -> InternalSndId -> PrevSndMsgHash -> ByteString
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encodeAgentMsgStr aMessage internalSndId prevMsgHash = do
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let privHeader = APrivHeader (unSndId internalSndId) prevMsgHash
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@@ -2865,15 +2869,18 @@ synchronizeRatchet' c connId pqSupport' force = withConnLock c connId "synchroni
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SomeConn _ (DuplexConnection cData@ConnData {pqSupport} rqs sqs)
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| ratchetSyncAllowed cData || force -> do
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-- check queues are not switching?
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when (pqSupport' /= pqSupport) $ withStore' c $ \db -> setConnPQSupport db connId pqSupport'
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let cData' = cData {pqSupport = pqSupport'} :: ConnData
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AgentConfig {e2eEncryptVRange} <- asks config
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AgentConfig {e2eEncryptVRange, smpAgentVRange} <- asks config
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g <- asks random
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(pks, e2eParams) <- liftIO $ CR.generateRcvE2EParams g (maxVersion e2eEncryptVRange) pqSupport'
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enqueueRatchetKeyMsgs c cData' sqs e2eParams
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withStore' c $ \db -> do
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setConnRatchetSync db connId RSStarted
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setRatchetX3dhKeys db connId pks
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msgId <- withStore c $ \db -> runExceptT $ do
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msgId <- storeRatchetKey db (L.head sqs) (maxVersion smpAgentVRange) e2eParams Nothing
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liftIO $ do
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when (pqSupport' /= pqSupport) $ setConnPQSupport db connId pqSupport'
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setConnRatchetSync db connId RSStarted
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setRatchetX3dhKeys db connId pks
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pure msgId
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lift $ enqueueRatchetKeyMsgs c cData' sqs msgId
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let cData'' = cData' {ratchetSyncState = RSStarted} :: ConnData
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conn' = DuplexConnection cData'' rqs sqs
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connectionStats c conn'
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@@ -3404,6 +3411,9 @@ subscriber c@AgentClient {msgQ, subQ} = run $ forever $ do
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run a = a `catchOwn` \e -> notify $ CRITICAL True $ "Agent subscriber stopped: " <> show e
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notify err = atomically $ writeTBQueue subQ ("", "", AEvt SAEConn $ ERR err)
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maxRatchetKeyHashes :: Int
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maxRatchetKeyHashes = 100
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cleanupManager :: AgentClient -> AM' ()
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cleanupManager c@AgentClient {subQ} = do
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AgentConfig {initialCleanupDelay, cleanupInterval = int, storedMsgDataTTL = ttl, cleanupBatchSize = limit} <-
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@@ -3413,7 +3423,7 @@ cleanupManager c@AgentClient {subQ} = do
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run ERR deleteConns
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run ERR $ withStore' c $ \db -> deleteRcvMsgHashesExpired db ttl limit
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run ERR $ withStore' c $ \db -> deleteSndMsgsExpired db ttl limit
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run ERR $ withStore' c $ \db -> deleteRatchetKeyHashesExpired db ttl limit
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run ERR $ withStore' c $ \db -> deleteRatchetKeyHashesExpired db ttl maxRatchetKeyHashes
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run ERR $ withStore' c (`deleteExpiredNtfTokensToDelete` ttl)
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run RFERR deleteRcvFilesExpired
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run RFERR deleteRcvFilesDeleted
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@@ -3610,9 +3620,9 @@ processSMPTransmissions c@AgentClient {subQ} (tSess@(userId, srv, _), THandlePar
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_ -> prohibited "handshake: incorrect state" >> ack
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(Just e2eDh, Nothing) -> do
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decryptClientMessage e2eDh clientMsg >>= \case
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(SMP.PHEmpty, AgentRatchetKey {agentVersion, e2eEncryption}) -> do
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(SMP.PHEmpty, AgentRatchetKey {agentVersion, e2eEncryption, info}) -> do
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conn' <- updateConnVersion conn cData agentVersion
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qDuplex conn' "AgentRatchetKey" $ \a -> newRatchetKey e2eEncryption a >> ack
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qDuplex conn' "AgentRatchetKey" $ \a -> newRatchetKey e2eEncryption info a >> ack
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(SMP.PHEmpty, AgentMsgEnvelope {agentVersion, encAgentMessage}) -> do
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conn' <- updateConnVersion conn cData agentVersion
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-- primary queue is set as Active in helloMsg, below is to set additional queues Active
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@@ -3655,7 +3665,7 @@ processSMPTransmissions c@AgentClient {subQ} (tSess@(userId, srv, _), THandlePar
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qDuplexAckDel conn'' name a = qDuplex conn'' name a >> ackDel msgId
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resetRatchetSync :: AM (Connection c)
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resetRatchetSync
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| rss `notElem` ([RSOk, RSStarted] :: [RatchetSyncState]) = do
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| rss `notElem` ([RSOk, RSStarted] :: [RatchetSyncState]) = ifM ((RSStarted ==) <$> getRatchetSyncState) (pure conn') $ do
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let cData'' = (toConnData conn') {ratchetSyncState = RSOk} :: ConnData
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conn'' = updateConnection cData'' conn'
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cStats <- connectionStats c conn''
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@@ -3696,7 +3706,7 @@ processSMPTransmissions c@AgentClient {subQ} (tSess@(userId, srv, _), THandlePar
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notifySync :: AM ()
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notifySync = qDuplex conn' "AGENT A_CRYPTO error" $ \connDuplex -> do
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let rss' = cryptoErrToSyncState e
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when (rss `elem` ([RSOk, RSAllowed, RSRequired] :: [RatchetSyncState])) $ do
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whenM ((`elem` ([RSOk, RSAllowed, RSRequired] :: [RatchetSyncState])) <$> getRatchetSyncState) $ do
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let cData'' = (toConnData conn') {ratchetSyncState = rss'} :: ConnData
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conn'' = updateConnection cData'' connDuplex
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cStats <- connectionStats c conn''
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@@ -3792,6 +3802,9 @@ processSMPTransmissions c@AgentClient {subQ} (tSess@(userId, srv, _), THandlePar
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enqueueCmd :: InternalCommand -> AM ()
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enqueueCmd = enqueueCommand c "" connId (Just srv) . AInternalCommand
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getRatchetSyncState :: AM RatchetSyncState
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getRatchetSyncState = withStore c (`getConnRatchetSync` connId)
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unexpected :: BrokerMsg -> AM ()
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unexpected r = do
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logServer "<--" c srv rId $ "unexpected: " <> bshow r
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@@ -4160,42 +4173,47 @@ processSMPTransmissions c@AgentClient {subQ} (tSess@(userId, srv, _), THandlePar
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DuplexConnection {} -> action conn'
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_ -> qError $ name <> ": message must be sent to duplex connection"
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newRatchetKey :: CR.RcvE2ERatchetParams 'C.X448 -> Connection 'CDuplex -> AM ()
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newRatchetKey e2eOtherPartyParams@(CR.E2ERatchetParams e2eVersion k1Rcv k2Rcv _) conn'@(DuplexConnection cData'@ConnData {lastExternalSndId, pqSupport} _ sqs) =
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newRatchetKey :: CR.RcvE2ERatchetParams 'C.X448 -> ByteString -> Connection 'CDuplex -> AM ()
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newRatchetKey e2eOtherPartyParams@(CR.E2ERatchetParams e2eVersion k1Rcv k2Rcv _) info conn'@(DuplexConnection cData'@ConnData {lastExternalSndId, pqSupport} _ sqs) =
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unlessM ratchetExists $ do
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AgentConfig {e2eEncryptVRange} <- asks config
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unless (e2eVersion `isCompatible` e2eEncryptVRange) (throwE $ AGENT A_VERSION)
|
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keys <- getSendRatchetKeys
|
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keys_ <- getSendRatchetKeys
|
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let rcVs = CR.RatchetVersions {current = e2eVersion, maxSupported = maxVersion e2eEncryptVRange}
|
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initRatchet rcVs keys
|
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notifyAgreed
|
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case keys_ of
|
||||
Just (keys, replyKey_) -> initRatchet rcVs keys replyKey_ >> notifyAgreed
|
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Nothing -> withStore' c $ \db -> addProcessedRatchetKeyHash db connId rkHashRcv
|
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where
|
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rkHashRcv = rkHash k1Rcv k2Rcv
|
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rkHash k1 k2 = C.sha256Hash $ C.pubKeyBytes k1 <> C.pubKeyBytes k2
|
||||
answeredKeyHash_ = case smpDecode info of
|
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Right (AgentRatchetInfo RatchetInfo {answeredKeyHash}) -> answeredKeyHash
|
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_ -> Nothing
|
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ratchetExists :: AM Bool
|
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ratchetExists = withStore' c $ \db -> do
|
||||
exists <- checkRatchetKeyHashExists db connId rkHashRcv
|
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unless exists $ addProcessedRatchetKeyHash db connId rkHashRcv
|
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pure exists
|
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getSendRatchetKeys :: AM (CR.RcvE2EPrivRatchetParams 'C.X448)
|
||||
getSendRatchetKeys = case rss of
|
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RSOk -> sendReplyKey -- receiving client
|
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RSAllowed -> sendReplyKey
|
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RSRequired -> sendReplyKey
|
||||
RSStarted -> withStore c (`getRatchetX3dhKeys` connId) -- initiating client
|
||||
RSAgreed -> do
|
||||
withStore' c $ \db -> setConnRatchetSync db connId RSRequired
|
||||
getSendRatchetKeys :: AM (Maybe (CR.RcvE2EPrivRatchetParams 'C.X448, Maybe (CR.RcvE2ERatchetParams 'C.X448)))
|
||||
getSendRatchetKeys = getRatchetSyncState >>= \rss' -> case (rss', answeredKeyHash_) of
|
||||
(RSStarted, Nothing) -> Just . (,Nothing) <$> withStore c (`getRatchetX3dhKeys` connId) -- initiating client
|
||||
(RSStarted, Just h) -> fmap (,Nothing) . answeredKeys h <$> withStore c (`getRatchetX3dhKeys` connId)
|
||||
(_, Nothing) -> Just <$> sendReplyKey -- receiving client
|
||||
(RSAgreed, Just _) -> do
|
||||
withStore' c $ \db -> addProcessedRatchetKeyHash db connId rkHashRcv >> setConnRatchetSync db connId RSRequired
|
||||
notifyRatchetSyncError
|
||||
-- can communicate for other client to reset to RSRequired
|
||||
-- - need to add new AgentMsgEnvelope, AgentMessage, AgentMessageType
|
||||
-- - need to deduplicate on receiving side
|
||||
throwE $ AGENT (A_CRYPTO RATCHET_SYNC)
|
||||
(_, Just _) -> pure Nothing
|
||||
where
|
||||
answeredKeys h keys@(pk1, pk2, _)
|
||||
| rkHash (C.publicKey pk1) (C.publicKey pk2) == h = Just keys
|
||||
| otherwise = Nothing
|
||||
sendReplyKey = do
|
||||
g <- asks random
|
||||
(pks, e2eParams) <- liftIO $ CR.generateRcvE2EParams g e2eVersion pqSupport
|
||||
enqueueRatchetKeyMsgs c cData' sqs e2eParams
|
||||
pure pks
|
||||
pure (pks, Just e2eParams)
|
||||
notifyRatchetSyncError = do
|
||||
let cData'' = cData' {ratchetSyncState = RSRequired} :: ConnData
|
||||
conn'' = updateConnection cData'' conn'
|
||||
@@ -4207,23 +4225,33 @@ processSMPTransmissions c@AgentClient {subQ} (tSess@(userId, srv, _), THandlePar
|
||||
conn'' = updateConnection cData'' conn'
|
||||
cStats <- connectionStats c conn''
|
||||
notify $ RSYNC RSAgreed Nothing cStats
|
||||
recreateRatchet :: CR.Ratchet 'C.X448 -> AM ()
|
||||
recreateRatchet rc = withStore' c $ \db -> do
|
||||
setConnRatchetSync db connId RSAgreed
|
||||
deleteRatchet db connId
|
||||
createRatchet db connId rc
|
||||
recreateRatchet :: Maybe (CR.RcvE2ERatchetParams 'C.X448) -> Maybe AMessage -> CR.Ratchet 'C.X448 -> AM ()
|
||||
recreateRatchet replyKey_ eready_ rc = do
|
||||
cfg@AgentConfig {smpAgentVRange} <- asks config
|
||||
(msgId_, r_) <- withStore c $ \db -> runExceptT $ do
|
||||
msgId_ <- forM replyKey_ $ \e2eParams -> storeRatchetKey db (L.head sqs) (maxVersion smpAgentVRange) e2eParams (Just rkHashRcv)
|
||||
liftIO $ do
|
||||
addProcessedRatchetKeyHash db connId rkHashRcv
|
||||
setConnRatchetSync db connId RSAgreed
|
||||
deleteRatchet db connId
|
||||
createRatchet db connId rc
|
||||
r_ <- forM eready_ $ \msg -> liftIO $ storeSentMsg db cfg IM.empty (Right (Right (cData', sqs), Nothing, SMP.MsgFlags {notification = True}, vrValue msg)) >>= either E.throwIO pure . snd
|
||||
pure (msgId_, r_)
|
||||
forM_ msgId_ $ lift . enqueueRatchetKeyMsgs c cData' sqs
|
||||
forM_ r_ $ \r -> lift $ do
|
||||
r' <- submitSentMsg c r
|
||||
enqueueSavedMessageB c $ mapMaybe snd $ rights [r']
|
||||
-- compare public keys `k1` in AgentRatchetKey messages sent by self and other party
|
||||
-- to determine ratchet initilization ordering
|
||||
initRatchet :: CR.RatchetVersions -> CR.RcvE2EPrivRatchetParams 'C.X448 -> AM ()
|
||||
initRatchet rcVs (pk1, pk2, pKem)
|
||||
initRatchet :: CR.RatchetVersions -> CR.RcvE2EPrivRatchetParams 'C.X448 -> Maybe (CR.RcvE2ERatchetParams 'C.X448) -> AM ()
|
||||
initRatchet rcVs (pk1, pk2, pKem) replyKey_
|
||||
| rkHash (C.publicKey pk1) (C.publicKey pk2) <= rkHashRcv = do
|
||||
rcParams <- liftError cryptoError $ CR.pqX3dhRcv (pk1, pk2, pKem) e2eOtherPartyParams
|
||||
recreateRatchet $ CR.initRcvRatchet rcVs pk2 rcParams pqSupport
|
||||
recreateRatchet replyKey_ Nothing $ CR.initRcvRatchet rcVs pk2 rcParams pqSupport
|
||||
| otherwise = do
|
||||
(_, rcDHRs) <- atomically . C.generateKeyPair =<< asks random
|
||||
rcParams <- liftEitherWith cryptoError $ CR.pqX3dhSnd (pk1, pk2, CR.APRKP CR.SRKSProposed <$> pKem) e2eOtherPartyParams
|
||||
recreateRatchet $ CR.initSndRatchet rcVs k2Rcv rcDHRs rcParams
|
||||
void . enqueueMessages' c cData' sqs SMP.MsgFlags {notification = True} $ EREADY lastExternalSndId
|
||||
recreateRatchet replyKey_ (Just $ EREADY lastExternalSndId) $ CR.initSndRatchet rcVs k2Rcv rcDHRs rcParams
|
||||
|
||||
checkMsgIntegrity :: PrevExternalSndId -> ExternalSndId -> PrevRcvMsgHash -> ByteString -> MsgIntegrity
|
||||
checkMsgIntegrity prevExtSndId extSndId internalPrevMsgHash receivedPrevMsgHash
|
||||
@@ -4336,32 +4364,25 @@ storeConfirmation c cData@ConnData {connId, pqSupport, connAgentVersion = v} sq
|
||||
liftIO $ createSndMsg db connId msgData
|
||||
liftIO $ createSndMsgDelivery db sq internalId
|
||||
|
||||
enqueueRatchetKeyMsgs :: AgentClient -> ConnData -> NonEmpty SndQueue -> CR.RcvE2ERatchetParams 'C.X448 -> AM ()
|
||||
enqueueRatchetKeyMsgs c cData (sq :| sqs) e2eEncryption = do
|
||||
msgId <- enqueueRatchetKey c sq e2eEncryption
|
||||
mapM_ (lift . enqueueSavedMessage c msgId) $ filter (isActiveSndQ cData) sqs
|
||||
enqueueRatchetKeyMsgs :: AgentClient -> ConnData -> NonEmpty SndQueue -> InternalId -> AM' ()
|
||||
enqueueRatchetKeyMsgs c cData (sq :| sqs) (InternalId msgId) = do
|
||||
submitPendingMsg c sq
|
||||
mapM_ (enqueueSavedMessage c msgId) $ filter (isActiveSndQ cData) sqs
|
||||
|
||||
enqueueRatchetKey :: AgentClient -> SndQueue -> CR.RcvE2ERatchetParams 'C.X448 -> AM AgentMsgId
|
||||
enqueueRatchetKey c sq@SndQueue {connId} e2eEncryption = do
|
||||
aVRange <- asks $ smpAgentVRange . config
|
||||
msgId <- storeRatchetKey $ maxVersion aVRange
|
||||
lift $ submitPendingMsg c sq
|
||||
pure $ unId msgId
|
||||
where
|
||||
storeRatchetKey :: VersionSMPA -> AM InternalId
|
||||
storeRatchetKey agentVersion = withStore c $ \db -> runExceptT $ do
|
||||
internalTs <- liftIO getCurrentTime
|
||||
(internalId, internalSndId, prevMsgHash) <- ExceptT $ updateSndIds db connId
|
||||
let agentMsg = AgentRatchetInfo ""
|
||||
agentMsgStr = smpEncode agentMsg
|
||||
internalHash = C.sha256Hash agentMsgStr
|
||||
let msgBody = smpEncode $ AgentRatchetKey {agentVersion, e2eEncryption, info = agentMsgStr}
|
||||
msgType = agentMessageType agentMsg
|
||||
-- this message is e2e encrypted with queue key, not with double ratchet
|
||||
msgData = SndMsgData {internalId, internalSndId, internalTs, msgType, msgBody, pqEncryption = PQEncOff, msgFlags = SMP.MsgFlags {notification = True}, internalHash, prevMsgHash, sndMsgPrepData_ = Nothing}
|
||||
liftIO $ createSndMsg db connId msgData
|
||||
liftIO $ createSndMsgDelivery db sq internalId
|
||||
pure internalId
|
||||
storeRatchetKey :: DB.Connection -> SndQueue -> VersionSMPA -> CR.RcvE2ERatchetParams 'C.X448 -> Maybe ByteString -> ExceptT StoreError IO InternalId
|
||||
storeRatchetKey db sq@SndQueue {connId} agentVersion e2eEncryption answeredKeyHash_ = do
|
||||
internalTs <- liftIO getCurrentTime
|
||||
(internalId, internalSndId, prevMsgHash) <- ExceptT $ updateSndIds db connId
|
||||
let agentMsg = AgentRatchetInfo RatchetInfo {answeredKeyHash = answeredKeyHash_}
|
||||
agentMsgStr = smpEncode agentMsg
|
||||
internalHash = C.sha256Hash agentMsgStr
|
||||
let msgBody = smpEncode $ AgentRatchetKey {agentVersion, e2eEncryption, info = agentMsgStr}
|
||||
msgType = agentMessageType agentMsg
|
||||
-- this message is e2e encrypted with queue key, not with double ratchet
|
||||
msgData = SndMsgData {internalId, internalSndId, internalTs, msgType, msgBody, pqEncryption = PQEncOff, msgFlags = SMP.MsgFlags {notification = True}, internalHash, prevMsgHash, sndMsgPrepData_ = Nothing}
|
||||
liftIO $ createSndMsg db connId msgData
|
||||
liftIO $ createSndMsgDelivery db sq internalId
|
||||
pure internalId
|
||||
|
||||
-- encoded AgentMessage -> encoded EncAgentMessage
|
||||
agentRatchetEncrypt :: DB.Connection -> ConnData -> ByteString -> (PQSupport -> Int) -> Maybe PQEncryption -> CR.VersionE2E -> ExceptT StoreError IO (ByteString, PQEncryption)
|
||||
@@ -4386,7 +4407,7 @@ agentRatchetDecrypt g db connId encAgentMsg = do
|
||||
|
||||
agentRatchetDecrypt' :: TVar ChaChaDRG -> DB.Connection -> ConnId -> CR.RatchetX448 -> ByteString -> ExceptT StoreError IO (ByteString, PQEncryption)
|
||||
agentRatchetDecrypt' g db connId rc encAgentMsg = do
|
||||
skipped <- liftIO $ getSkippedMsgKeys db connId
|
||||
skipped <- liftIO $ getSkippedMsgKeys db connId CR.maxSkippedMsgKeys
|
||||
(agentMsgBody_, rc', skippedDiff) <- withExceptT (SEAgentError . cryptoError) $ CR.rcDecrypt g rc skipped encAgentMsg
|
||||
agentMsgBody <- liftEither $ first (SEAgentError . cryptoError) agentMsgBody_
|
||||
liftIO $ updateRatchet db connId rc' skippedDiff
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1260,9 +1260,12 @@ sendOrProxySMPCommand c nm userId destSrv@ProtocolServer {host = destHosts} conn
|
||||
Left e -> throwE e
|
||||
|
||||
ipAddressProtected :: NetworkConfig -> ProtocolServer p -> Bool
|
||||
ipAddressProtected NetworkConfig {socksProxy, hostMode} (ProtocolServer _ hosts _ _) = do
|
||||
isJust socksProxy || (hostMode == HMOnion && any isOnionHost hosts)
|
||||
ipAddressProtected NetworkConfig {socksProxy, socksMode, hostMode} (ProtocolServer _ hosts _ _)
|
||||
| isJust socksProxy = socksMode == SMAlways || if hostMode == HMPublic then allOnion else anyOnion
|
||||
| otherwise = hostMode == HMOnion && anyOnion
|
||||
where
|
||||
anyOnion = any isOnionHost hosts
|
||||
allOnion = all isOnionHost hosts
|
||||
isOnionHost = \case THOnionHost _ -> True; _ -> False
|
||||
|
||||
withNtfClient :: AgentClient -> NetworkRequestMode -> NtfServer -> EntityId -> ByteString -> (NtfClient -> ExceptT NtfClientError IO a) -> AM a
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -79,6 +79,7 @@ module Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Protocol
|
||||
SMPConfirmation (..),
|
||||
AgentMsgEnvelope (..),
|
||||
AgentMessage (..),
|
||||
RatchetInfo (..),
|
||||
RequestSignature (..),
|
||||
AgentMessageType (..),
|
||||
APrivHeader (..),
|
||||
@@ -928,7 +929,7 @@ data AgentMessage
|
||||
| -- AgentConnInfoReply is used by accepting party in duplexHandshake mode (v2), allowing to include reply queue(s) in the initial confirmation.
|
||||
-- It made removed REPLY message unnecessary.
|
||||
AgentConnInfoReply (NonEmpty SMPQueueInfo) ConnInfo
|
||||
| AgentRatchetInfo ByteString
|
||||
| AgentRatchetInfo RatchetInfo
|
||||
| AgentMessage APrivHeader AMessage
|
||||
| AgentServiceRequest (NonEmpty SMPQueueInfo) (Maybe RequestSignature) MsgBody
|
||||
| AgentServiceResponse MsgBody
|
||||
@@ -939,7 +940,7 @@ instance Encoding AgentMessage where
|
||||
smpEncode = \case
|
||||
AgentConnInfo cInfo -> smpEncode ('I', Tail cInfo)
|
||||
AgentConnInfoReply smpQueues cInfo -> smpEncode ('D', smpQueues, Tail cInfo) -- 'D' stands for "duplex"
|
||||
AgentRatchetInfo info -> smpEncode ('R', Tail info)
|
||||
AgentRatchetInfo info -> smpEncode ('R', info)
|
||||
AgentMessage hdr aMsg -> smpEncode ('M', hdr, aMsg)
|
||||
AgentServiceRequest qs sig_ body -> smpEncode ('A', qs, sig_, Tail body)
|
||||
AgentServiceResponse body -> smpEncode ('P', Tail body)
|
||||
@@ -948,13 +949,23 @@ instance Encoding AgentMessage where
|
||||
smpP >>= \case
|
||||
'I' -> AgentConnInfo . unTail <$> smpP
|
||||
'D' -> AgentConnInfoReply <$> smpP <*> (unTail <$> smpP)
|
||||
'R' -> AgentRatchetInfo . unTail <$> smpP
|
||||
'R' -> AgentRatchetInfo <$> smpP
|
||||
'M' -> AgentMessage <$> smpP <*> smpP
|
||||
'A' -> AgentServiceRequest <$> smpP <*> smpP <*> (unTail <$> smpP)
|
||||
'P' -> AgentServiceResponse . unTail <$> smpP
|
||||
'J' -> AgentRejection . unTail <$> smpP
|
||||
_ -> fail "bad AgentMessage"
|
||||
|
||||
data RatchetInfo = RatchetInfo {answeredKeyHash :: Maybe ByteString}
|
||||
deriving (Eq, Show)
|
||||
|
||||
instance Encoding RatchetInfo where
|
||||
smpEncode RatchetInfo {answeredKeyHash} = smpEncode answeredKeyHash
|
||||
smpP = do
|
||||
answeredKeyHash <- smpP <|> pure Nothing
|
||||
_ <- A.takeByteString
|
||||
pure RatchetInfo {answeredKeyHash}
|
||||
|
||||
-- internal type for storing message type in the database
|
||||
data AgentMessageType
|
||||
= AM_CONN_INFO
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -76,6 +76,7 @@ module Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.AgentStore
|
||||
getExpiredServiceConns,
|
||||
deleteExpiredServiceRequests,
|
||||
getDeletedWaitingDeliveryConnIds,
|
||||
getConnRatchetSync,
|
||||
setConnRatchetSync,
|
||||
addProcessedRatchetKeyHash,
|
||||
checkRatchetKeyHashExists,
|
||||
@@ -1594,12 +1595,16 @@ getRatchet_ q db connId =
|
||||
where
|
||||
ratchet = maybe (Left SERatchetNotFound) Right . fromOnly
|
||||
|
||||
getSkippedMsgKeys :: DB.Connection -> ConnId -> IO SkippedMsgKeys
|
||||
getSkippedMsgKeys db connId =
|
||||
skipped <$> DB.query db "SELECT header_key, msg_n, msg_key FROM skipped_messages WHERE conn_id = ?" (Only connId)
|
||||
getSkippedMsgKeys :: DB.Connection -> ConnId -> Int -> IO SkippedMsgKeys
|
||||
getSkippedMsgKeys db connId maxKeys = do
|
||||
(keys, oldKeys) <- splitAt maxKeys <$> DB.query db "SELECT skipped_message_id, header_key, msg_n, msg_key FROM skipped_messages WHERE conn_id = ? ORDER BY skipped_message_id DESC LIMIT ?" (connId, maxKeys + 1)
|
||||
case oldKeys of
|
||||
(skippedMsgId :: Int64, _, _, _) : _ -> DB.execute db "DELETE FROM skipped_messages WHERE conn_id = ? AND skipped_message_id <= ?" (connId, skippedMsgId)
|
||||
[] -> pure ()
|
||||
pure $ skipped keys
|
||||
where
|
||||
skipped = foldl' addSkippedKey M.empty
|
||||
addSkippedKey smks (hk, msgN, mk) = M.alter (Just . addMsgKey) hk smks
|
||||
addSkippedKey smks (_, hk, msgN, mk) = M.alter (Just . addMsgKey) hk smks
|
||||
where
|
||||
addMsgKey = maybe (M.singleton msgN mk) (M.insert msgN mk)
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -2793,6 +2798,11 @@ getDeletedWaitingDeliveryConnIds :: DB.Connection -> IO [ConnId]
|
||||
getDeletedWaitingDeliveryConnIds db =
|
||||
map fromOnly <$> DB.query_ db "SELECT conn_id FROM connections WHERE deleted_at_wait_delivery IS NOT NULL"
|
||||
|
||||
getConnRatchetSync :: DB.Connection -> ConnId -> IO (Either StoreError RatchetSyncState)
|
||||
getConnRatchetSync db connId =
|
||||
firstRow fromOnly SEConnNotFound $
|
||||
DB.query db "SELECT ratchet_sync_state FROM connections WHERE conn_id = ?" (Only connId)
|
||||
|
||||
setConnRatchetSync :: DB.Connection -> ConnId -> RatchetSyncState -> IO ()
|
||||
setConnRatchetSync db connId ratchetSyncState =
|
||||
DB.execute db "UPDATE connections SET ratchet_sync_state = ? WHERE conn_id = ?" (ratchetSyncState, connId)
|
||||
@@ -2814,21 +2824,35 @@ checkRatchetKeyHashExists db connId hash =
|
||||
(connId, Binary hash)
|
||||
|
||||
deleteRatchetKeyHashesExpired :: DB.Connection -> NominalDiffTime -> Int -> IO ()
|
||||
deleteRatchetKeyHashesExpired db ttl limit = do
|
||||
deleteRatchetKeyHashesExpired db ttl maxConnHashes = do
|
||||
cutoffTs <- addUTCTime (-ttl) <$> getCurrentTime
|
||||
#if defined(dbPostgres)
|
||||
DB.execute
|
||||
db
|
||||
[sql|
|
||||
DELETE FROM processed_ratchet_key_hashes
|
||||
WHERE processed_ratchet_key_hash_id IN (
|
||||
SELECT processed_ratchet_key_hash_id
|
||||
FROM processed_ratchet_key_hashes
|
||||
WHERE created_at < ?
|
||||
ORDER BY created_at ASC
|
||||
LIMIT ?
|
||||
)
|
||||
|]
|
||||
(cutoffTs, limit)
|
||||
("DELETE FROM processed_ratchet_key_hashes h USING (" <> maxExcessIdsQuery <> ") e WHERE h.conn_id = e.conn_id AND h.processed_ratchet_key_hash_id <= e.max_excess_id AND h.created_at < ?")
|
||||
(maxConnHashes, maxConnHashes, cutoffTs)
|
||||
#else
|
||||
maxExcessIds <- DB.query db maxExcessIdsQuery (maxConnHashes, maxConnHashes)
|
||||
DB.executeMany
|
||||
db
|
||||
"DELETE FROM processed_ratchet_key_hashes WHERE conn_id = ? AND processed_ratchet_key_hash_id <= ? AND created_at < ?"
|
||||
(map (\(connId :: ConnId, maxExcessId :: Int64) -> (connId, maxExcessId, cutoffTs)) maxExcessIds)
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
where
|
||||
maxExcessIdsQuery :: Query
|
||||
maxExcessIdsQuery =
|
||||
[sql|
|
||||
SELECT conn_id, (
|
||||
SELECT processed_ratchet_key_hash_id
|
||||
FROM processed_ratchet_key_hashes
|
||||
WHERE conn_id = c.conn_id
|
||||
ORDER BY processed_ratchet_key_hash_id DESC
|
||||
LIMIT 1 OFFSET ?
|
||||
) AS max_excess_id
|
||||
FROM processed_ratchet_key_hashes c
|
||||
GROUP BY conn_id
|
||||
HAVING COUNT(*) > ?
|
||||
|]
|
||||
|
||||
-- | returns all connection queues, the first queue is the primary one
|
||||
getRcvQueuesByConnId_ :: DB.Connection -> ConnId -> IO (Maybe (NonEmpty RcvQueue))
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@ import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.Postgres.Migrations.M20260411_service_certs
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.Postgres.Migrations.M20260712_address_dr_rpc
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.Postgres.Migrations.M20260823_snd_files_entitlement
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.Postgres.Migrations.M20260919_ratchet_verify_codes
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.Postgres.Migrations.M20260929_ratchet_indexes
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.Shared (Migration (..))
|
||||
|
||||
schemaMigrations :: [(String, Text, Maybe Text)]
|
||||
@@ -31,7 +32,8 @@ schemaMigrations =
|
||||
("20260411_service_certs", m20260411_service_certs, Just down_m20260411_service_certs),
|
||||
("20260712_address_dr_rpc", m20260712_address_dr_rpc, Just down_m20260712_address_dr_rpc),
|
||||
("20260823_snd_files_entitlement", m20260823_snd_files_entitlement, Just down_m20260823_snd_files_entitlement),
|
||||
("20260919_ratchet_verify_codes", m20260919_ratchet_verify_codes, Just down_m20260919_ratchet_verify_codes)
|
||||
("20260919_ratchet_verify_codes", m20260919_ratchet_verify_codes, Just down_m20260919_ratchet_verify_codes),
|
||||
("20260929_ratchet_indexes", m20260929_ratchet_indexes, Just down_m20260929_ratchet_indexes)
|
||||
]
|
||||
|
||||
-- | The list of migrations in ascending order by date
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
|
||||
{-# LANGUAGE OverloadedStrings #-}
|
||||
{-# LANGUAGE QuasiQuotes #-}
|
||||
|
||||
module Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.Postgres.Migrations.M20260929_ratchet_indexes where
|
||||
|
||||
import Data.Text (Text)
|
||||
import Text.RawString.QQ (r)
|
||||
|
||||
m20260929_ratchet_indexes :: Text
|
||||
m20260929_ratchet_indexes =
|
||||
[r|
|
||||
DROP INDEX idx_skipped_messages_conn_id;
|
||||
CREATE INDEX idx_skipped_messages_conn_id ON skipped_messages(conn_id, skipped_message_id);
|
||||
|
||||
DELETE FROM processed_ratchet_key_hashes AS h
|
||||
WHERE EXISTS (
|
||||
SELECT 1 FROM processed_ratchet_key_hashes d
|
||||
WHERE d.conn_id = h.conn_id AND d.hash = h.hash AND d.processed_ratchet_key_hash_id < h.processed_ratchet_key_hash_id
|
||||
);
|
||||
|
||||
DROP INDEX idx_processed_ratchet_key_hashes_hash;
|
||||
CREATE UNIQUE INDEX idx_processed_ratchet_key_hashes_hash ON processed_ratchet_key_hashes(conn_id, hash);
|
||||
CREATE INDEX idx_processed_ratchet_key_hashes_conn_id ON processed_ratchet_key_hashes(conn_id, processed_ratchet_key_hash_id);
|
||||
|]
|
||||
|
||||
down_m20260929_ratchet_indexes :: Text
|
||||
down_m20260929_ratchet_indexes =
|
||||
[r|
|
||||
DROP INDEX idx_processed_ratchet_key_hashes_conn_id;
|
||||
DROP INDEX idx_processed_ratchet_key_hashes_hash;
|
||||
CREATE INDEX idx_processed_ratchet_key_hashes_hash ON processed_ratchet_key_hashes(conn_id, hash);
|
||||
DROP INDEX idx_skipped_messages_conn_id;
|
||||
CREATE INDEX idx_skipped_messages_conn_id ON skipped_messages(conn_id);
|
||||
|]
|
||||
@@ -1169,11 +1169,15 @@ CREATE INDEX idx_ntf_tokens_ntf_host_ntf_port ON smp_agent_test_protocol_schema.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
CREATE INDEX idx_processed_ratchet_key_hashes_conn_id ON smp_agent_test_protocol_schema.processed_ratchet_key_hashes USING btree (conn_id, processed_ratchet_key_hash_id);
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
CREATE INDEX idx_processed_ratchet_key_hashes_created_at ON smp_agent_test_protocol_schema.processed_ratchet_key_hashes USING btree (created_at);
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
CREATE INDEX idx_processed_ratchet_key_hashes_hash ON smp_agent_test_protocol_schema.processed_ratchet_key_hashes USING btree (conn_id, hash);
|
||||
CREATE UNIQUE INDEX idx_processed_ratchet_key_hashes_hash ON smp_agent_test_protocol_schema.processed_ratchet_key_hashes USING btree (conn_id, hash);
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1241,7 +1245,7 @@ CREATE UNIQUE INDEX idx_server_certs_user_id_host_port ON smp_agent_test_protoco
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
CREATE INDEX idx_skipped_messages_conn_id ON smp_agent_test_protocol_schema.skipped_messages USING btree (conn_id);
|
||||
CREATE INDEX idx_skipped_messages_conn_id ON smp_agent_test_protocol_schema.skipped_messages USING btree (conn_id, skipped_message_id);
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -52,6 +52,7 @@ import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.SQLite.Migrations.M20260411_service_certs
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.SQLite.Migrations.M20260712_address_dr_rpc
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.SQLite.Migrations.M20260823_snd_files_entitlement
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.SQLite.Migrations.M20260919_ratchet_verify_codes
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.SQLite.Migrations.M20260929_ratchet_indexes
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.Shared (Migration (..))
|
||||
|
||||
schemaMigrations :: [(String, Query, Maybe Query)]
|
||||
@@ -103,7 +104,8 @@ schemaMigrations =
|
||||
("m20260411_service_certs", m20260411_service_certs, Just down_m20260411_service_certs),
|
||||
("m20260712_address_dr_rpc", m20260712_address_dr_rpc, Just down_m20260712_address_dr_rpc),
|
||||
("m20260823_snd_files_entitlement", m20260823_snd_files_entitlement, Just down_m20260823_snd_files_entitlement),
|
||||
("m20260919_ratchet_verify_codes", m20260919_ratchet_verify_codes, Just down_m20260919_ratchet_verify_codes)
|
||||
("m20260919_ratchet_verify_codes", m20260919_ratchet_verify_codes, Just down_m20260919_ratchet_verify_codes),
|
||||
("m20260929_ratchet_indexes", m20260929_ratchet_indexes, Just down_m20260929_ratchet_indexes)
|
||||
]
|
||||
|
||||
-- | The list of migrations in ascending order by date
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
|
||||
{-# LANGUAGE QuasiQuotes #-}
|
||||
|
||||
module Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.SQLite.Migrations.M20260929_ratchet_indexes where
|
||||
|
||||
import Database.SQLite.Simple (Query)
|
||||
import Database.SQLite.Simple.QQ (sql)
|
||||
|
||||
-- idx_skipped_messages_conn_id is not changed: SQLite index entries include rowid (skipped_message_id)
|
||||
m20260929_ratchet_indexes :: Query
|
||||
m20260929_ratchet_indexes =
|
||||
[sql|
|
||||
DELETE FROM processed_ratchet_key_hashes AS h
|
||||
WHERE EXISTS (
|
||||
SELECT 1 FROM processed_ratchet_key_hashes d
|
||||
WHERE d.conn_id = h.conn_id AND d.hash = h.hash AND d.processed_ratchet_key_hash_id < h.processed_ratchet_key_hash_id
|
||||
);
|
||||
|
||||
DROP INDEX idx_processed_ratchet_key_hashes_hash;
|
||||
CREATE UNIQUE INDEX idx_processed_ratchet_key_hashes_hash ON processed_ratchet_key_hashes(conn_id, hash);
|
||||
CREATE INDEX idx_processed_ratchet_key_hashes_conn_id ON processed_ratchet_key_hashes(conn_id, processed_ratchet_key_hash_id);
|
||||
|]
|
||||
|
||||
down_m20260929_ratchet_indexes :: Query
|
||||
down_m20260929_ratchet_indexes =
|
||||
[sql|
|
||||
DROP INDEX idx_processed_ratchet_key_hashes_conn_id;
|
||||
DROP INDEX idx_processed_ratchet_key_hashes_hash;
|
||||
CREATE INDEX idx_processed_ratchet_key_hashes_hash ON processed_ratchet_key_hashes(conn_id, hash);
|
||||
|]
|
||||
@@ -573,10 +573,6 @@ CREATE INDEX idx_encrypted_rcv_message_hashes_hash ON encrypted_rcv_message_hash
|
||||
conn_id,
|
||||
hash
|
||||
);
|
||||
CREATE INDEX idx_processed_ratchet_key_hashes_hash ON processed_ratchet_key_hashes(
|
||||
conn_id,
|
||||
hash
|
||||
);
|
||||
CREATE INDEX idx_snd_messages_rcpt_internal_id ON snd_messages(
|
||||
conn_id,
|
||||
rcpt_internal_id
|
||||
@@ -641,6 +637,14 @@ CREATE INDEX idx_connections_deleted ON connections(deleted);
|
||||
CREATE INDEX idx_connections_service_request_expires_at ON connections(
|
||||
service_request_expires_at
|
||||
);
|
||||
CREATE UNIQUE INDEX idx_processed_ratchet_key_hashes_hash ON processed_ratchet_key_hashes(
|
||||
conn_id,
|
||||
hash
|
||||
);
|
||||
CREATE INDEX idx_processed_ratchet_key_hashes_conn_id ON processed_ratchet_key_hashes(
|
||||
conn_id,
|
||||
processed_ratchet_key_hash_id
|
||||
);
|
||||
CREATE TRIGGER tr_rcv_queue_insert
|
||||
AFTER INSERT ON rcv_queues
|
||||
FOR EACH ROW
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -195,6 +195,7 @@ data PClient v err msg = PClient
|
||||
transportHost :: TransportHost,
|
||||
tcpConnectTimeout :: NetworkTimeout,
|
||||
tcpTimeout :: NetworkTimeout,
|
||||
proxiedRelayVRange :: VersionRange v,
|
||||
sendPings :: TVar Bool,
|
||||
lastReceived :: TVar UTCTime,
|
||||
timeoutErrorCount :: TVar Int,
|
||||
@@ -240,6 +241,7 @@ smpClientStub g sessionId thVersion thAuth = do
|
||||
transportHost = "localhost",
|
||||
tcpConnectTimeout,
|
||||
tcpTimeout,
|
||||
proxiedRelayVRange = supportedClientSMPRelayVRange,
|
||||
sendPings,
|
||||
lastReceived,
|
||||
timeoutErrorCount,
|
||||
@@ -477,6 +479,7 @@ data ProtocolClientConfig v = ProtocolClientConfig
|
||||
serviceCredentials :: Maybe ServiceCredentials,
|
||||
-- | client-server protocol version range
|
||||
serverVRange :: VersionRange v,
|
||||
proxiedRelayVRange :: VersionRange v,
|
||||
-- | agree shared session secret (used in SMP proxy for additional encryption layer)
|
||||
agreeSecret :: Bool,
|
||||
-- | Whether connecting client is a proxy server. See comment in ClientHandshake
|
||||
@@ -495,6 +498,7 @@ defaultClientConfig clientALPN useSNI serverVRange =
|
||||
clientALPN,
|
||||
serviceCredentials = Nothing,
|
||||
serverVRange,
|
||||
proxiedRelayVRange = serverVRange,
|
||||
agreeSecret = False,
|
||||
proxyServer = False,
|
||||
useSNI
|
||||
@@ -505,6 +509,7 @@ defaultSMPClientConfig :: ProtocolClientConfig SMPVersion
|
||||
defaultSMPClientConfig =
|
||||
(defaultClientConfig (Just alpnSupportedSMPHandshakes) False supportedClientSMPRelayVRange)
|
||||
{ defaultTransport = (show defaultSMPPort, transport @TLS),
|
||||
proxiedRelayVRange = supportedClientSMPRelayVRange,
|
||||
agreeSecret = True
|
||||
}
|
||||
{-# INLINE defaultSMPClientConfig #-}
|
||||
@@ -568,7 +573,7 @@ type SMPTransportSession = TransportSession BrokerMsg
|
||||
-- A single queue can be used for multiple 'SMPClient' instances,
|
||||
-- as 'SMPServerTransmission' includes server information.
|
||||
getProtocolClient :: forall v err msg. Protocol v err msg => TVar ChaChaDRG -> NetworkRequestMode -> TransportSession msg -> ProtocolClientConfig v -> [HostName] -> Maybe (TBQueue (ServerTransmissionBatch v err msg)) -> UTCTime -> (ProtocolClient v err msg -> IO ()) -> IO (Either (ProtocolClientError err) (ProtocolClient v err msg))
|
||||
getProtocolClient g nm transportSession@(_, srv, _) cfg@ProtocolClientConfig {qSize, networkConfig, clientALPN, serviceCredentials, serverVRange, agreeSecret, proxyServer, useSNI} presetDomains msgQ proxySessTs disconnected = do
|
||||
getProtocolClient g nm transportSession@(_, srv, _) cfg@ProtocolClientConfig {qSize, networkConfig, clientALPN, serviceCredentials, serverVRange, proxiedRelayVRange, agreeSecret, proxyServer, useSNI} presetDomains msgQ proxySessTs disconnected = do
|
||||
case chooseTransportHost networkConfig (host srv) of
|
||||
Right useHost ->
|
||||
(getCurrentTime >>= mkProtocolClient useHost >>= runClient useTransport useHost)
|
||||
@@ -593,6 +598,7 @@ getProtocolClient g nm transportSession@(_, srv, _) cfg@ProtocolClientConfig {qS
|
||||
transportHost,
|
||||
tcpConnectTimeout,
|
||||
tcpTimeout,
|
||||
proxiedRelayVRange,
|
||||
sendPings,
|
||||
lastReceived,
|
||||
timeoutErrorCount,
|
||||
@@ -1115,10 +1121,10 @@ deleteSMPQueues = okSMPCommands DEL
|
||||
-- send PRXY :: SMPServer -> Maybe BasicAuth -> Command Sender
|
||||
-- receives PKEY :: SessionId -> X.CertificateChain -> X.SignedExact X.PubKey -> BrokerMsg
|
||||
connectSMPProxiedRelay :: SMPClient -> NetworkRequestMode -> SMPServer -> Maybe BasicAuth -> ExceptT SMPClientError IO ProxiedRelay
|
||||
connectSMPProxiedRelay c@ProtocolClient {client_ = PClient {tcpConnectTimeout, tcpTimeout}} nm relayServ@ProtocolServer {port = relayPort, keyHash = C.KeyHash kh} proxyAuth =
|
||||
connectSMPProxiedRelay c@ProtocolClient {client_ = PClient {tcpConnectTimeout, tcpTimeout, proxiedRelayVRange}} nm relayServ@ProtocolServer {port = relayPort, keyHash = C.KeyHash kh} proxyAuth =
|
||||
sendProtocolCommand_ c nm Nothing tOut Nothing NoEntity (Cmd SProxiedClient (PRXY relayServ proxyAuth)) >>= \case
|
||||
PKEY sId vr (CertChainPubKey chain key) ->
|
||||
case supportedClientSMPRelayVRange `compatibleVersion` vr of
|
||||
case proxiedRelayVRange `compatibleVersion` vr of
|
||||
Nothing -> throwE $ transportErr TEVersion
|
||||
Just (Compatible v) -> do
|
||||
relayKey <- liftEitherWith (const $ transportErr $ TEHandshake IDENTITY) =<< liftIO (runExceptT $ validateRelay chain key)
|
||||
@@ -1169,7 +1175,7 @@ instance StrEncoding ProxyClientError where
|
||||
-- consider how to process slow responses - is it handled somehow locally or delegated to the caller
|
||||
-- this method is used in the client
|
||||
-- sends PFWD :: C.PublicKeyX25519 -> EncTransmission -> Command Sender
|
||||
-- receives PRES :: EncResponse -> BrokerMsg -- proxy to client
|
||||
-- receives PRES :: Maybe C.CbNonce -> EncResponse -> BrokerMsg -- proxy to client
|
||||
|
||||
-- When client sends message via proxy, there may be one successful scenario and 9 error scenarios
|
||||
-- as shown below (WTF stands for unexpected response, ??? for response that failed to parse).
|
||||
@@ -1228,14 +1234,14 @@ proxySMPCommand c@ProtocolClient {thParams = proxyThParams, client_ = PClient {c
|
||||
TBError e _ : _ -> throwE $ PCETransportError e
|
||||
TBTransmission s _ : _ -> pure s
|
||||
TBTransmissions s _ _ : _ -> pure s
|
||||
et <- liftEitherWith PCECryptoError $ EncTransmission <$> C.cbEncrypt cmdSecret nonce b paddedProxiedTLength
|
||||
et <- liftEitherWith PCECryptoError $ EncTransmission <$> C.cbEncrypt cmdSecret (encTransmissionNonce v nonce) b paddedProxiedTLength
|
||||
-- proxy interaction errors are wrapped
|
||||
let tOut = Just $ 2 * netTimeoutInt tcpTimeout nm
|
||||
tryE (sendProtocolCommand_ c nm (Just nonce) tOut Nothing (EntityId sessionId) (Cmd SProxiedClient (PFWD v cmdPubKey et))) >>= \case
|
||||
Right r -> case r of
|
||||
PRES (EncResponse er) -> do
|
||||
PRES nonce_ (EncResponse er) -> do
|
||||
-- server interaction errors are thrown directly
|
||||
t' <- liftEitherWith PCECryptoError $ C.cbDecrypt cmdSecret (C.reverseNonce nonce) er
|
||||
t' <- liftEitherWith PCECryptoError $ C.cbDecrypt cmdSecret (fromMaybe (C.reverseNonce nonce) nonce_) er
|
||||
case tParse serverThParams t' of
|
||||
t'' :| [] -> case tDecodeClient serverThParams t'' of
|
||||
(_, _, cmd) -> case cmd of
|
||||
@@ -1253,10 +1259,10 @@ proxySMPCommand c@ProtocolClient {thParams = proxyThParams, client_ = PClient {c
|
||||
|
||||
-- this method is used in the proxy
|
||||
-- sends RFWD :: EncFwdTransmission -> Command Sender
|
||||
-- receives RRES :: EncFwdResponse -> BrokerMsg
|
||||
-- receives RRES :: Maybe C.CbNonce -> EncFwdResponse -> BrokerMsg
|
||||
-- proxy should send PRES to the client with EncResponse
|
||||
-- Always uses background timeout mode
|
||||
forwardSMPTransmission :: SMPClient -> CorrId -> VersionSMP -> C.PublicKeyX25519 -> EncTransmission -> ExceptT SMPClientError IO EncResponse
|
||||
forwardSMPTransmission :: SMPClient -> CorrId -> VersionSMP -> C.PublicKeyX25519 -> EncTransmission -> ExceptT SMPClientError IO (Maybe C.CbNonce, EncResponse)
|
||||
forwardSMPTransmission c@ProtocolClient {thParams, client_ = PClient {clientCorrId = g}} fwdCorrId fwdVersion fwdKey fwdTransmission = do
|
||||
-- prepare params
|
||||
sessSecret <- case thAuth thParams of
|
||||
@@ -1268,11 +1274,11 @@ forwardSMPTransmission c@ProtocolClient {thParams, client_ = PClient {clientCorr
|
||||
eft = EncFwdTransmission $ C.cbEncryptNoPad sessSecret nonce (smpEncode fwdT)
|
||||
-- send
|
||||
sendProtocolCommand_ c NRMBackground (Just nonce) Nothing Nothing NoEntity (Cmd SProxyService (RFWD eft)) >>= \case
|
||||
RRES (EncFwdResponse efr) -> do
|
||||
RRES nonce_ (EncFwdResponse efr) -> do
|
||||
-- unwrap
|
||||
r' <- liftEitherWith PCECryptoError $ C.cbDecryptNoPad sessSecret (C.reverseNonce nonce) efr
|
||||
FwdResponse {fwdCorrId = _, fwdResponse} <- liftEitherWith (const $ PCEResponseError BLOCK) $ smpDecode r'
|
||||
pure fwdResponse
|
||||
pure (nonce_, fwdResponse)
|
||||
r -> throwE $ unexpectedResponse r
|
||||
|
||||
-- get queue information - always sent interactively
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -931,6 +931,8 @@ data CryptoError
|
||||
CERatchetEarlierMessage Word32
|
||||
| -- | duplicate message number
|
||||
CERatchetDuplicateMessage
|
||||
| -- | KEM key generation failed, indicating a broken RNG
|
||||
CryptoKEMKeyGenError
|
||||
deriving (Eq, Show, Exception)
|
||||
|
||||
aesKeySize :: Int
|
||||
@@ -1045,9 +1047,7 @@ md5Hash = BA.convert . (hash :: ByteString -> Digest MD5)
|
||||
|
||||
-- | AEAD-GCM encryption with associated data.
|
||||
--
|
||||
-- Used as part of double ratchet encryption.
|
||||
-- This function requires 16 bytes IV, it transforms IV in cryptonite_aes_gcm_init here:
|
||||
-- https://github.com/haskell-crypto/cryptonite/blob/master/cbits/cryptonite_aes.c
|
||||
-- Used as part of double ratchet encryption, with a 16-byte IV (see @initAEAD@).
|
||||
encryptAEAD :: Key -> IV -> Int -> ByteString -> ByteString -> ExceptT CryptoError IO (AuthTag, ByteString)
|
||||
encryptAEAD aesKey ivBytes paddedLen ad msg = do
|
||||
aead <- initAEAD @AES256 aesKey ivBytes
|
||||
@@ -1067,10 +1067,7 @@ encryptAEADNoPad aesKey ivBytes ad msg = do
|
||||
|
||||
-- | AEAD-GCM decryption with associated data.
|
||||
--
|
||||
-- Used as part of double ratchet encryption.
|
||||
-- This function requires 16 bytes IV, it transforms IV in cryptonite_aes_gcm_init here:
|
||||
-- https://github.com/haskell-crypto/cryptonite/blob/master/cbits/cryptonite_aes.c
|
||||
-- To make it compatible with WebCrypto we will need to start using initAEADGCM.
|
||||
-- Used as part of double ratchet encryption, with a 16-byte IV (see @initAEAD@).
|
||||
decryptAEAD :: Key -> IV -> ByteString -> ByteString -> AuthTag -> ExceptT CryptoError IO ByteString
|
||||
decryptAEAD aesKey ivBytes ad msg (AuthTag authTag) = do
|
||||
aead <- initAEAD @AES256 aesKey ivBytes
|
||||
@@ -1148,9 +1145,9 @@ maxLength :: forall i. KnownNat i => Int
|
||||
maxLength = fromIntegral (natVal $ Proxy @i)
|
||||
{-# INLINE maxLength #-}
|
||||
|
||||
-- this function requires 16 bytes IV, it transforms IV in cryptonite_aes_gcm_init here:
|
||||
-- https://github.com/haskell-crypto/cryptonite/blob/master/cbits/cryptonite_aes.c
|
||||
-- This is used for double ratchet encryption, so to make it compatible with WebCrypto we will need to deprecate it and start using initAEADGCM
|
||||
-- The 16-byte double ratchet IV is intentionally not the 96-bit IV recommended by NIST SP 800-38D, so GCM derives J0 = GHASH(IV || 0^64 || [128]_64),
|
||||
-- as in crypton_aes_gcm_init: https://hackage.haskell.org/package/crypton-0.34/src/cbits/crypton_aes.c
|
||||
-- WebCrypto and other SP 800-38D implementations interoperate only when given all 16 IV bytes.
|
||||
initAEAD :: forall c. AES.BlockCipher c => Key -> IV -> ExceptT CryptoError IO (AES.AEAD c)
|
||||
initAEAD (Key aesKey) (IV ivBytes) = do
|
||||
iv <- makeIV @c ivBytes
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -72,6 +72,7 @@ module Simplex.Messaging.Crypto.Ratchet
|
||||
rcEncryptHeader,
|
||||
rcEncryptMsg,
|
||||
rcDecrypt,
|
||||
maxSkippedMsgKeys,
|
||||
-- used in tests
|
||||
MsgHeader (..),
|
||||
RatchetInitParams (..),
|
||||
@@ -119,7 +120,7 @@ import Simplex.Messaging.Crypto.SNTRUP761.Bindings
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Encoding
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Encoding.String
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Parsers (defaultJSON, parseE, parseE')
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Util (($>>=), (<$?>))
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Util ((<$?>))
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Version
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Version.Internal
|
||||
import UnliftIO.STM
|
||||
@@ -327,9 +328,13 @@ instance StrEncoding AnyE2ERatchetParamsUri where
|
||||
Nothing -> pure $ AnyE2ERatchetParamsUri SRKSProposed a $ E2ERatchetParamsUri vr k1 k2 Nothing
|
||||
_ -> fail "bad e2e params"
|
||||
where
|
||||
kemP query =
|
||||
queryParam_ "kem_key" query
|
||||
$>>= \k -> Just . kemParams k <$> queryParam_ "kem_ct" query
|
||||
kemP query = do
|
||||
k_ <- queryParam_ "kem_key" query
|
||||
ct_ <- queryParam_ "kem_ct" query
|
||||
case (k_, ct_) of
|
||||
(Just k, _) -> pure $ Just $ kemParams k ct_
|
||||
(Nothing, Nothing) -> pure Nothing
|
||||
(Nothing, Just _) -> fail "bad e2e params: kem_ct without kem_key"
|
||||
kemParams k = \case
|
||||
Nothing -> ARKP SRKSProposed $ RKParamsProposed k
|
||||
Just ct -> ARKP SRKSAccepted $ RKParamsAccepted ct k
|
||||
@@ -958,6 +963,9 @@ type DecryptResult a = (Either CryptoError ByteString, Ratchet a, SkippedMsgDiff
|
||||
maxSkip :: Word32
|
||||
maxSkip = 512
|
||||
|
||||
maxSkippedMsgKeys :: Int
|
||||
maxSkippedMsgKeys = 2000
|
||||
|
||||
rcDecrypt ::
|
||||
forall a.
|
||||
(AlgorithmI a, DhAlgorithm a) =>
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -16,6 +16,8 @@ module Simplex.Messaging.Crypto.SNTRUP761.Bindings
|
||||
) where
|
||||
|
||||
import Control.Concurrent.STM
|
||||
import Control.Exception (throwIO)
|
||||
import Control.Monad (when)
|
||||
import Crypto.Random (ChaChaDRG)
|
||||
import Data.Aeson (FromJSON (..), ToJSON (..))
|
||||
import Data.Bifunctor (bimap)
|
||||
@@ -23,6 +25,7 @@ import Data.ByteArray (ScrubbedBytes)
|
||||
import qualified Data.ByteArray as BA
|
||||
import Data.ByteString (ByteString)
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.DB (FromField (..), ToField (..))
|
||||
import qualified Simplex.Messaging.Crypto as C
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Crypto.SNTRUP761.Bindings.Defines
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Crypto.SNTRUP761.Bindings.FFI
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Crypto.SNTRUP761.Bindings.RNG (rngFuncPtr, withDRG)
|
||||
@@ -55,14 +58,13 @@ pattern KEMSharedKey s <- KEMSharedKey_ s
|
||||
type KEMKeyPair = (KEMPublicKey, KEMSecretKey)
|
||||
|
||||
sntrup761Keypair :: TVar ChaChaDRG -> IO KEMKeyPair
|
||||
sntrup761Keypair drg =
|
||||
bimap KEMPublicKey_ KEMSecretKey
|
||||
<$> BA.allocRet
|
||||
c_SNTRUP761_SECRETKEY_SIZE
|
||||
( \skPtr ->
|
||||
BA.alloc c_SNTRUP761_PUBLICKEY_SIZE $ \pkPtr ->
|
||||
withDRG drg $ \cxtPtr -> c_sntrup761_keypair pkPtr skPtr cxtPtr rngFuncPtr
|
||||
)
|
||||
sntrup761Keypair drg = do
|
||||
((r, pk), sk) <-
|
||||
BA.allocRet c_SNTRUP761_SECRETKEY_SIZE $ \skPtr ->
|
||||
BA.allocRet c_SNTRUP761_PUBLICKEY_SIZE $ \pkPtr ->
|
||||
withDRG drg $ \cxtPtr -> c_sntrup761_keypair pkPtr skPtr cxtPtr rngFuncPtr
|
||||
when (r /= 0) $ throwIO C.CryptoKEMKeyGenError
|
||||
pure (KEMPublicKey_ pk, KEMSecretKey sk)
|
||||
|
||||
sntrup761Enc :: TVar ChaChaDRG -> KEMPublicKey -> IO (KEMCiphertext, KEMSharedKey)
|
||||
sntrup761Enc drg (KEMPublicKey pk) =
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -10,9 +10,9 @@ import Foreign
|
||||
import Foreign.C
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Crypto.SNTRUP761.Bindings.RNG (RNGContext, RNGFunc)
|
||||
|
||||
-- void sntrup761_keypair (uint8_t *pk, uint8_t *sk, void *random_ctx, sntrup761_random_func *random);
|
||||
-- int sntrup761_keypair (uint8_t *pk, uint8_t *sk, void *random_ctx, sntrup761_random_func *random);
|
||||
foreign import ccall "sntrup761_keypair"
|
||||
c_sntrup761_keypair :: Ptr Word8 -> Ptr Word8 -> Ptr RNGContext -> FunPtr RNGFunc -> IO ()
|
||||
c_sntrup761_keypair :: Ptr Word8 -> Ptr Word8 -> Ptr RNGContext -> FunPtr RNGFunc -> IO CInt
|
||||
|
||||
-- void sntrup761_enc (uint8_t *c, uint8_t *k, const uint8_t *pk, void *random_ctx, sntrup761_random_func *random);
|
||||
foreign import ccall "sntrup761_enc"
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -168,6 +168,7 @@ module Simplex.Messaging.Protocol
|
||||
EncFwdTransmission (..),
|
||||
EncResponse (..),
|
||||
EncTransmission (..),
|
||||
encTransmissionNonce,
|
||||
FwdResponse (..),
|
||||
FwdTransmission (..),
|
||||
NameRecord (..),
|
||||
@@ -280,7 +281,7 @@ import Simplex.Messaging.ServiceScheme
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.SimplexName (LabelHash, SimplexDomain (..), SimplexTLD (..), fullDomainName, labelHash)
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Transport
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Transport.Client (TransportHost, TransportHosts (..))
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Util (bshow, eitherToMaybe, safeDecodeUtf8, (<$?>))
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Util (bshow, eitherToMaybe, packZipWith, safeDecodeUtf8, (<$?>))
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Version
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Version.Internal
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -702,6 +703,11 @@ instance Encoding NewNtfCreds where
|
||||
newtype EncTransmission = EncTransmission ByteString
|
||||
deriving (Show)
|
||||
|
||||
encTransmissionNonce :: VersionSMP -> C.CbNonce -> C.CbNonce
|
||||
encTransmissionNonce v nonce@(C.CbNonce s)
|
||||
| v >= fwdNoncesSMPVersion = C.cbNonce $ packZipWith xor (smpEncode v) s <> BS.drop 2 s
|
||||
| otherwise = nonce
|
||||
|
||||
data FwdTransmission = FwdTransmission
|
||||
{ fwdCorrId :: CorrId,
|
||||
fwdVersion :: VersionSMP,
|
||||
@@ -737,8 +743,8 @@ data BrokerMsg where
|
||||
NMSG :: C.CbNonce -> EncNMsgMeta -> BrokerMsg
|
||||
-- Should include certificate chain
|
||||
PKEY :: SessionId -> VersionRangeSMP -> CertChainPubKey -> BrokerMsg -- TLS-signed server key for proxy shared secret and initial sender key
|
||||
RRES :: EncFwdResponse -> BrokerMsg -- relay to proxy
|
||||
PRES :: EncResponse -> BrokerMsg -- proxy to client
|
||||
RRES :: Maybe C.CbNonce -> EncFwdResponse -> BrokerMsg -- relay to proxy
|
||||
PRES :: Maybe C.CbNonce -> EncResponse -> BrokerMsg -- proxy to client
|
||||
END :: BrokerMsg
|
||||
ENDS :: Int64 -> IdsHash -> BrokerMsg
|
||||
DELD :: BrokerMsg
|
||||
@@ -1985,8 +1991,8 @@ instance ProtocolEncoding SMPVersion ErrorType BrokerMsg where
|
||||
NID nId srvNtfDh -> e (NID_, ' ', nId, srvNtfDh)
|
||||
NMSG nmsgNonce encNMsgMeta -> e (NMSG_, ' ', nmsgNonce, encNMsgMeta)
|
||||
PKEY sid vr certKey -> e (PKEY_, ' ', sid, vr, certKey)
|
||||
RRES (EncFwdResponse encBlock) -> e (RRES_, ' ', Tail encBlock)
|
||||
PRES (EncResponse encBlock) -> e (PRES_, ' ', Tail encBlock)
|
||||
RRES nonce_ (EncFwdResponse encBlock) -> fwdResp RRES_ nonce_ encBlock
|
||||
PRES nonce_ (EncResponse encBlock) -> fwdResp PRES_ nonce_ encBlock
|
||||
END -> e END_
|
||||
ENDS n idsHash -> serviceResp ENDS_ n idsHash
|
||||
DELD -> e DELD_
|
||||
@@ -2010,6 +2016,9 @@ instance ProtocolEncoding SMPVersion ErrorType BrokerMsg where
|
||||
serviceResp tag n idsHash
|
||||
| v >= rcvServiceSMPVersion = e (tag, ' ', n, idsHash)
|
||||
| otherwise = e (tag, ' ', n)
|
||||
fwdResp tag nonce_ encBlock
|
||||
| v >= fwdNoncesSMPVersion = e (tag, ' ', nonce_, Tail encBlock)
|
||||
| otherwise = e (tag, ' ', Tail encBlock)
|
||||
|
||||
protocolP v = \case
|
||||
MSG_ -> do
|
||||
@@ -2041,8 +2050,8 @@ instance ProtocolEncoding SMPVersion ErrorType BrokerMsg where
|
||||
NID_ -> NID <$> _smpP <*> smpP
|
||||
NMSG_ -> NMSG <$> _smpP <*> smpP
|
||||
PKEY_ -> PKEY <$> _smpP <*> smpP <*> smpP
|
||||
RRES_ -> RRES <$> (EncFwdResponse . unTail <$> _smpP)
|
||||
PRES_ -> PRES <$> (EncResponse . unTail <$> _smpP)
|
||||
RRES_ -> fwdRespP RRES EncFwdResponse
|
||||
PRES_ -> fwdRespP PRES EncResponse
|
||||
END_ -> pure END
|
||||
ENDS_ -> serviceRespP ENDS
|
||||
DELD_ -> pure DELD
|
||||
@@ -2059,6 +2068,9 @@ instance ProtocolEncoding SMPVersion ErrorType BrokerMsg where
|
||||
serviceRespP resp
|
||||
| v >= rcvServiceSMPVersion = resp <$> _smpP <*> smpP
|
||||
| otherwise = resp <$> _smpP <*> pure mempty
|
||||
fwdRespP :: (Maybe C.CbNonce -> a -> BrokerMsg) -> (ByteString -> a) -> Parser BrokerMsg
|
||||
fwdRespP resp enc = resp <$> (A.space *> nonceP) <*> (enc <$> A.takeByteString)
|
||||
nonceP = if v >= fwdNoncesSMPVersion then smpP else pure Nothing
|
||||
|
||||
fromProtocolError = \case
|
||||
PECmdSyntax -> CMD SYNTAX
|
||||
@@ -2075,7 +2087,7 @@ instance ProtocolEncoding SMPVersion ErrorType BrokerMsg where
|
||||
-- PONG response must not have queue ID
|
||||
PONG -> noEntityMsg
|
||||
PKEY {} -> noEntityMsg
|
||||
RRES _ -> noEntityMsg
|
||||
RRES {} -> noEntityMsg
|
||||
ALLS -> noEntityMsg
|
||||
RNAME {} -> noEntityMsg
|
||||
-- other broker responses must have queue ID
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1320,11 +1320,6 @@ isContactQueue QueueRec {queueMode, senderKey} = case queueMode of
|
||||
Just QMContact -> True
|
||||
Nothing -> isNothing senderKey -- for backward compatibility with pre-SKEY contact addresses
|
||||
|
||||
isSecuredMsgQueue :: QueueRec -> Bool
|
||||
isSecuredMsgQueue QueueRec {queueMode, senderKey} = case queueMode of
|
||||
Just QMContact -> False
|
||||
_ -> isJust senderKey
|
||||
|
||||
-- Random correlation ID is used as a nonce in case crypto_box authenticator is used to authorize transmission
|
||||
verifyCmdAuthorization :: Maybe (THandleAuth 'TServer) -> Maybe TAuthorizations -> ByteString -> CorrId -> C.APublicAuthKey -> Bool
|
||||
verifyCmdAuthorization thAuth tAuth authorized corrId key = maybe False (verify key) tAuth
|
||||
@@ -1463,7 +1458,7 @@ client
|
||||
inc own pRequests
|
||||
forkProxiedCmd $ do
|
||||
liftIO (runExceptT (forwardSMPTransmission smp corrId fwdV pubKey encBlock) `E.catches` clientHandlers) >>= \case
|
||||
Right r -> PRES r <$ inc own pSuccesses
|
||||
Right (nonce_, r) -> PRES nonce_ r <$ inc own pSuccesses
|
||||
Left e -> ERR (smpProxyError e) <$ case e of
|
||||
PCEProtocolError {} -> inc own pSuccesses
|
||||
_ -> inc own pErrorsOther
|
||||
@@ -2132,7 +2127,7 @@ client
|
||||
unless (fwdVersion `isCompatible` thServerVRange thParams') $ throwE $ transportErr TEVersion
|
||||
let clientSecret = C.dh' fwdKey serverPrivKey
|
||||
clientNonce = C.cbNonce $ bs fwdCorrId
|
||||
b <- liftEitherWith (const CRYPTO) $ C.cbDecrypt clientSecret clientNonce et
|
||||
b <- liftEitherWith (const CRYPTO) $ C.cbDecrypt clientSecret (encTransmissionNonce fwdVersion clientNonce) et
|
||||
let clntTHParams = smpTHParamsSetVersion fwdVersion thParams'
|
||||
-- only allowing single forwarded transactions
|
||||
t' <- case tParse clntTHParams b of
|
||||
@@ -2145,9 +2140,13 @@ client
|
||||
TBError _ _ : _ -> throwE BLOCK
|
||||
TBTransmission b' _ : _ -> pure b'
|
||||
TBTransmissions b' _ _ : _ -> pure b'
|
||||
r2 <- liftEitherWith (const BLOCK) $ EncResponse <$> C.cbEncrypt clientSecret (C.reverseNonce clientNonce) r' paddedProxiedTLength
|
||||
nonce_ <-
|
||||
if fwdVersion >= fwdNoncesSMPVersion
|
||||
then Just <$> (atomically . C.randomCbNonce =<< asks random)
|
||||
else pure Nothing
|
||||
r2 <- liftEitherWith (const BLOCK) $ EncResponse <$> C.cbEncrypt clientSecret (fromMaybe (C.reverseNonce clientNonce) nonce_) r' paddedProxiedTLength
|
||||
let fr = FwdResponse {fwdCorrId, fwdResponse = r2}
|
||||
pure $ RRES $ EncFwdResponse $ C.cbEncryptNoPad sessSecret (C.reverseNonce proxyNonce) (smpEncode fr)
|
||||
pure $ RRES nonce_ $ EncFwdResponse $ C.cbEncryptNoPad sessSecret (C.reverseNonce proxyNonce) (smpEncode fr)
|
||||
-- the inner response, or Nothing if forked (RSLV).
|
||||
r_ <- lift (rejectOrVerify clntThAuth t') >>= \case
|
||||
-- rejectOrVerify filters allowed commands, no need to repeat it here.
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -13,12 +13,14 @@ module Simplex.Messaging.Server.QueueStore
|
||||
ServiceRec (..),
|
||||
CertFingerprint,
|
||||
ServerEntityStatus (..),
|
||||
isSecuredMsgQueue,
|
||||
) where
|
||||
|
||||
import Control.Applicative (optional, (<|>))
|
||||
import qualified Data.ByteString.Char8 as B
|
||||
import Data.Functor (($>))
|
||||
import Data.List.NonEmpty (NonEmpty)
|
||||
import Data.Maybe (isJust)
|
||||
import qualified Data.X509 as X
|
||||
import qualified Data.X509.Validation as XV
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Encoding
|
||||
@@ -48,6 +50,11 @@ data QueueRec = QueueRec
|
||||
}
|
||||
deriving (Show)
|
||||
|
||||
isSecuredMsgQueue :: QueueRec -> Bool
|
||||
isSecuredMsgQueue QueueRec {queueMode, senderKey} = case queueMode of
|
||||
Just QMContact -> False
|
||||
_ -> isJust senderKey
|
||||
|
||||
data NtfCreds = NtfCreds
|
||||
{ notifierId :: NotifierId,
|
||||
notifierKey :: NtfPublicAuthKey,
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -201,9 +201,9 @@ instance StoreQueueClass q => QueueStoreClass q (PostgresQueueStore q) where
|
||||
addQueueLinkData st sq lnkId d =
|
||||
withQueueRec sq $ \q -> case queueData q of
|
||||
Nothing ->
|
||||
addLink q $ \db -> DB.execute db qry (d :. (lnkId, rId))
|
||||
addLink q $ \db -> DB.execute db qry (d :. (lnkId, rId, QMContact))
|
||||
Just (lnkId', _) | lnkId' == lnkId ->
|
||||
addLink q $ \db -> DB.execute db (qry <> " AND (fixed_data IS NULL OR fixed_data = ?)") (d :. (lnkId, rId, fst d))
|
||||
addLink q $ \db -> DB.execute db (qry <> " AND (fixed_data IS NULL OR fixed_data = ?)") (d :. (lnkId, rId, QMContact, fst d))
|
||||
_ -> throwE AUTH
|
||||
where
|
||||
rId = recipientId sq
|
||||
@@ -211,7 +211,8 @@ instance StoreQueueClass q => QueueStoreClass q (PostgresQueueStore q) where
|
||||
assertUpdated $ withDB' "addQueueLinkData" st update
|
||||
atomically $ writeTVar (queueRec sq) $ Just q {queueData = Just (lnkId, d)}
|
||||
withLog "addQueueLinkData" st $ \s -> logCreateLink s rId lnkId d
|
||||
qry = "UPDATE msg_queues SET fixed_data = ?, user_data = ?, link_id = ? WHERE recipient_id = ? AND deleted_at IS NULL"
|
||||
-- the sender key condition is checked in SQL because without cache each command reads its own copy of the queue record
|
||||
qry = "UPDATE msg_queues SET fixed_data = ?, user_data = ?, link_id = ? WHERE recipient_id = ? AND deleted_at IS NULL AND (sender_key IS NULL OR queue_mode = ?)"
|
||||
|
||||
deleteQueueLinkData :: PostgresQueueStore q -> q -> IO (Either ErrorType ())
|
||||
deleteQueueLinkData st sq =
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -172,6 +172,7 @@ instance StoreQueueClass q => QueueStoreClass q (STMQueueStore q) where
|
||||
rId = recipientId sq
|
||||
qr = queueRec sq
|
||||
add q = case queueData q of
|
||||
_ | isSecuredMsgQueue q -> pure $ Left AUTH
|
||||
Nothing -> addLink
|
||||
Just (lnkId', d') | lnkId' == lnkId && fst d' == fst d -> addLink
|
||||
_ -> pure $ Left AUTH
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -54,6 +54,7 @@ module Simplex.Messaging.Transport
|
||||
namesSMPVersion,
|
||||
serverInfoSMPVersion,
|
||||
nameAvailSMPVersion,
|
||||
fwdNoncesSMPVersion,
|
||||
simplexMQVersion,
|
||||
smpBlockSize,
|
||||
TransportConfig (..),
|
||||
@@ -177,6 +178,7 @@ smpBlockSize = 16384
|
||||
-- 20 - public namespaces resolver, RSLV command (6/20/2026)
|
||||
-- 21 - server public information in handshake (7/5/2026)
|
||||
-- 22 - RNAME answers name availability as well as the record (7/25/2026)
|
||||
-- 23 - version in forwarded command nonce, random nonce in forwarded responses (10/2/2026)
|
||||
|
||||
data SMPVersion
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -218,6 +220,9 @@ serverInfoSMPVersion = VersionSMP 21
|
||||
nameAvailSMPVersion :: VersionSMP
|
||||
nameAvailSMPVersion = VersionSMP 22
|
||||
|
||||
fwdNoncesSMPVersion :: VersionSMP
|
||||
fwdNoncesSMPVersion = VersionSMP 23
|
||||
|
||||
minClientSMPRelayVersion :: VersionSMP
|
||||
minClientSMPRelayVersion = VersionSMP 14
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -225,20 +230,20 @@ minServerSMPRelayVersion :: VersionSMP
|
||||
minServerSMPRelayVersion = VersionSMP 14
|
||||
|
||||
currentClientSMPRelayVersion :: VersionSMP
|
||||
currentClientSMPRelayVersion = VersionSMP 22
|
||||
currentClientSMPRelayVersion = VersionSMP 23
|
||||
|
||||
currentServerSMPRelayVersion :: VersionSMP
|
||||
currentServerSMPRelayVersion = VersionSMP 22
|
||||
currentServerSMPRelayVersion = VersionSMP 23
|
||||
|
||||
-- Max SMP protocol version to be used in e2e encrypted connection between
|
||||
-- client and server, as defined by SMP proxy. Normally set below the current
|
||||
-- version to prevent client version fingerprinting by the destination relays
|
||||
-- when clients upgrade at different times. Pinned to the current version (22)
|
||||
-- for this release because a proxied RSLV only carries availability from
|
||||
-- nameAvailSMPVersion (22), so the one-version anti-fingerprinting buffer does
|
||||
-- not apply yet; it reappears once the current version advances past 22.
|
||||
-- when clients upgrade at different times. Pinned to the current version (23)
|
||||
-- for this release because forwarded commands use the nonces from
|
||||
-- fwdNoncesSMPVersion (23), so the one-version anti-fingerprinting buffer does
|
||||
-- not apply yet; it reappears once the current version advances past 23.
|
||||
proxiedSMPRelayVersion :: VersionSMP
|
||||
proxiedSMPRelayVersion = VersionSMP 22
|
||||
proxiedSMPRelayVersion = VersionSMP 23
|
||||
|
||||
-- minimal supported protocol version is 14
|
||||
supportedClientSMPRelayVRange :: VersionRangeSMP
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@ module Simplex.RemoteControl.Client
|
||||
-- for tests only
|
||||
sendRCPacket,
|
||||
receiveRCPacket,
|
||||
findRCCtrlPairing,
|
||||
) where
|
||||
|
||||
import Control.Applicative ((<|>))
|
||||
@@ -46,7 +47,7 @@ import Data.List.NonEmpty (NonEmpty (..))
|
||||
import qualified Data.List.NonEmpty as L
|
||||
import Data.Maybe (isNothing)
|
||||
import qualified Data.Text as T
|
||||
import Data.Time.Clock.System (getSystemTime)
|
||||
import Data.Time.Clock.System (SystemTime (..), getSystemTime)
|
||||
import Data.Tuple (swap)
|
||||
import Data.Word (Word16)
|
||||
import qualified Data.X509 as X
|
||||
@@ -395,8 +396,10 @@ findRCCtrlPairing :: NonEmpty RCCtrlPairing -> RCEncInvitation -> ExceptT RCErro
|
||||
findRCCtrlPairing pairings RCEncInvitation {dhPubKey, nonce, encInvitation} = do
|
||||
(pairing, signedInvStr) <- liftEither $ decrypt (L.toList pairings)
|
||||
signedInv <- liftEitherWith RCESyntax $ strDecode signedInvStr
|
||||
inv@(RCVerifiedInvitation RCInvitation {dh = invDh}) <- maybe (throwE RCEInvitation) pure $ verifySignedInvitation signedInv
|
||||
inv@(RCVerifiedInvitation RCInvitation {dh = invDh, ts}) <- maybe (throwE RCEInvitation) pure $ verifySignedInvitation signedInv
|
||||
unless (invDh == dhPubKey) $ throwE RCEInvitation
|
||||
now <- systemSeconds <$> liftIO getSystemTime
|
||||
unless (now - 3660 <= systemSeconds ts && systemSeconds ts <= now + 3600) $ throwE RCEInvitation
|
||||
pure (pairing, inv)
|
||||
where
|
||||
decrypt :: [RCCtrlPairing] -> Either RCErrorType (RCCtrlPairing, ByteString)
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -122,18 +122,22 @@ closeListener subscribers sock =
|
||||
joinMulticast :: TMVar Int -> N.Socket -> N.HostAddress -> IO ()
|
||||
joinMulticast subscribers sock group = do
|
||||
now <- atomically $ takeTMVar subscribers
|
||||
when (now == 0) $ do
|
||||
setMembership sock group True >>= \case
|
||||
Left e -> atomically (putTMVar subscribers now) >> logError ("setMembership failed " <> tshow e)
|
||||
Right () -> atomically $ putTMVar subscribers (now + 1)
|
||||
if now == 0
|
||||
then
|
||||
setMembership sock group True >>= \case
|
||||
Left e -> atomically (putTMVar subscribers now) >> logError ("setMembership failed " <> tshow e)
|
||||
Right () -> atomically $ putTMVar subscribers (now + 1)
|
||||
else atomically $ putTMVar subscribers (now + 1)
|
||||
|
||||
partMulticast :: TMVar Int -> N.Socket -> N.HostAddress -> IO ()
|
||||
partMulticast subscribers sock group = do
|
||||
now <- atomically $ takeTMVar subscribers
|
||||
when (now == 1) $
|
||||
setMembership sock group False >>= \case
|
||||
Left e -> atomically (putTMVar subscribers now) >> logError ("setMembership failed " <> tshow e)
|
||||
Right () -> atomically $ putTMVar subscribers (now - 1)
|
||||
if now == 1
|
||||
then
|
||||
setMembership sock group False >>= \case
|
||||
Left e -> atomically (putTMVar subscribers (now - 1)) >> logError ("setMembership failed " <> tshow e)
|
||||
Right () -> atomically $ putTMVar subscribers (now - 1)
|
||||
else atomically $ putTMVar subscribers (max 0 (now - 1))
|
||||
|
||||
listenerHostAddr4 :: UDP.ListenSocket -> N.HostAddress
|
||||
listenerHostAddr4 sock = case UDP.mySockAddr sock of
|
||||
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user