mirror of
https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq.git
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Merge branch 'master' into sh/corrid-nonce
# Conflicts: # src/Simplex/Messaging/Server.hs
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@@ -1261,9 +1261,12 @@ sendOrProxySMPCommand c nm userId destSrv@ProtocolServer {host = destHosts} conn
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Left e -> throwE e
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ipAddressProtected :: NetworkConfig -> ProtocolServer p -> Bool
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ipAddressProtected NetworkConfig {socksProxy, hostMode} (ProtocolServer _ hosts _ _) = do
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isJust socksProxy || (hostMode == HMOnion && any isOnionHost hosts)
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ipAddressProtected NetworkConfig {socksProxy, socksMode, hostMode} (ProtocolServer _ hosts _ _)
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| isJust socksProxy = socksMode == SMAlways || if hostMode == HMPublic then allOnion else anyOnion
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| otherwise = hostMode == HMOnion && anyOnion
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where
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anyOnion = any isOnionHost hosts
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allOnion = all isOnionHost hosts
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isOnionHost = \case THOnionHost _ -> True; _ -> False
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withNtfClient :: AgentClient -> NetworkRequestMode -> NtfServer -> EntityId -> ByteString -> (NtfClient -> ExceptT NtfClientError IO a) -> AM a
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@@ -195,6 +195,7 @@ data PClient v err msg = PClient
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transportHost :: TransportHost,
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tcpConnectTimeout :: NetworkTimeout,
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tcpTimeout :: NetworkTimeout,
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proxiedRelayVRange :: VersionRange v,
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sendPings :: TVar Bool,
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lastReceived :: TVar UTCTime,
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timeoutErrorCount :: TVar Int,
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@@ -240,6 +241,7 @@ smpClientStub g sessionId thVersion thAuth = do
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transportHost = "localhost",
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tcpConnectTimeout,
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tcpTimeout,
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proxiedRelayVRange = supportedClientSMPRelayVRange,
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sendPings,
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lastReceived,
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timeoutErrorCount,
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@@ -477,6 +479,7 @@ data ProtocolClientConfig v = ProtocolClientConfig
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serviceCredentials :: Maybe ServiceCredentials,
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-- | client-server protocol version range
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serverVRange :: VersionRange v,
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proxiedRelayVRange :: VersionRange v,
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-- | agree shared session secret (used in SMP proxy for additional encryption layer)
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agreeSecret :: Bool,
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-- | Whether connecting client is a proxy server. See comment in ClientHandshake
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@@ -495,6 +498,7 @@ defaultClientConfig clientALPN useSNI serverVRange =
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clientALPN,
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serviceCredentials = Nothing,
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serverVRange,
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proxiedRelayVRange = serverVRange,
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agreeSecret = False,
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proxyServer = False,
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useSNI
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@@ -505,6 +509,7 @@ defaultSMPClientConfig :: ProtocolClientConfig SMPVersion
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defaultSMPClientConfig =
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(defaultClientConfig (Just alpnSupportedSMPHandshakes) False supportedClientSMPRelayVRange)
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{ defaultTransport = (show defaultSMPPort, transport @TLS),
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proxiedRelayVRange = supportedClientSMPRelayVRange,
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agreeSecret = True
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}
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{-# INLINE defaultSMPClientConfig #-}
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@@ -568,7 +573,7 @@ type SMPTransportSession = TransportSession BrokerMsg
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-- A single queue can be used for multiple 'SMPClient' instances,
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-- as 'SMPServerTransmission' includes server information.
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getProtocolClient :: forall v err msg. Protocol v err msg => TVar ChaChaDRG -> NetworkRequestMode -> TransportSession msg -> ProtocolClientConfig v -> [HostName] -> Maybe (TBQueue (ServerTransmissionBatch v err msg)) -> UTCTime -> (ProtocolClient v err msg -> IO ()) -> IO (Either (ProtocolClientError err) (ProtocolClient v err msg))
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getProtocolClient g nm transportSession@(_, srv, _) cfg@ProtocolClientConfig {qSize, networkConfig, clientALPN, serviceCredentials, serverVRange, agreeSecret, proxyServer, useSNI} presetDomains msgQ proxySessTs disconnected = do
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getProtocolClient g nm transportSession@(_, srv, _) cfg@ProtocolClientConfig {qSize, networkConfig, clientALPN, serviceCredentials, serverVRange, proxiedRelayVRange, agreeSecret, proxyServer, useSNI} presetDomains msgQ proxySessTs disconnected = do
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case chooseTransportHost networkConfig (host srv) of
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Right useHost ->
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(getCurrentTime >>= mkProtocolClient useHost >>= runClient useTransport useHost)
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@@ -593,6 +598,7 @@ getProtocolClient g nm transportSession@(_, srv, _) cfg@ProtocolClientConfig {qS
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transportHost,
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tcpConnectTimeout,
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tcpTimeout,
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proxiedRelayVRange,
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sendPings,
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lastReceived,
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timeoutErrorCount,
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@@ -1115,10 +1121,10 @@ deleteSMPQueues = okSMPCommands DEL
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-- send PRXY :: SMPServer -> Maybe BasicAuth -> Command Sender
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-- receives PKEY :: SessionId -> X.CertificateChain -> X.SignedExact X.PubKey -> BrokerMsg
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connectSMPProxiedRelay :: SMPClient -> NetworkRequestMode -> SMPServer -> Maybe BasicAuth -> ExceptT SMPClientError IO ProxiedRelay
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connectSMPProxiedRelay c@ProtocolClient {client_ = PClient {tcpConnectTimeout, tcpTimeout}} nm relayServ@ProtocolServer {port = relayPort, keyHash = C.KeyHash kh} proxyAuth =
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connectSMPProxiedRelay c@ProtocolClient {client_ = PClient {tcpConnectTimeout, tcpTimeout, proxiedRelayVRange}} nm relayServ@ProtocolServer {port = relayPort, keyHash = C.KeyHash kh} proxyAuth =
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sendProtocolCommand_ c nm Nothing tOut Nothing NoEntity (Cmd SProxiedClient (PRXY relayServ proxyAuth)) >>= \case
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PKEY sId vr (CertChainPubKey chain key) ->
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case supportedClientSMPRelayVRange `compatibleVersion` vr of
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case proxiedRelayVRange `compatibleVersion` vr of
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Nothing -> throwE $ transportErr TEVersion
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Just (Compatible v) -> do
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relayKey <- liftEitherWith (const $ transportErr $ TEHandshake IDENTITY) =<< liftIO (runExceptT $ validateRelay chain key)
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@@ -1169,7 +1175,7 @@ instance StrEncoding ProxyClientError where
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-- consider how to process slow responses - is it handled somehow locally or delegated to the caller
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-- this method is used in the client
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-- sends PFWD :: C.PublicKeyX25519 -> EncTransmission -> Command Sender
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-- receives PRES :: EncResponse -> BrokerMsg -- proxy to client
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-- receives PRES :: Maybe C.CbNonce -> EncResponse -> BrokerMsg -- proxy to client
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-- When client sends message via proxy, there may be one successful scenario and 9 error scenarios
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-- as shown below (WTF stands for unexpected response, ??? for response that failed to parse).
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@@ -1228,14 +1234,14 @@ proxySMPCommand c@ProtocolClient {thParams = proxyThParams, client_ = PClient {c
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TBError e _ : _ -> throwE $ PCETransportError e
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TBTransmission s _ : _ -> pure s
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TBTransmissions s _ _ : _ -> pure s
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et <- liftEitherWith PCECryptoError $ EncTransmission <$> C.cbEncrypt cmdSecret nonce b paddedProxiedTLength
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et <- liftEitherWith PCECryptoError $ EncTransmission <$> C.cbEncrypt cmdSecret (encTransmissionNonce v nonce) b paddedProxiedTLength
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-- proxy interaction errors are wrapped
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let tOut = Just $ 2 * netTimeoutInt tcpTimeout nm
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tryE (sendProtocolCommand_ c nm (Just nonce) tOut Nothing (EntityId sessionId) (Cmd SProxiedClient (PFWD v cmdPubKey et))) >>= \case
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Right r -> case r of
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PRES (EncResponse er) -> do
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PRES nonce_ (EncResponse er) -> do
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-- server interaction errors are thrown directly
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t' <- liftEitherWith PCECryptoError $ C.cbDecrypt cmdSecret (C.reverseNonce nonce) er
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t' <- liftEitherWith PCECryptoError $ C.cbDecrypt cmdSecret (fromMaybe (C.reverseNonce nonce) nonce_) er
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case tParse serverThParams t' of
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t'' :| [] -> case tDecodeClient serverThParams t'' of
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(_, _, cmd) -> case cmd of
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@@ -1253,10 +1259,10 @@ proxySMPCommand c@ProtocolClient {thParams = proxyThParams, client_ = PClient {c
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-- this method is used in the proxy
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-- sends RFWD :: EncFwdTransmission -> Command Sender
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-- receives RRES :: EncFwdResponse -> BrokerMsg
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-- receives RRES :: Maybe C.CbNonce -> EncFwdResponse -> BrokerMsg
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-- proxy should send PRES to the client with EncResponse
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-- Always uses background timeout mode
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forwardSMPTransmission :: SMPClient -> CorrId -> VersionSMP -> C.PublicKeyX25519 -> EncTransmission -> ExceptT SMPClientError IO EncResponse
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forwardSMPTransmission :: SMPClient -> CorrId -> VersionSMP -> C.PublicKeyX25519 -> EncTransmission -> ExceptT SMPClientError IO (Maybe C.CbNonce, EncResponse)
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forwardSMPTransmission c@ProtocolClient {thParams, client_ = PClient {clientCorrId = g}} fwdCorrId fwdVersion fwdKey fwdTransmission = do
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-- prepare params
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sessSecret <- case thAuth thParams of
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@@ -1268,11 +1274,11 @@ forwardSMPTransmission c@ProtocolClient {thParams, client_ = PClient {clientCorr
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eft = EncFwdTransmission $ C.cbEncryptNoPad sessSecret nonce (smpEncode fwdT)
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-- send
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sendProtocolCommand_ c NRMBackground (Just nonce) Nothing Nothing NoEntity (Cmd SProxyService (RFWD eft)) >>= \case
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RRES (EncFwdResponse efr) -> do
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RRES nonce_ (EncFwdResponse efr) -> do
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-- unwrap
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r' <- liftEitherWith PCECryptoError $ C.cbDecryptNoPad sessSecret (C.reverseNonce nonce) efr
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FwdResponse {fwdCorrId = _, fwdResponse} <- liftEitherWith (const $ PCEResponseError BLOCK) $ smpDecode r'
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pure fwdResponse
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pure (nonce_, fwdResponse)
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r -> throwE $ unexpectedResponse r
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-- get queue information - always sent interactively
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@@ -931,6 +931,8 @@ data CryptoError
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CERatchetEarlierMessage Word32
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| -- | duplicate message number
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CERatchetDuplicateMessage
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| -- | KEM key generation failed, indicating a broken RNG
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CryptoKEMKeyGenError
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deriving (Eq, Show, Exception)
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aesKeySize :: Int
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@@ -1045,9 +1047,7 @@ md5Hash = BA.convert . (hash :: ByteString -> Digest MD5)
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-- | AEAD-GCM encryption with associated data.
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--
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-- Used as part of double ratchet encryption.
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-- This function requires 16 bytes IV, it transforms IV in cryptonite_aes_gcm_init here:
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-- https://github.com/haskell-crypto/cryptonite/blob/master/cbits/cryptonite_aes.c
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-- Used as part of double ratchet encryption, with a 16-byte IV (see @initAEAD@).
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encryptAEAD :: Key -> IV -> Int -> ByteString -> ByteString -> ExceptT CryptoError IO (AuthTag, ByteString)
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encryptAEAD aesKey ivBytes paddedLen ad msg = do
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aead <- initAEAD @AES256 aesKey ivBytes
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@@ -1067,10 +1067,7 @@ encryptAEADNoPad aesKey ivBytes ad msg = do
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-- | AEAD-GCM decryption with associated data.
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--
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-- Used as part of double ratchet encryption.
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-- This function requires 16 bytes IV, it transforms IV in cryptonite_aes_gcm_init here:
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-- https://github.com/haskell-crypto/cryptonite/blob/master/cbits/cryptonite_aes.c
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-- To make it compatible with WebCrypto we will need to start using initAEADGCM.
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-- Used as part of double ratchet encryption, with a 16-byte IV (see @initAEAD@).
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decryptAEAD :: Key -> IV -> ByteString -> ByteString -> AuthTag -> ExceptT CryptoError IO ByteString
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decryptAEAD aesKey ivBytes ad msg (AuthTag authTag) = do
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aead <- initAEAD @AES256 aesKey ivBytes
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@@ -1148,9 +1145,9 @@ maxLength :: forall i. KnownNat i => Int
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maxLength = fromIntegral (natVal $ Proxy @i)
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{-# INLINE maxLength #-}
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-- this function requires 16 bytes IV, it transforms IV in cryptonite_aes_gcm_init here:
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-- https://github.com/haskell-crypto/cryptonite/blob/master/cbits/cryptonite_aes.c
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-- This is used for double ratchet encryption, so to make it compatible with WebCrypto we will need to deprecate it and start using initAEADGCM
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-- The 16-byte double ratchet IV is intentionally not the 96-bit IV recommended by NIST SP 800-38D, so GCM derives J0 = GHASH(IV || 0^64 || [128]_64),
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-- as in crypton_aes_gcm_init: https://hackage.haskell.org/package/crypton-0.34/src/cbits/crypton_aes.c
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-- WebCrypto and other SP 800-38D implementations interoperate only when given all 16 IV bytes.
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initAEAD :: forall c. AES.BlockCipher c => Key -> IV -> ExceptT CryptoError IO (AES.AEAD c)
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initAEAD (Key aesKey) (IV ivBytes) = do
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iv <- makeIV @c ivBytes
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@@ -119,7 +119,7 @@ import Simplex.Messaging.Crypto.SNTRUP761.Bindings
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import Simplex.Messaging.Encoding
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import Simplex.Messaging.Encoding.String
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import Simplex.Messaging.Parsers (defaultJSON, parseE, parseE')
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import Simplex.Messaging.Util (($>>=), (<$?>))
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import Simplex.Messaging.Util ((<$?>))
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import Simplex.Messaging.Version
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import Simplex.Messaging.Version.Internal
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import UnliftIO.STM
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@@ -327,9 +327,13 @@ instance StrEncoding AnyE2ERatchetParamsUri where
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Nothing -> pure $ AnyE2ERatchetParamsUri SRKSProposed a $ E2ERatchetParamsUri vr k1 k2 Nothing
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_ -> fail "bad e2e params"
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where
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kemP query =
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queryParam_ "kem_key" query
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$>>= \k -> Just . kemParams k <$> queryParam_ "kem_ct" query
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kemP query = do
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k_ <- queryParam_ "kem_key" query
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ct_ <- queryParam_ "kem_ct" query
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case (k_, ct_) of
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(Just k, _) -> pure $ Just $ kemParams k ct_
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(Nothing, Nothing) -> pure Nothing
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||||
(Nothing, Just _) -> fail "bad e2e params: kem_ct without kem_key"
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kemParams k = \case
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Nothing -> ARKP SRKSProposed $ RKParamsProposed k
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Just ct -> ARKP SRKSAccepted $ RKParamsAccepted ct k
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@@ -16,6 +16,8 @@ module Simplex.Messaging.Crypto.SNTRUP761.Bindings
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) where
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import Control.Concurrent.STM
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import Control.Exception (throwIO)
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import Control.Monad (when)
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||||
import Crypto.Random (ChaChaDRG)
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import Data.Aeson (FromJSON (..), ToJSON (..))
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import Data.Bifunctor (bimap)
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@@ -23,6 +25,7 @@ import Data.ByteArray (ScrubbedBytes)
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import qualified Data.ByteArray as BA
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import Data.ByteString (ByteString)
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import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.DB (FromField (..), ToField (..))
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import qualified Simplex.Messaging.Crypto as C
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import Simplex.Messaging.Crypto.SNTRUP761.Bindings.Defines
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import Simplex.Messaging.Crypto.SNTRUP761.Bindings.FFI
|
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import Simplex.Messaging.Crypto.SNTRUP761.Bindings.RNG (rngFuncPtr, withDRG)
|
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@@ -55,14 +58,13 @@ pattern KEMSharedKey s <- KEMSharedKey_ s
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||||
type KEMKeyPair = (KEMPublicKey, KEMSecretKey)
|
||||
|
||||
sntrup761Keypair :: TVar ChaChaDRG -> IO KEMKeyPair
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sntrup761Keypair drg =
|
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bimap KEMPublicKey_ KEMSecretKey
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<$> BA.allocRet
|
||||
c_SNTRUP761_SECRETKEY_SIZE
|
||||
( \skPtr ->
|
||||
BA.alloc c_SNTRUP761_PUBLICKEY_SIZE $ \pkPtr ->
|
||||
withDRG drg $ \cxtPtr -> c_sntrup761_keypair pkPtr skPtr cxtPtr rngFuncPtr
|
||||
)
|
||||
sntrup761Keypair drg = do
|
||||
((r, pk), sk) <-
|
||||
BA.allocRet c_SNTRUP761_SECRETKEY_SIZE $ \skPtr ->
|
||||
BA.allocRet c_SNTRUP761_PUBLICKEY_SIZE $ \pkPtr ->
|
||||
withDRG drg $ \cxtPtr -> c_sntrup761_keypair pkPtr skPtr cxtPtr rngFuncPtr
|
||||
when (r /= 0) $ throwIO C.CryptoKEMKeyGenError
|
||||
pure (KEMPublicKey_ pk, KEMSecretKey sk)
|
||||
|
||||
sntrup761Enc :: TVar ChaChaDRG -> KEMPublicKey -> IO (KEMCiphertext, KEMSharedKey)
|
||||
sntrup761Enc drg (KEMPublicKey pk) =
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -10,9 +10,9 @@ import Foreign
|
||||
import Foreign.C
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Crypto.SNTRUP761.Bindings.RNG (RNGContext, RNGFunc)
|
||||
|
||||
-- void sntrup761_keypair (uint8_t *pk, uint8_t *sk, void *random_ctx, sntrup761_random_func *random);
|
||||
-- int sntrup761_keypair (uint8_t *pk, uint8_t *sk, void *random_ctx, sntrup761_random_func *random);
|
||||
foreign import ccall "sntrup761_keypair"
|
||||
c_sntrup761_keypair :: Ptr Word8 -> Ptr Word8 -> Ptr RNGContext -> FunPtr RNGFunc -> IO ()
|
||||
c_sntrup761_keypair :: Ptr Word8 -> Ptr Word8 -> Ptr RNGContext -> FunPtr RNGFunc -> IO CInt
|
||||
|
||||
-- void sntrup761_enc (uint8_t *c, uint8_t *k, const uint8_t *pk, void *random_ctx, sntrup761_random_func *random);
|
||||
foreign import ccall "sntrup761_enc"
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -169,6 +169,7 @@ module Simplex.Messaging.Protocol
|
||||
EncFwdTransmission (..),
|
||||
EncResponse (..),
|
||||
EncTransmission (..),
|
||||
encTransmissionNonce,
|
||||
FwdResponse (..),
|
||||
FwdTransmission (..),
|
||||
NameRecord (..),
|
||||
@@ -282,7 +283,7 @@ import Simplex.Messaging.ServiceScheme
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.SimplexName (LabelHash, SimplexDomain (..), SimplexTLD (..), fullDomainName, labelHash)
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Transport
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Transport.Client (TransportHost, TransportHosts (..))
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Util (bshow, eitherToMaybe, safeDecodeUtf8, (<$?>))
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Util (bshow, eitherToMaybe, packZipWith, safeDecodeUtf8, (<$?>))
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Version
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Version.Internal
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -704,6 +705,11 @@ instance Encoding NewNtfCreds where
|
||||
newtype EncTransmission = EncTransmission ByteString
|
||||
deriving (Show)
|
||||
|
||||
encTransmissionNonce :: VersionSMP -> C.CbNonce -> C.CbNonce
|
||||
encTransmissionNonce v nonce@(C.CbNonce s)
|
||||
| v >= fwdNoncesSMPVersion = C.cbNonce $ packZipWith xor (smpEncode v) s <> BS.drop 2 s
|
||||
| otherwise = nonce
|
||||
|
||||
data FwdTransmission = FwdTransmission
|
||||
{ fwdCorrId :: CorrId,
|
||||
fwdVersion :: VersionSMP,
|
||||
@@ -739,8 +745,8 @@ data BrokerMsg where
|
||||
NMSG :: C.CbNonce -> EncNMsgMeta -> BrokerMsg
|
||||
-- Should include certificate chain
|
||||
PKEY :: SessionId -> VersionRangeSMP -> CertChainPubKey -> BrokerMsg -- TLS-signed server key for proxy shared secret and initial sender key
|
||||
RRES :: EncFwdResponse -> BrokerMsg -- relay to proxy
|
||||
PRES :: EncResponse -> BrokerMsg -- proxy to client
|
||||
RRES :: Maybe C.CbNonce -> EncFwdResponse -> BrokerMsg -- relay to proxy
|
||||
PRES :: Maybe C.CbNonce -> EncResponse -> BrokerMsg -- proxy to client
|
||||
END :: BrokerMsg
|
||||
ENDS :: Int64 -> IdsHash -> BrokerMsg
|
||||
DELD :: BrokerMsg
|
||||
@@ -1991,8 +1997,8 @@ instance ProtocolEncoding SMPVersion ErrorType BrokerMsg where
|
||||
NID nId srvNtfDh -> e (NID_, ' ', nId, srvNtfDh)
|
||||
NMSG nmsgNonce encNMsgMeta -> e (NMSG_, ' ', nmsgNonce, encNMsgMeta)
|
||||
PKEY sid vr certKey -> e (PKEY_, ' ', sid, vr, certKey)
|
||||
RRES (EncFwdResponse encBlock) -> e (RRES_, ' ', Tail encBlock)
|
||||
PRES (EncResponse encBlock) -> e (PRES_, ' ', Tail encBlock)
|
||||
RRES nonce_ (EncFwdResponse encBlock) -> fwdResp RRES_ nonce_ encBlock
|
||||
PRES nonce_ (EncResponse encBlock) -> fwdResp PRES_ nonce_ encBlock
|
||||
END -> e END_
|
||||
ENDS n idsHash -> serviceResp ENDS_ n idsHash
|
||||
DELD -> e DELD_
|
||||
@@ -2016,6 +2022,9 @@ instance ProtocolEncoding SMPVersion ErrorType BrokerMsg where
|
||||
serviceResp tag n idsHash
|
||||
| v >= rcvServiceSMPVersion = e (tag, ' ', n, idsHash)
|
||||
| otherwise = e (tag, ' ', n)
|
||||
fwdResp tag nonce_ encBlock
|
||||
| v >= fwdNoncesSMPVersion = e (tag, ' ', nonce_, Tail encBlock)
|
||||
| otherwise = e (tag, ' ', Tail encBlock)
|
||||
|
||||
protocolP v = \case
|
||||
MSG_ -> do
|
||||
@@ -2047,8 +2056,8 @@ instance ProtocolEncoding SMPVersion ErrorType BrokerMsg where
|
||||
NID_ -> NID <$> _smpP <*> smpP
|
||||
NMSG_ -> NMSG <$> _smpP <*> smpP
|
||||
PKEY_ -> PKEY <$> _smpP <*> smpP <*> smpP
|
||||
RRES_ -> RRES <$> (EncFwdResponse . unTail <$> _smpP)
|
||||
PRES_ -> PRES <$> (EncResponse . unTail <$> _smpP)
|
||||
RRES_ -> fwdRespP RRES EncFwdResponse
|
||||
PRES_ -> fwdRespP PRES EncResponse
|
||||
END_ -> pure END
|
||||
ENDS_ -> serviceRespP ENDS
|
||||
DELD_ -> pure DELD
|
||||
@@ -2065,6 +2074,9 @@ instance ProtocolEncoding SMPVersion ErrorType BrokerMsg where
|
||||
serviceRespP resp
|
||||
| v >= rcvServiceSMPVersion = resp <$> _smpP <*> smpP
|
||||
| otherwise = resp <$> _smpP <*> pure mempty
|
||||
fwdRespP :: (Maybe C.CbNonce -> a -> BrokerMsg) -> (ByteString -> a) -> Parser BrokerMsg
|
||||
fwdRespP resp enc = resp <$> (A.space *> nonceP) <*> (enc <$> A.takeByteString)
|
||||
nonceP = if v >= fwdNoncesSMPVersion then smpP else pure Nothing
|
||||
|
||||
fromProtocolError = \case
|
||||
PECmdSyntax -> CMD SYNTAX
|
||||
@@ -2081,7 +2093,7 @@ instance ProtocolEncoding SMPVersion ErrorType BrokerMsg where
|
||||
-- PONG response must not have queue ID
|
||||
PONG -> noEntityMsg
|
||||
PKEY {} -> noEntityMsg
|
||||
RRES _ -> noEntityMsg
|
||||
RRES {} -> noEntityMsg
|
||||
ALLS -> noEntityMsg
|
||||
RNAME {} -> noEntityMsg
|
||||
-- other broker responses must have queue ID
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1464,7 +1464,7 @@ client
|
||||
inc own pRequests
|
||||
forkProxiedCmd $ do
|
||||
liftIO (runExceptT (forwardSMPTransmission smp corrId fwdV pubKey encBlock) `E.catches` clientHandlers) >>= \case
|
||||
Right r -> PRES r <$ inc own pSuccesses
|
||||
Right (nonce_, r) -> PRES nonce_ r <$ inc own pSuccesses
|
||||
Left e -> ERR (smpProxyError e) <$ case e of
|
||||
PCEProtocolError {} -> inc own pSuccesses
|
||||
_ -> inc own pErrorsOther
|
||||
@@ -2133,7 +2133,7 @@ client
|
||||
unless (fwdVersion `isCompatible` thServerVRange thParams') $ throwE $ transportErr TEVersion
|
||||
clientNonce <- liftEitherWith (const $ CMD SYNTAX) $ corrIdNonce fwdCorrId
|
||||
let clientSecret = C.dh' fwdKey serverPrivKey
|
||||
b <- liftEitherWith (const CRYPTO) $ C.cbDecrypt clientSecret clientNonce et
|
||||
b <- liftEitherWith (const CRYPTO) $ C.cbDecrypt clientSecret (encTransmissionNonce fwdVersion clientNonce) et
|
||||
let clntTHParams = smpTHParamsSetVersion fwdVersion thParams'
|
||||
-- only allowing single forwarded transactions
|
||||
t' <- case tParse clntTHParams b of
|
||||
@@ -2146,9 +2146,13 @@ client
|
||||
TBError _ _ : _ -> throwE BLOCK
|
||||
TBTransmission b' _ : _ -> pure b'
|
||||
TBTransmissions b' _ _ : _ -> pure b'
|
||||
r2 <- liftEitherWith (const BLOCK) $ EncResponse <$> C.cbEncrypt clientSecret (C.reverseNonce clientNonce) r' paddedProxiedTLength
|
||||
nonce_ <-
|
||||
if fwdVersion >= fwdNoncesSMPVersion
|
||||
then Just <$> (atomically . C.randomCbNonce =<< asks random)
|
||||
else pure Nothing
|
||||
r2 <- liftEitherWith (const BLOCK) $ EncResponse <$> C.cbEncrypt clientSecret (fromMaybe (C.reverseNonce clientNonce) nonce_) r' paddedProxiedTLength
|
||||
let fr = FwdResponse {fwdCorrId, fwdResponse = r2}
|
||||
pure $ RRES $ EncFwdResponse $ C.cbEncryptNoPad sessSecret (C.reverseNonce proxyNonce) (smpEncode fr)
|
||||
pure $ RRES nonce_ $ EncFwdResponse $ C.cbEncryptNoPad sessSecret (C.reverseNonce proxyNonce) (smpEncode fr)
|
||||
-- the inner response, or Nothing if forked (RSLV).
|
||||
r_ <- lift (rejectOrVerify clntThAuth t') >>= \case
|
||||
-- rejectOrVerify filters allowed commands, no need to repeat it here.
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -54,6 +54,7 @@ module Simplex.Messaging.Transport
|
||||
namesSMPVersion,
|
||||
serverInfoSMPVersion,
|
||||
nameAvailSMPVersion,
|
||||
fwdNoncesSMPVersion,
|
||||
simplexMQVersion,
|
||||
smpBlockSize,
|
||||
TransportConfig (..),
|
||||
@@ -177,6 +178,7 @@ smpBlockSize = 16384
|
||||
-- 20 - public namespaces resolver, RSLV command (6/20/2026)
|
||||
-- 21 - server public information in handshake (7/5/2026)
|
||||
-- 22 - RNAME answers name availability as well as the record (7/25/2026)
|
||||
-- 23 - version in forwarded command nonce, random nonce in forwarded responses (10/2/2026)
|
||||
|
||||
data SMPVersion
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -218,6 +220,9 @@ serverInfoSMPVersion = VersionSMP 21
|
||||
nameAvailSMPVersion :: VersionSMP
|
||||
nameAvailSMPVersion = VersionSMP 22
|
||||
|
||||
fwdNoncesSMPVersion :: VersionSMP
|
||||
fwdNoncesSMPVersion = VersionSMP 23
|
||||
|
||||
minClientSMPRelayVersion :: VersionSMP
|
||||
minClientSMPRelayVersion = VersionSMP 14
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -225,20 +230,20 @@ minServerSMPRelayVersion :: VersionSMP
|
||||
minServerSMPRelayVersion = VersionSMP 14
|
||||
|
||||
currentClientSMPRelayVersion :: VersionSMP
|
||||
currentClientSMPRelayVersion = VersionSMP 22
|
||||
currentClientSMPRelayVersion = VersionSMP 23
|
||||
|
||||
currentServerSMPRelayVersion :: VersionSMP
|
||||
currentServerSMPRelayVersion = VersionSMP 22
|
||||
currentServerSMPRelayVersion = VersionSMP 23
|
||||
|
||||
-- Max SMP protocol version to be used in e2e encrypted connection between
|
||||
-- client and server, as defined by SMP proxy. Normally set below the current
|
||||
-- version to prevent client version fingerprinting by the destination relays
|
||||
-- when clients upgrade at different times. Pinned to the current version (22)
|
||||
-- for this release because a proxied RSLV only carries availability from
|
||||
-- nameAvailSMPVersion (22), so the one-version anti-fingerprinting buffer does
|
||||
-- not apply yet; it reappears once the current version advances past 22.
|
||||
-- when clients upgrade at different times. Pinned to the current version (23)
|
||||
-- for this release because forwarded commands use the nonces from
|
||||
-- fwdNoncesSMPVersion (23), so the one-version anti-fingerprinting buffer does
|
||||
-- not apply yet; it reappears once the current version advances past 23.
|
||||
proxiedSMPRelayVersion :: VersionSMP
|
||||
proxiedSMPRelayVersion = VersionSMP 22
|
||||
proxiedSMPRelayVersion = VersionSMP 23
|
||||
|
||||
-- minimal supported protocol version is 14
|
||||
supportedClientSMPRelayVRange :: VersionRangeSMP
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@ module Simplex.RemoteControl.Client
|
||||
-- for tests only
|
||||
sendRCPacket,
|
||||
receiveRCPacket,
|
||||
findRCCtrlPairing,
|
||||
) where
|
||||
|
||||
import Control.Applicative ((<|>))
|
||||
@@ -46,7 +47,7 @@ import Data.List.NonEmpty (NonEmpty (..))
|
||||
import qualified Data.List.NonEmpty as L
|
||||
import Data.Maybe (isNothing)
|
||||
import qualified Data.Text as T
|
||||
import Data.Time.Clock.System (getSystemTime)
|
||||
import Data.Time.Clock.System (SystemTime (..), getSystemTime)
|
||||
import Data.Tuple (swap)
|
||||
import Data.Word (Word16)
|
||||
import qualified Data.X509 as X
|
||||
@@ -395,8 +396,10 @@ findRCCtrlPairing :: NonEmpty RCCtrlPairing -> RCEncInvitation -> ExceptT RCErro
|
||||
findRCCtrlPairing pairings RCEncInvitation {dhPubKey, nonce, encInvitation} = do
|
||||
(pairing, signedInvStr) <- liftEither $ decrypt (L.toList pairings)
|
||||
signedInv <- liftEitherWith RCESyntax $ strDecode signedInvStr
|
||||
inv@(RCVerifiedInvitation RCInvitation {dh = invDh}) <- maybe (throwE RCEInvitation) pure $ verifySignedInvitation signedInv
|
||||
inv@(RCVerifiedInvitation RCInvitation {dh = invDh, ts}) <- maybe (throwE RCEInvitation) pure $ verifySignedInvitation signedInv
|
||||
unless (invDh == dhPubKey) $ throwE RCEInvitation
|
||||
now <- systemSeconds <$> liftIO getSystemTime
|
||||
unless (now - 3660 <= systemSeconds ts && systemSeconds ts <= now + 3600) $ throwE RCEInvitation
|
||||
pure (pairing, inv)
|
||||
where
|
||||
decrypt :: [RCCtrlPairing] -> Either RCErrorType (RCCtrlPairing, ByteString)
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -122,18 +122,22 @@ closeListener subscribers sock =
|
||||
joinMulticast :: TMVar Int -> N.Socket -> N.HostAddress -> IO ()
|
||||
joinMulticast subscribers sock group = do
|
||||
now <- atomically $ takeTMVar subscribers
|
||||
when (now == 0) $ do
|
||||
setMembership sock group True >>= \case
|
||||
Left e -> atomically (putTMVar subscribers now) >> logError ("setMembership failed " <> tshow e)
|
||||
Right () -> atomically $ putTMVar subscribers (now + 1)
|
||||
if now == 0
|
||||
then
|
||||
setMembership sock group True >>= \case
|
||||
Left e -> atomically (putTMVar subscribers now) >> logError ("setMembership failed " <> tshow e)
|
||||
Right () -> atomically $ putTMVar subscribers (now + 1)
|
||||
else atomically $ putTMVar subscribers (now + 1)
|
||||
|
||||
partMulticast :: TMVar Int -> N.Socket -> N.HostAddress -> IO ()
|
||||
partMulticast subscribers sock group = do
|
||||
now <- atomically $ takeTMVar subscribers
|
||||
when (now == 1) $
|
||||
setMembership sock group False >>= \case
|
||||
Left e -> atomically (putTMVar subscribers now) >> logError ("setMembership failed " <> tshow e)
|
||||
Right () -> atomically $ putTMVar subscribers (now - 1)
|
||||
if now == 1
|
||||
then
|
||||
setMembership sock group False >>= \case
|
||||
Left e -> atomically (putTMVar subscribers (now - 1)) >> logError ("setMembership failed " <> tshow e)
|
||||
Right () -> atomically $ putTMVar subscribers (now - 1)
|
||||
else atomically $ putTMVar subscribers (max 0 (now - 1))
|
||||
|
||||
listenerHostAddr4 :: UDP.ListenSocket -> N.HostAddress
|
||||
listenerHostAddr4 sock = case UDP.mySockAddr sock of
|
||||
|
||||
Reference in new issue
Block a user