Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/master' into sh/fix-proxy-leak

# Conflicts:
#	tests/SMPClient.hs
This commit is contained in:
shum committed 2026-10-14 15:37:29 +00:00
commit b3ef8fda7e
85 files changed
+4612 -846

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+3 -2
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@@ -568,9 +568,10 @@ runXFTPSndWorker c srv Worker {doWork} = do
notify c sndFileEntityId $ SFPROG uploaded total
when complete $ do
(sndDescr, rcvDescrs) <- sndFileToDescrs sf
flip catchAllErrors (\e -> logError $ "XFTP snd worker error: " <> tshow e) $ do
lift . forM_ prefixPath $ removePath <=< toFSFilePath
withStore' c $ \db -> updateSndFileComplete db sndFileId
notify c sndFileEntityId $ SFDONE sndDescr rcvDescrs (sndFileExpiresAt chunks)
lift . forM_ prefixPath $ removePath <=< toFSFilePath
withStore' c $ \db -> updateSndFileComplete db sndFileId
where
addRecipients :: SndFileChunk -> SndFileChunkReplica -> AM SndFileChunkReplica
addRecipients ch@SndFileChunk {numRecipients} cr@SndFileChunkReplica {sndChunkReplicaId, rcvIdsKeys}
+2 -2
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@@ -80,7 +80,7 @@ import Simplex.Messaging.Protocol
tParse,
)
import Simplex.Messaging.Transport (THandleParams (..), TransportError (..), TransportPeer (..))
import Simplex.Messaging.Util ((<$?>))
import Simplex.Messaging.Util (eitherToMaybe, (<$?>))
xftpBlockSize :: Int
xftpBlockSize = 16384
@@ -383,7 +383,7 @@ checkParty' c = case testEquality (sFileParty @p) (sFileParty @p') of
xftpEncodeAuthTransmission :: ProtocolEncoding XFTPVersion XFTPErrorType c => THandleParams XFTPVersion 'TClient -> C.APrivateAuthKey -> Transmission c -> Either TransportError ByteString
xftpEncodeAuthTransmission thParams@THandleParams {thAuth} pKey t@(corrId, _, _) = do
let TransmissionForAuth {tForAuth, tToSend} = encodeTransmissionForAuth thParams t
xftpEncodeBatch1 . (,tToSend) =<< authTransmission thAuth False (Just pKey) (C.cbNonce $ bs corrId) tForAuth
xftpEncodeBatch1 . (,tToSend) =<< authTransmission thAuth False (Just pKey) (eitherToMaybe $ C.cbNonce $ bs corrId) tForAuth
xftpEncodeTransmission :: ProtocolEncoding XFTPVersion XFTPErrorType c => THandleParams XFTPVersion p -> Transmission c -> Either TransportError ByteString
xftpEncodeTransmission thParams t = xftpEncodeBatch1 (Nothing, encodeTransmission thParams t)
File diff suppressed because it is too large. Load diff
+13 -12
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@@ -312,7 +312,7 @@ import Simplex.Messaging.Session
import Simplex.Messaging.SystemTime
import Simplex.Messaging.TMap (TMap)
import qualified Simplex.Messaging.TMap as TM
import Simplex.Messaging.Transport (HandshakeError (..), SMPServiceRole (..), SMPVersion, ServiceCredentials (..), SessionId, THClientService' (..), THandleAuth (..), THandleParams (sessionId, thAuth, thVersion, serverInfo), TransportError (..), TransportPeer (..), shortLinksSMPVersion, newNtfCredsSMPVersion)
import Simplex.Messaging.Transport (HandshakeError (..), SMPServiceRole (..), SMPVersion, ServiceCredentials (..), SessionId, THClientService' (..), THandleAuth (..), THandleParams (sessionId, thAuth, thVersion, serverInfo), TransportError (..), newNtfCredsSMPVersion)
import Simplex.Messaging.Transport.Client (TransportHost (..))
import Simplex.Messaging.Transport.Credentials
import Simplex.Messaging.Util
@@ -1261,9 +1261,12 @@ sendOrProxySMPCommand c nm userId destSrv@ProtocolServer {host = destHosts} conn
Left e -> throwE e
ipAddressProtected :: NetworkConfig -> ProtocolServer p -> Bool
ipAddressProtected NetworkConfig {socksProxy, hostMode} (ProtocolServer _ hosts _ _) = do
isJust socksProxy || (hostMode == HMOnion && any isOnionHost hosts)
ipAddressProtected NetworkConfig {socksProxy, socksMode, hostMode} (ProtocolServer _ hosts _ _)
| isJust socksProxy = socksMode == SMAlways || if hostMode == HMPublic then allOnion else anyOnion
| otherwise = hostMode == HMOnion && anyOnion
where
anyOnion = any isOnionHost hosts
allOnion = all isOnionHost hosts
isOnionHost = \case THOnionHost _ -> True; _ -> False
withNtfClient :: AgentClient -> NetworkRequestMode -> NtfServer -> EntityId -> ByteString -> (NtfClient -> ExceptT NtfClientError IO a) -> AM a
@@ -1496,7 +1499,7 @@ newRcvQueue_ c nm userId connId (ProtoServerWithAuth srv auth) vRange cqrd enabl
let sessServiceId = (\THClientService {serviceId = sId} -> sId) <$> (clientService =<< thAuth thParams')
when (isJust serviceId && serviceId /= sessServiceId) $ logError "incorrect service ID in NEW response"
liftIO . logServer "<--" c srv NoEntity $ B.unwords ["IDS", logSecret rcvId, logSecret sndId]
shortLink <- mkShortLinkCreds thParams' qik
shortLink <- mkShortLinkCreds qik
let rq =
RcvQueue
{ userId,
@@ -1537,8 +1540,8 @@ newRcvQueue_ c nm userId connId (ProtoServerWithAuth srv auth) vRange cqrd enabl
(Just ((ntfPublicKey, ntfPrivateKey), dhpk), Just (ServerNtfCreds notifierId dhk')) ->
Just ClientNtfCreds {ntfPublicKey, ntfPrivateKey, notifierId, rcvNtfDhSecret = C.dh' dhk' dhpk}
_ -> Nothing
mkShortLinkCreds :: THandleParams SMPVersion 'TClient -> QueueIdsKeys -> AM (Maybe ShortLinkCreds)
mkShortLinkCreds thParams' QIK {sndId, queueMode, linkId} = case (cqrd, queueMode) of
mkShortLinkCreds :: QueueIdsKeys -> AM (Maybe ShortLinkCreds)
mkShortLinkCreds QIK {sndId, queueMode, linkId} = case (cqrd, queueMode) of
(CQRMessaging ld, Just QMMessaging) ->
withLinkData ld $ \lnkId CQRData {linkKey, privSigKey, srvReq = (sndId', d)} ->
if sndId == sndId'
@@ -1552,11 +1555,9 @@ newRcvQueue_ c nm userId connId (ProtoServerWithAuth srv auth) vRange cqrd enabl
(_, Nothing) -> newErr "unexpected link ID"
_ -> newErr "unexpected queue mode"
where
v = thVersion thParams'
withLinkData :: Maybe d -> (SMP.LinkId -> d -> AM (Maybe ShortLinkCreds)) -> AM (Maybe ShortLinkCreds)
withLinkData ld_ mkLink = case (ld_, linkId) of
(Just ld, Just lnkId) -> mkLink lnkId ld
(Just _, Nothing) | v < shortLinksSMPVersion -> pure Nothing
(Nothing, Nothing) -> pure Nothing
_ -> newErr "unexpected or absent link ID"
newErr :: String -> AM (Maybe ShortLinkCreds)
@@ -1981,7 +1982,7 @@ decryptSMPMessage :: RcvQueue -> SMP.RcvMessage -> AM SMP.ClientRcvMsgBody
decryptSMPMessage rq SMP.RcvMessage {msgId, msgBody = SMP.EncRcvMsgBody body} =
liftEither $ parse SMP.clientRcvMsgBodyP (AGENT $ A_MESSAGE "decrypt message") =<< decrypt body
where
decrypt = agentCbDecrypt (rcvDhSecret rq) (C.cbNonce msgId)
decrypt = agentCbDecrypt (rcvDhSecret rq) msgId
secureQueue :: AgentClient -> NetworkRequestMode -> RcvQueue -> SndPublicAuthKey -> AM ()
secureQueue c nm rq@RcvQueue {rcvId, rcvPrivateKey} senderKey =
@@ -2079,9 +2080,9 @@ disableQueuesNtfs c = sendTSessionBatches "NDEL" (mkSMPTSession . snd) disableQu
queueCreds :: DisableQueueNtfReq -> (SMP.RecipientId, SMP.RcvPrivateAuthKey)
queueCreds (_, RcvQueue {rcvPrivateKey, rcvId}) = (rcvId, rcvPrivateKey)
sendAck :: AgentClient -> RcvQueue -> MsgId -> AM ()
sendAck :: AgentClient -> RcvQueue -> MsgId -> AM QueueDrained
sendAck c rq@RcvQueue {rcvId, rcvPrivateKey} msgId =
withSMPClient c NRMBackground rq ("ACK:" <> logSecret' msgId) $ \smp ->
withSMPClient c NRMBackground rq ("ACK:" <> logSecret' (SMP.unMsgId msgId)) $ \smp ->
ackSMPMessage smp rcvPrivateKey rcvId msgId
hasGetLock :: SomeRcvQueue q => AgentClient -> q -> IO Bool
@@ -2276,7 +2277,7 @@ agentCbEncryptOnce clientVersion dhRcvPubKey msg = do
-- | NaCl crypto-box decrypt - both for messages received from the server
-- and per-queue E2E encrypted messages from the sender that were inside.
agentCbDecrypt :: C.DhSecretX25519 -> C.CbNonce -> ByteString -> Either AgentErrorType ByteString
agentCbDecrypt :: C.CbNonceI n => C.DhSecretX25519 -> n -> ByteString -> Either AgentErrorType ByteString
agentCbDecrypt dhSecret nonce msg =
first cryptoError $
C.cbDecrypt dhSecret nonce msg
+20 -7
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@@ -79,6 +79,7 @@ module Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Protocol
SMPConfirmation (..),
AgentMsgEnvelope (..),
AgentMessage (..),
RatchetInfo (..),
RequestSignature (..),
AgentMessageType (..),
APrivHeader (..),
@@ -245,7 +246,6 @@ import Simplex.Messaging.Crypto.Ratchet
RcvE2ERatchetParams,
RcvE2ERatchetParamsUri,
SndE2ERatchetParams,
RcvE2EPrivRatchetParams,
pattern PQSupportOff,
pattern PQSupportOn,
)
@@ -611,6 +611,7 @@ data RcvSwitchStatus
| RSSendingQADD
| RSSendingQUSE
| RSReceivedMessage
| RSReceivedQEND
deriving (Eq, Show)
instance StrEncoding RcvSwitchStatus where
@@ -619,12 +620,14 @@ instance StrEncoding RcvSwitchStatus where
RSSendingQADD -> "sending_qadd"
RSSendingQUSE -> "sending_quse"
RSReceivedMessage -> "received_message"
RSReceivedQEND -> "received_qend"
strP =
A.takeTill (== ' ') >>= \case
"switch_started" -> pure RSSwitchStarted
"sending_qadd" -> pure RSSendingQADD
"sending_quse" -> pure RSSendingQUSE
"received_message" -> pure RSReceivedMessage
"received_qend" -> pure RSReceivedQEND
_ -> fail "bad RcvSwitchStatus"
instance ToField RcvSwitchStatus where toField = toField . decodeLatin1 . strEncode
@@ -928,7 +931,7 @@ data AgentMessage
| -- AgentConnInfoReply is used by accepting party in duplexHandshake mode (v2), allowing to include reply queue(s) in the initial confirmation.
-- It made removed REPLY message unnecessary.
AgentConnInfoReply (NonEmpty SMPQueueInfo) ConnInfo
| AgentRatchetInfo ByteString
| AgentRatchetInfo RatchetInfo
| AgentMessage APrivHeader AMessage
| AgentServiceRequest (NonEmpty SMPQueueInfo) (Maybe RequestSignature) MsgBody
| AgentServiceResponse MsgBody
@@ -939,7 +942,7 @@ instance Encoding AgentMessage where
smpEncode = \case
AgentConnInfo cInfo -> smpEncode ('I', Tail cInfo)
AgentConnInfoReply smpQueues cInfo -> smpEncode ('D', smpQueues, Tail cInfo) -- 'D' stands for "duplex"
AgentRatchetInfo info -> smpEncode ('R', Tail info)
AgentRatchetInfo info -> smpEncode ('R', info)
AgentMessage hdr aMsg -> smpEncode ('M', hdr, aMsg)
AgentServiceRequest qs sig_ body -> smpEncode ('A', qs, sig_, Tail body)
AgentServiceResponse body -> smpEncode ('P', Tail body)
@@ -948,13 +951,23 @@ instance Encoding AgentMessage where
smpP >>= \case
'I' -> AgentConnInfo . unTail <$> smpP
'D' -> AgentConnInfoReply <$> smpP <*> (unTail <$> smpP)
'R' -> AgentRatchetInfo . unTail <$> smpP
'R' -> AgentRatchetInfo <$> smpP
'M' -> AgentMessage <$> smpP <*> smpP
'A' -> AgentServiceRequest <$> smpP <*> smpP <*> (unTail <$> smpP)
'P' -> AgentServiceResponse . unTail <$> smpP
'J' -> AgentRejection . unTail <$> smpP
_ -> fail "bad AgentMessage"
data RatchetInfo = RatchetInfo {answeredKeyHash :: Maybe ByteString}
deriving (Eq, Show)
instance Encoding RatchetInfo where
smpEncode RatchetInfo {answeredKeyHash} = smpEncode answeredKeyHash
smpP = do
answeredKeyHash <- smpP <|> pure Nothing
_ <- A.takeByteString
pure RatchetInfo {answeredKeyHash}
-- internal type for storing message type in the database
data AgentMessageType
= AM_CONN_INFO
@@ -1613,7 +1626,7 @@ newtype LinkKey = LinkKey ByteString -- sha3-256(fixed_data)
instance ToField LinkKey where toField (LinkKey s) = toField $ Binary s
-- | Parameters for creating a connection with a prepared link.
data PreparedLinkParams = PreparedLinkParams
data PreparedLinkParams k = PreparedLinkParams
{ -- | Correlation ID / determines sender ID
plpNonce :: C.CbNonce,
-- | Queue E2EE DH key pair
@@ -1628,8 +1641,8 @@ data PreparedLinkParams = PreparedLinkParams
plpSrvWithAuth :: SMPServerWithAuth,
-- | Initial PQ keys
plpInitKeys :: InitialKeys,
-- | Contact address double ratchet keys
plpAddressKeys :: Maybe (RatchetKeyId, RcvE2EPrivRatchetParams 'C.X448)
-- | Contact address double ratchet keys or invitation X3DH keys
plpRatchetKeys :: k
}
instance ConnectionModeI c => ToField (ConnectionLink c) where toField = toField . Binary . strEncode
+1
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@@ -219,6 +219,7 @@ canAbortRcvSwitch ConnData {connAgentVersion} = maybe False canAbort . rcvSwchSt
-- if switch is in RSReceivedMessage status, aborting switch (deleting new queue)
-- will break the connection because the sender would have original queue deleted
RSReceivedMessage -> False
RSReceivedQEND -> False
data ClientNtfCreds = ClientNtfCreds
{ -- | key pair to be used by the notification server to authorize transmissions
+52 -22
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@@ -76,6 +76,7 @@ module Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.AgentStore
getExpiredServiceConns,
deleteExpiredServiceRequests,
getDeletedWaitingDeliveryConnIds,
getConnRatchetSync,
setConnRatchetSync,
addProcessedRatchetKeyHash,
checkRatchetKeyHashExists,
@@ -99,6 +100,7 @@ module Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.AgentStore
setSndQueuePrimary,
deleteConnRcvQueue,
incRcvDeleteErrors,
getEndedRcvQueueConnIds,
deleteConnSndQueue,
getPrimaryRcvQueue,
getRcvQueue,
@@ -762,6 +764,10 @@ incRcvDeleteErrors :: DB.Connection -> RcvQueue -> IO ()
incRcvDeleteErrors db RcvQueue {connId, dbQueueId} =
DB.execute db "UPDATE rcv_queues SET delete_errors = delete_errors + 1 WHERE conn_id = ? AND rcv_queue_id = ?" (connId, dbQueueId)
getEndedRcvQueueConnIds :: DB.Connection -> IO [ConnId]
getEndedRcvQueueConnIds db =
map fromOnly <$> DB.query db "SELECT conn_id FROM rcv_queues WHERE switch_status = ? AND deleted = 0" (Only RSReceivedQEND)
deleteConnRcvQueue :: DB.Connection -> RcvQueue -> IO ()
deleteConnRcvQueue db RcvQueue {connId, dbQueueId} =
DB.execute db "DELETE FROM rcv_queues WHERE conn_id = ? AND rcv_queue_id = ?" (connId, dbQueueId)
@@ -1254,7 +1260,7 @@ getLastMsg db connId msgId =
LEFT JOIN snd_messages s ON s.conn_id = r.conn_id AND s.rcpt_internal_id = r.internal_id
WHERE r.conn_id = ? AND r.broker_id = ?
|]
(connId, Binary msgId)
(connId, msgId)
toRcvMsg :: (Int64, InternalTs, BrokerId, BrokerTs) :. (AgentMsgId, MsgIntegrity, MsgHash, AgentMessageType, MsgBody, PQEncryption, Maybe AgentMsgId, Maybe MsgReceiptStatus, BoolInt) -> RcvMsg
toRcvMsg ((agentMsgId, internalTs, brokerId, brokerTs) :. (sndMsgId, integrity, internalHash, msgType, msgBody, pqEncryption, rcptInternalId_, rcptStatus_, BI userAck)) =
@@ -1286,7 +1292,7 @@ checkRcvMsgHashExists db connId hash =
getRcvMsgBrokerTs :: DB.Connection -> ConnId -> SMP.MsgId -> IO (Either StoreError BrokerTs)
getRcvMsgBrokerTs db connId msgId =
firstRow fromOnly (SEMsgNotFound "getRcvMsgBrokerTs") $
DB.query db "SELECT broker_ts FROM rcv_messages WHERE conn_id = ? AND broker_id = ?" (connId, Binary msgId)
DB.query db "SELECT broker_ts FROM rcv_messages WHERE conn_id = ? AND broker_id = ?" (connId, msgId)
deleteMsg :: DB.Connection -> ConnId -> InternalId -> IO ()
deleteMsg db connId msgId =
@@ -1594,12 +1600,16 @@ getRatchet_ q db connId =
where
ratchet = maybe (Left SERatchetNotFound) Right . fromOnly
getSkippedMsgKeys :: DB.Connection -> ConnId -> IO SkippedMsgKeys
getSkippedMsgKeys db connId =
skipped <$> DB.query db "SELECT header_key, msg_n, msg_key FROM skipped_messages WHERE conn_id = ?" (Only connId)
getSkippedMsgKeys :: DB.Connection -> ConnId -> Int -> IO SkippedMsgKeys
getSkippedMsgKeys db connId maxKeys = do
(keys, oldKeys) <- splitAt maxKeys <$> DB.query db "SELECT skipped_message_id, header_key, msg_n, msg_key FROM skipped_messages WHERE conn_id = ? ORDER BY skipped_message_id DESC LIMIT ?" (connId, maxKeys + 1)
case oldKeys of
(skippedMsgId :: Int64, _, _, _) : _ -> DB.execute db "DELETE FROM skipped_messages WHERE conn_id = ? AND skipped_message_id <= ?" (connId, skippedMsgId)
[] -> pure ()
pure $ skipped keys
where
skipped = foldl' addSkippedKey M.empty
addSkippedKey smks (hk, msgN, mk) = M.alter (Just . addMsgKey) hk smks
addSkippedKey smks (_, hk, msgN, mk) = M.alter (Just . addMsgKey) hk smks
where
addMsgKey = maybe (M.singleton msgN mk) (M.insert msgN mk)
@@ -2793,6 +2803,11 @@ getDeletedWaitingDeliveryConnIds :: DB.Connection -> IO [ConnId]
getDeletedWaitingDeliveryConnIds db =
map fromOnly <$> DB.query_ db "SELECT conn_id FROM connections WHERE deleted_at_wait_delivery IS NOT NULL"
getConnRatchetSync :: DB.Connection -> ConnId -> IO (Either StoreError RatchetSyncState)
getConnRatchetSync db connId =
firstRow fromOnly SEConnNotFound $
DB.query db "SELECT ratchet_sync_state FROM connections WHERE conn_id = ?" (Only connId)
setConnRatchetSync :: DB.Connection -> ConnId -> RatchetSyncState -> IO ()
setConnRatchetSync db connId ratchetSyncState =
DB.execute db "UPDATE connections SET ratchet_sync_state = ? WHERE conn_id = ?" (ratchetSyncState, connId)
@@ -2814,21 +2829,35 @@ checkRatchetKeyHashExists db connId hash =
(connId, Binary hash)
deleteRatchetKeyHashesExpired :: DB.Connection -> NominalDiffTime -> Int -> IO ()
deleteRatchetKeyHashesExpired db ttl limit = do
deleteRatchetKeyHashesExpired db ttl maxConnHashes = do
cutoffTs <- addUTCTime (-ttl) <$> getCurrentTime
#if defined(dbPostgres)
DB.execute
db
[sql|
DELETE FROM processed_ratchet_key_hashes
WHERE processed_ratchet_key_hash_id IN (
SELECT processed_ratchet_key_hash_id
FROM processed_ratchet_key_hashes
WHERE created_at < ?
ORDER BY created_at ASC
LIMIT ?
)
|]
(cutoffTs, limit)
("DELETE FROM processed_ratchet_key_hashes h USING (" <> maxExcessIdsQuery <> ") e WHERE h.conn_id = e.conn_id AND h.processed_ratchet_key_hash_id <= e.max_excess_id AND h.created_at < ?")
(maxConnHashes, maxConnHashes, cutoffTs)
#else
maxExcessIds <- DB.query db maxExcessIdsQuery (maxConnHashes, maxConnHashes)
DB.executeMany
db
"DELETE FROM processed_ratchet_key_hashes WHERE conn_id = ? AND processed_ratchet_key_hash_id <= ? AND created_at < ?"
(map (\(connId :: ConnId, maxExcessId :: Int64) -> (connId, maxExcessId, cutoffTs)) maxExcessIds)
#endif
where
maxExcessIdsQuery :: Query
maxExcessIdsQuery =
[sql|
SELECT conn_id, (
SELECT processed_ratchet_key_hash_id
FROM processed_ratchet_key_hashes
WHERE conn_id = c.conn_id
ORDER BY processed_ratchet_key_hash_id DESC
LIMIT 1 OFFSET ?
) AS max_excess_id
FROM processed_ratchet_key_hashes c
GROUP BY conn_id
HAVING COUNT(*) > ?
|]
-- | returns all connection queues, the first queue is the primary one
getRcvQueuesByConnId_ :: DB.Connection -> ConnId -> IO (Maybe (NonEmpty RcvQueue))
@@ -3011,7 +3040,7 @@ insertRcvMsgDetails_ db connId RcvQueue {dbQueueId} RcvMsgData {msgMeta, interna
VALUES
(?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?)
|]
(connId, dbQueueId, internalRcvId, fst recipient, sndMsgId, Binary (fst broker), snd broker, Binary internalHash, Binary externalPrevSndHash, integrity)
(connId, dbQueueId, internalRcvId, fst recipient, sndMsgId, fst broker, snd broker, Binary internalHash, Binary externalPrevSndHash, integrity)
DB.execute db "INSERT INTO encrypted_rcv_message_hashes (conn_id, hash) VALUES (?,?)" (connId, Binary encryptedMsgHash)
updateRcvMsgHash :: DB.Connection -> ConnId -> AgentMsgId -> InternalRcvId -> MsgHash -> IO ()
@@ -3159,7 +3188,8 @@ createRcvFile db gVar userId fd@FileDescription {chunks} prefixPath tmpPath file
createRcvFileRedirect :: DB.Connection -> TVar ChaChaDRG -> UserId -> FileDescription 'FRecipient -> FilePath -> FilePath -> CryptoFile -> FilePath -> CryptoFile -> Bool -> IO (Either StoreError RcvFileId)
createRcvFileRedirect _ _ _ FileDescription {redirect = Nothing} _ _ _ _ _ _ = pure $ Left $ SEInternal "createRcvFileRedirect called without redirect"
createRcvFileRedirect db gVar userId redirectFd@FileDescription {chunks = redirectChunks, redirect = Just RedirectFileInfo {size, digest}} prefixPath redirectPath redirectFile dstPath dstFile approvedRelays = runExceptT $ do
(dstEntityId, dstId) <- ExceptT $ insertRcvFile db gVar userId dummyDst prefixPath dstPath dstFile Nothing Nothing approvedRelays
nonce <- atomically $ C.randomCbNonce gVar
(dstEntityId, dstId) <- ExceptT $ insertRcvFile db gVar userId (dummyDst nonce) prefixPath dstPath dstFile Nothing Nothing approvedRelays
(_, redirectId) <- ExceptT $ insertRcvFile db gVar userId redirectFd prefixPath redirectPath redirectFile (Just dstId) (Just dstEntityId) approvedRelays
liftIO $
forM_ redirectChunks $ \fc@FileChunk {replicas} -> do
@@ -3167,7 +3197,7 @@ createRcvFileRedirect db gVar userId redirectFd@FileDescription {chunks = redire
forM_ (zip [1 ..] replicas) $ \(rno, replica) -> insertRcvFileChunkReplica db rno replica chunkId
pure dstEntityId
where
dummyDst =
dummyDst nonce =
FileDescription
{ party = SFRecipient,
size,
@@ -3175,7 +3205,7 @@ createRcvFileRedirect db gVar userId redirectFd@FileDescription {chunks = redire
redirect = Nothing,
-- updated later with updateRcvFileRedirect
key = C.unsafeSbKey $ B.replicate 32 '#',
nonce = C.cbNonce "",
nonce,
chunkSize = FileSize 0,
chunks = []
}
@@ -16,6 +16,8 @@ import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.Postgres.Migrations.M20260411_service_certs
import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.Postgres.Migrations.M20260712_address_dr_rpc
import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.Postgres.Migrations.M20260823_snd_files_entitlement
import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.Postgres.Migrations.M20260919_ratchet_verify_codes
import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.Postgres.Migrations.M20260929_ratchet_indexes
import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.Postgres.Migrations.M20261008_rcv_switch_status
import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.Shared (Migration (..))
schemaMigrations :: [(String, Text, Maybe Text)]
@@ -31,7 +33,9 @@ schemaMigrations =
("20260411_service_certs", m20260411_service_certs, Just down_m20260411_service_certs),
("20260712_address_dr_rpc", m20260712_address_dr_rpc, Just down_m20260712_address_dr_rpc),
("20260823_snd_files_entitlement", m20260823_snd_files_entitlement, Just down_m20260823_snd_files_entitlement),
("20260919_ratchet_verify_codes", m20260919_ratchet_verify_codes, Just down_m20260919_ratchet_verify_codes)
("20260919_ratchet_verify_codes", m20260919_ratchet_verify_codes, Just down_m20260919_ratchet_verify_codes),
("20260929_ratchet_indexes", m20260929_ratchet_indexes, Just down_m20260929_ratchet_indexes),
("20261008_rcv_switch_status", m20261008_rcv_switch_status, Just down_m20261008_rcv_switch_status)
]
-- | The list of migrations in ascending order by date
@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
{-# LANGUAGE OverloadedStrings #-}
{-# LANGUAGE QuasiQuotes #-}
module Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.Postgres.Migrations.M20260929_ratchet_indexes where
import Data.Text (Text)
import Text.RawString.QQ (r)
m20260929_ratchet_indexes :: Text
m20260929_ratchet_indexes =
[r|
DROP INDEX idx_skipped_messages_conn_id;
CREATE INDEX idx_skipped_messages_conn_id ON skipped_messages(conn_id, skipped_message_id);
DELETE FROM processed_ratchet_key_hashes AS h
WHERE EXISTS (
SELECT 1 FROM processed_ratchet_key_hashes d
WHERE d.conn_id = h.conn_id AND d.hash = h.hash AND d.processed_ratchet_key_hash_id < h.processed_ratchet_key_hash_id
);
DROP INDEX idx_processed_ratchet_key_hashes_hash;
CREATE UNIQUE INDEX idx_processed_ratchet_key_hashes_hash ON processed_ratchet_key_hashes(conn_id, hash);
CREATE INDEX idx_processed_ratchet_key_hashes_conn_id ON processed_ratchet_key_hashes(conn_id, processed_ratchet_key_hash_id);
|]
down_m20260929_ratchet_indexes :: Text
down_m20260929_ratchet_indexes =
[r|
DROP INDEX idx_processed_ratchet_key_hashes_conn_id;
DROP INDEX idx_processed_ratchet_key_hashes_hash;
CREATE INDEX idx_processed_ratchet_key_hashes_hash ON processed_ratchet_key_hashes(conn_id, hash);
DROP INDEX idx_skipped_messages_conn_id;
CREATE INDEX idx_skipped_messages_conn_id ON skipped_messages(conn_id);
|]
@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
{-# LANGUAGE OverloadedStrings #-}
{-# LANGUAGE QuasiQuotes #-}
module Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.Postgres.Migrations.M20261008_rcv_switch_status where
import Data.Text (Text)
import Text.RawString.QQ (r)
m20261008_rcv_switch_status :: Text
m20261008_rcv_switch_status =
[r|
CREATE INDEX idx_rcv_queues_switch_status ON rcv_queues(switch_status);
|]
down_m20261008_rcv_switch_status :: Text
down_m20261008_rcv_switch_status =
[r|
UPDATE rcv_queues SET switch_status = NULL WHERE switch_status = 'received_qend';
DROP INDEX idx_rcv_queues_switch_status;
|]
@@ -1169,11 +1169,15 @@ CREATE INDEX idx_ntf_tokens_ntf_host_ntf_port ON smp_agent_test_protocol_schema.
CREATE INDEX idx_processed_ratchet_key_hashes_conn_id ON smp_agent_test_protocol_schema.processed_ratchet_key_hashes USING btree (conn_id, processed_ratchet_key_hash_id);
CREATE INDEX idx_processed_ratchet_key_hashes_created_at ON smp_agent_test_protocol_schema.processed_ratchet_key_hashes USING btree (created_at);
CREATE INDEX idx_processed_ratchet_key_hashes_hash ON smp_agent_test_protocol_schema.processed_ratchet_key_hashes USING btree (conn_id, hash);
CREATE UNIQUE INDEX idx_processed_ratchet_key_hashes_hash ON smp_agent_test_protocol_schema.processed_ratchet_key_hashes USING btree (conn_id, hash);
@@ -1229,6 +1233,10 @@ CREATE UNIQUE INDEX idx_rcv_queues_ntf ON smp_agent_test_protocol_schema.rcv_que
CREATE INDEX idx_rcv_queues_switch_status ON smp_agent_test_protocol_schema.rcv_queues USING btree (switch_status);
CREATE INDEX idx_rcv_queues_to_subscribe ON smp_agent_test_protocol_schema.rcv_queues USING btree (to_subscribe);
@@ -1241,7 +1249,7 @@ CREATE UNIQUE INDEX idx_server_certs_user_id_host_port ON smp_agent_test_protoco
CREATE INDEX idx_skipped_messages_conn_id ON smp_agent_test_protocol_schema.skipped_messages USING btree (conn_id);
CREATE INDEX idx_skipped_messages_conn_id ON smp_agent_test_protocol_schema.skipped_messages USING btree (conn_id, skipped_message_id);
@@ -100,7 +100,8 @@ withTransaction st = withTransactionPriority st False
{-# INLINE withTransaction #-}
withTransactionPriority :: DBStore -> Bool -> (DB.Connection -> IO a) -> IO a
withTransactionPriority st priority action = withConnectionPriority st priority $ dbBusyLoop . transaction
withTransactionPriority st@DBStore {dbClosed} priority action = withConnectionPriority st priority $ \db ->
ifM (readTVarIO dbClosed) (fail "withTransaction: database closed") (dbBusyLoop $ transaction db)
where
transaction db@DB.Connection {conn} = SQL.withImmediateTransaction conn $ action db
@@ -52,6 +52,9 @@ import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.SQLite.Migrations.M20260411_service_certs
import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.SQLite.Migrations.M20260712_address_dr_rpc
import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.SQLite.Migrations.M20260823_snd_files_entitlement
import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.SQLite.Migrations.M20260919_ratchet_verify_codes
import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.SQLite.Migrations.M20260929_ratchet_indexes
import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.SQLite.Migrations.M20261005_commands_autoincrement
import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.SQLite.Migrations.M20261008_rcv_switch_status
import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.Shared (Migration (..))
schemaMigrations :: [(String, Query, Maybe Query)]
@@ -103,7 +106,10 @@ schemaMigrations =
("m20260411_service_certs", m20260411_service_certs, Just down_m20260411_service_certs),
("m20260712_address_dr_rpc", m20260712_address_dr_rpc, Just down_m20260712_address_dr_rpc),
("m20260823_snd_files_entitlement", m20260823_snd_files_entitlement, Just down_m20260823_snd_files_entitlement),
("m20260919_ratchet_verify_codes", m20260919_ratchet_verify_codes, Just down_m20260919_ratchet_verify_codes)
("m20260919_ratchet_verify_codes", m20260919_ratchet_verify_codes, Just down_m20260919_ratchet_verify_codes),
("m20260929_ratchet_indexes", m20260929_ratchet_indexes, Just down_m20260929_ratchet_indexes),
("m20261005_commands_autoincrement", m20261005_commands_autoincrement, Just down_m20261005_commands_autoincrement),
("m20261008_rcv_switch_status", m20261008_rcv_switch_status, Just down_m20261008_rcv_switch_status)
]
-- | The list of migrations in ascending order by date
@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
{-# LANGUAGE QuasiQuotes #-}
module Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.SQLite.Migrations.M20260929_ratchet_indexes where
import Database.SQLite.Simple (Query)
import Database.SQLite.Simple.QQ (sql)
-- idx_skipped_messages_conn_id is not changed: SQLite index entries include rowid (skipped_message_id)
m20260929_ratchet_indexes :: Query
m20260929_ratchet_indexes =
[sql|
DELETE FROM processed_ratchet_key_hashes AS h
WHERE EXISTS (
SELECT 1 FROM processed_ratchet_key_hashes d
WHERE d.conn_id = h.conn_id AND d.hash = h.hash AND d.processed_ratchet_key_hash_id < h.processed_ratchet_key_hash_id
);
DROP INDEX idx_processed_ratchet_key_hashes_hash;
CREATE UNIQUE INDEX idx_processed_ratchet_key_hashes_hash ON processed_ratchet_key_hashes(conn_id, hash);
CREATE INDEX idx_processed_ratchet_key_hashes_conn_id ON processed_ratchet_key_hashes(conn_id, processed_ratchet_key_hash_id);
|]
down_m20260929_ratchet_indexes :: Query
down_m20260929_ratchet_indexes =
[sql|
DROP INDEX idx_processed_ratchet_key_hashes_conn_id;
DROP INDEX idx_processed_ratchet_key_hashes_hash;
CREATE INDEX idx_processed_ratchet_key_hashes_hash ON processed_ratchet_key_hashes(conn_id, hash);
|]
@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
{-# LANGUAGE QuasiQuotes #-}
module Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.SQLite.Migrations.M20261005_commands_autoincrement where
import Database.SQLite.Simple (Query)
import Database.SQLite.Simple.QQ (sql)
m20261005_commands_autoincrement :: Query
m20261005_commands_autoincrement =
[sql|
INSERT INTO sqlite_sequence (name, seq)
SELECT 'commands', MAX(ROWID) FROM commands;
PRAGMA writable_schema=1;
UPDATE sqlite_master SET sql = replace(sql, 'command_id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY,', 'command_id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY AUTOINCREMENT,')
WHERE name = 'commands' AND type = 'table';
PRAGMA writable_schema=RESET;
|]
down_m20261005_commands_autoincrement :: Query
down_m20261005_commands_autoincrement =
[sql|
DELETE FROM sqlite_sequence WHERE name = 'commands';
PRAGMA writable_schema=1;
UPDATE sqlite_master SET sql = replace(sql, 'command_id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY AUTOINCREMENT,', 'command_id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY,')
WHERE name = 'commands' AND type = 'table';
PRAGMA writable_schema=RESET;
|]
@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
{-# LANGUAGE QuasiQuotes #-}
module Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.SQLite.Migrations.M20261008_rcv_switch_status where
import Database.SQLite.Simple (Query)
import Database.SQLite.Simple.QQ (sql)
m20261008_rcv_switch_status :: Query
m20261008_rcv_switch_status =
[sql|
CREATE INDEX idx_rcv_queues_switch_status ON rcv_queues(switch_status);
|]
down_m20261008_rcv_switch_status :: Query
down_m20261008_rcv_switch_status =
[sql|
UPDATE rcv_queues SET switch_status = NULL WHERE switch_status = 'received_qend';
DROP INDEX idx_rcv_queues_switch_status;
|]
@@ -247,7 +247,7 @@ CREATE TABLE ntf_subscriptions(
ON DELETE RESTRICT ON UPDATE CASCADE
) WITHOUT ROWID, STRICT;
CREATE TABLE commands(
command_id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY,
command_id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY AUTOINCREMENT,
conn_id BLOB NOT NULL REFERENCES connections ON DELETE CASCADE,
host TEXT,
port TEXT,
@@ -261,6 +261,7 @@ CREATE TABLE commands(
FOREIGN KEY(host, port) REFERENCES servers
ON DELETE RESTRICT ON UPDATE CASCADE
) STRICT;
CREATE TABLE sqlite_sequence(name,seq);
CREATE TABLE snd_message_deliveries(
snd_message_delivery_id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY AUTOINCREMENT,
conn_id BLOB NOT NULL REFERENCES connections ON DELETE CASCADE,
@@ -269,7 +270,6 @@ CREATE TABLE snd_message_deliveries(
failed INTEGER DEFAULT 0,
FOREIGN KEY(conn_id, internal_id) REFERENCES messages ON DELETE CASCADE DEFERRABLE INITIALLY DEFERRED
) STRICT;
CREATE TABLE sqlite_sequence(name,seq);
CREATE TABLE users(
user_id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY AUTOINCREMENT
,
@@ -573,10 +573,6 @@ CREATE INDEX idx_encrypted_rcv_message_hashes_hash ON encrypted_rcv_message_hash
conn_id,
hash
);
CREATE INDEX idx_processed_ratchet_key_hashes_hash ON processed_ratchet_key_hashes(
conn_id,
hash
);
CREATE INDEX idx_snd_messages_rcpt_internal_id ON snd_messages(
conn_id,
rcpt_internal_id
@@ -641,6 +637,15 @@ CREATE INDEX idx_connections_deleted ON connections(deleted);
CREATE INDEX idx_connections_service_request_expires_at ON connections(
service_request_expires_at
);
CREATE UNIQUE INDEX idx_processed_ratchet_key_hashes_hash ON processed_ratchet_key_hashes(
conn_id,
hash
);
CREATE INDEX idx_processed_ratchet_key_hashes_conn_id ON processed_ratchet_key_hashes(
conn_id,
processed_ratchet_key_hash_id
);
CREATE INDEX idx_rcv_queues_switch_status ON rcv_queues(switch_status);
CREATE TRIGGER tr_rcv_queue_insert
AFTER INSERT ON rcv_queues
FOR EACH ROW
+30 -21
View File
@@ -69,6 +69,7 @@ module Simplex.Messaging.Client
enableSMPQueuesNtfs,
disableSMPQueuesNtfs,
sendSMPMessage,
QueueDrained,
ackSMPMessage,
suspendSMPQueue,
deleteSMPQueue,
@@ -198,6 +199,7 @@ data PClient v err msg = PClient
transportHost :: TransportHost,
tcpConnectTimeout :: NetworkTimeout,
tcpTimeout :: NetworkTimeout,
proxiedRelayVRange :: VersionRange v,
sendPings :: TVar Bool,
lastReceived :: TVar UTCTime,
timeoutErrorCount :: TVar Int,
@@ -243,6 +245,7 @@ smpClientStub g sessionId thVersion thAuth = do
transportHost = "localhost",
tcpConnectTimeout,
tcpTimeout,
proxiedRelayVRange = supportedClientSMPRelayVRange,
sendPings,
lastReceived,
timeoutErrorCount,
@@ -480,6 +483,7 @@ data ProtocolClientConfig v = ProtocolClientConfig
serviceCredentials :: Maybe ServiceCredentials,
-- | client-server protocol version range
serverVRange :: VersionRange v,
proxiedRelayVRange :: VersionRange v,
-- | agree shared session secret (used in SMP proxy for additional encryption layer)
agreeSecret :: Bool,
-- | Whether connecting client is a proxy server. See comment in ClientHandshake
@@ -498,6 +502,7 @@ defaultClientConfig clientALPN useSNI serverVRange =
clientALPN,
serviceCredentials = Nothing,
serverVRange,
proxiedRelayVRange = serverVRange,
agreeSecret = False,
proxyServer = False,
useSNI
@@ -508,6 +513,7 @@ defaultSMPClientConfig :: ProtocolClientConfig SMPVersion
defaultSMPClientConfig =
(defaultClientConfig (Just alpnSupportedSMPHandshakes) False supportedClientSMPRelayVRange)
{ defaultTransport = (show defaultSMPPort, transport @TLS),
proxiedRelayVRange = supportedClientSMPRelayVRange,
agreeSecret = True
}
{-# INLINE defaultSMPClientConfig #-}
@@ -571,7 +577,7 @@ type SMPTransportSession = TransportSession BrokerMsg
-- A single queue can be used for multiple 'SMPClient' instances,
-- as 'SMPServerTransmission' includes server information.
getProtocolClient :: forall v err msg. Protocol v err msg => TVar ChaChaDRG -> NetworkRequestMode -> TransportSession msg -> ProtocolClientConfig v -> [HostName] -> Maybe (TBQueue (ServerTransmissionBatch v err msg)) -> UTCTime -> (ProtocolClient v err msg -> IO ()) -> IO (Either (ProtocolClientError err) (ProtocolClient v err msg))
getProtocolClient g nm transportSession@(_, srv, _) cfg@ProtocolClientConfig {qSize, networkConfig, clientALPN, serviceCredentials, serverVRange, agreeSecret, proxyServer, useSNI} presetDomains msgQ proxySessTs disconnected = do
getProtocolClient g nm transportSession@(_, srv, _) cfg@ProtocolClientConfig {qSize, networkConfig, clientALPN, serviceCredentials, serverVRange, proxiedRelayVRange, agreeSecret, proxyServer, useSNI} presetDomains msgQ proxySessTs disconnected = do
case chooseTransportHost networkConfig (host srv) of
Right useHost ->
(getCurrentTime >>= mkProtocolClient useHost >>= runClient useTransport useHost)
@@ -596,6 +602,7 @@ getProtocolClient g nm transportSession@(_, srv, _) cfg@ProtocolClientConfig {qS
transportHost,
tcpConnectTimeout,
tcpTimeout,
proxiedRelayVRange,
sendPings,
lastReceived,
timeoutErrorCount,
@@ -1092,15 +1099,17 @@ resolvedNameOrNotFound d NameResponse {registration} = case registration of
NRRegistered {nameRecord} -> T.toLower (nrName nameRecord) == fullDomainName d
_ -> True
type QueueDrained = Bool
-- | Acknowledge message delivery (server deletes the message).
--
-- https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq/blob/master/protocol/simplex-messaging.md#acknowledge-message-delivery
-- This command is always sent in background request mode
ackSMPMessage :: SMPClient -> RcvPrivateAuthKey -> QueueId -> MsgId -> ExceptT SMPClientError IO ()
ackSMPMessage :: SMPClient -> RcvPrivateAuthKey -> QueueId -> MsgId -> ExceptT SMPClientError IO QueueDrained
ackSMPMessage c rpKey rId msgId =
sendSMPCommand c NRMBackground (Just rpKey) rId (ACK msgId) >>= \case
OK -> return ()
cmd@MSG {} -> liftIO $ writeSMPMessage c rId cmd
OK -> pure True
cmd@MSG {} -> liftIO (writeSMPMessage c rId cmd) $> False
r -> throwE $ unexpectedResponse r
-- | Irreversibly suspend SMP queue.
@@ -1126,10 +1135,10 @@ deleteSMPQueues = okSMPCommands DEL
-- send PRXY :: SMPServer -> Maybe BasicAuth -> Command Sender
-- receives PKEY :: SessionId -> X.CertificateChain -> X.SignedExact X.PubKey -> BrokerMsg
connectSMPProxiedRelay :: SMPClient -> NetworkRequestMode -> SMPServer -> Maybe BasicAuth -> ExceptT SMPClientError IO ProxiedRelay
connectSMPProxiedRelay c@ProtocolClient {client_ = PClient {tcpConnectTimeout, tcpTimeout}} nm relayServ@ProtocolServer {port = relayPort, keyHash = C.KeyHash kh} proxyAuth =
connectSMPProxiedRelay c@ProtocolClient {client_ = PClient {tcpConnectTimeout, tcpTimeout, proxiedRelayVRange}} nm relayServ@ProtocolServer {port = relayPort, keyHash = C.KeyHash kh} proxyAuth =
sendProtocolCommand_ c nm Nothing tOut Nothing NoEntity (Cmd SProxiedClient (PRXY relayServ proxyAuth)) >>= \case
PKEY sId vr (CertChainPubKey chain key) ->
case supportedClientSMPRelayVRange `compatibleVersion` vr of
case proxiedRelayVRange `compatibleVersion` vr of
Nothing -> throwE $ transportErr TEVersion
Just (Compatible v) -> do
relayKey <- liftEitherWith (const $ transportErr $ TEHandshake IDENTITY) =<< liftIO (runExceptT $ validateRelay chain key)
@@ -1180,7 +1189,7 @@ instance StrEncoding ProxyClientError where
-- consider how to process slow responses - is it handled somehow locally or delegated to the caller
-- this method is used in the client
-- sends PFWD :: C.PublicKeyX25519 -> EncTransmission -> Command Sender
-- receives PRES :: EncResponse -> BrokerMsg -- proxy to client
-- receives PRES :: Maybe C.CbNonce -> EncResponse -> BrokerMsg -- proxy to client
-- When client sends message via proxy, there may be one successful scenario and 9 error scenarios
-- as shown below (WTF stands for unexpected response, ??? for response that failed to parse).
@@ -1233,20 +1242,20 @@ proxySMPCommand c@ProtocolClient {thParams = proxyThParams, client_ = PClient {c
-- encode
let TransmissionForAuth {tForAuth, tToSend} = encodeTransmissionForAuth serverThParams (CorrId corrId, sId, Cmd (sParty @p) command)
-- serviceAuth is False here – proxied commands are not used with service certificates
auth <- liftEitherWith PCETransportError $ authTransmission serverThAuth False spKey nonce tForAuth
auth <- liftEitherWith PCETransportError $ authTransmission serverThAuth False spKey (Just nonce) tForAuth
b <- case batchTransmissions serverThParams [Right (auth, tToSend)] of
[] -> throwE $ PCETransportError TELargeMsg
TBError e _ : _ -> throwE $ PCETransportError e
TBTransmission s _ : _ -> pure s
TBTransmissions s _ _ : _ -> pure s
et <- liftEitherWith PCECryptoError $ EncTransmission <$> C.cbEncrypt cmdSecret nonce b paddedProxiedTLength
et <- liftEitherWith PCECryptoError $ EncTransmission <$> C.cbEncrypt cmdSecret (encTransmissionNonce v nonce) b paddedProxiedTLength
-- proxy interaction errors are wrapped
let tOut = Just $ 2 * netTimeoutInt tcpTimeout nm
tryE (sendProtocolCommand_ c nm (Just nonce) tOut Nothing (EntityId sessionId) (Cmd SProxiedClient (PFWD v cmdPubKey et))) >>= \case
Right r -> case r of
PRES (EncResponse er) -> do
PRES nonce_ (EncResponse er) -> do
-- server interaction errors are thrown directly
t' <- liftEitherWith PCECryptoError $ C.cbDecrypt cmdSecret (C.reverseNonce nonce) er
t' <- liftEitherWith PCECryptoError $ C.cbDecrypt cmdSecret (fromMaybe (C.reverseNonce nonce) nonce_) er
case tParse serverThParams t' of
t'' :| [] -> case tDecodeClient serverThParams t'' of
(_, _, cmd) -> case cmd of
@@ -1264,10 +1273,10 @@ proxySMPCommand c@ProtocolClient {thParams = proxyThParams, client_ = PClient {c
-- this method is used in the proxy
-- sends RFWD :: EncFwdTransmission -> Command Sender
-- receives RRES :: EncFwdResponse -> BrokerMsg
-- receives RRES :: Maybe C.CbNonce -> EncFwdResponse -> BrokerMsg
-- proxy should send PRES to the client with EncResponse
-- Always uses background timeout mode
forwardSMPTransmission :: SMPClient -> CorrId -> VersionSMP -> C.PublicKeyX25519 -> EncTransmission -> ExceptT SMPClientError IO EncResponse
forwardSMPTransmission :: SMPClient -> C.CorrCbNonce -> VersionSMP -> C.PublicKeyX25519 -> EncTransmission -> ExceptT SMPClientError IO (Maybe C.CbNonce, EncResponse)
forwardSMPTransmission c@ProtocolClient {thParams, client_ = PClient {clientCorrId = g}} fwdCorrId fwdVersion fwdKey fwdTransmission = do
-- prepare params
sessSecret <- case thAuth thParams of
@@ -1279,11 +1288,11 @@ forwardSMPTransmission c@ProtocolClient {thParams, client_ = PClient {clientCorr
eft = EncFwdTransmission $ C.cbEncryptNoPad sessSecret nonce (smpEncode fwdT)
-- send
sendProtocolCommand_ c NRMBackground (Just nonce) Nothing Nothing NoEntity (Cmd SProxyService (RFWD eft)) >>= \case
RRES (EncFwdResponse efr) -> do
RRES nonce_ (EncFwdResponse efr) -> do
-- unwrap
r' <- liftEitherWith PCECryptoError $ C.cbDecryptNoPad sessSecret (C.reverseNonce nonce) efr
FwdResponse {fwdCorrId = _, fwdResponse} <- liftEitherWith (const $ PCEResponseError BLOCK) $ smpDecode r'
pure fwdResponse
pure (nonce_, fwdResponse)
r -> throwE $ unexpectedResponse r
-- get queue information - always sent interactively
@@ -1411,7 +1420,7 @@ mkTransmission_ :: forall v err msg. Protocol v err msg => ProtocolClient v err
mkTransmission_ ProtocolClient {thParams, client_ = PClient {clientCorrId, sentCommands}} nonce_ (entityId, pKey_, command) = do
nonce@(C.CbNonce corrId) <- maybe (atomically $ C.randomCbNonce clientCorrId) pure nonce_
let TransmissionForAuth {tForAuth, tToSend} = encodeTransmissionForAuth thParams (CorrId corrId, entityId, command)
auth = authTransmission (thAuth thParams) (useServiceAuth command) pKey_ nonce tForAuth
auth = authTransmission (thAuth thParams) (useServiceAuth command) pKey_ (Just nonce) tForAuth
r <- mkRequest (CorrId corrId)
pure ((,tToSend) <$> auth, r)
where
@@ -1430,14 +1439,14 @@ mkTransmission_ ProtocolClient {thParams, client_ = PClient {clientCorrId, sentC
atomically $ TM.insert corrId r sentCommands
pure r
authTransmission :: Maybe (THandleAuth 'TClient) -> Bool -> Maybe C.APrivateAuthKey -> C.CbNonce -> ByteString -> Either TransportError (Maybe TAuthorizations)
authTransmission thAuth serviceAuth pKey_ nonce t = traverse authenticate pKey_
authTransmission :: Maybe (THandleAuth 'TClient) -> Bool -> Maybe C.APrivateAuthKey -> Maybe C.CbNonce -> ByteString -> Either TransportError (Maybe TAuthorizations)
authTransmission thAuth serviceAuth pKey_ nonce_ t = traverse authenticate pKey_
where
authenticate :: C.APrivateAuthKey -> Either TransportError TAuthorizations
authenticate (C.APrivateAuthKey a pk) = (,serviceSig) <$> case a of
C.SX25519 -> case thAuth of
Just THAuthClient {peerServerPubKey = k} -> Right $ TAAuthenticator $ C.cbAuthenticate k pk nonce t'
Nothing -> Left TENoServerAuth
C.SX25519 -> case (thAuth, nonce_) of
(Just THAuthClient {peerServerPubKey = k}, Just nonce) -> Right $ TAAuthenticator $ C.cbAuthenticate k pk nonce t'
_ -> Left TENoServerAuth
C.SEd25519 -> sign pk
C.SEd448 -> sign pk
-- When command is signed by both entity key and service key,
+58 -27
View File
@@ -140,8 +140,10 @@ module Simplex.Messaging.Crypto
gcmIV,
-- * NaCl crypto_box
CbNonce (unCbNonce),
CbNonceI (..),
CbNonce,
pattern CbNonce,
CorrCbNonce,
cbEncrypt,
cbEncryptNoPad,
cbEncryptMaxLenBS,
@@ -152,8 +154,12 @@ module Simplex.Messaging.Crypto
sbEncryptNoPad,
sbDecryptNoPad,
cbNonce,
unsafeCbNonce,
corrCbNonce,
randomCbNonce,
reverseNonce,
xorNonce,
toCbNonce,
-- * NaCl crypto_secretbox
SbKey (unSbKey),
@@ -232,6 +238,7 @@ import Data.ASN1.Types
import Data.Aeson (FromJSON (..), ToJSON (..))
import qualified Data.Attoparsec.ByteString.Char8 as A
import Data.Bifunctor (bimap, first)
import Data.Bits (xor)
import Data.ByteArray (ByteArrayAccess)
import qualified Data.ByteArray as BA
import Data.ByteString.Base64 (decode)
@@ -254,7 +261,7 @@ import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.DB (Binary (..), FromField (..), ToField (.
import Simplex.Messaging.Encoding
import Simplex.Messaging.Encoding.String
import Simplex.Messaging.Parsers (parseAll, parseString)
import Simplex.Messaging.Util ((<$?>))
import Simplex.Messaging.Util (packZipWith, (<$?>))
-- | Cryptographic algorithms.
data Algorithm = Ed25519 | Ed448 | X25519 | X448
@@ -931,6 +938,8 @@ data CryptoError
CERatchetEarlierMessage Word32
| -- | duplicate message number
CERatchetDuplicateMessage
| -- | KEM key generation failed, indicating a broken RNG
CryptoKEMKeyGenError
deriving (Eq, Show, Exception)
aesKeySize :: Int
@@ -1045,9 +1054,7 @@ md5Hash = BA.convert . (hash :: ByteString -> Digest MD5)
-- | AEAD-GCM encryption with associated data.
--
-- Used as part of double ratchet encryption.
-- This function requires 16 bytes IV, it transforms IV in cryptonite_aes_gcm_init here:
-- https://github.com/haskell-crypto/cryptonite/blob/master/cbits/cryptonite_aes.c
-- Used as part of double ratchet encryption, with a 16-byte IV (see @initAEAD@).
encryptAEAD :: Key -> IV -> Int -> ByteString -> ByteString -> ExceptT CryptoError IO (AuthTag, ByteString)
encryptAEAD aesKey ivBytes paddedLen ad msg = do
aead <- initAEAD @AES256 aesKey ivBytes
@@ -1067,10 +1074,7 @@ encryptAEADNoPad aesKey ivBytes ad msg = do
-- | AEAD-GCM decryption with associated data.
--
-- Used as part of double ratchet encryption.
-- This function requires 16 bytes IV, it transforms IV in cryptonite_aes_gcm_init here:
-- https://github.com/haskell-crypto/cryptonite/blob/master/cbits/cryptonite_aes.c
-- To make it compatible with WebCrypto we will need to start using initAEADGCM.
-- Used as part of double ratchet encryption, with a 16-byte IV (see @initAEAD@).
decryptAEAD :: Key -> IV -> ByteString -> ByteString -> AuthTag -> ExceptT CryptoError IO ByteString
decryptAEAD aesKey ivBytes ad msg (AuthTag authTag) = do
aead <- initAEAD @AES256 aesKey ivBytes
@@ -1148,9 +1152,9 @@ maxLength :: forall i. KnownNat i => Int
maxLength = fromIntegral (natVal $ Proxy @i)
{-# INLINE maxLength #-}
-- this function requires 16 bytes IV, it transforms IV in cryptonite_aes_gcm_init here:
-- https://github.com/haskell-crypto/cryptonite/blob/master/cbits/cryptonite_aes.c
-- This is used for double ratchet encryption, so to make it compatible with WebCrypto we will need to deprecate it and start using initAEADGCM
-- The 16-byte double ratchet IV is intentionally not the 96-bit IV recommended by NIST SP 800-38D, so GCM derives J0 = GHASH(IV || 0^64 || [128]_64),
-- as in crypton_aes_gcm_init: https://hackage.haskell.org/package/crypton-0.34/src/cbits/crypton_aes.c
-- WebCrypto and other SP 800-38D implementations interoperate only when given all 16 IV bytes.
initAEAD :: forall c. AES.BlockCipher c => Key -> IV -> ExceptT CryptoError IO (AES.AEAD c)
initAEAD (Key aesKey) (IV ivBytes) = do
iv <- makeIV @c ivBytes
@@ -1327,8 +1331,8 @@ sbEncryptNoPad (SbKey key) (CbNonce nonce) = cryptoBox key nonce
{-# INLINE sbEncryptNoPad #-}
-- | NaCl @crypto_box@ encrypt with a shared DH secret and 192-bit nonce.
cbEncryptMaxLenBS :: KnownNat i => DhSecret X25519 -> CbNonce -> MaxLenBS i -> ByteString
cbEncryptMaxLenBS (DhSecretX25519 secret) (CbNonce nonce) = cryptoBox secret nonce . unMaxLenBS . padMaxLenBS
cbEncryptMaxLenBS :: (KnownNat i, CbNonceI n) => DhSecret X25519 -> n -> MaxLenBS i -> ByteString
cbEncryptMaxLenBS (DhSecretX25519 secret) nonce = cryptoBox secret (unCbNonce nonce) . unMaxLenBS . padMaxLenBS
{-# INLINE cbEncryptMaxLenBS #-}
cryptoBox :: ByteArrayAccess key => key -> ByteString -> ByteString -> ByteString
@@ -1338,8 +1342,8 @@ cryptoBox secret nonce s = BA.convert tag <> c
tag = Poly1305.auth rs c
-- | NaCl @crypto_box@ decrypt with a shared DH secret and 192-bit nonce.
cbDecrypt :: DhSecret X25519 -> CbNonce -> ByteString -> Either CryptoError ByteString
cbDecrypt (DhSecretX25519 secret) = sbDecrypt_ secret
cbDecrypt :: CbNonceI n => DhSecret X25519 -> n -> ByteString -> Either CryptoError ByteString
cbDecrypt (DhSecretX25519 secret) = sbDecrypt_ secret . toCbNonce
{-# INLINE cbDecrypt #-}
-- | NaCl @crypto_box@ decrypt with a shared DH secret and 192-bit nonce (without unpadding).
@@ -1386,9 +1390,16 @@ cbAuthenticate k pk nonce msg = CbAuthenticator $ cbEncryptNoPad (dh' k pk) nonc
cbVerify :: PublicKeyX25519 -> PrivateKeyX25519 -> CbNonce -> CbAuthenticator -> ByteString -> Bool
cbVerify k pk nonce (CbAuthenticator s) authorized = cbDecryptNoPad (dh' k pk) nonce s == Right (sha512Hash authorized)
newtype CbNonce = CryptoBoxNonce {unCbNonce :: ByteString}
class CbNonceI n where
unCbNonce :: n -> ByteString
newtype CbNonce = CryptoBoxNonce ByteString
deriving (Eq, Show)
deriving newtype (FromField)
instance CbNonceI CbNonce where
unCbNonce (CryptoBoxNonce s) = s
instance FromField CbNonce where fromField = blobFieldDecoder cbNonce
instance ToField CbNonce where toField (CryptoBoxNonce s) = toField $ Binary s
@@ -1399,7 +1410,7 @@ pattern CbNonce s <- CryptoBoxNonce s
instance StrEncoding CbNonce where
strEncode (CbNonce s) = strEncode s
strP = cbNonce <$> strP
strP = cbNonce <$?> strP
instance ToJSON CbNonce where
toJSON = strToJSON
@@ -1408,13 +1419,16 @@ instance ToJSON CbNonce where
instance FromJSON CbNonce where
parseJSON = strParseJSON "CbNonce"
cbNonce :: ByteString -> CbNonce
cbNonce :: ByteString -> Either String CbNonce
cbNonce s
| len == 24 = CryptoBoxNonce s
| len > 24 = CryptoBoxNonce . fst $ B.splitAt 24 s
| otherwise = CryptoBoxNonce $ s <> B.replicate (24 - len) (toEnum 0)
where
len = B.length s
| B.length s == 24 = Right $ CryptoBoxNonce s
| otherwise = Left "CbNonce: invalid length"
unsafeCbNonce :: ByteString -> CbNonce
unsafeCbNonce s = either error id $ cbNonce s
corrCbNonce :: ByteString -> Either String CorrCbNonce
corrCbNonce s = CorrCbNonce . unCbNonce <$> cbNonce s
randomCbNonce :: TVar ChaChaDRG -> STM CbNonce
randomCbNonce = fmap CryptoBoxNonce . randomBytes 24
@@ -1422,13 +1436,30 @@ randomCbNonce = fmap CryptoBoxNonce . randomBytes 24
randomBytes :: Int -> TVar ChaChaDRG -> STM ByteString
randomBytes n gVar = stateTVar gVar $ randomBytesGenerate n
reverseNonce :: CbNonce -> CbNonce
reverseNonce (CryptoBoxNonce s) = CryptoBoxNonce (B.reverse s)
reverseNonce :: CbNonceI n => n -> CbNonce
reverseNonce = CryptoBoxNonce . B.reverse . unCbNonce
xorNonce :: CbNonceI n => ByteString -> n -> CbNonce
xorNonce s nonce = CryptoBoxNonce $ packZipWith xor s n <> B.drop (B.length s) n
where
n = unCbNonce nonce
toCbNonce :: CbNonceI n => n -> CbNonce
toCbNonce = CryptoBoxNonce . unCbNonce
instance Encoding CbNonce where
smpEncode = unCbNonce
smpP = CryptoBoxNonce <$> A.take 24
newtype CorrCbNonce = CorrCbNonce ByteString
instance CbNonceI CorrCbNonce where
unCbNonce (CorrCbNonce s) = s
instance Encoding CorrCbNonce where
smpEncode = smpEncode . unCbNonce
smpP = corrCbNonce <$?> smpP
newtype SbKey = SecretBoxKey {unSbKey :: ByteString}
deriving (Eq, Show)
deriving newtype (FromField)
+12 -4
View File
@@ -72,6 +72,7 @@ module Simplex.Messaging.Crypto.Ratchet
rcEncryptHeader,
rcEncryptMsg,
rcDecrypt,
maxSkippedMsgKeys,
-- used in tests
MsgHeader (..),
RatchetInitParams (..),
@@ -119,7 +120,7 @@ import Simplex.Messaging.Crypto.SNTRUP761.Bindings
import Simplex.Messaging.Encoding
import Simplex.Messaging.Encoding.String
import Simplex.Messaging.Parsers (defaultJSON, parseE, parseE')
import Simplex.Messaging.Util (($>>=), (<$?>))
import Simplex.Messaging.Util ((<$?>))
import Simplex.Messaging.Version
import Simplex.Messaging.Version.Internal
import UnliftIO.STM
@@ -327,9 +328,13 @@ instance StrEncoding AnyE2ERatchetParamsUri where
Nothing -> pure $ AnyE2ERatchetParamsUri SRKSProposed a $ E2ERatchetParamsUri vr k1 k2 Nothing
_ -> fail "bad e2e params"
where
kemP query =
queryParam_ "kem_key" query
$>>= \k -> Just . kemParams k <$> queryParam_ "kem_ct" query
kemP query = do
k_ <- queryParam_ "kem_key" query
ct_ <- queryParam_ "kem_ct" query
case (k_, ct_) of
(Just k, _) -> pure $ Just $ kemParams k ct_
(Nothing, Nothing) -> pure Nothing
(Nothing, Just _) -> fail "bad e2e params: kem_ct without kem_key"
kemParams k = \case
Nothing -> ARKP SRKSProposed $ RKParamsProposed k
Just ct -> ARKP SRKSAccepted $ RKParamsAccepted ct k
@@ -958,6 +963,9 @@ type DecryptResult a = (Either CryptoError ByteString, Ratchet a, SkippedMsgDiff
maxSkip :: Word32
maxSkip = 512
maxSkippedMsgKeys :: Int
maxSkippedMsgKeys = 2000
rcDecrypt ::
forall a.
(AlgorithmI a, DhAlgorithm a) =>
@@ -16,6 +16,8 @@ module Simplex.Messaging.Crypto.SNTRUP761.Bindings
) where
import Control.Concurrent.STM
import Control.Exception (throwIO)
import Control.Monad (when)
import Crypto.Random (ChaChaDRG)
import Data.Aeson (FromJSON (..), ToJSON (..))
import Data.Bifunctor (bimap)
@@ -23,6 +25,7 @@ import Data.ByteArray (ScrubbedBytes)
import qualified Data.ByteArray as BA
import Data.ByteString (ByteString)
import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.DB (FromField (..), ToField (..))
import qualified Simplex.Messaging.Crypto as C
import Simplex.Messaging.Crypto.SNTRUP761.Bindings.Defines
import Simplex.Messaging.Crypto.SNTRUP761.Bindings.FFI
import Simplex.Messaging.Crypto.SNTRUP761.Bindings.RNG (rngFuncPtr, withDRG)
@@ -55,14 +58,13 @@ pattern KEMSharedKey s <- KEMSharedKey_ s
type KEMKeyPair = (KEMPublicKey, KEMSecretKey)
sntrup761Keypair :: TVar ChaChaDRG -> IO KEMKeyPair
sntrup761Keypair drg =
bimap KEMPublicKey_ KEMSecretKey
<$> BA.allocRet
c_SNTRUP761_SECRETKEY_SIZE
( \skPtr ->
BA.alloc c_SNTRUP761_PUBLICKEY_SIZE $ \pkPtr ->
withDRG drg $ \cxtPtr -> c_sntrup761_keypair pkPtr skPtr cxtPtr rngFuncPtr
)
sntrup761Keypair drg = do
((r, pk), sk) <-
BA.allocRet c_SNTRUP761_SECRETKEY_SIZE $ \skPtr ->
BA.allocRet c_SNTRUP761_PUBLICKEY_SIZE $ \pkPtr ->
withDRG drg $ \cxtPtr -> c_sntrup761_keypair pkPtr skPtr cxtPtr rngFuncPtr
when (r /= 0) $ throwIO C.CryptoKEMKeyGenError
pure (KEMPublicKey_ pk, KEMSecretKey sk)
sntrup761Enc :: TVar ChaChaDRG -> KEMPublicKey -> IO (KEMCiphertext, KEMSharedKey)
sntrup761Enc drg (KEMPublicKey pk) =
@@ -10,9 +10,9 @@ import Foreign
import Foreign.C
import Simplex.Messaging.Crypto.SNTRUP761.Bindings.RNG (RNGContext, RNGFunc)
-- void sntrup761_keypair (uint8_t *pk, uint8_t *sk, void *random_ctx, sntrup761_random_func *random);
-- int sntrup761_keypair (uint8_t *pk, uint8_t *sk, void *random_ctx, sntrup761_random_func *random);
foreign import ccall "sntrup761_keypair"
c_sntrup761_keypair :: Ptr Word8 -> Ptr Word8 -> Ptr RNGContext -> FunPtr RNGFunc -> IO ()
c_sntrup761_keypair :: Ptr Word8 -> Ptr Word8 -> Ptr RNGContext -> FunPtr RNGFunc -> IO CInt
-- void sntrup761_enc (uint8_t *c, uint8_t *k, const uint8_t *pk, void *random_ctx, sntrup761_random_func *random);
foreign import ccall "sntrup761_enc"
+5 -3
View File
@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ module Simplex.Messaging.Crypto.ShortLink
encodeSignUserData,
newOwnerAuth,
encryptLinkData,
encryptFixedData,
encryptUserData,
decryptLinkData,
)
@@ -84,9 +85,10 @@ newOwnerAuth g ownerId signingKey = do
pure (ownerPrivKey, OwnerAuth {ownerId, ownerKey, authOwnerSig})
encryptLinkData :: TVar ChaChaDRG -> C.SbKey -> (ByteString, ByteString) -> ExceptT AgentErrorType IO QueueLinkData
encryptLinkData g k = bimapM (encrypt fixedDataPaddedLength) (encrypt userDataPaddedLength)
where
encrypt len = encryptData g k len
encryptLinkData g k = bimapM (encryptFixedData g k) (encryptUserData g k)
encryptFixedData :: TVar ChaChaDRG -> C.SbKey -> ByteString -> ExceptT AgentErrorType IO EncDataBytes
encryptFixedData g k s = encryptData g k fixedDataPaddedLength s
encryptUserData :: TVar ChaChaDRG -> C.SbKey -> ByteString -> ExceptT AgentErrorType IO EncDataBytes
encryptUserData g k s = encryptData g k userDataPaddedLength s
@@ -1,5 +1,6 @@
SET statement_timeout = 0;
SET lock_timeout = 0;
SET idle_in_transaction_session_timeout = 0;
@@ -312,3 +313,4 @@ ALTER TABLE ONLY ntf_server.subscriptions
+80 -40
View File
@@ -145,7 +145,10 @@ module Simplex.Messaging.Protocol
RcvNtfDhSecret,
Message (..),
RcvMessage (..),
MsgId,
MsgId (unMsgId),
mkMsgId,
unsafeMsgId,
randomMsgId,
MsgBody,
IdsHash (..),
ServiceSub (..),
@@ -168,6 +171,7 @@ module Simplex.Messaging.Protocol
EncFwdTransmission (..),
EncResponse (..),
EncTransmission (..),
encTransmissionNonce,
FwdResponse (..),
FwdTransmission (..),
NameRecord (..),
@@ -232,8 +236,10 @@ module Simplex.Messaging.Protocol
where
import Control.Applicative (optional, (<|>))
import Control.Concurrent.STM (STM, TVar)
import Control.Exception (Exception, SomeException, displayException, fromException)
import Control.Monad.Except
import Crypto.Random (ChaChaDRG)
import Data.Aeson (FromJSON (..), ToJSON (..))
import qualified Data.Aeson as J
import qualified Data.Aeson.TH as J
@@ -268,7 +274,7 @@ import qualified GHC.TypeLits as TE
import qualified GHC.TypeLits as Type
import Network.Socket (ServiceName)
import qualified Network.TLS as TLS
import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.DB (Binary (..), FromField (..), ToField (..))
import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.DB (Binary (..), FromField (..), ToField (..), blobFieldDecoder)
import qualified Simplex.Messaging.Crypto as C
import Simplex.Messaging.Encoding
import Simplex.Messaging.Encoding.String
@@ -702,19 +708,24 @@ instance Encoding NewNtfCreds where
newtype EncTransmission = EncTransmission ByteString
deriving (Show)
encTransmissionNonce :: C.CbNonceI n => VersionSMP -> n -> C.CbNonce
encTransmissionNonce v nonce
| v >= fwdNoncesSMPVersion = C.xorNonce (smpEncode v) nonce
| otherwise = C.toCbNonce nonce
data FwdTransmission = FwdTransmission
{ fwdCorrId :: CorrId,
{ fwdCorrId :: C.CorrCbNonce,
fwdVersion :: VersionSMP,
fwdKey :: C.PublicKeyX25519,
fwdTransmission :: EncTransmission
}
instance Encoding FwdTransmission where
smpEncode FwdTransmission {fwdCorrId = CorrId corrId, fwdVersion, fwdKey, fwdTransmission = EncTransmission t} =
smpEncode (corrId, fwdVersion, fwdKey, Tail t)
smpEncode FwdTransmission {fwdCorrId, fwdVersion, fwdKey, fwdTransmission = EncTransmission t} =
smpEncode (fwdCorrId, fwdVersion, fwdKey, Tail t)
smpP = do
(corrId, fwdVersion, fwdKey, Tail t) <- smpP
pure FwdTransmission {fwdCorrId = CorrId corrId, fwdVersion, fwdKey, fwdTransmission = EncTransmission t}
(fwdCorrId, fwdVersion, fwdKey, Tail t) <- smpP
pure FwdTransmission {fwdCorrId, fwdVersion, fwdKey, fwdTransmission = EncTransmission t}
newtype EncFwdTransmission = EncFwdTransmission ByteString
deriving (Show)
@@ -737,8 +748,8 @@ data BrokerMsg where
NMSG :: C.CbNonce -> EncNMsgMeta -> BrokerMsg
-- Should include certificate chain
PKEY :: SessionId -> VersionRangeSMP -> CertChainPubKey -> BrokerMsg -- TLS-signed server key for proxy shared secret and initial sender key
RRES :: EncFwdResponse -> BrokerMsg -- relay to proxy
PRES :: EncResponse -> BrokerMsg -- proxy to client
RRES :: Maybe C.CbNonce -> EncFwdResponse -> BrokerMsg -- relay to proxy
PRES :: Maybe C.CbNonce -> EncResponse -> BrokerMsg -- proxy to client
END :: BrokerMsg
ENDS :: Int64 -> IdsHash -> BrokerMsg
DELD :: BrokerMsg
@@ -760,16 +771,16 @@ newtype EncFwdResponse = EncFwdResponse ByteString
deriving (Eq, Show)
data FwdResponse = FwdResponse
{ fwdCorrId :: CorrId,
{ fwdCorrId :: C.CorrCbNonce,
fwdResponse :: EncResponse
}
instance Encoding FwdResponse where
smpEncode FwdResponse {fwdCorrId = CorrId corrId, fwdResponse = EncResponse t} =
smpEncode (corrId, Tail t)
smpEncode FwdResponse {fwdCorrId, fwdResponse = EncResponse t} =
smpEncode (fwdCorrId, Tail t)
smpP = do
(corrId, Tail t) <- smpP
pure FwdResponse {fwdCorrId = CorrId corrId, fwdResponse = EncResponse t}
(fwdCorrId, Tail t) <- smpP
pure FwdResponse {fwdCorrId, fwdResponse = EncResponse t}
newtype EncResponse = EncResponse ByteString
deriving (Eq, Show)
@@ -792,7 +803,7 @@ toMsgInfo = \case
Message {msgId, msgTs} -> msgInfo msgId msgTs MTMessage
MessageQuota {msgId, msgTs} -> msgInfo msgId msgTs MTQuota
where
msgInfo msgId msgTs msgType = MsgInfo {msgId = decodeLatin1 $ B64.encode msgId, msgTs = systemToUTCTime msgTs, msgType}
msgInfo msgId msgTs msgType = MsgInfo {msgId = decodeLatin1 $ B64.encode $ unMsgId msgId, msgTs = systemToUTCTime msgTs, msgType}
messageId :: Message -> MsgId
messageId = \case
@@ -1493,7 +1504,34 @@ type RcvNtfPublicDhKey = C.PublicKeyX25519
type RcvNtfDhSecret = C.DhSecretX25519
-- | SMP message server ID.
type MsgId = ByteString
newtype MsgId = MsgId {unMsgId :: ByteString}
deriving (Eq, Show)
instance C.CbNonceI MsgId where
unCbNonce (MsgId s) = B.take 24 s
instance Encoding MsgId where
smpEncode (MsgId s) = smpEncode s
smpP = mkMsgId <$?> smpP
instance StrEncoding MsgId where
strEncode (MsgId s) = strEncode s
strP = mkMsgId <$?> strP
instance FromField MsgId where fromField = blobFieldDecoder mkMsgId
instance ToField MsgId where toField (MsgId s) = toField $ Binary s
mkMsgId :: ByteString -> Either String MsgId
mkMsgId s
| B.length s >= 24 = Right $ MsgId s
| otherwise = Left "MsgId: invalid length"
unsafeMsgId :: ByteString -> MsgId
unsafeMsgId s = either error id $ mkMsgId s
randomMsgId :: Int -> TVar ChaChaDRG -> STM MsgId
randomMsgId n = fmap MsgId . C.randomBytes (max 24 n)
-- | SMP message body.
type MsgBody = ByteString
@@ -1818,8 +1856,7 @@ instance PartyI p => ProtocolEncoding SMPVersion ErrorType (Command p) where
encodeProtocol v = \case
NEW NewQueueReq {rcvAuthKey = rKey, rcvDhKey = dhKey, auth_, subMode, queueReqData, ntfCreds}
| v >= newNtfCredsSMPVersion -> new <> e (subMode, queueReqData, ntfCreds)
| v >= shortLinksSMPVersion -> new <> e (subMode, queueReqData)
| otherwise -> new <> e (subMode, senderCanSecure (queueReqMode <$> queueReqData))
| otherwise -> new <> e (subMode, queueReqData)
where
new = e (NEW_, ' ', rKey, dhKey, auth_)
SUB -> e SUB_
@@ -1906,20 +1943,18 @@ instance ProtocolEncoding SMPVersion ErrorType Cmd where
CT SCreator NEW_ -> Cmd SCreator <$> newCmd
where
newCmd
| v >= newNtfCredsSMPVersion = new smpP smpP
| v >= shortLinksSMPVersion = new smpP nothing
| otherwise = new (qReq <$> smpP) nothing
| v >= newNtfCredsSMPVersion = new smpP
| otherwise = new nothing
where
nothing = pure Nothing
new p2 p3 = NEW <$> do
new p3 = NEW <$> do
rcvAuthKey <- _smpP
rcvDhKey <- smpP
auth_ <- smpP
subMode <- smpP
queueReqData <- p2
queueReqData <- smpP
ntfCreds <- p3
pure NewQueueReq {rcvAuthKey, rcvDhKey, auth_, subMode, queueReqData, ntfCreds}
qReq sndSecure = Just $ if sndSecure then QRMessaging Nothing else QRContact Nothing
CT SRecipient tag ->
Cmd SRecipient <$> case tag of
SUB_ -> pure SUB
@@ -1970,8 +2005,7 @@ instance ProtocolEncoding SMPVersion ErrorType BrokerMsg where
IDS QIK {rcvId, sndId, rcvPublicDhKey = srvDh, queueMode, linkId, serviceId, serverNtfCreds}
| v >= newNtfCredsSMPVersion -> ids <> e (queueMode, linkId, serviceId, serverNtfCreds)
| v >= serviceCertsSMPVersion -> ids <> e (queueMode, linkId, serviceId)
| v >= shortLinksSMPVersion -> ids <> e (queueMode, linkId)
| otherwise -> ids <> e (senderCanSecure queueMode)
| otherwise -> ids <> e (queueMode, linkId)
where
ids = e (IDS_, ' ', rcvId, sndId, srvDh)
LNK sId d -> e (LNK_, ' ', sId, d)
@@ -1985,8 +2019,8 @@ instance ProtocolEncoding SMPVersion ErrorType BrokerMsg where
NID nId srvNtfDh -> e (NID_, ' ', nId, srvNtfDh)
NMSG nmsgNonce encNMsgMeta -> e (NMSG_, ' ', nmsgNonce, encNMsgMeta)
PKEY sid vr certKey -> e (PKEY_, ' ', sid, vr, certKey)
RRES (EncFwdResponse encBlock) -> e (RRES_, ' ', Tail encBlock)
PRES (EncResponse encBlock) -> e (PRES_, ' ', Tail encBlock)
RRES nonce_ (EncFwdResponse encBlock) -> fwdResp RRES_ nonce_ encBlock
PRES nonce_ (EncResponse encBlock) -> fwdResp PRES_ nonce_ encBlock
END -> e END_
ENDS n idsHash -> serviceResp ENDS_ n idsHash
DELD -> e DELD_
@@ -2010,6 +2044,9 @@ instance ProtocolEncoding SMPVersion ErrorType BrokerMsg where
serviceResp tag n idsHash
| v >= rcvServiceSMPVersion = e (tag, ' ', n, idsHash)
| otherwise = e (tag, ' ', n)
fwdResp tag nonce_ encBlock
| v >= fwdNoncesSMPVersion = e (tag, ' ', nonce_, Tail encBlock)
| otherwise = e (tag, ' ', Tail encBlock)
protocolP v = \case
MSG_ -> do
@@ -2019,19 +2056,17 @@ instance ProtocolEncoding SMPVersion ErrorType BrokerMsg where
bodyP = EncRcvMsgBody . unTail <$> smpP
ALLS_ -> pure ALLS
IDS_
| v >= newNtfCredsSMPVersion -> ids smpP smpP smpP smpP
| v >= serviceCertsSMPVersion -> ids smpP smpP smpP nothing
| v >= shortLinksSMPVersion -> ids smpP smpP nothing nothing
| otherwise -> ids (qm <$> smpP) nothing nothing nothing
| v >= newNtfCredsSMPVersion -> ids smpP smpP
| v >= serviceCertsSMPVersion -> ids smpP nothing
| otherwise -> ids nothing nothing
where
qm sndSecure = Just $ if sndSecure then QMMessaging else QMContact
nothing = pure Nothing
ids p1 p2 p3 p4 = do
ids p3 p4 = do
rcvId <- _smpP
sndId <- smpP
rcvPublicDhKey <- smpP
queueMode <- p1
linkId <- p2
queueMode <- smpP
linkId <- smpP
serviceId <- p3
serverNtfCreds <- p4
pure $ IDS QIK {rcvId, sndId, rcvPublicDhKey, queueMode, linkId, serviceId, serverNtfCreds}
@@ -2041,8 +2076,8 @@ instance ProtocolEncoding SMPVersion ErrorType BrokerMsg where
NID_ -> NID <$> _smpP <*> smpP
NMSG_ -> NMSG <$> _smpP <*> smpP
PKEY_ -> PKEY <$> _smpP <*> smpP <*> smpP
RRES_ -> RRES <$> (EncFwdResponse . unTail <$> _smpP)
PRES_ -> PRES <$> (EncResponse . unTail <$> _smpP)
RRES_ -> fwdRespP RRES EncFwdResponse
PRES_ -> fwdRespP PRES EncResponse
END_ -> pure END
ENDS_ -> serviceRespP ENDS
DELD_ -> pure DELD
@@ -2059,6 +2094,9 @@ instance ProtocolEncoding SMPVersion ErrorType BrokerMsg where
serviceRespP resp
| v >= rcvServiceSMPVersion = resp <$> _smpP <*> smpP
| otherwise = resp <$> _smpP <*> pure mempty
fwdRespP :: (Maybe C.CbNonce -> a -> BrokerMsg) -> (ByteString -> a) -> Parser BrokerMsg
fwdRespP resp enc = resp <$> (A.space *> nonceP) <*> (enc <$> A.takeByteString)
nonceP = if v >= fwdNoncesSMPVersion then smpP else pure Nothing
fromProtocolError = \case
PECmdSyntax -> CMD SYNTAX
@@ -2075,7 +2113,7 @@ instance ProtocolEncoding SMPVersion ErrorType BrokerMsg where
-- PONG response must not have queue ID
PONG -> noEntityMsg
PKEY {} -> noEntityMsg
RRES _ -> noEntityMsg
RRES {} -> noEntityMsg
ALLS -> noEntityMsg
RNAME {} -> noEntityMsg
-- other broker responses must have queue ID
@@ -2411,7 +2449,9 @@ tDecodeServer THandleParams {sessionId, thVersion = v, implySessId} = \case
where
cmdOrErr = parseProtocol @v @err @cmd v command >>= checkCredentials tAuth entityId
t :: a -> (CorrId, EntityId, a)
t = (corrId,entityId,)
-- IDs are slices of the ~16 KB received block and are kept as subscription keys,
-- so without a copy one live key retains the whole block
t = (CorrId $ B.copy $ bs corrId,EntityId $ B.copy $ unEntityId entityId,)
Left _ -> tError corrId PEBlock
| otherwise -> tError corrId PESession
Left _ -> tError "" PEBlock
+55 -24
View File
@@ -1145,14 +1145,16 @@ cancelSub s = case subThread s of
type VerifiedTransmissionOrError s = Either (Transmission BrokerMsg) (VerifiedTransmission s)
receive :: forall c s. (Transport c, MsgStoreClass s) => THandleSMP c 'TServer -> s -> Client s -> M s ()
receive h@THandle {params = THandleParams {thAuth, sessionId}} ms Client {rcvQ, sndQ, rcvActiveAt} = do
receive h@THandle {params = THandleParams {thAuth, sessionId}} ms c@Client {rcvQ, rcvActiveAt} = do
labelMyThread . B.unpack $ "client $" <> encode sessionId <> " receive"
sa <- asks serverActive
stats <- asks serverStats
authDelay <- asks $ authErrorDelay . config
liftIO $ forever $ do
ts <- tGetServer h
unlessM (readTVarIO sa) $ throwIO $ userError "server stopped"
atomically . (writeTVar rcvActiveAt $!) =<< getSystemTime
receivedAt <- getSystemTime
atomically $ writeTVar rcvActiveAt $! receivedAt
let (es, ts') = partitionEithers $ L.toList ts
errs = map (second ERR) es
errs' <- case ts' of
@@ -1168,7 +1170,7 @@ receive h@THandle {params = THandleParams {thAuth, sessionId}} ms Client {rcvQ,
mapM_ (atomically . writeTBQueue rcvQ) $ L.nonEmpty cmds
pure $ errs ++ errs'
[] -> pure errs
mapM_ (atomically . writeTBQueue sndQ . (,[])) $ L.nonEmpty errs'
mapM_ (sendResponses c stats authDelay receivedAt . (,[])) $ L.nonEmpty errs'
where
sameParty :: SParty p -> SignedTransmission Cmd -> Bool
sameParty p (_, _, (_, _, Cmd p' _)) = isJust $ testEquality p p'
@@ -1191,6 +1193,27 @@ receive h@THandle {params = THandleParams {thAuth, sessionId}} ms Client {rcvQ,
GET -> incStat $ msgGetAuth stats
_ -> pure ()
isAuthError :: Transmission BrokerMsg -> Bool
isAuthError (_, _, r) = case r of
ERR AUTH -> True
_ -> False
sendResponses :: Client s -> ServerStats -> Int64 -> SystemTime -> (NonEmpty (Transmission BrokerMsg), [Transmission BrokerMsg]) -> IO ()
sendResponses c@Client {sndQ} stats authDelay since rs@(ts, _)
| any isAuthError ts = sendAfterDelay c stats authDelay since rs
| otherwise = atomically $ writeTBQueue sndQ rs
sendAfterDelay :: Client s -> ServerStats -> Int64 -> SystemTime -> (NonEmpty (Transmission BrokerMsg), [Transmission BrokerMsg]) -> IO ()
sendAfterDelay c@Client {sndQ, clientTHParams = THandleParams {sessionId}} stats delay since rs
| delay > 0 = do
elapsed <- subtract (microseconds since) . microseconds <$> getSystemTime
when (elapsed >= delay) $ incStat $ authDelayExceeded stats
forkClient c (B.unpack $ "client $" <> encode sessionId <> " auth") $ threadDelay' (delay - elapsed `mod` delay) >> write
| otherwise = write
where
write = atomically $ writeTBQueue sndQ rs
microseconds (MkSystemTime s ns) = s * 1000000 + fromIntegral (ns `div` 1000)
send :: Transport c => MVar (THandleSMP c 'TServer) -> Client s -> IO ()
send th c@Client {sndQ, msgQ, clientTHParams = THandleParams {sessionId}} = do
labelMyThread . B.unpack $ "client $" <> encode sessionId <> " send"
@@ -1319,11 +1342,6 @@ isContactQueue QueueRec {queueMode, senderKey} = case queueMode of
Just QMContact -> True
Nothing -> isNothing senderKey -- for backward compatibility with pre-SKEY contact addresses
isSecuredMsgQueue :: QueueRec -> Bool
isSecuredMsgQueue QueueRec {queueMode, senderKey} = case queueMode of
Just QMContact -> False
_ -> isJust senderKey
-- Random correlation ID is used as a nonce in case crypto_box authenticator is used to authorize transmission
verifyCmdAuthorization :: Maybe (THandleAuth 'TServer) -> Maybe TAuthorizations -> ByteString -> CorrId -> C.APublicAuthKey -> Bool
verifyCmdAuthorization thAuth tAuth authorized corrId key = maybe False (verify key) tAuth
@@ -1339,7 +1357,7 @@ verifyCmdAuthorization thAuth tAuth authorized corrId key = maybe False (verify
verifyCmdAuth :: Maybe (THandleAuth 'TServer) -> C.PublicKeyX25519 -> C.CbAuthenticator -> ByteString -> CorrId -> Bool
verifyCmdAuth thAuth k authenticator authorized (CorrId corrId) = case thAuth of
Just THAuthServer {serverPrivKey = pk} -> C.cbVerify k pk (C.cbNonce corrId) authenticator authorized
Just THAuthServer {serverPrivKey = pk} -> either (const False) (\nonce -> C.cbVerify k pk nonce authenticator authorized) $ C.cbNonce corrId
Nothing -> False
dummyVerifyCmd :: Maybe (THandleAuth 'TServer) -> Maybe TAuthorizations -> ByteString -> CorrId -> Bool
@@ -1379,15 +1397,18 @@ client
ms
clnt@Client {clientId, rcvQ, sndQ, msgQ, clientTHParams = thParams'@THandleParams {sessionId}, procThreads} = do
labelMyThread . B.unpack $ "client $" <> encode sessionId <> " commands"
stats <- asks serverStats
authDelay <- asks $ authErrorDelay . config
let clntServiceId = (\THClientService {serviceId} -> serviceId) <$> (peerClientService =<< thAuth thParams')
process batchSubs t acc@(rs, msgs) =
(maybe acc (\(!r, !msg_) -> (r : rs, maybe msgs (: msgs) msg_)))
<$> processCommand clntServiceId batchSubs t
forever $ do
batch <- atomically (readTBQueue rcvQ)
processedAt <- liftIO getSystemTime
batchSubs <- prepareBatchSubs clntServiceId batch
foldrM (process batchSubs) ([], []) batch
>>= \(rs_, msgs) -> mapM_ (atomically . writeTBQueue sndQ . (,msgs)) (L.nonEmpty rs_)
>>= \(rs_, msgs) -> mapM_ (liftIO . sendResponses clnt stats authDelay processedAt . (,msgs)) (L.nonEmpty rs_)
where
prepareBatchSubs ::
Maybe ServiceId ->
@@ -1458,17 +1479,18 @@ client
ServerStats {pMsgFwds, pMsgFwdsOwn} <- asks serverStats
let inc = mkIncProxyStats pMsgFwds pMsgFwdsOwn
liftIO (lookupSMPServerClient a sessId) >>= \case
Just (own, smp) -> do
Just (own, smp) | Right fwdCorrId <- C.corrCbNonce (bs corrId) -> do
inc own pRequests
forkProxiedCmd $ do
liftIO (runExceptT (forwardSMPTransmission smp corrId fwdV pubKey encBlock) `E.catches` clientHandlers) >>= \case
Right r -> PRES r <$ inc own pSuccesses
liftIO (runExceptT (forwardSMPTransmission smp fwdCorrId fwdV pubKey encBlock) `E.catches` clientHandlers) >>= \case
Right (nonce_, r) -> PRES nonce_ r <$ inc own pSuccesses
Left e -> ERR (smpProxyError e) <$ case e of
PCEProtocolError {} -> inc own pSuccesses
PCEResponseTimeout -> do
inc own pErrorsOther
liftIO $ closeTimedOutClient (smpPingCount $ networkConfig $ smpCfg $ agentCfg a) smp
_ -> inc own pErrorsOther
Just _ -> pure $ Just $ ERR $ CMD SYNTAX
Nothing -> inc False pRequests >> inc False pErrorsConnect $> Just (ERR $ PROXY NO_SESSION)
where
forkProxiedCmd :: M s BrokerMsg -> M s (Maybe BrokerMsg)
@@ -1958,7 +1980,7 @@ client
getDelivered :: Sub -> STM (Maybe (ServerSub, SystemSeconds))
getDelivered Sub {delivered, subThread} = do
readTVar delivered $>>= \(msgId', ts) ->
if msgId == msgId' || B.null msgId
if msgId == msgId'
then writeTVar delivered Nothing $> Just (subThread, ts)
else pure Nothing
updateStats :: ServerStats -> Bool -> SystemSeconds -> Message -> IO ()
@@ -2004,7 +2026,7 @@ client
when (isJust (queueData qr) && isSecuredMsgQueue qr) $ void $ liftIO $
deleteQueueLinkData (queueStore ms) q
ServerConfig {messageExpiration, expireMessagesOnSend, msgIdBytes} <- asks config
msgId <- randomId' msgIdBytes
msgId <- atomically . randomMsgId msgIdBytes =<< asks random
msg_ <- liftIO $ runExceptT $ do
when expireMessagesOnSend $ mapM_ (expireMessages stats) messageExpiration
msg <- liftIO $ mkMessage msgId body
@@ -2117,7 +2139,7 @@ client
liftIO $ storeNtf ns nId ntf
incStat . ntfCount =<< asks serverStats
mkMessageNotification :: ByteString -> SystemTime -> RcvNtfDhSecret -> M s MsgNtf
mkMessageNotification :: MsgId -> SystemTime -> RcvNtfDhSecret -> M s MsgNtf
mkMessageNotification msgId msgTs rcvNtfDhSecret = do
ntfNonce <- atomically . C.randomCbNonce =<< asks random
let msgMeta = NMsgMeta {msgId, msgTs}
@@ -2126,15 +2148,16 @@ client
processForwardedCommand :: EncFwdTransmission -> M s (Maybe BrokerMsg)
processForwardedCommand (EncFwdTransmission s) = fmap (either (Just . ERR) id) . runExceptT $ do
startedAt <- liftIO getSystemTime
THAuthServer {serverPrivKey, sessSecret'} <- maybe (throwE $ transportErr TENoServerAuth) pure (thAuth thParams')
sessSecret <- maybe (throwE $ transportErr TENoServerAuth) pure sessSecret'
let proxyNonce = C.cbNonce $ bs corrId
proxyNonce <- liftEitherWith (const CRYPTO) $ C.cbNonce $ bs corrId
s' <- liftEitherWith (const CRYPTO) $ C.cbDecryptNoPad sessSecret proxyNonce s
FwdTransmission {fwdCorrId, fwdVersion, fwdKey, fwdTransmission = EncTransmission et} <- liftEitherWith (const $ CMD SYNTAX) $ smpDecode s'
unless (fwdVersion `isCompatible` thServerVRange thParams') $ throwE $ transportErr TEVersion
let clientSecret = C.dh' fwdKey serverPrivKey
clientNonce = C.cbNonce $ bs fwdCorrId
b <- liftEitherWith (const CRYPTO) $ C.cbDecrypt clientSecret clientNonce et
clientNonce = fwdCorrId
b <- liftEitherWith (const CRYPTO) $ C.cbDecrypt clientSecret (encTransmissionNonce fwdVersion clientNonce) et
let clntTHParams = smpTHParamsSetVersion fwdVersion thParams'
-- only allowing single forwarded transactions
t' <- case tParse clntTHParams b of
@@ -2147,9 +2170,13 @@ client
TBError _ _ : _ -> throwE BLOCK
TBTransmission b' _ : _ -> pure b'
TBTransmissions b' _ _ : _ -> pure b'
r2 <- liftEitherWith (const BLOCK) $ EncResponse <$> C.cbEncrypt clientSecret (C.reverseNonce clientNonce) r' paddedProxiedTLength
nonce_ <-
if fwdVersion >= fwdNoncesSMPVersion
then Just <$> (atomically . C.randomCbNonce =<< asks random)
else pure Nothing
r2 <- liftEitherWith (const BLOCK) $ EncResponse <$> C.cbEncrypt clientSecret (fromMaybe (C.reverseNonce clientNonce) nonce_) r' paddedProxiedTLength
let fr = FwdResponse {fwdCorrId, fwdResponse = r2}
pure $ RRES $ EncFwdResponse $ C.cbEncryptNoPad sessSecret (C.reverseNonce proxyNonce) (smpEncode fr)
pure $ RRES nonce_ $ EncFwdResponse $ C.cbEncryptNoPad sessSecret (C.reverseNonce proxyNonce) (smpEncode fr)
-- the inner response, or Nothing if forked (RSLV).
r_ <- lift (rejectOrVerify clntThAuth t') >>= \case
-- rejectOrVerify filters allowed commands, no need to repeat it here.
@@ -2165,7 +2192,11 @@ client
_ -> Just . maybe (corrId', entId', ERR INTERNAL) fst <$> lift (processCommand Nothing (Right (M.empty, M.empty, M.empty)) t'')
stats <- asks serverStats
incStat $ pMsgFwdsRecv stats
traverse encodeResp r_
traverse encodeResp r_ >>= \case
Just rres | any isAuthError r_ -> do
authDelay <- asks $ authErrorDelay . config
Nothing <$ liftIO (sendAfterDelay clnt stats authDelay startedAt ([(corrId, NoEntity, rres)], []))
rres_ -> pure rres_
where
rejectOrVerify :: Maybe (THandleAuth 'TServer) -> SignedTransmissionOrError ErrorType Cmd -> M s (VerifiedTransmissionOrError s)
rejectOrVerify clntThAuth = \case
@@ -2191,7 +2222,7 @@ client
MessageQuota {} -> RcvMsgQuota msgTs'
where
encrypt :: KnownNat i => C.MaxLenBS i -> RcvMessage
encrypt body = RcvMessage msgId' . EncRcvMsgBody $ C.cbEncryptMaxLenBS (rcvDhSecret qr) (C.cbNonce msgId') body
encrypt body = RcvMessage msgId' . EncRcvMsgBody $ C.cbEncryptMaxLenBS (rcvDhSecret qr) msgId' body
msgId' = messageId msg
msgTs' = messageTs msg
@@ -2240,7 +2271,7 @@ client
SubPending -> QSubPending
SubThread _ -> QSubThread
ProhibitSub -> pure QProhibitSub
qDelivered <- decodeLatin1 . encode . fst <$$> readTVarIO delivered
qDelivered <- decodeLatin1 . encode . unMsgId . fst <$$> readTVarIO delivered
pure QSub {qSubThread, qDelivered}
ok :: Transmission BrokerMsg
+9 -1
View File
@@ -68,6 +68,7 @@ module Simplex.Messaging.Server.Env.STM
defaultInactiveClientExpiration,
defaultProxyClientConcurrency,
defaultNameResolverConcurrency,
defaultAuthErrorDelayMs,
defaultMaxJournalMsgCount,
defaultMaxJournalStateLines,
defaultIdleQueueInterval,
@@ -187,6 +188,7 @@ data ServerConfig s = ServerConfig
ntfDeliveryInterval :: Int,
-- | interval between sending pending END events to unsubscribed clients, seconds
pendingENDInterval :: Int,
authErrorDelay :: Int64,
smpCredentials :: ServerCredentials,
httpCredentials :: Maybe ServerCredentials,
-- | SMP client-server protocol version range
@@ -255,6 +257,9 @@ defaultProxyClientConcurrency = 32
defaultNameResolverConcurrency :: Int
defaultNameResolverConcurrency = 1000
defaultAuthErrorDelayMs :: Int64
defaultAuthErrorDelayMs = 50
journalMsgStoreDepth :: Int
journalMsgStoreDepth = 5
@@ -571,7 +576,10 @@ newProhibitedSub = do
return Sub {subThread = ProhibitSub, delivered}
newEnv :: ServerConfig s -> IO (Env s)
newEnv config@ServerConfig {smpCredentials, httpCredentials, serverStoreCfg, smpAgentCfg, information, messageExpiration, idleQueueInterval, msgQueueQuota, maxJournalMsgCount, maxJournalStateLines, namesConfig} = do
newEnv config@ServerConfig {smpCredentials, httpCredentials, serverStoreCfg, smpAgentCfg, information, messageExpiration, idleQueueInterval, msgQueueQuota, maxJournalMsgCount, maxJournalStateLines, namesConfig, msgIdBytes} = do
when (msgIdBytes < 24) $ do
logError "Error: msgIdBytes must be at least 24"
exitFailure
serverActive <- newTVarIO True
server <- newServer
msgStore_ <- case serverStoreCfg of
+1
View File
@@ -580,6 +580,7 @@ smpServerCLI_ generateSite serveStaticFiles attachStaticFiles cfgPath logPath =
prometheusMetricsFile = combine logPath "smp-server-metrics.txt",
pendingENDInterval = 15000000, -- 15 seconds
ntfDeliveryInterval = 1500000, -- 1.5 second
authErrorDelay = 1000 * readIniDefault defaultAuthErrorDelayMs "TRANSPORT" "auth_error_delay_ms" ini,
smpServerVRange = supportedServerSMPRelayVRange,
transportConfig =
mkTransportServerConfig
+3 -1
View File
@@ -130,7 +130,9 @@ iniFileContent cfgPath logPath opts host basicAuth controlPortPwds =
<> ("host = " <> T.pack host <> "\n")
<> ("port = " <> defaultServerPorts <> "\n")
<> "log_tls_errors = off\n\n\
\# Use `websockets = 443` to run websockets server in addition to plain TLS.\n\
\# Minimum time to respond with AUTH error, milliseconds.\n"
<> ("# auth_error_delay_ms = " <> tshow defaultAuthErrorDelayMs <> "\n\n")
<> "# Use `websockets = 443` to run websockets server in addition to plain TLS.\n\
\# This option is deprecated and should be used for testing only.\n\
\# , port 443 should be specified in port above\n\
\websockets = off\n"
@@ -114,7 +114,9 @@ instance MsgStoreClass PostgresMsgStore where
where
st = dbStore $ queueStore_ ms
oldMsg = now - ttl
batchSize = 10000 :: Int
-- expired messages read per page in expire_old_messages, and the page is one
-- transaction: queues in it stay row-locked against SEND and ACK until it commits.
batchSize = 100 :: Int
toMessageStats (expiredMsgsCount, storedMsgsCount, storedQueues) =
MessageStats {expiredMsgsCount, storedMsgsCount, storedQueues}
@@ -200,7 +202,7 @@ instance MsgStoreClass PostgresMsgStore where
DB.query
db
"SELECT quota_written, was_empty FROM write_message(?,?,?,?,?,?,?)"
(recipientId' q, Binary (messageId msg), systemSeconds (messageTs msg), msgQuota, ntf, Binary body, quota)
(recipientId' q, messageId msg, systemSeconds (messageTs msg), msgQuota, ntf, Binary body, quota)
where
toResult = \case
((msgQuota, wasEmpty) : _) -> if msgQuota then Nothing else Just (msg, wasEmpty)
@@ -269,14 +271,14 @@ instance MsgStoreClass PostgresMsgStore where
uninterruptibleMask_ $
withDB' "tryDelMsg" (queueStore_ ms) $ \db ->
maybeFirstRow toMessage $
DB.query db "SELECT r_msg_id, r_msg_ts, r_msg_quota, r_msg_ntf_flag, r_msg_body FROM try_del_msg(?, ?)" (recipientId' q, Binary msgId)
DB.query db "SELECT r_msg_id, r_msg_ts, r_msg_quota, r_msg_ntf_flag, r_msg_body FROM try_del_msg(?, ?)" (recipientId' q, msgId)
tryDelPeekMsg :: PostgresMsgStore -> PostgresQueue -> MsgId -> ExceptT ErrorType IO (Maybe Message, Maybe Message)
tryDelPeekMsg ms q msgId =
uninterruptibleMask_ $
withDB' "tryDelPeekMsg" (queueStore_ ms) $ \db ->
toResult . map toMessage
<$> DB.query db "SELECT r_msg_id, r_msg_ts, r_msg_quota, r_msg_ntf_flag, r_msg_body FROM try_del_peek_msg(?, ?)" (recipientId' q, Binary msgId)
<$> DB.query db "SELECT r_msg_id, r_msg_ts, r_msg_quota, r_msg_ntf_flag, r_msg_body FROM try_del_peek_msg(?, ?)" (recipientId' q, msgId)
where
toResult = \case
[] -> (Nothing, Nothing)
@@ -295,13 +297,13 @@ uninterruptibleMask_ :: ExceptT ErrorType IO a -> ExceptT ErrorType IO a
uninterruptibleMask_ = ExceptT . E.uninterruptibleMask_ . runExceptT
{-# INLINE uninterruptibleMask_ #-}
toMaybeMessage :: (Maybe (Binary MsgId), Maybe Int64, Maybe Bool, Maybe Bool, Maybe (Binary MsgBody)) -> Maybe Message
toMaybeMessage :: (Maybe MsgId, Maybe Int64, Maybe Bool, Maybe Bool, Maybe (Binary MsgBody)) -> Maybe Message
toMaybeMessage = \case
(Just msgId, Just ts, Just msgQuota, Just ntf, Just body) -> Just $ toMessage (msgId, ts, msgQuota, ntf, body)
_ -> Nothing
toMessage :: (Binary MsgId, Int64, Bool, Bool, Binary MsgBody) -> Message
toMessage (Binary msgId, ts, msgQuota, ntf, Binary body)
toMessage :: (MsgId, Int64, Bool, Bool, Binary MsgBody) -> Message
toMessage (msgId, ts, msgQuota, ntf, Binary body)
| msgQuota = MessageQuota {msgId, msgTs}
| otherwise = Message {msgId, msgTs, msgFlags = MsgFlags ntf, msgBody = C.unsafeMaxLenBS body} -- TODO [messages] unsafeMaxLenBS?
where
@@ -363,8 +365,8 @@ deleteAllMessages ms =
db
[sql|
UPDATE msg_queues
SET msg_queue_size = 0, msg_can_write = TRUE, msg_queue_expire = FALSE
WHERE msg_queue_size != 0 OR msg_can_write = FALSE OR msg_queue_expire = TRUE
SET msg_queue_size = 0, msg_can_write = TRUE
WHERE msg_queue_size != 0 OR msg_can_write = FALSE
|]
updateQueueCounts :: PostgresMsgStore -> IO ()
@@ -384,16 +386,15 @@ updateQueueCounts ms =
db
[sql|
UPDATE msg_queues
SET msg_queue_size = 0, msg_can_write = TRUE, msg_queue_expire = FALSE
WHERE msg_queue_size != 0 OR msg_can_write = FALSE OR msg_queue_expire = TRUE
SET msg_queue_size = 0, msg_can_write = TRUE
WHERE msg_queue_size != 0 OR msg_can_write = FALSE
|]
void $ DB.execute_
db
[sql|
UPDATE msg_queues q
SET msg_queue_size = s.size,
msg_can_write = s.quota_count = 0,
msg_queue_expire = s.size > s.quota_count
msg_can_write = s.quota_count = 0
FROM queue_stats s
WHERE q.recipient_id = s.recipient_id
|]
@@ -428,7 +429,7 @@ messageRecToText rId msg =
tabFields = BB.char7 ',' `intersperse` fields
fields =
[ renderField (toField rId),
renderField (toField $ Binary (messageId msg)),
renderField (toField $ messageId msg),
renderField (toField $ systemSeconds (messageTs msg)),
renderField (toField msgQuota),
renderField (toField ntf),
@@ -126,6 +126,7 @@ prometheusMetrics sm rtm ts =
_ntfServices,
_rcvServicesSubMsg,
_rcvServicesSubDuplicate,
_authDelayExceeded,
_qCount,
_msgCount,
_ntfCount,
@@ -192,6 +193,10 @@ prometheusMetrics sm rtm ts =
\# HELP simplex_smp_queues_notify_monthly Monthly active queues with notifications.\n\
\# TYPE simplex_smp_queues_notify_monthly gauge\n\
\simplex_smp_queues_notify_monthly " <> mstr (monthCount psNtf) <> "\n# monthCountNtf\n\
\\n\
\# HELP simplex_smp_auth_delay_exceeded Responses with AUTH errors sent without delay, as processing took longer than the delay.\n\
\# TYPE simplex_smp_auth_delay_exceeded counter\n\
\simplex_smp_auth_delay_exceeded " <> mshow _authDelayExceeded <> "\n# authDelayExceeded\n\
\\n"
subscriptions =
"# Subscriptions\n\
@@ -13,12 +13,14 @@ module Simplex.Messaging.Server.QueueStore
ServiceRec (..),
CertFingerprint,
ServerEntityStatus (..),
isSecuredMsgQueue,
) where
import Control.Applicative (optional, (<|>))
import qualified Data.ByteString.Char8 as B
import Data.Functor (($>))
import Data.List.NonEmpty (NonEmpty)
import Data.Maybe (isJust)
import qualified Data.X509 as X
import qualified Data.X509.Validation as XV
import Simplex.Messaging.Encoding
@@ -48,6 +50,11 @@ data QueueRec = QueueRec
}
deriving (Show)
isSecuredMsgQueue :: QueueRec -> Bool
isSecuredMsgQueue QueueRec {queueMode, senderKey} = case queueMode of
Just QMContact -> False
_ -> isJust senderKey
data NtfCreds = NtfCreds
{ notifierId :: NotifierId,
notifierKey :: NtfPublicAuthKey,
@@ -314,9 +314,9 @@ instance StoreQueueClass q => QueueStoreClass q (PostgresQueueStore q) where
addQueueLinkData st sq lnkId d =
withQueueRec sq "addQueueLinkData" $ \q -> case queueData q of
Nothing ->
addLink q $ \db -> DB.execute db qry (d :. (lnkId, rId))
addLink q $ \db -> DB.execute db qry (d :. (lnkId, rId, QMContact))
Just (lnkId', _) | lnkId' == lnkId ->
addLink q $ \db -> DB.execute db (qry <> " AND (fixed_data IS NULL OR fixed_data = ?)") (d :. (lnkId, rId, fst d))
addLink q $ \db -> DB.execute db (qry <> " AND (fixed_data IS NULL OR fixed_data = ?)") (d :. (lnkId, rId, QMContact, fst d))
_ -> throwE AUTH
where
rId = recipientId sq
@@ -324,7 +324,8 @@ instance StoreQueueClass q => QueueStoreClass q (PostgresQueueStore q) where
assertUpdated $ withDB' "addQueueLinkData" st update
atomically $ writeTVar (queueRec sq) $ Just q {queueData = Just (lnkId, d)}
withLog "addQueueLinkData" st $ \s -> logCreateLink s rId lnkId d
qry = "UPDATE msg_queues SET fixed_data = ?, user_data = ?, link_id = ? WHERE recipient_id = ? AND deleted_at IS NULL"
-- the sender key condition is checked in SQL because without cache each command reads its own copy of the queue record
qry = "UPDATE msg_queues SET fixed_data = ?, user_data = ?, link_id = ? WHERE recipient_id = ? AND deleted_at IS NULL AND (sender_key IS NULL OR queue_mode = ?)"
deleteQueueLinkData :: PostgresQueueStore q -> q -> IO (Either ErrorType ())
deleteQueueLinkData st sq =
@@ -824,6 +825,10 @@ instance ToField EncDataBytes where toField (EncDataBytes s) = toField (Binary s
deriving newtype instance FromField EncDataBytes
instance ToField MsgId where toField = toField . Binary . unMsgId
instance FromField MsgId where fromField = blobFieldDecoder mkMsgId
deriving newtype instance ToField (RoundedSystemTime t)
deriving newtype instance FromField (RoundedSystemTime t)
@@ -22,7 +22,8 @@ serverSchemaMigrations =
("20250903_store_messages", m20250903_store_messages, Just down_m20250903_store_messages),
("20250915_queue_ids_hash", m20250915_queue_ids_hash, Just down_m20250915_queue_ids_hash),
("20260916_prometheus_indexes", m20260916_prometheus_indexes, Just down_m20260916_prometheus_indexes),
("20260917_msg_queues_hot", m20260917_msg_queues_hot, Just down_m20260917_msg_queues_hot)
("20260917_msg_queues_hot", m20260917_msg_queues_hot, Just down_m20260917_msg_queues_hot),
("20260918_expire_messages", m20260918_expire_messages, Just down_m20260918_expire_messages)
]
-- | The list of migrations in ascending order by date
@@ -734,3 +735,504 @@ ALTER TABLE msg_queues RESET (fillfactor, autovacuum_vacuum_scale_factor, autova
ALTER TABLE messages RESET (autovacuum_vacuum_scale_factor, autovacuum_analyze_scale_factor, toast.autovacuum_vacuum_scale_factor);
ALTER TABLE services RESET (fillfactor, autovacuum_vacuum_threshold, autovacuum_vacuum_scale_factor);
|]
m20260918_expire_messages :: Text
m20260918_expire_messages =
[r|
CREATE INDEX idx_messages_expire ON messages (msg_ts, recipient_id) WHERE NOT msg_quota;
DROP INDEX idx_messages_recipient_id_msg_ts;
DROP INDEX idx_msg_queues_expire;
DROP PROCEDURE expire_old_messages(bigint, integer);
CREATE PROCEDURE expire_old_messages(IN p_old_ts bigint, IN batch_size integer, OUT r_expired_msgs_count bigint, OUT r_stored_msgs_count bigint, OUT r_stored_queues bigint)
LANGUAGE plpgsql
AS $$
DECLARE
rids BYTEA[];
rid BYTEA;
last_ts BIGINT := -1;
last_rid BYTEA := '\x';
next_ts BIGINT;
next_rid BYTEA;
del_count BIGINT;
total_deleted BIGINT := 0;
BEGIN
LOOP
-- The page is scanned in (msg_ts, recipient_id) order, so its last row is the next
-- keyset cursor. Advancing it past every row read, including queues left unexpired
-- because delete_expired_msgs skipped a locked row or raised, is what terminates the
-- loop; re-reading from the start instead would repeat those queues forever.
SELECT array_agg(DISTINCT recipient_id),
(array_agg(msg_ts ORDER BY msg_ts DESC, recipient_id DESC))[1],
(array_agg(recipient_id ORDER BY msg_ts DESC, recipient_id DESC))[1]
INTO rids, next_ts, next_rid
FROM (
SELECT msg_ts, recipient_id
FROM messages
WHERE NOT msg_quota
AND msg_ts < p_old_ts
AND (msg_ts, recipient_id) > (last_ts, last_rid)
ORDER BY msg_ts ASC, recipient_id ASC
LIMIT batch_size
) m;
EXIT WHEN rids IS NULL;
FOREACH rid IN ARRAY rids
LOOP
BEGIN
del_count := delete_expired_msgs(rid, p_old_ts);
total_deleted := total_deleted + del_count;
EXCEPTION WHEN OTHERS THEN
RAISE WARNING 'STORE, expire_old_messages, error expiring queue %: %', encode(rid, 'base64'), SQLERRM;
CONTINUE;
END;
END LOOP;
COMMIT;
last_ts := next_ts;
last_rid := next_rid;
END LOOP;
r_expired_msgs_count := total_deleted;
r_stored_msgs_count := (SELECT COUNT(1) FROM messages);
r_stored_queues := (SELECT COUNT(1) FROM msg_queues WHERE deleted_at IS NULL);
END;
$$;
CREATE OR REPLACE FUNCTION delete_expired_msgs(p_recipient_id bytea, p_old_ts bigint) RETURNS bigint
LANGUAGE plpgsql
AS $$
DECLARE
q_size BIGINT;
keep_min_id BIGINT;
del_count BIGINT;
BEGIN
SELECT msg_queue_size INTO q_size
FROM msg_queues
WHERE recipient_id = p_recipient_id AND deleted_at IS NULL
FOR UPDATE SKIP LOCKED;
IF NOT FOUND OR q_size = 0 THEN
RETURN 0;
END IF;
SELECT MIN(message_id) INTO keep_min_id
FROM messages WHERE recipient_id = p_recipient_id AND msg_ts >= p_old_ts AND msg_quota = FALSE;
IF keep_min_id IS NULL THEN
DELETE FROM messages WHERE recipient_id = p_recipient_id AND msg_quota = FALSE;
ELSE
DELETE FROM messages WHERE recipient_id = p_recipient_id AND message_id < keep_min_id AND msg_quota = FALSE;
END IF;
GET DIAGNOSTICS del_count = ROW_COUNT;
IF del_count > 0 THEN
UPDATE msg_queues
SET msg_can_write = msg_can_write OR msg_queue_size <= del_count,
msg_queue_size = GREATEST(msg_queue_size - del_count, 0)
WHERE recipient_id = p_recipient_id;
END IF;
RETURN del_count;
END;
$$;
CREATE OR REPLACE FUNCTION write_message(p_recipient_id bytea, p_msg_id bytea, p_msg_ts bigint, p_msg_quota boolean, p_msg_ntf_flag boolean, p_msg_body bytea, p_quota integer) RETURNS TABLE(quota_written boolean, was_empty boolean)
LANGUAGE plpgsql
AS $$
DECLARE
q_can_write BOOLEAN;
q_size BIGINT;
BEGIN
SELECT msg_can_write, msg_queue_size INTO q_can_write, q_size
FROM msg_queues
WHERE recipient_id = p_recipient_id AND deleted_at IS NULL
FOR UPDATE;
IF q_can_write OR q_size = 0 THEN
quota_written := p_msg_quota OR q_size >= p_quota;
was_empty := q_size = 0;
INSERT INTO messages(recipient_id, msg_id, msg_ts, msg_quota, msg_ntf_flag, msg_body)
VALUES (p_recipient_id, p_msg_id, p_msg_ts, quota_written, p_msg_ntf_flag AND NOT quota_written, CASE WHEN quota_written THEN '' :: BYTEA ELSE p_msg_body END);
UPDATE msg_queues
SET msg_can_write = NOT quota_written,
msg_queue_size = msg_queue_size + 1
WHERE recipient_id = p_recipient_id;
RETURN QUERY VALUES (quota_written, was_empty);
END IF;
END;
$$;
CREATE OR REPLACE FUNCTION try_del_msg(p_recipient_id bytea, p_msg_id bytea) RETURNS TABLE(r_msg_id bytea, r_msg_ts bigint, r_msg_quota boolean, r_msg_ntf_flag boolean, r_msg_body bytea)
LANGUAGE plpgsql
AS $$
DECLARE
q_size BIGINT;
msg RECORD;
BEGIN
SELECT msg_queue_size INTO q_size
FROM msg_queues
WHERE recipient_id = p_recipient_id AND deleted_at IS NULL
FOR UPDATE;
IF NOT FOUND THEN
RETURN;
END IF;
SELECT message_id, msg_id, msg_ts, msg_quota, msg_ntf_flag, msg_body
INTO msg
FROM messages
WHERE recipient_id = p_recipient_id
ORDER BY message_id ASC LIMIT 1;
IF NOT FOUND THEN
IF q_size != 0 THEN
UPDATE msg_queues
SET msg_can_write = TRUE,
msg_queue_size = 0
WHERE recipient_id = p_recipient_id;
END IF;
RETURN;
END IF;
IF msg.msg_id = p_msg_id THEN
DELETE FROM messages WHERE message_id = msg.message_id;
IF FOUND THEN
UPDATE msg_queues
SET msg_can_write = msg_can_write OR msg_queue_size <= 1,
msg_queue_size = GREATEST(msg_queue_size - 1, 0)
WHERE recipient_id = p_recipient_id;
RETURN QUERY VALUES (msg.msg_id, msg.msg_ts, msg.msg_quota, msg.msg_ntf_flag, msg.msg_body);
END IF;
END IF;
END;
$$;
CREATE OR REPLACE FUNCTION try_del_peek_msg(p_recipient_id bytea, p_msg_id bytea) RETURNS TABLE(r_msg_id bytea, r_msg_ts bigint, r_msg_quota boolean, r_msg_ntf_flag boolean, r_msg_body bytea)
LANGUAGE plpgsql
AS $$
DECLARE
q_size BIGINT;
msg RECORD;
msg_deleted BOOLEAN;
BEGIN
SELECT msg_queue_size INTO q_size
FROM msg_queues
WHERE recipient_id = p_recipient_id AND deleted_at IS NULL
FOR UPDATE;
IF NOT FOUND THEN
RETURN;
END IF;
SELECT message_id, msg_id, msg_ts, msg_quota, msg_ntf_flag, msg_body
INTO msg
FROM messages
WHERE recipient_id = p_recipient_id
ORDER BY message_id ASC LIMIT 1;
IF NOT FOUND THEN
IF q_size != 0 THEN
UPDATE msg_queues
SET msg_can_write = TRUE,
msg_queue_size = 0
WHERE recipient_id = p_recipient_id;
END IF;
RETURN;
END IF;
IF msg.msg_id = p_msg_id THEN
DELETE FROM messages WHERE message_id = msg.message_id;
msg_deleted := FOUND;
IF msg_deleted THEN
RETURN QUERY VALUES (msg.msg_id, msg.msg_ts, msg.msg_quota, msg.msg_ntf_flag, msg.msg_body);
END IF;
SELECT msg_id, msg_ts, msg_quota, msg_ntf_flag, msg_body
INTO msg
FROM messages
WHERE recipient_id = p_recipient_id
ORDER BY message_id ASC LIMIT 1;
IF FOUND THEN
RETURN QUERY VALUES (msg.msg_id, msg.msg_ts, msg.msg_quota, msg.msg_ntf_flag, msg.msg_body);
IF msg_deleted THEN
UPDATE msg_queues
SET msg_can_write = msg_can_write OR msg_queue_size <= 1,
msg_queue_size = GREATEST(msg_queue_size - 1, 0)
WHERE recipient_id = p_recipient_id;
END IF;
ELSIF msg_deleted OR q_size != 0 THEN
UPDATE msg_queues
SET msg_can_write = TRUE,
msg_queue_size = 0
WHERE recipient_id = p_recipient_id;
END IF;
ELSE
RETURN QUERY VALUES (msg.msg_id, msg.msg_ts, msg.msg_quota, msg.msg_ntf_flag, msg.msg_body);
END IF;
END;
$$;
ALTER TABLE msg_queues DROP COLUMN msg_queue_expire;
|]
down_m20260918_expire_messages :: Text
down_m20260918_expire_messages =
[r|
ALTER TABLE msg_queues ADD COLUMN msg_queue_expire boolean NOT NULL DEFAULT FALSE;
-- ADD COLUMN already defaulted every row to FALSE, so the backfill only needs the rows
-- that become TRUE, which avoids rewriting the whole table. The flag is only read to pick
-- queues for delete_expired_msgs, and that returns 0 without deleting when msg_queue_size
-- is 0, so excluding empty queues here cannot change what expires.
UPDATE msg_queues q
SET msg_queue_expire = TRUE
WHERE msg_queue_size > 0
AND EXISTS (SELECT 1 FROM messages m WHERE m.recipient_id = q.recipient_id AND NOT m.msg_quota);
CREATE INDEX idx_msg_queues_expire ON msg_queues (recipient_id) WHERE deleted_at IS NULL AND msg_queue_expire;
CREATE INDEX idx_messages_recipient_id_msg_ts ON messages (recipient_id, msg_ts);
DROP INDEX idx_messages_expire;
CREATE OR REPLACE FUNCTION delete_expired_msgs(p_recipient_id bytea, p_old_ts bigint) RETURNS bigint
LANGUAGE plpgsql
AS $$
DECLARE
q_size BIGINT;
keep_min_id BIGINT;
del_count BIGINT;
BEGIN
SELECT msg_queue_size INTO q_size
FROM msg_queues
WHERE recipient_id = p_recipient_id AND deleted_at IS NULL
FOR UPDATE SKIP LOCKED;
IF NOT FOUND OR q_size = 0 THEN
RETURN 0;
END IF;
SELECT MIN(message_id) INTO keep_min_id
FROM messages WHERE recipient_id = p_recipient_id AND msg_ts >= p_old_ts AND msg_quota = FALSE;
IF keep_min_id IS NULL THEN
DELETE FROM messages WHERE recipient_id = p_recipient_id AND msg_quota = FALSE;
ELSE
DELETE FROM messages WHERE recipient_id = p_recipient_id AND message_id < keep_min_id AND msg_quota = FALSE;
END IF;
GET DIAGNOSTICS del_count = ROW_COUNT;
IF del_count > 0 THEN
UPDATE msg_queues
SET msg_can_write = msg_can_write OR msg_queue_size <= del_count,
msg_queue_expire = msg_queue_size > del_count AND keep_min_id IS NOT NULL,
msg_queue_size = GREATEST(msg_queue_size - del_count, 0)
WHERE recipient_id = p_recipient_id;
END IF;
RETURN del_count;
END;
$$;
CREATE OR REPLACE FUNCTION write_message(p_recipient_id bytea, p_msg_id bytea, p_msg_ts bigint, p_msg_quota boolean, p_msg_ntf_flag boolean, p_msg_body bytea, p_quota integer) RETURNS TABLE(quota_written boolean, was_empty boolean)
LANGUAGE plpgsql
AS $$
DECLARE
q_can_write BOOLEAN;
q_size BIGINT;
BEGIN
SELECT msg_can_write, msg_queue_size INTO q_can_write, q_size
FROM msg_queues
WHERE recipient_id = p_recipient_id AND deleted_at IS NULL
FOR UPDATE;
IF q_can_write OR q_size = 0 THEN
quota_written := p_msg_quota OR q_size >= p_quota;
was_empty := q_size = 0;
INSERT INTO messages(recipient_id, msg_id, msg_ts, msg_quota, msg_ntf_flag, msg_body)
VALUES (p_recipient_id, p_msg_id, p_msg_ts, quota_written, p_msg_ntf_flag AND NOT quota_written, CASE WHEN quota_written THEN '' :: BYTEA ELSE p_msg_body END);
UPDATE msg_queues
SET msg_can_write = NOT quota_written,
msg_queue_expire = TRUE,
msg_queue_size = msg_queue_size + 1
WHERE recipient_id = p_recipient_id;
RETURN QUERY VALUES (quota_written, was_empty);
END IF;
END;
$$;
CREATE OR REPLACE FUNCTION try_del_msg(p_recipient_id bytea, p_msg_id bytea) RETURNS TABLE(r_msg_id bytea, r_msg_ts bigint, r_msg_quota boolean, r_msg_ntf_flag boolean, r_msg_body bytea)
LANGUAGE plpgsql
AS $$
DECLARE
q_size BIGINT;
msg RECORD;
BEGIN
SELECT msg_queue_size INTO q_size
FROM msg_queues
WHERE recipient_id = p_recipient_id AND deleted_at IS NULL
FOR UPDATE;
IF NOT FOUND THEN
RETURN;
END IF;
SELECT message_id, msg_id, msg_ts, msg_quota, msg_ntf_flag, msg_body
INTO msg
FROM messages
WHERE recipient_id = p_recipient_id
ORDER BY message_id ASC LIMIT 1;
IF NOT FOUND THEN
IF q_size != 0 THEN
UPDATE msg_queues
SET msg_can_write = TRUE,
msg_queue_expire = FALSE,
msg_queue_size = 0
WHERE recipient_id = p_recipient_id;
END IF;
RETURN;
END IF;
IF msg.msg_id = p_msg_id THEN
DELETE FROM messages WHERE message_id = msg.message_id;
IF FOUND THEN
UPDATE msg_queues
SET msg_can_write = msg_can_write OR msg_queue_size <= 1,
msg_queue_expire = msg_queue_size > 1,
msg_queue_size = GREATEST(msg_queue_size - 1, 0)
WHERE recipient_id = p_recipient_id;
RETURN QUERY VALUES (msg.msg_id, msg.msg_ts, msg.msg_quota, msg.msg_ntf_flag, msg.msg_body);
END IF;
END IF;
END;
$$;
CREATE OR REPLACE FUNCTION try_del_peek_msg(p_recipient_id bytea, p_msg_id bytea) RETURNS TABLE(r_msg_id bytea, r_msg_ts bigint, r_msg_quota boolean, r_msg_ntf_flag boolean, r_msg_body bytea)
LANGUAGE plpgsql
AS $$
DECLARE
q_size BIGINT;
msg RECORD;
msg_deleted BOOLEAN;
BEGIN
SELECT msg_queue_size INTO q_size
FROM msg_queues
WHERE recipient_id = p_recipient_id AND deleted_at IS NULL
FOR UPDATE;
IF NOT FOUND THEN
RETURN;
END IF;
SELECT message_id, msg_id, msg_ts, msg_quota, msg_ntf_flag, msg_body
INTO msg
FROM messages
WHERE recipient_id = p_recipient_id
ORDER BY message_id ASC LIMIT 1;
IF NOT FOUND THEN
IF q_size != 0 THEN
UPDATE msg_queues
SET msg_can_write = TRUE,
msg_queue_expire = FALSE,
msg_queue_size = 0
WHERE recipient_id = p_recipient_id;
END IF;
RETURN;
END IF;
IF msg.msg_id = p_msg_id THEN
DELETE FROM messages WHERE message_id = msg.message_id;
msg_deleted := FOUND;
IF msg_deleted THEN
RETURN QUERY VALUES (msg.msg_id, msg.msg_ts, msg.msg_quota, msg.msg_ntf_flag, msg.msg_body);
END IF;
SELECT msg_id, msg_ts, msg_quota, msg_ntf_flag, msg_body
INTO msg
FROM messages
WHERE recipient_id = p_recipient_id
ORDER BY message_id ASC LIMIT 1;
IF FOUND THEN
RETURN QUERY VALUES (msg.msg_id, msg.msg_ts, msg.msg_quota, msg.msg_ntf_flag, msg.msg_body);
IF msg_deleted THEN
UPDATE msg_queues
SET msg_can_write = msg_can_write OR msg_queue_size <= 1,
msg_queue_expire = msg_queue_size > 1,
msg_queue_size = GREATEST(msg_queue_size - 1, 0)
WHERE recipient_id = p_recipient_id;
END IF;
ELSIF msg_deleted OR q_size != 0 THEN
UPDATE msg_queues
SET msg_can_write = TRUE,
msg_queue_expire = FALSE,
msg_queue_size = 0
WHERE recipient_id = p_recipient_id;
END IF;
ELSE
RETURN QUERY VALUES (msg.msg_id, msg.msg_ts, msg.msg_quota, msg.msg_ntf_flag, msg.msg_body);
END IF;
END;
$$;
DROP PROCEDURE expire_old_messages(bigint, integer);
CREATE PROCEDURE expire_old_messages(IN p_old_ts bigint, IN batch_size integer, OUT r_expired_msgs_count bigint, OUT r_stored_msgs_count bigint, OUT r_stored_queues bigint)
LANGUAGE plpgsql
AS $$
DECLARE
rids BYTEA[];
rid BYTEA;
last_rid BYTEA := '\x';
del_count BIGINT;
total_deleted BIGINT := 0;
BEGIN
LOOP
SELECT array_agg(recipient_id)
INTO rids
FROM (
SELECT recipient_id
FROM msg_queues
WHERE deleted_at IS NULL
AND msg_queue_expire = TRUE
AND recipient_id > last_rid
ORDER BY recipient_id ASC
LIMIT batch_size
) qs;
EXIT WHEN rids IS NULL OR cardinality(rids) = 0;
FOREACH rid IN ARRAY rids
LOOP
BEGIN
del_count := delete_expired_msgs(rid, p_old_ts);
total_deleted := total_deleted + del_count;
EXCEPTION WHEN OTHERS THEN
RAISE WARNING 'STORE, expire_old_messages, error expiring queue %: %', encode(rid, 'base64'), SQLERRM;
CONTINUE;
END;
COMMIT;
END LOOP;
last_rid := rids[cardinality(rids)];
END LOOP;
r_expired_msgs_count := total_deleted;
r_stored_msgs_count := (SELECT COUNT(1) FROM messages);
r_stored_queues := (SELECT COUNT(1) FROM msg_queues WHERE deleted_at IS NULL);
END;
$$;
|]
@@ -47,7 +47,6 @@ BEGIN
IF del_count > 0 THEN
UPDATE msg_queues
SET msg_can_write = msg_can_write OR msg_queue_size <= del_count,
msg_queue_expire = msg_queue_size > del_count AND keep_min_id IS NOT NULL,
msg_queue_size = GREATEST(msg_queue_size - del_count, 0)
WHERE recipient_id = p_recipient_id;
END IF;
@@ -63,24 +62,33 @@ CREATE PROCEDURE smp_server.expire_old_messages(IN p_old_ts bigint, IN batch_siz
DECLARE
rids BYTEA[];
rid BYTEA;
last_ts BIGINT := -1;
last_rid BYTEA := '\x';
next_ts BIGINT;
next_rid BYTEA;
del_count BIGINT;
total_deleted BIGINT := 0;
BEGIN
LOOP
SELECT array_agg(recipient_id)
INTO rids
-- The page is scanned in (msg_ts, recipient_id) order, so its last row is the next
-- keyset cursor. Advancing it past every row read, including queues left unexpired
-- because delete_expired_msgs skipped a locked row or raised, is what terminates the
-- loop; re-reading from the start instead would repeat those queues forever.
SELECT array_agg(DISTINCT recipient_id),
(array_agg(msg_ts ORDER BY msg_ts DESC, recipient_id DESC))[1],
(array_agg(recipient_id ORDER BY msg_ts DESC, recipient_id DESC))[1]
INTO rids, next_ts, next_rid
FROM (
SELECT recipient_id
FROM msg_queues
WHERE deleted_at IS NULL
AND msg_queue_expire = TRUE
AND recipient_id > last_rid
ORDER BY recipient_id ASC
SELECT msg_ts, recipient_id
FROM messages
WHERE NOT msg_quota
AND msg_ts < p_old_ts
AND (msg_ts, recipient_id) > (last_ts, last_rid)
ORDER BY msg_ts ASC, recipient_id ASC
LIMIT batch_size
) qs;
) m;
EXIT WHEN rids IS NULL OR cardinality(rids) = 0;
EXIT WHEN rids IS NULL;
FOREACH rid IN ARRAY rids
LOOP
@@ -91,9 +99,11 @@ BEGIN
RAISE WARNING 'STORE, expire_old_messages, error expiring queue %: %', encode(rid, 'base64'), SQLERRM;
CONTINUE;
END;
COMMIT;
END LOOP;
last_rid := rids[cardinality(rids)];
COMMIT;
last_ts := next_ts;
last_rid := next_rid;
END LOOP;
r_expired_msgs_count := total_deleted;
@@ -195,7 +205,6 @@ BEGIN
IF q_size != 0 THEN
UPDATE msg_queues
SET msg_can_write = TRUE,
msg_queue_expire = FALSE,
msg_queue_size = 0
WHERE recipient_id = p_recipient_id;
END IF;
@@ -207,7 +216,6 @@ BEGIN
IF FOUND THEN
UPDATE msg_queues
SET msg_can_write = msg_can_write OR msg_queue_size <= 1,
msg_queue_expire = msg_queue_size > 1,
msg_queue_size = GREATEST(msg_queue_size - 1, 0)
WHERE recipient_id = p_recipient_id;
RETURN QUERY VALUES (msg.msg_id, msg.msg_ts, msg.msg_quota, msg.msg_ntf_flag, msg.msg_body);
@@ -245,7 +253,6 @@ BEGIN
IF q_size != 0 THEN
UPDATE msg_queues
SET msg_can_write = TRUE,
msg_queue_expire = FALSE,
msg_queue_size = 0
WHERE recipient_id = p_recipient_id;
END IF;
@@ -271,14 +278,12 @@ BEGIN
IF msg_deleted THEN
UPDATE msg_queues
SET msg_can_write = msg_can_write OR msg_queue_size <= 1,
msg_queue_expire = msg_queue_size > 1,
msg_queue_size = GREATEST(msg_queue_size - 1, 0)
WHERE recipient_id = p_recipient_id;
END IF;
ELSIF msg_deleted OR q_size != 0 THEN
UPDATE msg_queues
SET msg_can_write = TRUE,
msg_queue_expire = FALSE,
msg_queue_size = 0
WHERE recipient_id = p_recipient_id;
END IF;
@@ -348,7 +353,6 @@ BEGIN
UPDATE msg_queues
SET msg_can_write = NOT quota_written,
msg_queue_expire = TRUE,
msg_queue_size = msg_queue_size + 1
WHERE recipient_id = p_recipient_id;
@@ -440,7 +444,6 @@ CREATE TABLE smp_server.msg_queues (
rcv_service_id bytea,
ntf_service_id bytea,
msg_can_write boolean DEFAULT true NOT NULL,
msg_queue_expire boolean DEFAULT false NOT NULL,
msg_queue_size bigint DEFAULT 0 NOT NULL
)
WITH (fillfactor='80', autovacuum_vacuum_scale_factor='0.02', autovacuum_analyze_scale_factor='0.01', autovacuum_vacuum_cost_limit='1000');
@@ -485,6 +488,10 @@ ALTER TABLE ONLY smp_server.services
CREATE INDEX idx_messages_expire ON smp_server.messages USING btree (msg_ts, recipient_id) WHERE (NOT msg_quota);
CREATE INDEX idx_messages_recipient_id_message_id ON smp_server.messages USING btree (recipient_id, message_id);
@@ -493,14 +500,6 @@ CREATE INDEX idx_messages_recipient_id_msg_quota ON smp_server.messages USING bt
CREATE INDEX idx_messages_recipient_id_msg_ts ON smp_server.messages USING btree (recipient_id, msg_ts);
CREATE INDEX idx_msg_queues_expire ON smp_server.msg_queues USING btree (recipient_id) WHERE ((deleted_at IS NULL) AND msg_queue_expire);
CREATE UNIQUE INDEX idx_msg_queues_link_id ON smp_server.msg_queues USING btree (link_id);
@@ -173,6 +173,7 @@ instance StoreQueueClass q => QueueStoreClass q (STMQueueStore q) where
rId = recipientId sq
qr = queueRec sq
add q = case queueData q of
_ | isSecuredMsgQueue q -> pure $ Left AUTH
Nothing -> addLink
Just (lnkId', d') | lnkId' == lnkId && fst d' == fst d -> addLink
_ -> pure $ Left AUTH
+8
View File
@@ -128,6 +128,7 @@ data ServerStats = ServerStats
ntfServices :: ServiceStats,
rcvServicesSubMsg :: IORef Int,
rcvServicesSubDuplicate :: IORef Int,
authDelayExceeded :: IORef Int,
qCount :: IORef Int,
msgCount :: IORef Int,
ntfCount :: IORef Int,
@@ -190,6 +191,7 @@ data ServerStatsData = ServerStatsData
_rcvServices :: ServiceStatsData,
_rcvServicesSubMsg :: Int,
_rcvServicesSubDuplicate :: Int,
_authDelayExceeded :: Int,
_qCount :: Int,
_msgCount :: Int,
_ntfCount :: Int,
@@ -254,6 +256,7 @@ newServerStats ts = do
ntfServices <- newServiceStats
rcvServicesSubMsg <- newIORef 0
rcvServicesSubDuplicate <- newIORef 0
authDelayExceeded <- newIORef 0
qCount <- newIORef 0
msgCount <- newIORef 0
ntfCount <- newIORef 0
@@ -315,6 +318,7 @@ newServerStats ts = do
ntfServices,
rcvServicesSubMsg,
rcvServicesSubDuplicate,
authDelayExceeded,
qCount,
msgCount,
ntfCount,
@@ -378,6 +382,7 @@ getServerStatsData s = do
_ntfServices <- getServiceStatsData $ ntfServices s
_rcvServicesSubMsg <- readIORef $ rcvServicesSubMsg s
_rcvServicesSubDuplicate <- readIORef $ rcvServicesSubDuplicate s
_authDelayExceeded <- readIORef $ authDelayExceeded s
_qCount <- readIORef $ qCount s
_msgCount <- readIORef $ msgCount s
_ntfCount <- readIORef $ ntfCount s
@@ -439,6 +444,7 @@ getServerStatsData s = do
_ntfServices,
_rcvServicesSubMsg,
_rcvServicesSubDuplicate,
_authDelayExceeded,
_qCount,
_msgCount,
_ntfCount,
@@ -503,6 +509,7 @@ setServerStats s d = do
setServiceStats (ntfServices s) $! _ntfServices d
writeIORef (rcvServicesSubMsg s) $! _rcvServicesSubMsg d
writeIORef (rcvServicesSubDuplicate s) $! _rcvServicesSubDuplicate d
writeIORef (authDelayExceeded s) $! _authDelayExceeded d
writeIORef (qCount s) $! _qCount d
writeIORef (msgCount s) $! _msgCount d
writeIORef (ntfCount s) $! _ntfCount d
@@ -705,6 +712,7 @@ instance StrEncoding ServerStatsData where
_ntfServices,
_rcvServicesSubMsg = 0,
_rcvServicesSubDuplicate = 0,
_authDelayExceeded = 0,
_qCount,
_msgCount = 0,
_ntfCount = 0,
+17 -16
View File
@@ -46,7 +46,6 @@ module Simplex.Messaging.Transport
minServerSMPRelayVersion,
currentClientSMPRelayVersion,
currentServerSMPRelayVersion,
shortLinksSMPVersion,
serviceCertsSMPVersion,
newNtfCredsSMPVersion,
clientNoticesSMPVersion,
@@ -54,6 +53,7 @@ module Simplex.Messaging.Transport
namesSMPVersion,
serverInfoSMPVersion,
nameAvailSMPVersion,
fwdNoncesSMPVersion,
simplexMQVersion,
smpBlockSize,
TransportConfig (..),
@@ -177,6 +177,7 @@ smpBlockSize = 16384
-- 20 - public namespaces resolver, RSLV command (6/20/2026)
-- 21 - server public information in handshake (7/5/2026)
-- 22 - RNAME answers name availability as well as the record (7/25/2026)
-- 23 - version in forwarded command nonce, random nonce in forwarded responses (10/2/2026)
data SMPVersion
@@ -189,11 +190,8 @@ type VersionRangeSMP = VersionRange SMPVersion
pattern VersionSMP :: Word16 -> VersionSMP
pattern VersionSMP v = Version v
_proxyServerHandshakeSMPVersion :: VersionSMP
_proxyServerHandshakeSMPVersion = VersionSMP 14
shortLinksSMPVersion :: VersionSMP
shortLinksSMPVersion = VersionSMP 15
_shortLinksSMPVersion :: VersionSMP
_shortLinksSMPVersion = VersionSMP 15
serviceCertsSMPVersion :: VersionSMP
serviceCertsSMPVersion = VersionSMP 16
@@ -218,29 +216,32 @@ serverInfoSMPVersion = VersionSMP 21
nameAvailSMPVersion :: VersionSMP
nameAvailSMPVersion = VersionSMP 22
fwdNoncesSMPVersion :: VersionSMP
fwdNoncesSMPVersion = VersionSMP 23
minClientSMPRelayVersion :: VersionSMP
minClientSMPRelayVersion = VersionSMP 14
minClientSMPRelayVersion = VersionSMP 15
minServerSMPRelayVersion :: VersionSMP
minServerSMPRelayVersion = VersionSMP 14
minServerSMPRelayVersion = VersionSMP 15
currentClientSMPRelayVersion :: VersionSMP
currentClientSMPRelayVersion = VersionSMP 22
currentClientSMPRelayVersion = VersionSMP 23
currentServerSMPRelayVersion :: VersionSMP
currentServerSMPRelayVersion = VersionSMP 22
currentServerSMPRelayVersion = VersionSMP 23
-- Max SMP protocol version to be used in e2e encrypted connection between
-- client and server, as defined by SMP proxy. Normally set below the current
-- version to prevent client version fingerprinting by the destination relays
-- when clients upgrade at different times. Pinned to the current version (22)
-- for this release because a proxied RSLV only carries availability from
-- nameAvailSMPVersion (22), so the one-version anti-fingerprinting buffer does
-- not apply yet; it reappears once the current version advances past 22.
-- when clients upgrade at different times. Pinned to the current version (23)
-- for this release because forwarded commands use the nonces from
-- fwdNoncesSMPVersion (23), so the one-version anti-fingerprinting buffer does
-- not apply yet; it reappears once the current version advances past 23.
proxiedSMPRelayVersion :: VersionSMP
proxiedSMPRelayVersion = VersionSMP 22
proxiedSMPRelayVersion = VersionSMP 23
-- minimal supported protocol version is 14
-- minimal supported protocol version is 15
supportedClientSMPRelayVRange :: VersionRangeSMP
supportedClientSMPRelayVRange = mkVersionRange minClientSMPRelayVersion currentClientSMPRelayVersion
+5 -2
View File
@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@ module Simplex.RemoteControl.Client
-- for tests only
sendRCPacket,
receiveRCPacket,
findRCCtrlPairing,
) where
import Control.Applicative ((<|>))
@@ -46,7 +47,7 @@ import Data.List.NonEmpty (NonEmpty (..))
import qualified Data.List.NonEmpty as L
import Data.Maybe (isNothing)
import qualified Data.Text as T
import Data.Time.Clock.System (getSystemTime)
import Data.Time.Clock.System (SystemTime (..), getSystemTime)
import Data.Tuple (swap)
import Data.Word (Word16)
import qualified Data.X509 as X
@@ -395,8 +396,10 @@ findRCCtrlPairing :: NonEmpty RCCtrlPairing -> RCEncInvitation -> ExceptT RCErro
findRCCtrlPairing pairings RCEncInvitation {dhPubKey, nonce, encInvitation} = do
(pairing, signedInvStr) <- liftEither $ decrypt (L.toList pairings)
signedInv <- liftEitherWith RCESyntax $ strDecode signedInvStr
inv@(RCVerifiedInvitation RCInvitation {dh = invDh}) <- maybe (throwE RCEInvitation) pure $ verifySignedInvitation signedInv
inv@(RCVerifiedInvitation RCInvitation {dh = invDh, ts}) <- maybe (throwE RCEInvitation) pure $ verifySignedInvitation signedInv
unless (invDh == dhPubKey) $ throwE RCEInvitation
now <- systemSeconds <$> liftIO getSystemTime
unless (now - 3660 <= systemSeconds ts && systemSeconds ts <= now + 3600) $ throwE RCEInvitation
pure (pairing, inv)
where
decrypt :: [RCCtrlPairing] -> Either RCErrorType (RCCtrlPairing, ByteString)
+12 -8
View File
@@ -122,18 +122,22 @@ closeListener subscribers sock =
joinMulticast :: TMVar Int -> N.Socket -> N.HostAddress -> IO ()
joinMulticast subscribers sock group = do
now <- atomically $ takeTMVar subscribers
when (now == 0) $ do
setMembership sock group True >>= \case
Left e -> atomically (putTMVar subscribers now) >> logError ("setMembership failed " <> tshow e)
Right () -> atomically $ putTMVar subscribers (now + 1)
if now == 0
then
setMembership sock group True >>= \case
Left e -> atomically (putTMVar subscribers now) >> logError ("setMembership failed " <> tshow e)
Right () -> atomically $ putTMVar subscribers (now + 1)
else atomically $ putTMVar subscribers (now + 1)
partMulticast :: TMVar Int -> N.Socket -> N.HostAddress -> IO ()
partMulticast subscribers sock group = do
now <- atomically $ takeTMVar subscribers
when (now == 1) $
setMembership sock group False >>= \case
Left e -> atomically (putTMVar subscribers now) >> logError ("setMembership failed " <> tshow e)
Right () -> atomically $ putTMVar subscribers (now - 1)
if now == 1
then
setMembership sock group False >>= \case
Left e -> atomically (putTMVar subscribers (now - 1)) >> logError ("setMembership failed " <> tshow e)
Right () -> atomically $ putTMVar subscribers (now - 1)
else atomically $ putTMVar subscribers (max 0 (now - 1))
listenerHostAddr4 :: UDP.ListenSocket -> N.HostAddress
listenerHostAddr4 sock = case UDP.mySockAddr sock of