agent: drop versions before 07/2024 (support of PQ encryption and securing reply queue) (#1841)

* agent: drop versions before 07/2024 (support of PQ encryption and securing reply queue)

* fix encoding, add error context

* fix agent tests

* fix test

---------

Co-authored-by: sh <github.shum@liber.li>
This commit is contained in:
Evgenyandsh authored and GitHub committed 2026-08-17 12:51:45 +01:00
1 parent c377f2c1b1
commit d95eb47a4d
9 files changed
+279 -413

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+77 -119
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@@ -51,8 +51,6 @@ module Simplex.Messaging.Crypto.Ratchet
VersionRangeE2E,
pattern VersionE2E,
RatchetVersions (..),
kdfX3DHE2EEncryptVersion,
pqRatchetE2EEncryptVersion,
currentE2EEncryptVersion,
supportedE2EEncryptVRange,
generateRcvE2EParams,
@@ -87,8 +85,6 @@ module Simplex.Messaging.Crypto.Ratchet
RatchetKey (..),
fullHeaderLen,
applySMDiff,
encodeMsgHeader,
msgHeaderP,
)
where
@@ -102,7 +98,6 @@ import Crypto.Random (ChaChaDRG)
import Data.Aeson (FromJSON (..), ToJSON (..))
import qualified Data.Aeson as J
import qualified Data.Aeson.TH as JQ
import Data.Attoparsec.ByteString (Parser, peekWord8')
import qualified Data.Attoparsec.ByteString.Char8 as A
import qualified Data.ByteArray as BA
import Data.ByteString.Char8 (ByteString)
@@ -132,6 +127,7 @@ import UnliftIO.STM
-- e2e encryption headers version history:
-- 1 - binary protocol encoding (1/1/2022)
-- 2 - use KDF in x3dh (10/20/2022)
-- 3 - PQDR (3/14/2024)
data E2EVersion
@@ -144,17 +140,17 @@ type VersionRangeE2E = VersionRange E2EVersion
pattern VersionE2E :: Word16 -> VersionE2E
pattern VersionE2E v = Version v
kdfX3DHE2EEncryptVersion :: VersionE2E
kdfX3DHE2EEncryptVersion = VersionE2E 2
_pqRatchetE2EEncryptVersion :: VersionE2E
_pqRatchetE2EEncryptVersion = VersionE2E 3
pqRatchetE2EEncryptVersion :: VersionE2E
pqRatchetE2EEncryptVersion = VersionE2E 3
minSupportedE2EEncryptVersion :: VersionE2E
minSupportedE2EEncryptVersion = _pqRatchetE2EEncryptVersion
currentE2EEncryptVersion :: VersionE2E
currentE2EEncryptVersion = VersionE2E 3
supportedE2EEncryptVRange :: VersionRangeE2E
supportedE2EEncryptVRange = mkVersionRange kdfX3DHE2EEncryptVersion currentE2EEncryptVersion
supportedE2EEncryptVRange = mkVersionRange minSupportedE2EEncryptVersion currentE2EEncryptVersion
data RatchetKEMState
= RKSProposed -- only KEM encapsulation key
@@ -238,9 +234,7 @@ data AnyE2ERatchetParams
deriving instance Show AnyE2ERatchetParams
instance (RatchetKEMStateI s, AlgorithmI a) => Encoding (E2ERatchetParams s a) where
smpEncode (E2ERatchetParams v k1 k2 kem_)
| v >= pqRatchetE2EEncryptVersion = smpEncode (v, k1, k2, kem_)
| otherwise = smpEncode (v, k1, k2)
smpEncode (E2ERatchetParams v k1 k2 kem_) = smpEncode (v, k1, k2, kem_)
smpP = toParams <$?> smpP
where
toParams :: AE2ERatchetParams a -> Either String (E2ERatchetParams s a)
@@ -261,14 +255,9 @@ instance Encoding AnyE2ERatchetParams where
case testEquality a a' of
Nothing -> fail "bad e2e params: different key algorithms"
Just Refl ->
kemP v >>= \case
smpP >>= \case
Just (ARKP s kem) -> pure $ AnyE2ERatchetParams s a $ E2ERatchetParams v k1 k2 (Just kem)
Nothing -> pure $ AnyE2ERatchetParams SRKSProposed a $ E2ERatchetParams v k1 k2 Nothing
where
kemP :: VersionE2E -> Parser (Maybe ARKEMParams)
kemP v
| v >= pqRatchetE2EEncryptVersion = smpP
| otherwise = pure Nothing
instance VersionI E2EVersion (E2ERatchetParams s a) where
type VersionRangeT E2EVersion (E2ERatchetParams s a) = E2ERatchetParamsUri s a
@@ -307,11 +296,10 @@ instance (RatchetKEMStateI s, AlgorithmI a) => StrEncoding (E2ERatchetParamsUri
[("v", strEncode vs), ("x3dh", strEncodeList [key1, key2])]
<> maybe [] encodeKem kem_
where
encodeKem kem
| maxVersion vs < pqRatchetE2EEncryptVersion = []
| otherwise = case kem of
RKParamsProposed k -> [("kem_key", strEncode k)]
RKParamsAccepted ct k -> [("kem_ct", strEncode ct), ("kem_key", strEncode k)]
encodeKem :: RKEMParams s -> [(ByteString, ByteString)]
encodeKem kem = case kem of
RKParamsProposed k -> [("kem_key", strEncode k)]
RKParamsAccepted ct k -> [("kem_ct", strEncode ct), ("kem_key", strEncode k)]
strP = toE2ERatchetParamsUri <$?> strP
{-# INLINE strP #-}
@@ -328,25 +316,26 @@ instance StrEncoding AnyE2ERatchetParamsUri where
strEncode (AnyE2ERatchetParamsUri _ _ ps) = strEncode ps
strP = do
query <- strP
vr :: VersionRangeE2E <- queryParam "v" query
vr :: VersionRangeE2E <- adjustE2EVRange <$> queryParam "v" query
keys <- L.toList <$> queryParam "x3dh" query
case keys of
[APublicDhKey a k1, APublicDhKey a' k2] -> case testEquality a a' of
Nothing -> fail "bad e2e params: different key algorithms"
Just Refl ->
kemP vr query >>= \case
kemP query >>= \case
Just (ARKP s kem) -> pure $ AnyE2ERatchetParamsUri s a $ E2ERatchetParamsUri vr k1 k2 (Just kem)
Nothing -> pure $ AnyE2ERatchetParamsUri SRKSProposed a $ E2ERatchetParamsUri vr k1 k2 Nothing
_ -> fail "bad e2e params"
where
kemP vr query
| maxVersion vr >= pqRatchetE2EEncryptVersion =
queryParam_ "kem_key" query
$>>= \k -> Just . kemParams k <$> queryParam_ "kem_ct" query
| otherwise = pure Nothing
kemP query =
queryParam_ "kem_key" query
$>>= \k -> Just . kemParams k <$> queryParam_ "kem_ct" query
kemParams k = \case
Nothing -> ARKP SRKSProposed $ RKParamsProposed k
Just ct -> ARKP SRKSAccepted $ RKParamsAccepted ct k
adjustE2EVRange vr =
let v = max minSupportedE2EEncryptVersion $ minVersion vr
in fromMaybe vr $ safeVersionRange v (max v $ maxVersion vr)
instance (RatchetKEMStateI s, AlgorithmI a) => Encoding (E2ERatchetParamsUri s a) where
smpEncode (E2ERatchetParamsUri vr k1 k2 kem_) = smpEncode (vr, k1, k2, kem_)
@@ -432,16 +421,14 @@ generateE2EParams g v useKEM_ = do
where
kemParams :: IO (Maybe (RKEMParams s, PrivRKEMParams s))
kemParams = case useKEM_ of
Just useKem
| v >= pqRatchetE2EEncryptVersion ->
Just <$> do
ks@(k, _) <- sntrup761Keypair g
case useKem of
ProposeKEM -> pure (RKParamsProposed k, PrivateRKParamsProposed ks)
AcceptKEM k' -> do
(ct, shared) <- sntrup761Enc g k'
pure (RKParamsAccepted ct k, PrivateRKParamsAccepted ct shared ks)
_ -> pure Nothing
Just useKem -> Just <$> do
ks@(k, _) <- sntrup761Keypair g
case useKem of
ProposeKEM -> pure (RKParamsProposed k, PrivateRKParamsProposed ks)
AcceptKEM k' -> do
(ct, shared) <- sntrup761Enc g k'
pure (RKParamsAccepted ct k, PrivateRKParamsAccepted ct shared ks)
Nothing -> pure Nothing
-- used by party initiating connection, Bob in double-ratchet spec
generateRcvE2EParams :: (AlgorithmI a, DhAlgorithm a) => TVar ChaChaDRG -> VersionE2E -> PQSupport -> IO (RcvE2EPrivRatchetParams a, RcvE2ERatchetParams a)
@@ -474,30 +461,30 @@ data RatchetInitParams = RatchetInitParams
-- this is used by the peer joining the connection
pqX3dhSnd :: DhAlgorithm a => AE2EPrivRatchetParams a -> E2ERatchetParams 'RKSProposed a -> Either CryptoError (RatchetInitParams, Maybe KEMKeyPair)
-- 3. replied 2. received
pqX3dhSnd (spk1, spk2, spKem_) (E2ERatchetParams v rk1 rk2 rKem_) = do
pqX3dhSnd (spk1, spk2, spKem_) (E2ERatchetParams _ rk1 rk2 rKem_) = do
(ks_, kem_) <- sndPq
let initParams = pqX3dh (publicKey spk1, rk1) (dh' rk1 spk2) (dh' rk2 spk1) (dh' rk2 spk2) kem_
pure (initParams, ks_)
where
sndPq :: Either CryptoError (Maybe KEMKeyPair, Maybe RatchetKEMAccepted)
sndPq = case spKem_ of
Just (APRKP _ ps) | v >= pqRatchetE2EEncryptVersion -> case (ps, rKem_) of
Just (APRKP _ ps) -> case (ps, rKem_) of
(PrivateRKParamsAccepted ct shared ks, Just (RKParamsProposed k)) -> Right (Just ks, Just $ RatchetKEMAccepted k shared ct)
(PrivateRKParamsProposed ks, _) -> Right (Just ks, Nothing) -- both parties can send "proposal" in case of ratchet renegotiation
_ -> Left CERatchetKEMState
_ -> Right (Nothing, Nothing)
Nothing -> Right (Nothing, Nothing)
-- this is used by the peer that created new connection, after receiving the reply
pqX3dhRcv :: forall s a. (RatchetKEMStateI s, DhAlgorithm a) => RcvE2EPrivRatchetParams a -> E2ERatchetParams s a -> ExceptT CryptoError IO (RatchetInitParams, Maybe KEMKeyPair)
-- 1. sent 4. received in reply
pqX3dhRcv (rpk1, rpk2, rpKem_) (E2ERatchetParams v sk1 sk2 sKem_) = do
pqX3dhRcv (rpk1, rpk2, rpKem_) (E2ERatchetParams _ sk1 sk2 sKem_) = do
kem_ <- rcvPq
let initParams = pqX3dh (sk1, publicKey rpk1) (dh' sk2 rpk1) (dh' sk1 rpk2) (dh' sk2 rpk2) (snd <$> kem_)
pure (initParams, fst <$> kem_)
where
rcvPq :: ExceptT CryptoError IO (Maybe (KEMKeyPair, RatchetKEMAccepted))
rcvPq = case sKem_ of
Just (RKParamsAccepted ct k') | v >= pqRatchetE2EEncryptVersion -> case rpKem_ of
Just (RKParamsAccepted ct k') -> case rpKem_ of
Just (PrivateRKParamsProposed ks@(_, pk)) -> do
shared <- liftIO $ sntrup761Dec ct pk
pure $ Just (ks, RatchetKEMAccepted k' shared ct)
@@ -721,31 +708,22 @@ data MsgHeader a = MsgHeader
-- to allow extension without increasing the size, the actual header length is:
-- 69 = 2 (original size) + 2 + 1+56 (Curve448) + 4 + 4
-- The exact size is 2288, added reserve
paddedHeaderLen :: VersionE2E -> PQSupport -> Int
paddedHeaderLen v = \case
PQSupportOn | v >= pqRatchetE2EEncryptVersion -> 2310
_ -> 88
paddedHeaderLen :: PQSupport -> Int
paddedHeaderLen = \case
PQSupportOn -> 2310
PQSupportOff -> 88
-- only used in tests to validate correct padding
-- (2 bytes - version size, 1 byte - header size)
fullHeaderLen :: VersionE2E -> PQSupport -> Int
fullHeaderLen v pq = 2 + 1 + paddedHeaderLen v pq + authTagSize + ivSize @AES256
fullHeaderLen :: PQSupport -> Int
fullHeaderLen pq = 2 + 1 + paddedHeaderLen pq + authTagSize + ivSize @AES256
-- pass the current version, as MsgHeader only includes the max supported version that can be different from the current
encodeMsgHeader :: AlgorithmI a => VersionE2E -> MsgHeader a -> ByteString
encodeMsgHeader v MsgHeader {msgMaxVersion, msgDHRs, msgKEM, msgPN, msgNs}
| v >= pqRatchetE2EEncryptVersion = smpEncode (msgMaxVersion, msgDHRs, msgKEM, msgPN, msgNs)
| otherwise = smpEncode (msgMaxVersion, msgDHRs, msgPN, msgNs)
-- pass the current version, as MsgHeader only includes the max supported version that can be different from the current
msgHeaderP :: AlgorithmI a => VersionE2E -> Parser (MsgHeader a)
msgHeaderP v = do
msgMaxVersion <- smpP
msgDHRs <- smpP
msgKEM <- if v >= pqRatchetE2EEncryptVersion then smpP else pure Nothing
msgPN <- smpP
msgNs <- smpP
pure MsgHeader {msgMaxVersion, msgDHRs, msgKEM, msgPN, msgNs}
instance AlgorithmI a => Encoding (MsgHeader a) where
smpEncode MsgHeader {msgMaxVersion, msgDHRs, msgKEM, msgPN, msgNs} =
smpEncode (msgMaxVersion, msgDHRs, msgKEM, msgPN, msgNs)
smpP = do
(msgMaxVersion, msgDHRs, msgKEM, msgPN, msgNs) <- smpP
pure MsgHeader {msgMaxVersion, msgDHRs, msgKEM, msgPN, msgNs}
data EncMessageHeader = EncMessageHeader
{ ehVersion :: VersionE2E, -- this is current ratchet version
@@ -757,26 +735,11 @@ data EncMessageHeader = EncMessageHeader
-- this encoding depends on version in EncMessageHeader because it is "current" ratchet version
instance Encoding EncMessageHeader where
smpEncode EncMessageHeader {ehVersion, ehIV, ehAuthTag, ehBody} =
smpEncode (ehVersion, ehIV, ehAuthTag) <> encodeLarge ehVersion ehBody
smpEncode (ehVersion, ehIV, ehAuthTag, Large ehBody)
smpP = do
(ehVersion, ehIV, ehAuthTag) <- smpP
ehBody <- largeP
(ehVersion, ehIV, ehAuthTag, Large ehBody) <- smpP
pure EncMessageHeader {ehVersion, ehIV, ehAuthTag, ehBody}
-- the encoder always uses 2-byte lengths for the new version, even for short headers without PQ keys.
encodeLarge :: VersionE2E -> ByteString -> ByteString
encodeLarge v s
| v >= pqRatchetE2EEncryptVersion = smpEncode $ Large s
| otherwise = smpEncode s
-- This parser relies on the fact that header cannot be shorter than 32 bytes (it is ~69 bytes without PQ KEM),
-- therefore if the first byte is less or equal to 31 (x1F), then we have 2 byte-length limited to 8191.
-- This allows upgrading the current version in one message.
largeP :: Parser ByteString
largeP = do
len1 <- peekWord8'
if len1 < 32 then unLarge <$> smpP else smpP
-- the header is length-prefixed to parse it as string and use as part of associated data for authenticated encryption
data EncRatchetMessage = EncRatchetMessage
{ emHeader :: ByteString,
@@ -784,15 +747,12 @@ data EncRatchetMessage = EncRatchetMessage
emBody :: ByteString
}
encodeEncRatchetMessage :: VersionE2E -> EncRatchetMessage -> ByteString
encodeEncRatchetMessage v EncRatchetMessage {emHeader, emBody, emAuthTag} =
encodeLarge v emHeader <> smpEncode (emAuthTag, Tail emBody)
encRatchetMessageP :: Parser EncRatchetMessage
encRatchetMessageP = do
emHeader <- largeP
(emAuthTag, Tail emBody) <- smpP
pure EncRatchetMessage {emHeader, emBody, emAuthTag}
instance Encoding EncRatchetMessage where
smpEncode EncRatchetMessage {emHeader, emBody, emAuthTag} =
smpEncode (Large emHeader, emAuthTag, Tail emBody)
smpP = do
(Large emHeader, emAuthTag, Tail emBody) <- smpP
pure EncRatchetMessage {emHeader, emBody, emAuthTag}
newtype PQEncryption = PQEncryption {enablePQ :: Bool}
deriving (Eq, Show)
@@ -841,15 +801,15 @@ pqEncToSupport (PQEncryption pq) = PQSupport pq
pqSupportAnd :: PQSupport -> PQSupport -> PQSupport
pqSupportAnd (PQSupport s1) (PQSupport s2) = PQSupport $ s1 && s2
pqEnableSupport :: VersionE2E -> PQSupport -> PQEncryption -> PQSupport
pqEnableSupport v (PQSupport sup) (PQEncryption enc) = PQSupport $ sup || (v >= pqRatchetE2EEncryptVersion && enc)
pqEnableSupport :: PQSupport -> PQEncryption -> PQSupport
pqEnableSupport (PQSupport sup) (PQEncryption enc) = PQSupport $ sup || enc
replyKEM_ :: VersionE2E -> Maybe (RKEMParams 'RKSProposed) -> PQSupport -> Maybe AUseKEM
replyKEM_ v kem_ = \case
PQSupportOn | v >= pqRatchetE2EEncryptVersion -> Just $ case kem_ of
replyKEM_ :: Maybe (RKEMParams 'RKSProposed) -> PQSupport -> Maybe AUseKEM
replyKEM_ kem_ = \case
PQSupportOn -> Just $ case kem_ of
Just (RKParamsProposed k) -> AUseKEM SRKSAccepted $ AcceptKEM k
Nothing -> AUseKEM SRKSProposed ProposeKEM
_ -> Nothing
PQSupportOff -> Nothing
instance StrEncoding PQEncryption where
strEncode pqMode
@@ -898,9 +858,9 @@ connPQEncryption = \case
IKUsePQ -> PQSupportOn
IKLinkPQ pq -> pq -- default for creating connection is IKLinkPQ PQEncOn
joinContactInitialKeys :: Bool -> PQSupport -> InitialKeys
joinContactInitialKeys pqCompatible = \case
PQSupportOn | pqCompatible -> IKUsePQ
joinContactInitialKeys :: PQSupport -> InitialKeys
joinContactInitialKeys = \case
PQSupportOn -> IKUsePQ
pqEnc -> IKLinkPQ pqEnc
rcCheckCanPad :: Int -> ByteString -> ExceptT CryptoError IO ()
@@ -916,14 +876,14 @@ rcEncryptHeader rc@Ratchet {rcSnd = Just sr@SndRatchet {rcCKs, rcHKs}, rcDHRs, r
-- PQ encryption can be enabled or disabled
rcEnableKEM' = fromMaybe rcEnableKEM pqEnc_
-- support for PQ encryption (and therefore large headers/small envelopes) can only be enabled, it cannot be disabled
rcSupportKEM' = pqEnableSupport v rcSupportKEM rcEnableKEM'
rcSupportKEM' = pqEnableSupport rcSupportKEM rcEnableKEM'
-- This sets max version to support PQ encryption.
-- Current version upgrade happens when peer decrypts the message.
-- TODO note that maxSupported will not downgrade here below current (v).
maxSupported' = max supportedE2EVersion $ if pqEnc_ == Just PQEncOn then pqRatchetE2EEncryptVersion else v
maxSupported' = max supportedE2EVersion $ if pqEnc_ == Just PQEncOn then minSupportedE2EEncryptVersion else v
rcVersion' = rcVersion {maxSupported = maxSupported'}
-- enc_header = HENCRYPT(state.HKs, header)
(ehAuthTag, ehBody) <- encryptAEAD rcHKs ehIV (paddedHeaderLen v rcSupportKEM') rcAD (msgHeader v maxSupported')
(ehAuthTag, ehBody) <- encryptAEAD rcHKs ehIV (paddedHeaderLen rcSupportKEM') rcAD (msgHeader maxSupported')
-- return enc_header
let emHeader = smpEncode EncMessageHeader {ehVersion = v, ehBody, ehAuthTag, ehIV}
msgEncryptKey =
@@ -951,9 +911,8 @@ rcEncryptHeader rc@Ratchet {rcSnd = Just sr@SndRatchet {rcCKs, rcHKs}, rcDHRs, r
-- pn = state.PN,
-- n = state.Ns
-- )
msgHeader v maxSupported' =
encodeMsgHeader
v
msgHeader maxSupported' =
smpEncode
MsgHeader
{ msgMaxVersion = maxSupported',
msgDHRs = publicKey rcDHRs,
@@ -976,11 +935,10 @@ data MsgEncryptKey a = MsgEncryptKey
deriving (Show)
rcEncryptMsg :: AlgorithmI a => MsgEncryptKey a -> Int -> ByteString -> ExceptT CryptoError IO ByteString
rcEncryptMsg MsgEncryptKey {msgKey = MessageKey mk iv, msgRcAD, msgEncHeader, msgRcVersion = v} paddedMsgLen msg = do
rcEncryptMsg MsgEncryptKey {msgKey = MessageKey mk iv, msgRcAD, msgEncHeader} paddedMsgLen msg = do
-- return ENCRYPT(mk, plaintext, CONCAT(AD, enc_header))
(emAuthTag, emBody) <- encryptAEAD mk iv paddedMsgLen (msgRcAD <> msgEncHeader) msg
let msg' = encodeEncRatchetMessage v EncRatchetMessage {emHeader = msgEncHeader, emBody, emAuthTag}
pure msg'
pure $ smpEncode EncRatchetMessage {emHeader = msgEncHeader, emBody, emAuthTag}
data SkippedMessage a
= SMMessage (DecryptResult a)
@@ -1004,7 +962,7 @@ rcDecrypt ::
ByteString ->
ExceptT CryptoError IO (DecryptResult a)
rcDecrypt g rc@Ratchet {rcRcv, rcAD = Str rcAD, rcVersion} rcMKSkipped msg' = do
encMsg@EncRatchetMessage {emHeader} <- parseE CryptoHeaderError encRatchetMessageP msg'
encMsg@EncRatchetMessage {emHeader} <- parseE CryptoHeaderError smpP msg'
encHdr <- parseE CryptoHeaderError smpP emHeader
-- plaintext = TrySkippedMessageKeysHE(state, enc_header, cipher-text, AD)
decryptSkipped encHdr encMsg >>= \case
@@ -1049,7 +1007,7 @@ rcDecrypt g rc@Ratchet {rcRcv, rcAD = Str rcAD, rcVersion} rcMKSkipped msg' = do
smkDiff :: SkippedMsgKeys -> SkippedMsgDiff
smkDiff smks = if M.null smks then SMDNoChange else SMDAdd smks
ratchetStep :: Ratchet a -> MsgHeader a -> ExceptT CryptoError IO (Ratchet a)
ratchetStep rc'@Ratchet {rcDHRs, rcRK, rcNHKs, rcNHKr, rcSupportKEM, rcVersion = rv} MsgHeader {msgDHRs, msgKEM} = do
ratchetStep rc'@Ratchet {rcDHRs, rcRK, rcNHKs, rcNHKr, rcSupportKEM} MsgHeader {msgDHRs, msgKEM} = do
(kemSS, kemSS', rcKEM') <- pqRatchetStep rc' msgKEM
-- state.DHRs = GENERATE_DH()
(_, rcDHRs') <- atomically $ generateKeyPair @a g
@@ -1064,7 +1022,7 @@ rcDecrypt g rc@Ratchet {rcRcv, rcAD = Str rcAD, rcVersion} rcMKSkipped msg' = do
rc'
{ rcDHRs = rcDHRs',
rcKEM = rcKEM',
rcSupportKEM = pqEnableSupport (current rv) rcSupportKEM rcEnableKEM',
rcSupportKEM = pqEnableSupport rcSupportKEM rcEnableKEM',
rcEnableKEM = rcEnableKEM',
rcSndKEM = PQEncryption sndKEM,
rcRcvKEM = PQEncryption rcvKEM,
@@ -1078,17 +1036,17 @@ rcDecrypt g rc@Ratchet {rcRcv, rcAD = Str rcAD, rcVersion} rcMKSkipped msg' = do
rcNHKr = rcNHKr'
}
pqRatchetStep :: Ratchet a -> Maybe ARKEMParams -> ExceptT CryptoError IO (Maybe KEMSharedKey, Maybe KEMSharedKey, Maybe RatchetKEM)
pqRatchetStep Ratchet {rcKEM, rcEnableKEM = PQEncryption pqEnc, rcVersion = rv} = \case
pqRatchetStep Ratchet {rcKEM, rcEnableKEM = PQEncryption pqEnc} = \case
-- received message does not have KEM in header,
-- but the user enabled KEM when sending previous message
Nothing -> case rcKEM of
Nothing | pqEnc && current rv >= pqRatchetE2EEncryptVersion -> do
Nothing | pqEnc -> do
rcPQRs <- liftIO $ sntrup761Keypair g
pure (Nothing, Nothing, Just RatchetKEM {rcPQRs, rcKEMs = Nothing})
_ -> pure (Nothing, Nothing, Nothing)
-- received message has KEM in header.
Just (ARKP _ ps)
| pqEnc && current rv >= pqRatchetE2EEncryptVersion -> do
| pqEnc -> do
-- state.PQRr = header.kem
(ss, rcPQRr) <- sharedSecret
-- state.PQRct = PQKEM-ENC(state.PQRr, state.PQRss) // encapsulated additional shared secret KEM #1
@@ -1156,9 +1114,9 @@ rcDecrypt g rc@Ratchet {rcRcv, rcAD = Str rcAD, rcVersion} rcMKSkipped msg' = do
e -> throwE e
-- header = HDECRYPT(state.NHKr, enc_header)
decryptNextHeader hdr = (AdvanceRatchet,) <$> decryptHeader (rcNHKr rc) hdr
decryptHeader k EncMessageHeader {ehVersion, ehBody, ehAuthTag, ehIV} = do
decryptHeader k EncMessageHeader {ehBody, ehAuthTag, ehIV} = do
header <- decryptAEAD k ehIV rcAD ehBody ehAuthTag `catchE` \_ -> throwE CERatchetHeader
parseE' CryptoHeaderError (msgHeaderP ehVersion) header
parseE' CryptoHeaderError smpP header
decryptMessage :: MessageKey -> EncRatchetMessage -> ExceptT CryptoError IO (Either CryptoError ByteString)
decryptMessage (MessageKey mk iv) EncRatchetMessage {emHeader, emBody, emAuthTag} =
-- DECRYPT(mk, cipher-text, CONCAT(AD, enc_header))
+1 -1
View File
@@ -120,6 +120,6 @@ decryptLinkData linkKey k (encFD, encMD) = do
pure (sig, s)
decode :: Encoding a => ByteString -> Either AgentErrorType a
decode = msgErr . smpDecode
msgErr = first (const $ AGENT A_MESSAGE)
msgErr = first (const $ AGENT $ A_MESSAGE "parse link data")
linkErr :: String -> Either AgentErrorType ()
linkErr = Left . AGENT . A_LINK