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agent: quantum-resistant double ratchet encryption (#939)
* doc * diff * ratchet header * types * ratchet step with PQ KEM, message header with KEM * comment * update types, remove Eq instances, store KEM keys to database * pqx3dh * PQ double ratchet test * pqdr tests pass * fix most tests * refactor * allow KEM proposals from both sides * test names * agent API parameters to use PQ KEM * initialize ratchet state for enabling KEM * fix/test KEM state machine to support disabling/enabling via messages * more tests * diff * diff2 * refactor * refactor * refactor * refactor * remove Maybe * rename * add PQ encryption status to CON, MID and MSG events and sendMessage API results * different PQ parameter when creating connection * rename/reorganize types for PQ encryption modes * rename * fix testWaitDeliveryTimeout * rename * rename2 * ghc8107 * rename * increase timeouts for concurrent send/receive test * enable all tests --------- Co-authored-by: spaced4ndy <8711996+spaced4ndy@users.noreply.github.com>
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@@ -218,20 +218,20 @@ deleteUser :: AgentErrorMonad m => AgentClient -> UserId -> Bool -> m ()
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deleteUser c = withAgentEnv c .: deleteUser' c
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-- | Create SMP agent connection (NEW command) asynchronously, synchronous response is new connection id
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createConnectionAsync :: forall m c. (AgentErrorMonad m, ConnectionModeI c) => AgentClient -> UserId -> ACorrId -> Bool -> SConnectionMode c -> SubscriptionMode -> m ConnId
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createConnectionAsync c userId aCorrId enableNtfs = withAgentEnv c .: newConnAsync c userId aCorrId enableNtfs
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createConnectionAsync :: forall m c. (AgentErrorMonad m, ConnectionModeI c) => AgentClient -> UserId -> ACorrId -> Bool -> SConnectionMode c -> CR.InitialKeys -> SubscriptionMode -> m ConnId
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createConnectionAsync c userId aCorrId enableNtfs = withAgentEnv c .:. newConnAsync c userId aCorrId enableNtfs
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-- | Join SMP agent connection (JOIN command) asynchronously, synchronous response is new connection id
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joinConnectionAsync :: AgentErrorMonad m => AgentClient -> UserId -> ACorrId -> Bool -> ConnectionRequestUri c -> ConnInfo -> SubscriptionMode -> m ConnId
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joinConnectionAsync c userId aCorrId enableNtfs = withAgentEnv c .:. joinConnAsync c userId aCorrId enableNtfs
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joinConnectionAsync :: AgentErrorMonad m => AgentClient -> UserId -> ACorrId -> Bool -> ConnectionRequestUri c -> ConnInfo -> CR.PQEncryption -> SubscriptionMode -> m ConnId
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joinConnectionAsync c userId aCorrId enableNtfs = withAgentEnv c .:: joinConnAsync c userId aCorrId enableNtfs
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-- | Allow connection to continue after CONF notification (LET command), no synchronous response
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allowConnectionAsync :: AgentErrorMonad m => AgentClient -> ACorrId -> ConnId -> ConfirmationId -> ConnInfo -> m ()
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allowConnectionAsync c = withAgentEnv c .:: allowConnectionAsync' c
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-- | Accept contact after REQ notification (ACPT command) asynchronously, synchronous response is new connection id
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acceptContactAsync :: AgentErrorMonad m => AgentClient -> ACorrId -> Bool -> ConfirmationId -> ConnInfo -> SubscriptionMode -> m ConnId
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acceptContactAsync c aCorrId enableNtfs = withAgentEnv c .:. acceptContactAsync' c aCorrId enableNtfs
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acceptContactAsync :: AgentErrorMonad m => AgentClient -> ACorrId -> Bool -> ConfirmationId -> ConnInfo -> CR.PQEncryption -> SubscriptionMode -> m ConnId
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acceptContactAsync c aCorrId enableNtfs = withAgentEnv c .:: acceptContactAsync' c aCorrId enableNtfs
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-- | Acknowledge message (ACK command) asynchronously, no synchronous response
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ackMessageAsync :: forall m. AgentErrorMonad m => AgentClient -> ACorrId -> ConnId -> AgentMsgId -> Maybe MsgReceiptInfo -> m ()
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@@ -250,20 +250,20 @@ deleteConnectionsAsync :: AgentErrorMonad m => AgentClient -> Bool -> [ConnId] -
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deleteConnectionsAsync c waitDelivery = withAgentEnv c . deleteConnectionsAsync' c waitDelivery
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-- | Create SMP agent connection (NEW command)
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createConnection :: AgentErrorMonad m => AgentClient -> UserId -> Bool -> SConnectionMode c -> Maybe CRClientData -> SubscriptionMode -> m (ConnId, ConnectionRequestUri c)
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createConnection c userId enableNtfs = withAgentEnv c .:. newConn c userId "" enableNtfs
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createConnection :: AgentErrorMonad m => AgentClient -> UserId -> Bool -> SConnectionMode c -> Maybe CRClientData -> CR.InitialKeys -> SubscriptionMode -> m (ConnId, ConnectionRequestUri c)
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createConnection c userId enableNtfs = withAgentEnv c .:: newConn c userId "" enableNtfs
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-- | Join SMP agent connection (JOIN command)
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joinConnection :: AgentErrorMonad m => AgentClient -> UserId -> Bool -> ConnectionRequestUri c -> ConnInfo -> SubscriptionMode -> m ConnId
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joinConnection c userId enableNtfs = withAgentEnv c .:. joinConn c userId "" enableNtfs
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joinConnection :: AgentErrorMonad m => AgentClient -> UserId -> Bool -> ConnectionRequestUri c -> ConnInfo -> CR.PQEncryption -> SubscriptionMode -> m ConnId
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joinConnection c userId enableNtfs = withAgentEnv c .:: joinConn c userId "" enableNtfs
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-- | Allow connection to continue after CONF notification (LET command)
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allowConnection :: AgentErrorMonad m => AgentClient -> ConnId -> ConfirmationId -> ConnInfo -> m ()
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allowConnection c = withAgentEnv c .:. allowConnection' c
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-- | Accept contact after REQ notification (ACPT command)
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acceptContact :: AgentErrorMonad m => AgentClient -> Bool -> ConfirmationId -> ConnInfo -> SubscriptionMode -> m ConnId
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acceptContact c enableNtfs = withAgentEnv c .:. acceptContact' c "" enableNtfs
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acceptContact :: AgentErrorMonad m => AgentClient -> Bool -> ConfirmationId -> ConnInfo -> CR.PQEncryption -> SubscriptionMode -> m ConnId
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acceptContact c enableNtfs = withAgentEnv c .:: acceptContact' c "" enableNtfs
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-- | Reject contact (RJCT command)
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rejectContact :: AgentErrorMonad m => AgentClient -> ConnId -> ConfirmationId -> m ()
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@@ -292,17 +292,17 @@ resubscribeConnections :: AgentErrorMonad m => AgentClient -> [ConnId] -> m (Map
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resubscribeConnections c = withAgentEnv c . resubscribeConnections' c
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-- | Send message to the connection (SEND command)
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sendMessage :: AgentErrorMonad m => AgentClient -> ConnId -> MsgFlags -> MsgBody -> m AgentMsgId
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sendMessage c = withAgentEnv c .:. sendMessage' c
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sendMessage :: AgentErrorMonad m => AgentClient -> ConnId -> CR.PQEncryption -> MsgFlags -> MsgBody -> m (AgentMsgId, CR.PQEncryption)
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sendMessage c = withAgentEnv c .:: sendMessage' c
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type MsgReq = (ConnId, MsgFlags, MsgBody)
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-- | Send multiple messages to different connections (SEND command)
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sendMessages :: MonadUnliftIO m => AgentClient -> [MsgReq] -> m [Either AgentErrorType AgentMsgId]
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sendMessages c = withAgentEnv c . sendMessages' c
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sendMessages :: MonadUnliftIO m => AgentClient -> CR.PQEncryption -> [MsgReq] -> m [Either AgentErrorType (AgentMsgId, CR.PQEncryption)]
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sendMessages c = withAgentEnv c .: sendMessages' c
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sendMessagesB :: (MonadUnliftIO m, Traversable t) => AgentClient -> t (Either AgentErrorType MsgReq) -> m (t (Either AgentErrorType AgentMsgId))
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sendMessagesB c = withAgentEnv c . sendMessagesB' c
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sendMessagesB :: (MonadUnliftIO m, Traversable t) => AgentClient -> CR.PQEncryption -> t (Either AgentErrorType MsgReq) -> m (t (Either AgentErrorType (AgentMsgId, CR.PQEncryption)))
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sendMessagesB c = withAgentEnv c .: sendMessagesB' c
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ackMessage :: AgentErrorMonad m => AgentClient -> ConnId -> AgentMsgId -> Maybe MsgReceiptInfo -> m ()
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ackMessage c = withAgentEnv c .:. ackMessage' c
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@@ -316,8 +316,8 @@ abortConnectionSwitch :: AgentErrorMonad m => AgentClient -> ConnId -> m Connect
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abortConnectionSwitch c = withAgentEnv c . abortConnectionSwitch' c
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-- | Re-synchronize connection ratchet keys
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synchronizeRatchet :: AgentErrorMonad m => AgentClient -> ConnId -> Bool -> m ConnectionStats
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synchronizeRatchet c = withAgentEnv c .: synchronizeRatchet' c
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synchronizeRatchet :: AgentErrorMonad m => AgentClient -> ConnId -> CR.PQEncryption -> Bool -> m ConnectionStats
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synchronizeRatchet c = withAgentEnv c .:. synchronizeRatchet' c
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-- | Suspend SMP agent connection (OFF command)
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suspendConnection :: AgentErrorMonad m => AgentClient -> ConnId -> m ()
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@@ -514,13 +514,13 @@ client c@AgentClient {rcvQ, subQ} = forever $ do
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processCommand :: forall m. AgentMonad m => AgentClient -> (EntityId, APartyCmd 'Client) -> m (EntityId, APartyCmd 'Agent)
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processCommand c (connId, APC e cmd) =
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second (APC e) <$> case cmd of
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NEW enableNtfs (ACM cMode) subMode -> second (INV . ACR cMode) <$> newConn c userId connId enableNtfs cMode Nothing subMode
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JOIN enableNtfs (ACR _ cReq) subMode connInfo -> (,OK) <$> joinConn c userId connId enableNtfs cReq connInfo subMode
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NEW enableNtfs (ACM cMode) pqIK subMode -> second (INV . ACR cMode) <$> newConn c userId connId enableNtfs cMode Nothing pqIK subMode
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JOIN enableNtfs (ACR _ cReq) pqEnc subMode connInfo -> (,OK) <$> joinConn c userId connId enableNtfs cReq connInfo pqEnc subMode
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LET confId ownCInfo -> allowConnection' c connId confId ownCInfo $> (connId, OK)
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ACPT invId ownCInfo -> (,OK) <$> acceptContact' c connId True invId ownCInfo SMSubscribe
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ACPT invId pqEnc ownCInfo -> (,OK) <$> acceptContact' c connId True invId ownCInfo pqEnc SMSubscribe
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RJCT invId -> rejectContact' c connId invId $> (connId, OK)
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SUB -> subscribeConnection' c connId $> (connId, OK)
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SEND msgFlags msgBody -> (connId,) . MID <$> sendMessage' c connId msgFlags msgBody
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SEND pqEnc msgFlags msgBody -> (connId,) . uncurry MID <$> sendMessage' c connId pqEnc msgFlags msgBody
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ACK msgId rcptInfo_ -> ackMessage' c connId msgId rcptInfo_ $> (connId, OK)
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SWCH -> switchConnection' c connId $> (connId, OK)
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OFF -> suspendConnection' c connId $> (connId, OK)
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@@ -549,32 +549,32 @@ deleteUser' c userId delSMPQueues = do
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whenM (withStore' c (`deleteUserWithoutConns` userId)) . atomically $
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writeTBQueue (subQ c) ("", "", APC SAENone $ DEL_USER userId)
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newConnAsync :: forall m c. (AgentMonad m, ConnectionModeI c) => AgentClient -> UserId -> ACorrId -> Bool -> SConnectionMode c -> SubscriptionMode -> m ConnId
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newConnAsync c userId corrId enableNtfs cMode subMode = do
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connId <- newConnNoQueues c userId "" enableNtfs cMode
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enqueueCommand c corrId connId Nothing $ AClientCommand $ APC SAEConn $ NEW enableNtfs (ACM cMode) subMode
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newConnAsync :: forall m c. (AgentMonad m, ConnectionModeI c) => AgentClient -> UserId -> ACorrId -> Bool -> SConnectionMode c -> CR.InitialKeys -> SubscriptionMode -> m ConnId
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newConnAsync c userId corrId enableNtfs cMode pqInitKeys subMode = do
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connId <- newConnNoQueues c userId "" enableNtfs cMode (CR.connPQEncryption pqInitKeys)
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enqueueCommand c corrId connId Nothing $ AClientCommand $ APC SAEConn $ NEW enableNtfs (ACM cMode) pqInitKeys subMode
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pure connId
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newConnNoQueues :: AgentMonad m => AgentClient -> UserId -> ConnId -> Bool -> SConnectionMode c -> m ConnId
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newConnNoQueues c userId connId enableNtfs cMode = do
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newConnNoQueues :: AgentMonad m => AgentClient -> UserId -> ConnId -> Bool -> SConnectionMode c -> CR.PQEncryption -> m ConnId
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newConnNoQueues c userId connId enableNtfs cMode pqEncryption = do
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g <- asks random
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connAgentVersion <- asks $ maxVersion . smpAgentVRange . config
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let cData = ConnData {userId, connId, connAgentVersion, enableNtfs, lastExternalSndId = 0, deleted = False, ratchetSyncState = RSOk}
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let cData = ConnData {userId, connId, connAgentVersion, enableNtfs, lastExternalSndId = 0, deleted = False, ratchetSyncState = RSOk, pqEncryption}
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withStore c $ \db -> createNewConn db g cData cMode
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joinConnAsync :: AgentMonad m => AgentClient -> UserId -> ACorrId -> Bool -> ConnectionRequestUri c -> ConnInfo -> SubscriptionMode -> m ConnId
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joinConnAsync c userId corrId enableNtfs cReqUri@(CRInvitationUri ConnReqUriData {crAgentVRange} _) cInfo subMode = do
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joinConnAsync :: AgentMonad m => AgentClient -> UserId -> ACorrId -> Bool -> ConnectionRequestUri c -> ConnInfo -> CR.PQEncryption -> SubscriptionMode -> m ConnId
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joinConnAsync c userId corrId enableNtfs cReqUri@(CRInvitationUri ConnReqUriData {crAgentVRange} _) cInfo pqEncryption subMode = do
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withInvLock c (strEncode cReqUri) "joinConnAsync" $ do
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aVRange <- asks $ smpAgentVRange . config
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case crAgentVRange `compatibleVersion` aVRange of
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Just (Compatible connAgentVersion) -> do
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g <- asks random
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let cData = ConnData {userId, connId = "", connAgentVersion, enableNtfs, lastExternalSndId = 0, deleted = False, ratchetSyncState = RSOk}
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let cData = ConnData {userId, connId = "", connAgentVersion, enableNtfs, lastExternalSndId = 0, deleted = False, ratchetSyncState = RSOk, pqEncryption}
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connId <- withStore c $ \db -> createNewConn db g cData SCMInvitation
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enqueueCommand c corrId connId Nothing $ AClientCommand $ APC SAEConn $ JOIN enableNtfs (ACR sConnectionMode cReqUri) subMode cInfo
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enqueueCommand c corrId connId Nothing $ AClientCommand $ APC SAEConn $ JOIN enableNtfs (ACR sConnectionMode cReqUri) pqEncryption subMode cInfo
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pure connId
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_ -> throwError $ AGENT A_VERSION
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joinConnAsync _c _userId _corrId _enableNtfs (CRContactUri _) _subMode _cInfo =
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joinConnAsync _c _userId _corrId _enableNtfs (CRContactUri _) _subMode _cInfo _pqEncryption =
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throwError $ CMD PROHIBITED
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allowConnectionAsync' :: AgentMonad m => AgentClient -> ACorrId -> ConnId -> ConfirmationId -> ConnInfo -> m ()
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@@ -584,13 +584,13 @@ allowConnectionAsync' c corrId connId confId ownConnInfo =
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enqueueCommand c corrId connId (Just server) $ AClientCommand $ APC SAEConn $ LET confId ownConnInfo
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_ -> throwError $ CMD PROHIBITED
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acceptContactAsync' :: AgentMonad m => AgentClient -> ACorrId -> Bool -> InvitationId -> ConnInfo -> SubscriptionMode -> m ConnId
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acceptContactAsync' c corrId enableNtfs invId ownConnInfo subMode = do
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acceptContactAsync' :: AgentMonad m => AgentClient -> ACorrId -> Bool -> InvitationId -> ConnInfo -> CR.PQEncryption -> SubscriptionMode -> m ConnId
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acceptContactAsync' c corrId enableNtfs invId ownConnInfo pqEnc subMode = do
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Invitation {contactConnId, connReq} <- withStore c (`getInvitation` invId)
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withStore c (`getConn` contactConnId) >>= \case
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SomeConn _ (ContactConnection ConnData {userId} _) -> do
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withStore' c $ \db -> acceptInvitation db invId ownConnInfo
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joinConnAsync c userId corrId enableNtfs connReq ownConnInfo subMode `catchAgentError` \err -> do
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joinConnAsync c userId corrId enableNtfs connReq ownConnInfo pqEnc subMode `catchAgentError` \err -> do
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withStore' c (`unacceptInvitation` invId)
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throwError err
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_ -> throwError $ CMD PROHIBITED
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@@ -644,17 +644,20 @@ switchConnectionAsync' c corrId connId =
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pure . connectionStats $ DuplexConnection cData rqs' sqs
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_ -> throwError $ CMD PROHIBITED
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newConn :: AgentMonad m => AgentClient -> UserId -> ConnId -> Bool -> SConnectionMode c -> Maybe CRClientData -> SubscriptionMode -> m (ConnId, ConnectionRequestUri c)
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newConn c userId connId enableNtfs cMode clientData subMode =
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getSMPServer c userId >>= newConnSrv c userId connId enableNtfs cMode clientData subMode
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newConn :: AgentMonad m => AgentClient -> UserId -> ConnId -> Bool -> SConnectionMode c -> Maybe CRClientData -> CR.InitialKeys -> SubscriptionMode -> m (ConnId, ConnectionRequestUri c)
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newConn c userId connId enableNtfs cMode clientData pqInitKeys subMode =
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getSMPServer c userId >>= newConnSrv c userId connId enableNtfs cMode clientData pqInitKeys subMode
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newConnSrv :: AgentMonad m => AgentClient -> UserId -> ConnId -> Bool -> SConnectionMode c -> Maybe CRClientData -> SubscriptionMode -> SMPServerWithAuth -> m (ConnId, ConnectionRequestUri c)
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newConnSrv c userId connId enableNtfs cMode clientData subMode srv = do
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connId' <- newConnNoQueues c userId connId enableNtfs cMode
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newRcvConnSrv c userId connId' enableNtfs cMode clientData subMode srv
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newConnSrv :: AgentMonad m => AgentClient -> UserId -> ConnId -> Bool -> SConnectionMode c -> Maybe CRClientData -> CR.InitialKeys -> SubscriptionMode -> SMPServerWithAuth -> m (ConnId, ConnectionRequestUri c)
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newConnSrv c userId connId enableNtfs cMode clientData pqInitKeys subMode srv = do
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connId' <- newConnNoQueues c userId connId enableNtfs cMode (CR.connPQEncryption pqInitKeys)
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newRcvConnSrv c userId connId' enableNtfs cMode clientData pqInitKeys subMode srv
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newRcvConnSrv :: AgentMonad m => AgentClient -> UserId -> ConnId -> Bool -> SConnectionMode c -> Maybe CRClientData -> SubscriptionMode -> SMPServerWithAuth -> m (ConnId, ConnectionRequestUri c)
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newRcvConnSrv c userId connId enableNtfs cMode clientData subMode srv = do
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newRcvConnSrv :: AgentMonad m => AgentClient -> UserId -> ConnId -> Bool -> SConnectionMode c -> Maybe CRClientData -> CR.InitialKeys -> SubscriptionMode -> SMPServerWithAuth -> m (ConnId, ConnectionRequestUri c)
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newRcvConnSrv c userId connId enableNtfs cMode clientData pqInitKeys subMode srv = do
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case (cMode, pqInitKeys) of
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(SCMContact, CR.IKUsePQ) -> throwError $ CMD PROHIBITED
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_ -> pure ()
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AgentConfig {smpClientVRange, smpAgentVRange, e2eEncryptVRange} <- asks config
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(rq, qUri) <- newRcvQueue c userId connId srv smpClientVRange subMode `catchAgentError` \e -> liftIO (print e) >> throwError e
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rq' <- withStore c $ \db -> updateNewConnRcv db connId rq
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@@ -669,71 +672,73 @@ newRcvConnSrv c userId connId enableNtfs cMode clientData subMode srv = do
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SCMContact -> pure (connId, CRContactUri crData)
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SCMInvitation -> do
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g <- asks random
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(pk1, pk2, e2eRcvParams) <- atomically . CR.generateE2EParams g $ maxVersion e2eEncryptVRange
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withStore' c $ \db -> createRatchetX3dhKeys db connId pk1 pk2
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(pk1, pk2, pKem, e2eRcvParams) <- liftIO $ CR.generateRcvE2EParams g (maxVersion e2eEncryptVRange) (CR.initialPQEncryption pqInitKeys)
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withStore' c $ \db -> createRatchetX3dhKeys db connId pk1 pk2 pKem
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pure (connId, CRInvitationUri crData $ toVersionRangeT e2eRcvParams e2eEncryptVRange)
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joinConn :: AgentMonad m => AgentClient -> UserId -> ConnId -> Bool -> ConnectionRequestUri c -> ConnInfo -> SubscriptionMode -> m ConnId
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joinConn c userId connId enableNtfs cReq cInfo subMode = do
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joinConn :: AgentMonad m => AgentClient -> UserId -> ConnId -> Bool -> ConnectionRequestUri c -> ConnInfo -> CR.PQEncryption -> SubscriptionMode -> m ConnId
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joinConn c userId connId enableNtfs cReq cInfo pqEnc subMode = do
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srv <- case cReq of
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CRInvitationUri ConnReqUriData {crSmpQueues = q :| _} _ ->
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getNextServer c userId [qServer q]
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_ -> getSMPServer c userId
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joinConnSrv c userId connId enableNtfs cReq cInfo subMode srv
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joinConnSrv c userId connId enableNtfs cReq cInfo pqEnc subMode srv
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startJoinInvitation :: AgentMonad m => UserId -> ConnId -> Bool -> ConnectionRequestUri 'CMInvitation -> m (Compatible Version, ConnData, NewSndQueue, CR.Ratchet 'C.X448, CR.E2ERatchetParams 'C.X448)
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startJoinInvitation userId connId enableNtfs (CRInvitationUri ConnReqUriData {crAgentVRange, crSmpQueues = (qUri :| _)} e2eRcvParamsUri) = do
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startJoinInvitation :: AgentMonad m => UserId -> ConnId -> Bool -> ConnectionRequestUri 'CMInvitation -> CR.PQEncryption -> m (Compatible Version, ConnData, NewSndQueue, CR.Ratchet 'C.X448, CR.SndE2ERatchetParams 'C.X448)
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startJoinInvitation userId connId enableNtfs (CRInvitationUri ConnReqUriData {crAgentVRange, crSmpQueues = (qUri :| _)} e2eRcvParamsUri) pqEncryption = do
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AgentConfig {smpClientVRange, smpAgentVRange, e2eEncryptVRange} <- asks config
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case ( qUri `compatibleVersion` smpClientVRange,
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e2eRcvParamsUri `compatibleVersion` e2eEncryptVRange,
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crAgentVRange `compatibleVersion` smpAgentVRange
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) of
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(Just qInfo, Just (Compatible e2eRcvParams@(CR.E2ERatchetParams _ _ rcDHRr)), Just aVersion@(Compatible connAgentVersion)) -> do
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(Just qInfo, Just (Compatible e2eRcvParams@(CR.E2ERatchetParams v _ rcDHRr kem_)), Just aVersion@(Compatible connAgentVersion)) -> do
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g <- asks random
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(pk1, pk2, e2eSndParams) <- atomically . CR.generateE2EParams g $ version e2eRcvParams
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(pk1, pk2, pKem, e2eSndParams) <- liftIO $ CR.generateSndE2EParams g v (CR.replyKEM_ pqEncryption kem_)
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(_, rcDHRs) <- atomically $ C.generateKeyPair g
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let rc = CR.initSndRatchet e2eEncryptVRange rcDHRr rcDHRs $ CR.x3dhSnd pk1 pk2 e2eRcvParams
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-- TODO PQ generate KEM keypair if needed - is it done?
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rcParams <- liftEitherWith cryptoError $ CR.pqX3dhSnd pk1 pk2 pKem e2eRcvParams
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let rc = CR.initSndRatchet e2eEncryptVRange rcDHRr rcDHRs rcParams
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q <- newSndQueue userId "" qInfo
|
||||
let cData = ConnData {userId, connId, connAgentVersion, enableNtfs, lastExternalSndId = 0, deleted = False, ratchetSyncState = RSOk}
|
||||
let cData = ConnData {userId, connId, connAgentVersion, enableNtfs, lastExternalSndId = 0, deleted = False, ratchetSyncState = RSOk, pqEncryption}
|
||||
pure (aVersion, cData, q, rc, e2eSndParams)
|
||||
_ -> throwError $ AGENT A_VERSION
|
||||
|
||||
joinConnSrv :: AgentMonad m => AgentClient -> UserId -> ConnId -> Bool -> ConnectionRequestUri c -> ConnInfo -> SubscriptionMode -> SMPServerWithAuth -> m ConnId
|
||||
joinConnSrv c userId connId enableNtfs inv@CRInvitationUri {} cInfo subMode srv =
|
||||
joinConnSrv :: AgentMonad m => AgentClient -> UserId -> ConnId -> Bool -> ConnectionRequestUri c -> ConnInfo -> CR.PQEncryption -> SubscriptionMode -> SMPServerWithAuth -> m ConnId
|
||||
joinConnSrv c userId connId enableNtfs inv@CRInvitationUri {} cInfo pqEnc subMode srv =
|
||||
withInvLock c (strEncode inv) "joinConnSrv" $ do
|
||||
(aVersion, cData, q, rc, e2eSndParams) <- startJoinInvitation userId connId enableNtfs inv
|
||||
(aVersion, cData, q, rc, e2eSndParams) <- startJoinInvitation userId connId enableNtfs inv pqEnc
|
||||
g <- asks random
|
||||
(connId', sq) <- withStore c $ \db -> runExceptT $ do
|
||||
r@(connId', _) <- ExceptT $ createSndConn db g cData q
|
||||
liftIO $ createRatchet db connId' rc
|
||||
pure r
|
||||
let cData' = (cData :: ConnData) {connId = connId'}
|
||||
tryError (confirmQueue aVersion c cData' sq srv cInfo (Just e2eSndParams) subMode) >>= \case
|
||||
tryError (confirmQueue aVersion c cData' sq srv cInfo (Just e2eSndParams) (Just pqEnc) subMode) >>= \case
|
||||
Right _ -> pure connId'
|
||||
Left e -> do
|
||||
-- possible improvement: recovery for failure on network timeout, see rfcs/2022-04-20-smp-conf-timeout-recovery.md
|
||||
void $ withStore' c $ \db -> deleteConn db Nothing connId'
|
||||
throwError e
|
||||
joinConnSrv c userId connId enableNtfs (CRContactUri ConnReqUriData {crAgentVRange, crSmpQueues = (qUri :| _)}) cInfo subMode srv = do
|
||||
joinConnSrv c userId connId enableNtfs (CRContactUri ConnReqUriData {crAgentVRange, crSmpQueues = (qUri :| _)}) cInfo pqEnc subMode srv = do
|
||||
aVRange <- asks $ smpAgentVRange . config
|
||||
clientVRange <- asks $ smpClientVRange . config
|
||||
case ( qUri `compatibleVersion` clientVRange,
|
||||
crAgentVRange `compatibleVersion` aVRange
|
||||
) of
|
||||
(Just qInfo, Just vrsn) -> do
|
||||
(connId', cReq) <- newConnSrv c userId connId enableNtfs SCMInvitation Nothing subMode srv
|
||||
(connId', cReq) <- newConnSrv c userId connId enableNtfs SCMInvitation Nothing (CR.joinContactInitialKeys pqEnc) subMode srv
|
||||
sendInvitation c userId qInfo vrsn cReq cInfo
|
||||
pure connId'
|
||||
_ -> throwError $ AGENT A_VERSION
|
||||
|
||||
joinConnSrvAsync :: AgentMonad m => AgentClient -> UserId -> ConnId -> Bool -> ConnectionRequestUri c -> ConnInfo -> SubscriptionMode -> SMPServerWithAuth -> m ()
|
||||
joinConnSrvAsync c userId connId enableNtfs inv@CRInvitationUri {} cInfo subMode srv = do
|
||||
(_aVersion, cData, q, rc, e2eSndParams) <- startJoinInvitation userId connId enableNtfs inv
|
||||
joinConnSrvAsync :: AgentMonad m => AgentClient -> UserId -> ConnId -> Bool -> ConnectionRequestUri c -> ConnInfo -> CR.PQEncryption -> SubscriptionMode -> SMPServerWithAuth -> m ()
|
||||
joinConnSrvAsync c userId connId enableNtfs inv@CRInvitationUri {} cInfo pqEnc subMode srv = do
|
||||
(_aVersion, cData, q, rc, e2eSndParams) <- startJoinInvitation userId connId enableNtfs inv pqEnc
|
||||
q' <- withStore c $ \db -> runExceptT $ do
|
||||
liftIO $ createRatchet db connId rc
|
||||
ExceptT $ updateNewConnSnd db connId q
|
||||
confirmQueueAsync c cData q' srv cInfo (Just e2eSndParams) subMode
|
||||
joinConnSrvAsync _c _userId _connId _enableNtfs (CRContactUri _) _cInfo _subMode _srv = do
|
||||
confirmQueueAsync c cData q' srv cInfo (Just e2eSndParams) pqEnc subMode
|
||||
joinConnSrvAsync _c _userId _connId _enableNtfs (CRContactUri _) _cInfo _subMode _pqEnc _srv = do
|
||||
throwError $ CMD PROHIBITED
|
||||
|
||||
createReplyQueue :: AgentMonad m => AgentClient -> ConnData -> SndQueue -> SubscriptionMode -> SMPServerWithAuth -> m SMPQueueInfo
|
||||
@@ -764,13 +769,13 @@ allowConnection' c connId confId ownConnInfo = withConnLock c connId "allowConne
|
||||
_ -> throwError $ CMD PROHIBITED
|
||||
|
||||
-- | Accept contact (ACPT command) in Reader monad
|
||||
acceptContact' :: AgentMonad m => AgentClient -> ConnId -> Bool -> InvitationId -> ConnInfo -> SubscriptionMode -> m ConnId
|
||||
acceptContact' c connId enableNtfs invId ownConnInfo subMode = withConnLock c connId "acceptContact" $ do
|
||||
acceptContact' :: AgentMonad m => AgentClient -> ConnId -> Bool -> InvitationId -> ConnInfo -> CR.PQEncryption -> SubscriptionMode -> m ConnId
|
||||
acceptContact' c connId enableNtfs invId ownConnInfo pqEnc subMode = withConnLock c connId "acceptContact" $ do
|
||||
Invitation {contactConnId, connReq} <- withStore c (`getInvitation` invId)
|
||||
withStore c (`getConn` contactConnId) >>= \case
|
||||
SomeConn _ (ContactConnection ConnData {userId} _) -> do
|
||||
withStore' c $ \db -> acceptInvitation db invId ownConnInfo
|
||||
joinConn c userId connId enableNtfs connReq ownConnInfo subMode `catchAgentError` \err -> do
|
||||
joinConn c userId connId enableNtfs connReq ownConnInfo pqEnc subMode `catchAgentError` \err -> do
|
||||
withStore' c (`unacceptInvitation` invId)
|
||||
throwError err
|
||||
_ -> throwError $ CMD PROHIBITED
|
||||
@@ -905,18 +910,18 @@ getNotificationMessage' c nonce encNtfInfo = do
|
||||
Nothing -> SMP.notification msgFlags
|
||||
|
||||
-- | Send message to the connection (SEND command) in Reader monad
|
||||
sendMessage' :: forall m. AgentMonad m => AgentClient -> ConnId -> MsgFlags -> MsgBody -> m AgentMsgId
|
||||
sendMessage' c connId msgFlags msg = liftEither . runIdentity =<< sendMessagesB' c (Identity (Right (connId, msgFlags, msg)))
|
||||
sendMessage' :: forall m. AgentMonad m => AgentClient -> ConnId -> CR.PQEncryption -> MsgFlags -> MsgBody -> m (AgentMsgId, CR.PQEncryption)
|
||||
sendMessage' c connId pqEnc msgFlags msg = liftEither . runIdentity =<< sendMessagesB' c pqEnc (Identity (Right (connId, msgFlags, msg)))
|
||||
|
||||
-- | Send multiple messages to different connections (SEND command) in Reader monad
|
||||
sendMessages' :: forall m. AgentMonad' m => AgentClient -> [MsgReq] -> m [Either AgentErrorType AgentMsgId]
|
||||
sendMessages' c = sendMessagesB' c . map Right
|
||||
sendMessages' :: forall m. AgentMonad' m => AgentClient -> CR.PQEncryption -> [MsgReq] -> m [Either AgentErrorType (AgentMsgId, CR.PQEncryption)]
|
||||
sendMessages' c pqEnc = sendMessagesB' c pqEnc . map Right
|
||||
|
||||
sendMessagesB' :: forall m t. (AgentMonad' m, Traversable t) => AgentClient -> t (Either AgentErrorType MsgReq) -> m (t (Either AgentErrorType AgentMsgId))
|
||||
sendMessagesB' c reqs = withConnLocks c connIds "sendMessages" $ do
|
||||
sendMessagesB' :: forall m t. (AgentMonad' m, Traversable t) => AgentClient -> CR.PQEncryption -> t (Either AgentErrorType MsgReq) -> m (t (Either AgentErrorType (AgentMsgId, CR.PQEncryption)))
|
||||
sendMessagesB' c pqEnc reqs = withConnLocks c connIds "sendMessages" $ do
|
||||
reqs' <- withStoreBatch c (\db -> fmap (bindRight $ \req@(connId, _, _) -> bimap storeError (req,) <$> getConn db connId) reqs)
|
||||
let reqs'' = fmap (>>= prepareConn) reqs'
|
||||
enqueueMessagesB c reqs''
|
||||
enqueueMessagesB c (Just pqEnc) reqs''
|
||||
where
|
||||
prepareConn :: (MsgReq, SomeConn) -> Either AgentErrorType (ConnData, NonEmpty SndQueue, MsgFlags, AMessage)
|
||||
prepareConn ((_, msgFlags, msg), SomeConn _ conn) = case conn of
|
||||
@@ -965,16 +970,16 @@ runCommandProcessing c@AgentClient {subQ} server_ Worker {doWork} = do
|
||||
processCmd :: RetryInterval -> PendingCommand -> m ()
|
||||
processCmd ri PendingCommand {cmdId, corrId, userId, connId, command} = case command of
|
||||
AClientCommand (APC _ cmd) -> case cmd of
|
||||
NEW enableNtfs (ACM cMode) subMode -> noServer $ do
|
||||
NEW enableNtfs (ACM cMode) pqEnc subMode -> noServer $ do
|
||||
usedSrvs <- newTVarIO ([] :: [SMPServer])
|
||||
tryCommand . withNextSrv c userId usedSrvs [] $ \srv -> do
|
||||
(_, cReq) <- newRcvConnSrv c userId connId enableNtfs cMode Nothing subMode srv
|
||||
(_, cReq) <- newRcvConnSrv c userId connId enableNtfs cMode Nothing pqEnc subMode srv
|
||||
notify $ INV (ACR cMode cReq)
|
||||
JOIN enableNtfs (ACR _ cReq@(CRInvitationUri ConnReqUriData {crSmpQueues = q :| _} _)) subMode connInfo -> noServer $ do
|
||||
JOIN enableNtfs (ACR _ cReq@(CRInvitationUri ConnReqUriData {crSmpQueues = q :| _} _)) pqEnc subMode connInfo -> noServer $ do
|
||||
let initUsed = [qServer q]
|
||||
usedSrvs <- newTVarIO initUsed
|
||||
tryCommand . withNextSrv c userId usedSrvs initUsed $ \srv -> do
|
||||
joinConnSrvAsync c userId connId enableNtfs cReq connInfo subMode srv
|
||||
joinConnSrvAsync c userId connId enableNtfs cReq connInfo pqEnc subMode srv
|
||||
notify OK
|
||||
LET confId ownCInfo -> withServer' . tryCommand $ allowConnection' c connId confId ownCInfo >> notify OK
|
||||
ACK msgId rcptInfo_ -> withServer' . tryCommand $ ackMessage' c connId msgId rcptInfo_ >> notify OK
|
||||
@@ -999,7 +1004,7 @@ runCommandProcessing c@AgentClient {subQ} server_ Worker {doWork} = do
|
||||
_ -> throwError $ INTERNAL $ "incorrect connection type " <> show (internalCmdTag cmd)
|
||||
ICDuplexSecure _rId senderKey -> withServer' . tryWithLock "ICDuplexSecure" . withDuplexConn $ \(DuplexConnection cData (rq :| _) (sq :| _)) -> do
|
||||
secure rq senderKey
|
||||
void $ enqueueMessage c cData sq SMP.MsgFlags {notification = True} HELLO
|
||||
void $ enqueueMessage c cData sq Nothing SMP.MsgFlags {notification = True} HELLO
|
||||
-- ICDeleteConn is no longer used, but it can be present in old client databases
|
||||
ICDeleteConn -> withStore' c (`deleteCommand` cmdId)
|
||||
ICDeleteRcvQueue rId -> withServer $ \srv -> tryWithLock "ICDeleteRcvQueue" $ do
|
||||
@@ -1014,7 +1019,7 @@ runCommandProcessing c@AgentClient {subQ} server_ Worker {doWork} = do
|
||||
Just rq1 -> when (status == Confirmed) $ do
|
||||
secureQueue c rq' senderKey
|
||||
withStore' c $ \db -> setRcvQueueStatus db rq' Secured
|
||||
void . enqueueMessages c cData sqs SMP.noMsgFlags $ QUSE [((server, sndId), True)]
|
||||
void . enqueueMessages c cData sqs Nothing SMP.noMsgFlags $ QUSE [((server, sndId), True)]
|
||||
rq1' <- withStore' c $ \db -> setRcvSwitchStatus db rq1 $ Just RSSendingQUSE
|
||||
let rqs' = updatedQs rq1' rqs
|
||||
conn' = DuplexConnection cData rqs' sqs
|
||||
@@ -1077,39 +1082,39 @@ runCommandProcessing c@AgentClient {subQ} server_ Worker {doWork} = do
|
||||
notify cmd = atomically $ writeTBQueue subQ (corrId, connId, APC (sAEntity @e) cmd)
|
||||
-- ^ ^ ^ async command processing /
|
||||
|
||||
enqueueMessages :: AgentMonad m => AgentClient -> ConnData -> NonEmpty SndQueue -> MsgFlags -> AMessage -> m AgentMsgId
|
||||
enqueueMessages c cData sqs msgFlags aMessage = do
|
||||
enqueueMessages :: AgentMonad m => AgentClient -> ConnData -> NonEmpty SndQueue -> Maybe CR.PQEncryption -> MsgFlags -> AMessage -> m (AgentMsgId, CR.PQEncryption)
|
||||
enqueueMessages c cData sqs pqEnc_ msgFlags aMessage = do
|
||||
when (ratchetSyncSendProhibited cData) $ throwError $ INTERNAL "enqueueMessages: ratchet is not synchronized"
|
||||
enqueueMessages' c cData sqs msgFlags aMessage
|
||||
enqueueMessages' c cData sqs pqEnc_ msgFlags aMessage
|
||||
|
||||
enqueueMessages' :: AgentMonad m => AgentClient -> ConnData -> NonEmpty SndQueue -> MsgFlags -> AMessage -> m AgentMsgId
|
||||
enqueueMessages' c cData sqs msgFlags aMessage =
|
||||
liftEither . runIdentity =<< enqueueMessagesB c (Identity (Right (cData, sqs, msgFlags, aMessage)))
|
||||
enqueueMessages' :: AgentMonad m => AgentClient -> ConnData -> NonEmpty SndQueue -> Maybe CR.PQEncryption -> MsgFlags -> AMessage -> m (AgentMsgId, CR.PQEncryption)
|
||||
enqueueMessages' c cData sqs pqEnc_ msgFlags aMessage =
|
||||
liftEither . runIdentity =<< enqueueMessagesB c pqEnc_ (Identity (Right (cData, sqs, msgFlags, aMessage)))
|
||||
|
||||
enqueueMessagesB :: (AgentMonad' m, Traversable t) => AgentClient -> t (Either AgentErrorType (ConnData, NonEmpty SndQueue, MsgFlags, AMessage)) -> m (t (Either AgentErrorType AgentMsgId))
|
||||
enqueueMessagesB c reqs = do
|
||||
reqs' <- enqueueMessageB c reqs
|
||||
enqueueMessagesB :: (AgentMonad' m, Traversable t) => AgentClient -> Maybe CR.PQEncryption -> t (Either AgentErrorType (ConnData, NonEmpty SndQueue, MsgFlags, AMessage)) -> m (t (Either AgentErrorType (AgentMsgId, CR.PQEncryption)))
|
||||
enqueueMessagesB c pqEnc_ reqs = do
|
||||
reqs' <- enqueueMessageB c pqEnc_ reqs
|
||||
enqueueSavedMessageB c $ mapMaybe snd $ rights $ toList reqs'
|
||||
pure $ fst <$$> reqs'
|
||||
|
||||
isActiveSndQ :: SndQueue -> Bool
|
||||
isActiveSndQ SndQueue {status} = status == Secured || status == Active
|
||||
|
||||
enqueueMessage :: forall m. AgentMonad m => AgentClient -> ConnData -> SndQueue -> MsgFlags -> AMessage -> m AgentMsgId
|
||||
enqueueMessage c cData sq msgFlags aMessage =
|
||||
liftEither . fmap fst . runIdentity =<< enqueueMessageB c (Identity (Right (cData, [sq], msgFlags, aMessage)))
|
||||
enqueueMessage :: forall m. AgentMonad m => AgentClient -> ConnData -> SndQueue -> Maybe CR.PQEncryption -> MsgFlags -> AMessage -> m (AgentMsgId, CR.PQEncryption)
|
||||
enqueueMessage c cData sq pqEnc_ msgFlags aMessage =
|
||||
liftEither . fmap fst . runIdentity =<< enqueueMessageB c pqEnc_ (Identity (Right (cData, [sq], msgFlags, aMessage)))
|
||||
|
||||
-- this function is used only for sending messages in batch, it returns the list of successes to enqueue additional deliveries
|
||||
enqueueMessageB :: forall m t. (AgentMonad' m, Traversable t) => AgentClient -> t (Either AgentErrorType (ConnData, NonEmpty SndQueue, MsgFlags, AMessage)) -> m (t (Either AgentErrorType (AgentMsgId, Maybe (ConnData, [SndQueue], AgentMsgId))))
|
||||
enqueueMessageB c reqs = do
|
||||
enqueueMessageB :: forall m t. (AgentMonad' m, Traversable t) => AgentClient -> Maybe CR.PQEncryption -> t (Either AgentErrorType (ConnData, NonEmpty SndQueue, MsgFlags, AMessage)) -> m (t (Either AgentErrorType ((AgentMsgId, CR.PQEncryption), Maybe (ConnData, [SndQueue], AgentMsgId))))
|
||||
enqueueMessageB c pqEnc_ reqs = do
|
||||
aVRange <- asks $ maxVersion . smpAgentVRange . config
|
||||
reqMids <- withStoreBatch c $ \db -> fmap (bindRight $ storeSentMsg db aVRange) reqs
|
||||
forME reqMids $ \((cData, sq :| sqs, _, _), InternalId msgId) -> do
|
||||
forME reqMids $ \((cData, sq :| sqs, _, _), InternalId msgId, pqSecr) -> do
|
||||
submitPendingMsg c cData sq
|
||||
let sqs' = filter isActiveSndQ sqs
|
||||
pure $ Right (msgId, if null sqs' then Nothing else Just (cData, sqs', msgId))
|
||||
pure $ Right ((msgId, pqSecr), if null sqs' then Nothing else Just (cData, sqs', msgId))
|
||||
where
|
||||
storeSentMsg :: DB.Connection -> Version -> (ConnData, NonEmpty SndQueue, MsgFlags, AMessage) -> IO (Either AgentErrorType ((ConnData, NonEmpty SndQueue, MsgFlags, AMessage), InternalId))
|
||||
storeSentMsg :: DB.Connection -> Version -> (ConnData, NonEmpty SndQueue, MsgFlags, AMessage) -> IO (Either AgentErrorType ((ConnData, NonEmpty SndQueue, MsgFlags, AMessage), InternalId, CR.PQEncryption))
|
||||
storeSentMsg db agentVersion req@(ConnData {connId}, sq :| _, msgFlags, aMessage) = fmap (first storeError) $ runExceptT $ do
|
||||
internalTs <- liftIO getCurrentTime
|
||||
(internalId, internalSndId, prevMsgHash) <- liftIO $ updateSndIds db connId
|
||||
@@ -1117,13 +1122,13 @@ enqueueMessageB c reqs = do
|
||||
agentMsg = AgentMessage privHeader aMessage
|
||||
agentMsgStr = smpEncode agentMsg
|
||||
internalHash = C.sha256Hash agentMsgStr
|
||||
encAgentMessage <- agentRatchetEncrypt db connId agentMsgStr e2eEncUserMsgLength
|
||||
(encAgentMessage, pqEncryption) <- agentRatchetEncrypt db connId agentMsgStr e2eEncUserMsgLength pqEnc_
|
||||
let msgBody = smpEncode $ AgentMsgEnvelope {agentVersion, encAgentMessage}
|
||||
msgType = agentMessageType agentMsg
|
||||
msgData = SndMsgData {internalId, internalSndId, internalTs, msgType, msgFlags, msgBody, internalHash, prevMsgHash}
|
||||
msgData = SndMsgData {internalId, internalSndId, internalTs, msgType, msgFlags, msgBody, pqEncryption, internalHash, prevMsgHash}
|
||||
liftIO $ createSndMsg db connId msgData
|
||||
liftIO $ createSndMsgDelivery db connId sq internalId
|
||||
pure (req, internalId)
|
||||
pure (req, internalId, pqEncryption)
|
||||
|
||||
enqueueSavedMessage :: AgentMonad' m => AgentClient -> ConnData -> AgentMsgId -> SndQueue -> m ()
|
||||
enqueueSavedMessage c cData msgId sq = enqueueSavedMessageB c $ Identity (cData, [sq], msgId)
|
||||
@@ -1166,7 +1171,7 @@ runSmpQueueMsgDelivery c@AgentClient {subQ} ConnData {connId} sq (Worker {doWork
|
||||
atomically $ throwWhenNoDelivery c sq
|
||||
atomically $ beginAgentOperation c AOSndNetwork
|
||||
withWork c doWork (\db -> getPendingQueueMsg db connId sq) $
|
||||
\(rq_, PendingMsgData {msgId, msgType, msgBody, msgFlags, msgRetryState, internalTs}) -> do
|
||||
\(rq_, PendingMsgData {msgId, msgType, msgBody, pqEncryption, msgFlags, msgRetryState, internalTs}) -> do
|
||||
atomically $ endAgentOperation c AOMsgDelivery -- this operation begins in submitPendingMsg
|
||||
let mId = unId msgId
|
||||
ri' = maybe id updateRetryInterval2 msgRetryState ri
|
||||
@@ -1236,7 +1241,7 @@ runSmpQueueMsgDelivery c@AgentClient {subQ} ConnData {connId} sq (Worker {doWork
|
||||
-- it would lead to the non-deterministic internal ID of the first sent message, at to some other race conditions,
|
||||
-- because it can be sent before HELLO is received
|
||||
-- With `status == Active` condition, CON is sent here only by the accepting party, that previously received HELLO
|
||||
when (status == Active) $ notify CON
|
||||
when (status == Active) $ notify $ CON pqEncryption
|
||||
-- this branch should never be reached as receive queue is created before the confirmation,
|
||||
_ -> logError "HELLO sent without receive queue"
|
||||
AM_A_MSG_ -> notify $ SENT mId
|
||||
@@ -1335,7 +1340,7 @@ ackMessage' c connId msgId rcptInfo_ = withConnLock c connId "ackMessage" $ do
|
||||
when (connAgentVersion >= deliveryRcptsSMPAgentVersion) $ do
|
||||
let RcvMsg {msgMeta = MsgMeta {sndMsgId}, internalHash} = msg
|
||||
rcpt = A_RCVD [AMessageReceipt {agentMsgId = sndMsgId, msgHash = internalHash, rcptInfo}]
|
||||
void $ enqueueMessages c cData sqs SMP.MsgFlags {notification = False} rcpt
|
||||
void $ enqueueMessages c cData sqs Nothing SMP.MsgFlags {notification = False} rcpt
|
||||
Nothing -> case (msgType, msgReceipt) of
|
||||
-- only remove sent message if receipt hash was Ok, both to debug and for future redundancy
|
||||
(AM_A_RCVD_, Just MsgReceipt {agentMsgId = sndMsgId, msgRcptStatus = MROk}) ->
|
||||
@@ -1365,7 +1370,7 @@ switchDuplexConnection c (DuplexConnection cData@ConnData {connId, userId} rqs s
|
||||
let rq' = (q :: NewRcvQueue) {primary = True, dbReplaceQueueId = Just dbQueueId}
|
||||
rq'' <- withStore c $ \db -> addConnRcvQueue db connId rq'
|
||||
addSubscription c rq''
|
||||
void . enqueueMessages c cData sqs SMP.noMsgFlags $ QADD [(qUri, Just (server, sndId))]
|
||||
void . enqueueMessages c cData sqs Nothing SMP.noMsgFlags $ QADD [(qUri, Just (server, sndId))]
|
||||
rq1 <- withStore' c $ \db -> setRcvSwitchStatus db rq $ Just RSSendingQADD
|
||||
let rqs' = updatedQs rq1 rqs <> [rq'']
|
||||
pure . connectionStats $ DuplexConnection cData rqs' sqs
|
||||
@@ -1394,19 +1399,19 @@ abortConnectionSwitch' c connId =
|
||||
_ -> throwError $ CMD PROHIBITED
|
||||
_ -> throwError $ CMD PROHIBITED
|
||||
|
||||
synchronizeRatchet' :: AgentMonad m => AgentClient -> ConnId -> Bool -> m ConnectionStats
|
||||
synchronizeRatchet' c connId force = withConnLock c connId "synchronizeRatchet" $ do
|
||||
synchronizeRatchet' :: AgentMonad m => AgentClient -> ConnId -> CR.PQEncryption -> Bool -> m ConnectionStats
|
||||
synchronizeRatchet' c connId pqEnc force = withConnLock c connId "synchronizeRatchet" $ do
|
||||
withStore c (`getConn` connId) >>= \case
|
||||
SomeConn _ (DuplexConnection cData rqs sqs)
|
||||
| ratchetSyncAllowed cData || force -> do
|
||||
-- check queues are not switching?
|
||||
AgentConfig {e2eEncryptVRange} <- asks config
|
||||
g <- asks random
|
||||
(pk1, pk2, e2eParams) <- atomically . CR.generateE2EParams g $ maxVersion e2eEncryptVRange
|
||||
(pk1, pk2, pKem, e2eParams) <- liftIO $ CR.generateRcvE2EParams g (maxVersion e2eEncryptVRange) pqEnc
|
||||
enqueueRatchetKeyMsgs c cData sqs e2eParams
|
||||
withStore' c $ \db -> do
|
||||
setConnRatchetSync db connId RSStarted
|
||||
setRatchetX3dhKeys db connId pk1 pk2
|
||||
setRatchetX3dhKeys db connId pk1 pk2 pKem
|
||||
let cData' = cData {ratchetSyncState = RSStarted} :: ConnData
|
||||
conn' = DuplexConnection cData' rqs sqs
|
||||
pure $ connectionStats conn'
|
||||
@@ -1938,7 +1943,7 @@ processSMPTransmission c@AgentClient {smpClients, subQ} (tSess@(_, srv, _), _v,
|
||||
notify (MSGNTF $ SMP.rcvMessageMeta srvMsgId msg')
|
||||
where
|
||||
queueDrained = case conn of
|
||||
DuplexConnection _ _ sqs -> void $ enqueueMessages c cData sqs SMP.noMsgFlags $ QCONT (sndAddress rq)
|
||||
DuplexConnection _ _ sqs -> void $ enqueueMessages c cData sqs Nothing SMP.noMsgFlags $ QCONT (sndAddress rq)
|
||||
_ -> pure ()
|
||||
processClientMsg srvTs msgFlags msgBody = do
|
||||
clientMsg@SMP.ClientMsgEnvelope {cmHeader = SMP.PubHeader phVer e2ePubKey_} <-
|
||||
@@ -1981,7 +1986,7 @@ processSMPTransmission c@AgentClient {smpClients, subQ} (tSess@(_, srv, _), _v,
|
||||
Right (Just (msgId, msgMeta, aMessage, rcPrev)) -> do
|
||||
conn'' <- resetRatchetSync
|
||||
case aMessage of
|
||||
HELLO -> helloMsg srvMsgId conn'' >> ackDel msgId
|
||||
HELLO -> helloMsg srvMsgId msgMeta conn'' >> ackDel msgId
|
||||
-- note that there is no ACK sent for A_MSG, it is sent with agent's user ACK command
|
||||
A_MSG body -> do
|
||||
logServer "<--" c srv rId $ "MSG <MSG>:" <> logSecret srvMsgId
|
||||
@@ -2041,7 +2046,7 @@ processSMPTransmission c@AgentClient {smpClients, subQ} (tSess@(_, srv, _), _v,
|
||||
agentClientMsg :: TVar ChaChaDRG -> ByteString -> m (Maybe (InternalId, MsgMeta, AMessage, CR.RatchetX448))
|
||||
agentClientMsg g encryptedMsgHash = withStore c $ \db -> runExceptT $ do
|
||||
rc <- ExceptT $ getRatchet db connId -- ratchet state pre-decryption - required for processing EREADY
|
||||
agentMsgBody <- agentRatchetDecrypt' g db connId rc encAgentMessage
|
||||
(agentMsgBody, pqEncryption) <- agentRatchetDecrypt' g db connId rc encAgentMessage
|
||||
liftEither (parse smpP (SEAgentError $ AGENT A_MESSAGE) agentMsgBody) >>= \case
|
||||
agentMsg@(AgentMessage APrivHeader {sndMsgId, prevMsgHash} aMessage) -> do
|
||||
let msgType = agentMessageType agentMsg
|
||||
@@ -2051,7 +2056,7 @@ processSMPTransmission c@AgentClient {smpClients, subQ} (tSess@(_, srv, _), _v,
|
||||
let integrity = checkMsgIntegrity prevExtSndId sndMsgId prevRcvMsgHash prevMsgHash
|
||||
recipient = (unId internalId, internalTs)
|
||||
broker = (srvMsgId, systemToUTCTime srvTs)
|
||||
msgMeta = MsgMeta {integrity, recipient, broker, sndMsgId}
|
||||
msgMeta = MsgMeta {integrity, recipient, broker, sndMsgId, pqEncryption}
|
||||
rcvMsg = RcvMsgData {msgMeta, msgType, msgFlags, msgBody = agentMsgBody, internalRcvId, internalHash, externalPrevSndHash = prevMsgHash, encryptedMsgHash}
|
||||
liftIO $ createRcvMsg db connId rq rcvMsg
|
||||
pure $ Just (internalId, msgMeta, aMessage, rc)
|
||||
@@ -2121,7 +2126,7 @@ processSMPTransmission c@AgentClient {smpClients, subQ} (tSess@(_, srv, _), _v,
|
||||
parseMessage :: Encoding a => ByteString -> m a
|
||||
parseMessage = liftEither . parse smpP (AGENT A_MESSAGE)
|
||||
|
||||
smpConfirmation :: SMP.MsgId -> Connection c -> C.APublicAuthKey -> C.PublicKeyX25519 -> Maybe (CR.E2ERatchetParams 'C.X448) -> ByteString -> Version -> Version -> m ()
|
||||
smpConfirmation :: SMP.MsgId -> Connection c -> C.APublicAuthKey -> C.PublicKeyX25519 -> Maybe (CR.SndE2ERatchetParams 'C.X448) -> ByteString -> Version -> Version -> m ()
|
||||
smpConfirmation srvMsgId conn' senderKey e2ePubKey e2eEncryption encConnInfo smpClientVersion agentVersion = do
|
||||
logServer "<--" c srv rId $ "MSG <CONF>:" <> logSecret srvMsgId
|
||||
AgentConfig {smpClientVRange, smpAgentVRange, e2eEncryptVRange} <- asks config
|
||||
@@ -2131,10 +2136,11 @@ processSMPTransmission c@AgentClient {smpClients, subQ} (tSess@(_, srv, _), _v,
|
||||
case status of
|
||||
New -> case (conn', e2eEncryption) of
|
||||
-- party initiating connection
|
||||
(RcvConnection {}, Just e2eSndParams@(CR.E2ERatchetParams e2eVersion _ _)) -> do
|
||||
(RcvConnection ConnData {pqEncryption} _, Just (CR.AE2ERatchetParams _ e2eSndParams@(CR.E2ERatchetParams e2eVersion _ _ _))) -> do
|
||||
unless (e2eVersion `isCompatible` e2eEncryptVRange) (throwError $ AGENT A_VERSION)
|
||||
(pk1, rcDHRs) <- withStore c (`getRatchetX3dhKeys` connId)
|
||||
let rc = CR.initRcvRatchet e2eEncryptVRange rcDHRs $ CR.x3dhRcv pk1 rcDHRs e2eSndParams
|
||||
(pk1, rcDHRs, pKem) <- withStore c (`getRatchetX3dhKeys` connId)
|
||||
rcParams <- liftError cryptoError $ CR.pqX3dhRcv pk1 rcDHRs pKem e2eSndParams
|
||||
let rc = CR.initRcvRatchet e2eEncryptVRange rcDHRs rcParams pqEncryption
|
||||
g <- asks random
|
||||
(agentMsgBody_, rc', skipped) <- liftError cryptoError $ CR.rcDecrypt g rc M.empty encConnInfo
|
||||
case (agentMsgBody_, skipped) of
|
||||
@@ -2155,7 +2161,7 @@ processSMPTransmission c@AgentClient {smpClients, subQ} (tSess@(_, srv, _), _v,
|
||||
-- party accepting connection
|
||||
(DuplexConnection _ (RcvQueue {smpClientVersion = v'} :| _) _, Nothing) -> do
|
||||
g <- asks random
|
||||
withStore c (\db -> runExceptT $ agentRatchetDecrypt g db connId encConnInfo) >>= parseMessage >>= \case
|
||||
withStore c (\db -> runExceptT $ agentRatchetDecrypt g db connId encConnInfo) >>= parseMessage . fst >>= \case
|
||||
AgentConnInfo connInfo -> do
|
||||
notify $ INFO connInfo
|
||||
let dhSecret = C.dh' e2ePubKey e2ePrivKey
|
||||
@@ -2165,8 +2171,8 @@ processSMPTransmission c@AgentClient {smpClients, subQ} (tSess@(_, srv, _), _v,
|
||||
_ -> prohibited
|
||||
_ -> prohibited
|
||||
|
||||
helloMsg :: SMP.MsgId -> Connection c -> m ()
|
||||
helloMsg srvMsgId conn' = do
|
||||
helloMsg :: SMP.MsgId -> MsgMeta -> Connection c -> m ()
|
||||
helloMsg srvMsgId MsgMeta {pqEncryption} conn' = do
|
||||
logServer "<--" c srv rId $ "MSG <HELLO>:" <> logSecret srvMsgId
|
||||
case status of
|
||||
Active -> prohibited
|
||||
@@ -2176,14 +2182,16 @@ processSMPTransmission c@AgentClient {smpClients, subQ} (tSess@(_, srv, _), _v,
|
||||
-- `sndStatus == Active` when HELLO was previously sent, and this is the reply HELLO
|
||||
-- this branch is executed by the accepting party in duplexHandshake mode (v2)
|
||||
-- (was executed by initiating party in v1 that is no longer supported)
|
||||
| sndStatus == Active -> notify CON
|
||||
--
|
||||
-- TODO PQ encryption mode
|
||||
| sndStatus == Active -> notify $ CON pqEncryption
|
||||
| otherwise -> enqueueDuplexHello sq
|
||||
_ -> pure ()
|
||||
where
|
||||
enqueueDuplexHello :: SndQueue -> m ()
|
||||
enqueueDuplexHello sq = do
|
||||
let cData' = toConnData conn'
|
||||
void $ enqueueMessage c cData' sq SMP.MsgFlags {notification = True} HELLO
|
||||
void $ enqueueMessage c cData' sq Nothing SMP.MsgFlags {notification = True} HELLO
|
||||
|
||||
continueSending :: SMP.MsgId -> (SMPServer, SMP.SenderId) -> Connection 'CDuplex -> m ()
|
||||
continueSending srvMsgId addr (DuplexConnection _ _ sqs) =
|
||||
@@ -2240,7 +2248,7 @@ processSMPTransmission c@AgentClient {smpClients, subQ} (tSess@(_, srv, _), _v,
|
||||
(Just sndPubKey, Just dhPublicKey) -> do
|
||||
logServer "<--" c srv rId $ "MSG <QADD>:" <> logSecret srvMsgId <> " " <> logSecret (senderId queueAddress)
|
||||
let sqInfo' = (sqInfo :: SMPQueueInfo) {queueAddress = queueAddress {dhPublicKey}}
|
||||
void . enqueueMessages c cData' sqs SMP.noMsgFlags $ QKEY [(sqInfo', sndPubKey)]
|
||||
void . enqueueMessages c cData' sqs Nothing SMP.noMsgFlags $ QKEY [(sqInfo', sndPubKey)]
|
||||
sq1 <- withStore' c $ \db -> setSndSwitchStatus db sq $ Just SSSendingQKEY
|
||||
let sqs'' = updatedQs sq1 sqs' <> [sq2]
|
||||
conn' = DuplexConnection cData' rqs sqs''
|
||||
@@ -2285,7 +2293,7 @@ processSMPTransmission c@AgentClient {smpClients, subQ} (tSess@(_, srv, _), _v,
|
||||
withStore' c $ \db -> setSndQueueStatus db sq' Secured
|
||||
let sq'' = (sq' :: SndQueue) {status = Secured}
|
||||
-- sending QTEST to the new queue only, the old one will be removed if sent successfully
|
||||
void $ enqueueMessages c cData' [sq''] SMP.noMsgFlags $ QTEST [addr]
|
||||
void $ enqueueMessages c cData' [sq''] Nothing SMP.noMsgFlags $ QTEST [addr]
|
||||
sq1' <- withStore' c $ \db -> setSndSwitchStatus db sq1 $ Just SSSendingQTEST
|
||||
let sqs' = updatedQs sq1' sqs
|
||||
conn' = DuplexConnection cData' rqs sqs'
|
||||
@@ -2301,7 +2309,7 @@ processSMPTransmission c@AgentClient {smpClients, subQ} (tSess@(_, srv, _), _v,
|
||||
let CR.Ratchet {rcSnd} = rcPrev
|
||||
-- if ratchet was initialized as receiving, it means EREADY wasn't sent on key negotiation
|
||||
when (isNothing rcSnd) . void $
|
||||
enqueueMessages' c cData' sqs SMP.MsgFlags {notification = True} (EREADY lastExternalSndId)
|
||||
enqueueMessages' c cData' sqs Nothing SMP.MsgFlags {notification = True} (EREADY lastExternalSndId)
|
||||
|
||||
smpInvitation :: SMP.MsgId -> Connection c -> ConnectionRequestUri 'CMInvitation -> ConnInfo -> m ()
|
||||
smpInvitation srvMsgId conn' connReq@(CRInvitationUri crData _) cInfo = do
|
||||
@@ -2320,8 +2328,8 @@ processSMPTransmission c@AgentClient {smpClients, subQ} (tSess@(_, srv, _), _v,
|
||||
DuplexConnection {} -> action conn'
|
||||
_ -> qError $ name <> ": message must be sent to duplex connection"
|
||||
|
||||
newRatchetKey :: CR.E2ERatchetParams 'C.X448 -> Connection 'CDuplex -> m ()
|
||||
newRatchetKey e2eOtherPartyParams@(CR.E2ERatchetParams e2eVersion k1Rcv k2Rcv) conn'@(DuplexConnection cData'@ConnData {lastExternalSndId} _ sqs) =
|
||||
newRatchetKey :: CR.RcvE2ERatchetParams 'C.X448 -> Connection 'CDuplex -> m ()
|
||||
newRatchetKey e2eOtherPartyParams@(CR.E2ERatchetParams e2eVersion k1Rcv k2Rcv kem_) conn'@(DuplexConnection cData'@ConnData {lastExternalSndId} _ sqs) =
|
||||
unlessM ratchetExists $ do
|
||||
AgentConfig {e2eEncryptVRange} <- asks config
|
||||
unless (e2eVersion `isCompatible` e2eEncryptVRange) (throwError $ AGENT A_VERSION)
|
||||
@@ -2336,7 +2344,7 @@ processSMPTransmission c@AgentClient {smpClients, subQ} (tSess@(_, srv, _), _v,
|
||||
exists <- checkRatchetKeyHashExists db connId rkHashRcv
|
||||
unless exists $ addProcessedRatchetKeyHash db connId rkHashRcv
|
||||
pure exists
|
||||
getSendRatchetKeys :: m (C.PrivateKeyX448, C.PrivateKeyX448)
|
||||
getSendRatchetKeys :: m (C.PrivateKeyX448, C.PrivateKeyX448, Maybe CR.RcvPrivRKEMParams)
|
||||
getSendRatchetKeys = case rss of
|
||||
RSOk -> sendReplyKey -- receiving client
|
||||
RSAllowed -> sendReplyKey
|
||||
@@ -2352,9 +2360,10 @@ processSMPTransmission c@AgentClient {smpClients, subQ} (tSess@(_, srv, _), _v,
|
||||
where
|
||||
sendReplyKey = do
|
||||
g <- asks random
|
||||
(pk1, pk2, e2eParams) <- atomically . CR.generateE2EParams g $ version e2eOtherPartyParams
|
||||
-- TODO PQ the decision to use KEM should depend on connection
|
||||
(pk1, pk2, pKem, e2eParams) <- liftIO $ CR.generateRcvE2EParams g e2eVersion CR.PQEncOn
|
||||
enqueueRatchetKeyMsgs c cData' sqs e2eParams
|
||||
pure (pk1, pk2)
|
||||
pure (pk1, pk2, pKem)
|
||||
notifyRatchetSyncError = do
|
||||
let cData'' = cData' {ratchetSyncState = RSRequired} :: ConnData
|
||||
conn'' = updateConnection cData'' conn'
|
||||
@@ -2371,14 +2380,17 @@ processSMPTransmission c@AgentClient {smpClients, subQ} (tSess@(_, srv, _), _v,
|
||||
createRatchet db connId rc
|
||||
-- compare public keys `k1` in AgentRatchetKey messages sent by self and other party
|
||||
-- to determine ratchet initilization ordering
|
||||
initRatchet :: VersionRange -> (C.PrivateKeyX448, C.PrivateKeyX448) -> m ()
|
||||
initRatchet e2eEncryptVRange (pk1, pk2)
|
||||
initRatchet :: VersionRange -> (C.PrivateKeyX448, C.PrivateKeyX448, Maybe CR.RcvPrivRKEMParams) -> m ()
|
||||
initRatchet e2eEncryptVRange (pk1, pk2, pKem)
|
||||
| rkHash (C.publicKey pk1) (C.publicKey pk2) <= rkHashRcv = do
|
||||
recreateRatchet $ CR.initRcvRatchet e2eEncryptVRange pk2 $ CR.x3dhRcv pk1 pk2 e2eOtherPartyParams
|
||||
rcParams <- liftError cryptoError $ CR.pqX3dhRcv pk1 pk2 pKem e2eOtherPartyParams
|
||||
-- TODO PQ the decision to use KEM should either depend on the global setting or on whether it was enabled in connection before
|
||||
recreateRatchet $ CR.initRcvRatchet e2eEncryptVRange pk2 rcParams $ CR.PQEncryption (isJust kem_)
|
||||
| otherwise = do
|
||||
(_, rcDHRs) <- atomically . C.generateKeyPair =<< asks random
|
||||
recreateRatchet $ CR.initSndRatchet e2eEncryptVRange k2Rcv rcDHRs $ CR.x3dhSnd pk1 pk2 e2eOtherPartyParams
|
||||
void . enqueueMessages' c cData' sqs SMP.MsgFlags {notification = True} $ EREADY lastExternalSndId
|
||||
rcParams <- liftEitherWith cryptoError $ CR.pqX3dhSnd pk1 pk2 (CR.APRKP CR.SRKSProposed <$> pKem) e2eOtherPartyParams
|
||||
recreateRatchet $ CR.initSndRatchet e2eEncryptVRange k2Rcv rcDHRs rcParams
|
||||
void . enqueueMessages' c cData' sqs Nothing SMP.MsgFlags {notification = True} $ EREADY lastExternalSndId
|
||||
|
||||
checkMsgIntegrity :: PrevExternalSndId -> ExternalSndId -> PrevRcvMsgHash -> ByteString -> MsgIntegrity
|
||||
checkMsgIntegrity prevExtSndId extSndId internalPrevMsgHash receivedPrevMsgHash
|
||||
@@ -2412,15 +2424,15 @@ connectReplyQueues c cData@ConnData {userId, connId} ownConnInfo (qInfo :| _) =
|
||||
Just qInfo' -> do
|
||||
sq <- newSndQueue userId connId qInfo'
|
||||
sq' <- withStore c $ \db -> upgradeRcvConnToDuplex db connId sq
|
||||
enqueueConfirmation c cData sq' ownConnInfo Nothing
|
||||
enqueueConfirmation c cData sq' ownConnInfo Nothing Nothing
|
||||
|
||||
confirmQueueAsync :: forall m. AgentMonad m => AgentClient -> ConnData -> SndQueue -> SMPServerWithAuth -> ConnInfo -> Maybe (CR.E2ERatchetParams 'C.X448) -> SubscriptionMode -> m ()
|
||||
confirmQueueAsync c cData sq srv connInfo e2eEncryption_ subMode = do
|
||||
storeConfirmation c cData sq e2eEncryption_ =<< mkAgentConfirmation c cData sq srv connInfo subMode
|
||||
confirmQueueAsync :: forall m. AgentMonad m => AgentClient -> ConnData -> SndQueue -> SMPServerWithAuth -> ConnInfo -> Maybe (CR.SndE2ERatchetParams 'C.X448) -> CR.PQEncryption -> SubscriptionMode -> m ()
|
||||
confirmQueueAsync c cData sq srv connInfo e2eEncryption_ pqEnc subMode = do
|
||||
storeConfirmation c cData sq e2eEncryption_ (Just pqEnc) =<< mkAgentConfirmation c cData sq srv connInfo subMode
|
||||
submitPendingMsg c cData sq
|
||||
|
||||
confirmQueue :: forall m. AgentMonad m => Compatible Version -> AgentClient -> ConnData -> SndQueue -> SMPServerWithAuth -> ConnInfo -> Maybe (CR.E2ERatchetParams 'C.X448) -> SubscriptionMode -> m ()
|
||||
confirmQueue (Compatible agentVersion) c cData@ConnData {connId} sq srv connInfo e2eEncryption_ subMode = do
|
||||
confirmQueue :: forall m. AgentMonad m => Compatible Version -> AgentClient -> ConnData -> SndQueue -> SMPServerWithAuth -> ConnInfo -> Maybe (CR.SndE2ERatchetParams 'C.X448) -> Maybe CR.PQEncryption -> SubscriptionMode -> m ()
|
||||
confirmQueue (Compatible agentVersion) c cData@ConnData {connId} sq srv connInfo e2eEncryption_ pqEnc_ subMode = do
|
||||
msg <- mkConfirmation =<< mkAgentConfirmation c cData sq srv connInfo subMode
|
||||
sendConfirmation c sq msg
|
||||
withStore' c $ \db -> setSndQueueStatus db sq Confirmed
|
||||
@@ -2428,7 +2440,7 @@ confirmQueue (Compatible agentVersion) c cData@ConnData {connId} sq srv connInfo
|
||||
mkConfirmation :: AgentMessage -> m MsgBody
|
||||
mkConfirmation aMessage = withStore c $ \db -> runExceptT $ do
|
||||
void . liftIO $ updateSndIds db connId
|
||||
encConnInfo <- agentRatchetEncrypt db connId (smpEncode aMessage) e2eEncConnInfoLength
|
||||
(encConnInfo, _) <- agentRatchetEncrypt db connId (smpEncode aMessage) e2eEncConnInfoLength pqEnc_
|
||||
pure . smpEncode $ AgentConfirmation {agentVersion, e2eEncryption_, encConnInfo}
|
||||
|
||||
mkAgentConfirmation :: AgentMonad m => AgentClient -> ConnData -> SndQueue -> SMPServerWithAuth -> ConnInfo -> SubscriptionMode -> m AgentMessage
|
||||
@@ -2436,30 +2448,30 @@ mkAgentConfirmation c cData sq srv connInfo subMode = do
|
||||
qInfo <- createReplyQueue c cData sq subMode srv
|
||||
pure $ AgentConnInfoReply (qInfo :| []) connInfo
|
||||
|
||||
enqueueConfirmation :: AgentMonad m => AgentClient -> ConnData -> SndQueue -> ConnInfo -> Maybe (CR.E2ERatchetParams 'C.X448) -> m ()
|
||||
enqueueConfirmation c cData sq connInfo e2eEncryption_ = do
|
||||
storeConfirmation c cData sq e2eEncryption_ $ AgentConnInfo connInfo
|
||||
enqueueConfirmation :: AgentMonad m => AgentClient -> ConnData -> SndQueue -> ConnInfo -> Maybe (CR.SndE2ERatchetParams 'C.X448) -> Maybe CR.PQEncryption -> m ()
|
||||
enqueueConfirmation c cData sq connInfo e2eEncryption_ pqEnc_ = do
|
||||
storeConfirmation c cData sq e2eEncryption_ pqEnc_ $ AgentConnInfo connInfo
|
||||
submitPendingMsg c cData sq
|
||||
|
||||
storeConfirmation :: AgentMonad m => AgentClient -> ConnData -> SndQueue -> Maybe (CR.E2ERatchetParams 'C.X448) -> AgentMessage -> m ()
|
||||
storeConfirmation c ConnData {connId, connAgentVersion} sq e2eEncryption_ agentMsg = withStore c $ \db -> runExceptT $ do
|
||||
storeConfirmation :: AgentMonad m => AgentClient -> ConnData -> SndQueue -> Maybe (CR.SndE2ERatchetParams 'C.X448) -> Maybe CR.PQEncryption -> AgentMessage -> m ()
|
||||
storeConfirmation c ConnData {connId, connAgentVersion} sq e2eEncryption_ pqEnc_ agentMsg = withStore c $ \db -> runExceptT $ do
|
||||
internalTs <- liftIO getCurrentTime
|
||||
(internalId, internalSndId, prevMsgHash) <- liftIO $ updateSndIds db connId
|
||||
let agentMsgStr = smpEncode agentMsg
|
||||
internalHash = C.sha256Hash agentMsgStr
|
||||
encConnInfo <- agentRatchetEncrypt db connId agentMsgStr e2eEncConnInfoLength
|
||||
(encConnInfo, pqEncryption) <- agentRatchetEncrypt db connId agentMsgStr e2eEncConnInfoLength pqEnc_
|
||||
let msgBody = smpEncode $ AgentConfirmation {agentVersion = connAgentVersion, e2eEncryption_, encConnInfo}
|
||||
msgType = agentMessageType agentMsg
|
||||
msgData = SndMsgData {internalId, internalSndId, internalTs, msgType, msgBody, msgFlags = SMP.MsgFlags {notification = True}, internalHash, prevMsgHash}
|
||||
msgData = SndMsgData {internalId, internalSndId, internalTs, msgType, msgBody, pqEncryption, msgFlags = SMP.MsgFlags {notification = True}, internalHash, prevMsgHash}
|
||||
liftIO $ createSndMsg db connId msgData
|
||||
liftIO $ createSndMsgDelivery db connId sq internalId
|
||||
|
||||
enqueueRatchetKeyMsgs :: forall m. AgentMonad m => AgentClient -> ConnData -> NonEmpty SndQueue -> CR.E2ERatchetParams 'C.X448 -> m ()
|
||||
enqueueRatchetKeyMsgs :: forall m. AgentMonad m => AgentClient -> ConnData -> NonEmpty SndQueue -> CR.RcvE2ERatchetParams 'C.X448 -> m ()
|
||||
enqueueRatchetKeyMsgs c cData (sq :| sqs) e2eEncryption = do
|
||||
msgId <- enqueueRatchetKey c cData sq e2eEncryption
|
||||
mapM_ (enqueueSavedMessage c cData msgId) $ filter isActiveSndQ sqs
|
||||
|
||||
enqueueRatchetKey :: forall m. AgentMonad m => AgentClient -> ConnData -> SndQueue -> CR.E2ERatchetParams 'C.X448 -> m AgentMsgId
|
||||
enqueueRatchetKey :: forall m. AgentMonad m => AgentClient -> ConnData -> SndQueue -> CR.RcvE2ERatchetParams 'C.X448 -> m AgentMsgId
|
||||
enqueueRatchetKey c cData@ConnData {connId} sq e2eEncryption = do
|
||||
aVRange <- asks $ smpAgentVRange . config
|
||||
msgId <- storeRatchetKey $ maxVersion aVRange
|
||||
@@ -2475,31 +2487,32 @@ enqueueRatchetKey c cData@ConnData {connId} sq e2eEncryption = do
|
||||
internalHash = C.sha256Hash agentMsgStr
|
||||
let msgBody = smpEncode $ AgentRatchetKey {agentVersion, e2eEncryption, info = agentMsgStr}
|
||||
msgType = agentMessageType agentMsg
|
||||
msgData = SndMsgData {internalId, internalSndId, internalTs, msgType, msgBody, msgFlags = SMP.MsgFlags {notification = True}, internalHash, prevMsgHash}
|
||||
-- TODO PQ set pqEncryption based on connection mode
|
||||
msgData = SndMsgData {internalId, internalSndId, internalTs, msgType, msgBody, pqEncryption = CR.PQEncOff, msgFlags = SMP.MsgFlags {notification = True}, internalHash, prevMsgHash}
|
||||
liftIO $ createSndMsg db connId msgData
|
||||
liftIO $ createSndMsgDelivery db connId sq internalId
|
||||
pure internalId
|
||||
|
||||
-- encoded AgentMessage -> encoded EncAgentMessage
|
||||
agentRatchetEncrypt :: DB.Connection -> ConnId -> ByteString -> Int -> ExceptT StoreError IO ByteString
|
||||
agentRatchetEncrypt db connId msg paddedLen = do
|
||||
agentRatchetEncrypt :: DB.Connection -> ConnId -> ByteString -> Int -> Maybe CR.PQEncryption -> ExceptT StoreError IO (ByteString, CR.PQEncryption)
|
||||
agentRatchetEncrypt db connId msg paddedLen pqEnc_ = do
|
||||
rc <- ExceptT $ getRatchet db connId
|
||||
(encMsg, rc') <- liftE (SEAgentError . cryptoError) $ CR.rcEncrypt rc paddedLen msg
|
||||
(encMsg, rc') <- liftE (SEAgentError . cryptoError) $ CR.rcEncrypt rc paddedLen msg pqEnc_
|
||||
liftIO $ updateRatchet db connId rc' CR.SMDNoChange
|
||||
pure encMsg
|
||||
pure (encMsg, CR.rcSndKEM rc')
|
||||
|
||||
-- encoded EncAgentMessage -> encoded AgentMessage
|
||||
agentRatchetDecrypt :: TVar ChaChaDRG -> DB.Connection -> ConnId -> ByteString -> ExceptT StoreError IO ByteString
|
||||
agentRatchetDecrypt :: TVar ChaChaDRG -> DB.Connection -> ConnId -> ByteString -> ExceptT StoreError IO (ByteString, CR.PQEncryption)
|
||||
agentRatchetDecrypt g db connId encAgentMsg = do
|
||||
rc <- ExceptT $ getRatchet db connId
|
||||
agentRatchetDecrypt' g db connId rc encAgentMsg
|
||||
|
||||
agentRatchetDecrypt' :: TVar ChaChaDRG -> DB.Connection -> ConnId -> CR.RatchetX448 -> ByteString -> ExceptT StoreError IO ByteString
|
||||
agentRatchetDecrypt' :: TVar ChaChaDRG -> DB.Connection -> ConnId -> CR.RatchetX448 -> ByteString -> ExceptT StoreError IO (ByteString, CR.PQEncryption)
|
||||
agentRatchetDecrypt' g db connId rc encAgentMsg = do
|
||||
skipped <- liftIO $ getSkippedMsgKeys db connId
|
||||
(agentMsgBody_, rc', skippedDiff) <- liftE (SEAgentError . cryptoError) $ CR.rcDecrypt g rc skipped encAgentMsg
|
||||
liftIO $ updateRatchet db connId rc' skippedDiff
|
||||
liftEither $ first (SEAgentError . cryptoError) agentMsgBody_
|
||||
liftEither $ bimap (SEAgentError . cryptoError) (,CR.rcRcvKEM rc') agentMsgBody_
|
||||
|
||||
newSndQueue :: (MonadUnliftIO m, MonadReader Env m) => UserId -> ConnId -> Compatible SMPQueueInfo -> m NewSndQueue
|
||||
newSndQueue userId connId (Compatible (SMPQueueInfo smpClientVersion SMPQueueAddress {smpServer, senderId, dhPublicKey = rcvE2ePubDhKey})) = do
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -166,7 +166,7 @@ import Data.List.NonEmpty (NonEmpty (..))
|
||||
import qualified Data.List.NonEmpty as L
|
||||
import Data.Map (Map)
|
||||
import qualified Data.Map as M
|
||||
import Data.Maybe (fromMaybe, isJust)
|
||||
import Data.Maybe (fromMaybe)
|
||||
import Data.Text (Text)
|
||||
import qualified Data.Text as T
|
||||
import Data.Text.Encoding (decodeLatin1, encodeUtf8)
|
||||
@@ -182,7 +182,7 @@ import Simplex.FileTransfer.Description
|
||||
import Simplex.FileTransfer.Protocol (FileParty (..), XFTPErrorType)
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.QueryString
|
||||
import qualified Simplex.Messaging.Crypto as C
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Crypto.Ratchet (E2ERatchetParams, E2ERatchetParamsUri)
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Crypto.Ratchet (InitialKeys (..), PQEncryption (..), pattern PQEncOff, RcvE2ERatchetParams, RcvE2ERatchetParamsUri, SndE2ERatchetParams)
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Encoding
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Encoding.String
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Parsers
|
||||
@@ -243,11 +243,15 @@ supportedSMPAgentVRange = mkVersionRange duplexHandshakeSMPAgentVersion currentS
|
||||
-- it is shorter to allow all handshake headers,
|
||||
-- including E2E (double-ratchet) parameters and
|
||||
-- signing key of the sender for the server
|
||||
-- TODO PQ this should be version-dependent
|
||||
-- previously it was 14848, reduced by 3700 (roughly the increase of message ratchet header size + key and ciphertext in reply link)
|
||||
e2eEncConnInfoLength :: Int
|
||||
e2eEncConnInfoLength = 14848
|
||||
e2eEncConnInfoLength = 11148
|
||||
|
||||
-- TODO PQ this should be version-dependent
|
||||
-- previously it was 15856, reduced by 2200 (roughly the increase of message ratchet header size)
|
||||
e2eEncUserMsgLength :: Int
|
||||
e2eEncUserMsgLength = 15856
|
||||
e2eEncUserMsgLength = 13656
|
||||
|
||||
-- | Raw (unparsed) SMP agent protocol transmission.
|
||||
type ARawTransmission = (ByteString, ByteString, ByteString)
|
||||
@@ -273,8 +277,6 @@ data SAParty :: AParty -> Type where
|
||||
|
||||
deriving instance Show (SAParty p)
|
||||
|
||||
deriving instance Eq (SAParty p)
|
||||
|
||||
instance TestEquality SAParty where
|
||||
testEquality SAgent SAgent = Just Refl
|
||||
testEquality SClient SClient = Just Refl
|
||||
@@ -297,8 +299,6 @@ data SAEntity :: AEntity -> Type where
|
||||
|
||||
deriving instance Show (SAEntity e)
|
||||
|
||||
deriving instance Eq (SAEntity e)
|
||||
|
||||
instance TestEquality SAEntity where
|
||||
testEquality SAEConn SAEConn = Just Refl
|
||||
testEquality SAERcvFile SAERcvFile = Just Refl
|
||||
@@ -322,27 +322,22 @@ deriving instance Show ACmd
|
||||
|
||||
data APartyCmd p = forall e. AEntityI e => APC (SAEntity e) (ACommand p e)
|
||||
|
||||
instance Eq (APartyCmd p) where
|
||||
APC e cmd == APC e' cmd' = case testEquality e e' of
|
||||
Just Refl -> cmd == cmd'
|
||||
Nothing -> False
|
||||
|
||||
deriving instance Show (APartyCmd p)
|
||||
|
||||
type ConnInfo = ByteString
|
||||
|
||||
-- | Parameterized type for SMP agent protocol commands and responses from all participants.
|
||||
data ACommand (p :: AParty) (e :: AEntity) where
|
||||
NEW :: Bool -> AConnectionMode -> SubscriptionMode -> ACommand Client AEConn -- response INV
|
||||
NEW :: Bool -> AConnectionMode -> InitialKeys -> SubscriptionMode -> ACommand Client AEConn -- response INV
|
||||
INV :: AConnectionRequestUri -> ACommand Agent AEConn
|
||||
JOIN :: Bool -> AConnectionRequestUri -> SubscriptionMode -> ConnInfo -> ACommand Client AEConn -- response OK
|
||||
JOIN :: Bool -> AConnectionRequestUri -> PQEncryption -> SubscriptionMode -> ConnInfo -> ACommand Client AEConn -- response OK
|
||||
CONF :: ConfirmationId -> [SMPServer] -> ConnInfo -> ACommand Agent AEConn -- ConnInfo is from sender, [SMPServer] will be empty only in v1 handshake
|
||||
LET :: ConfirmationId -> ConnInfo -> ACommand Client AEConn -- ConnInfo is from client
|
||||
REQ :: InvitationId -> NonEmpty SMPServer -> ConnInfo -> ACommand Agent AEConn -- ConnInfo is from sender
|
||||
ACPT :: InvitationId -> ConnInfo -> ACommand Client AEConn -- ConnInfo is from client
|
||||
ACPT :: InvitationId -> PQEncryption -> ConnInfo -> ACommand Client AEConn -- ConnInfo is from client
|
||||
RJCT :: InvitationId -> ACommand Client AEConn
|
||||
INFO :: ConnInfo -> ACommand Agent AEConn
|
||||
CON :: ACommand Agent AEConn -- notification that connection is established
|
||||
CON :: PQEncryption -> ACommand Agent AEConn -- notification that connection is established
|
||||
SUB :: ACommand Client AEConn
|
||||
END :: ACommand Agent AEConn
|
||||
CONNECT :: AProtocolType -> TransportHost -> ACommand Agent AENone
|
||||
@@ -351,8 +346,8 @@ data ACommand (p :: AParty) (e :: AEntity) where
|
||||
UP :: SMPServer -> [ConnId] -> ACommand Agent AENone
|
||||
SWITCH :: QueueDirection -> SwitchPhase -> ConnectionStats -> ACommand Agent AEConn
|
||||
RSYNC :: RatchetSyncState -> Maybe AgentCryptoError -> ConnectionStats -> ACommand Agent AEConn
|
||||
SEND :: MsgFlags -> MsgBody -> ACommand Client AEConn
|
||||
MID :: AgentMsgId -> ACommand Agent AEConn
|
||||
SEND :: PQEncryption -> MsgFlags -> MsgBody -> ACommand Client AEConn
|
||||
MID :: AgentMsgId -> PQEncryption -> ACommand Agent AEConn
|
||||
SENT :: AgentMsgId -> ACommand Agent AEConn
|
||||
MERR :: AgentMsgId -> AgentErrorType -> ACommand Agent AEConn
|
||||
MERRS :: NonEmpty AgentMsgId -> AgentErrorType -> ACommand Agent AEConn
|
||||
@@ -379,19 +374,12 @@ data ACommand (p :: AParty) (e :: AEntity) where
|
||||
SFDONE :: ValidFileDescription 'FSender -> [ValidFileDescription 'FRecipient] -> ACommand Agent AESndFile
|
||||
SFERR :: AgentErrorType -> ACommand Agent AESndFile
|
||||
|
||||
deriving instance Eq (ACommand p e)
|
||||
|
||||
deriving instance Show (ACommand p e)
|
||||
|
||||
data ACmdTag = forall p e. (APartyI p, AEntityI e) => ACmdTag (SAParty p) (SAEntity e) (ACommandTag p e)
|
||||
|
||||
data APartyCmdTag p = forall e. AEntityI e => APCT (SAEntity e) (ACommandTag p e)
|
||||
|
||||
instance Eq (APartyCmdTag p) where
|
||||
APCT e cmd == APCT e' cmd' = case testEquality e e' of
|
||||
Just Refl -> cmd == cmd'
|
||||
Nothing -> False
|
||||
|
||||
deriving instance Show (APartyCmdTag p)
|
||||
|
||||
data ACommandTag (p :: AParty) (e :: AEntity) where
|
||||
@@ -441,8 +429,6 @@ data ACommandTag (p :: AParty) (e :: AEntity) where
|
||||
SFDONE_ :: ACommandTag Agent AESndFile
|
||||
SFERR_ :: ACommandTag Agent AESndFile
|
||||
|
||||
deriving instance Eq (ACommandTag p e)
|
||||
|
||||
deriving instance Show (ACommandTag p e)
|
||||
|
||||
aPartyCmdTag :: APartyCmd p -> APartyCmdTag p
|
||||
@@ -458,8 +444,8 @@ aCommandTag = \case
|
||||
REQ {} -> REQ_
|
||||
ACPT {} -> ACPT_
|
||||
RJCT _ -> RJCT_
|
||||
INFO _ -> INFO_
|
||||
CON -> CON_
|
||||
INFO {} -> INFO_
|
||||
CON _ -> CON_
|
||||
SUB -> SUB_
|
||||
END -> END_
|
||||
CONNECT {} -> CONNECT_
|
||||
@@ -469,7 +455,7 @@ aCommandTag = \case
|
||||
SWITCH {} -> SWITCH_
|
||||
RSYNC {} -> RSYNC_
|
||||
SEND {} -> SEND_
|
||||
MID _ -> MID_
|
||||
MID {} -> MID_
|
||||
SENT _ -> SENT_
|
||||
MERR {} -> MERR_
|
||||
MERRS {} -> MERRS_
|
||||
@@ -726,8 +712,6 @@ data SConnectionMode (m :: ConnectionMode) where
|
||||
SCMInvitation :: SConnectionMode CMInvitation
|
||||
SCMContact :: SConnectionMode CMContact
|
||||
|
||||
deriving instance Eq (SConnectionMode m)
|
||||
|
||||
deriving instance Show (SConnectionMode m)
|
||||
|
||||
instance TestEquality SConnectionMode where
|
||||
@@ -737,9 +721,6 @@ instance TestEquality SConnectionMode where
|
||||
|
||||
data AConnectionMode = forall m. ConnectionModeI m => ACM (SConnectionMode m)
|
||||
|
||||
instance Eq AConnectionMode where
|
||||
ACM m == ACM m' = isJust $ testEquality m m'
|
||||
|
||||
cmInvitation :: AConnectionMode
|
||||
cmInvitation = ACM SCMInvitation
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -769,17 +750,19 @@ data MsgMeta = MsgMeta
|
||||
{ integrity :: MsgIntegrity,
|
||||
recipient :: (AgentMsgId, UTCTime),
|
||||
broker :: (MsgId, UTCTime),
|
||||
sndMsgId :: AgentMsgId
|
||||
sndMsgId :: AgentMsgId,
|
||||
pqEncryption :: PQEncryption
|
||||
}
|
||||
deriving (Eq, Show)
|
||||
|
||||
instance StrEncoding MsgMeta where
|
||||
strEncode MsgMeta {integrity, recipient = (rmId, rTs), broker = (bmId, bTs), sndMsgId} =
|
||||
strEncode MsgMeta {integrity, recipient = (rmId, rTs), broker = (bmId, bTs), sndMsgId, pqEncryption} =
|
||||
B.unwords
|
||||
[ strEncode integrity,
|
||||
"R=" <> bshow rmId <> "," <> showTs rTs,
|
||||
"B=" <> encode bmId <> "," <> showTs bTs,
|
||||
"S=" <> bshow sndMsgId
|
||||
"S=" <> bshow sndMsgId,
|
||||
"PQ=" <> strEncode pqEncryption
|
||||
]
|
||||
where
|
||||
showTs = B.pack . formatISO8601Millis
|
||||
@@ -788,7 +771,8 @@ instance StrEncoding MsgMeta where
|
||||
recipient <- " R=" *> partyMeta A.decimal
|
||||
broker <- " B=" *> partyMeta base64P
|
||||
sndMsgId <- " S=" *> A.decimal
|
||||
pure MsgMeta {integrity, recipient, broker, sndMsgId}
|
||||
pqEncryption <- " PQ=" *> strP
|
||||
pure MsgMeta {integrity, recipient, broker, sndMsgId, pqEncryption}
|
||||
where
|
||||
partyMeta idParser = (,) <$> idParser <* A.char ',' <*> tsISO8601P
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -809,7 +793,7 @@ data SMPConfirmation = SMPConfirmation
|
||||
data AgentMsgEnvelope
|
||||
= AgentConfirmation
|
||||
{ agentVersion :: Version,
|
||||
e2eEncryption_ :: Maybe (E2ERatchetParams 'C.X448),
|
||||
e2eEncryption_ :: Maybe (SndE2ERatchetParams 'C.X448),
|
||||
encConnInfo :: ByteString
|
||||
}
|
||||
| AgentMsgEnvelope
|
||||
@@ -823,7 +807,7 @@ data AgentMsgEnvelope
|
||||
}
|
||||
| AgentRatchetKey
|
||||
{ agentVersion :: Version,
|
||||
e2eEncryption :: E2ERatchetParams 'C.X448,
|
||||
e2eEncryption :: RcvE2ERatchetParams 'C.X448,
|
||||
info :: ByteString
|
||||
}
|
||||
deriving (Show)
|
||||
@@ -1115,7 +1099,7 @@ instance forall m. ConnectionModeI m => StrEncoding (ConnectionRequestUri m) whe
|
||||
CRInvitationUri crData e2eParams -> crEncode "invitation" crData (Just e2eParams)
|
||||
CRContactUri crData -> crEncode "contact" crData Nothing
|
||||
where
|
||||
crEncode :: ByteString -> ConnReqUriData -> Maybe (E2ERatchetParamsUri 'C.X448) -> ByteString
|
||||
crEncode :: ByteString -> ConnReqUriData -> Maybe (RcvE2ERatchetParamsUri 'C.X448) -> ByteString
|
||||
crEncode crMode ConnReqUriData {crScheme, crAgentVRange, crSmpQueues, crClientData} e2eParams =
|
||||
strEncode crScheme <> "/" <> crMode <> "#/?" <> queryStr
|
||||
where
|
||||
@@ -1324,22 +1308,15 @@ instance Encoding SMPQueueUri where
|
||||
pure $ SMPQueueUri clientVRange SMPQueueAddress {smpServer, senderId, dhPublicKey}
|
||||
|
||||
data ConnectionRequestUri (m :: ConnectionMode) where
|
||||
CRInvitationUri :: ConnReqUriData -> E2ERatchetParamsUri 'C.X448 -> ConnectionRequestUri CMInvitation
|
||||
-- contact connection request does NOT contain E2E encryption parameters -
|
||||
CRInvitationUri :: ConnReqUriData -> RcvE2ERatchetParamsUri 'C.X448 -> ConnectionRequestUri CMInvitation
|
||||
-- contact connection request does NOT contain E2E encryption parameters for double ratchet -
|
||||
-- they are passed in AgentInvitation message
|
||||
CRContactUri :: ConnReqUriData -> ConnectionRequestUri CMContact
|
||||
|
||||
deriving instance Eq (ConnectionRequestUri m)
|
||||
|
||||
deriving instance Show (ConnectionRequestUri m)
|
||||
|
||||
data AConnectionRequestUri = forall m. ConnectionModeI m => ACR (SConnectionMode m) (ConnectionRequestUri m)
|
||||
|
||||
instance Eq AConnectionRequestUri where
|
||||
ACR m cr == ACR m' cr' = case testEquality m m' of
|
||||
Just Refl -> cr == cr'
|
||||
_ -> False
|
||||
|
||||
deriving instance Show AConnectionRequestUri
|
||||
|
||||
data ConnReqUriData = ConnReqUriData
|
||||
@@ -1713,13 +1690,13 @@ commandP binaryP =
|
||||
>>= \case
|
||||
ACmdTag SClient e cmd ->
|
||||
ACmd SClient e <$> case cmd of
|
||||
NEW_ -> s (NEW <$> strP_ <*> strP_ <*> (strP <|> pure SMP.SMSubscribe))
|
||||
JOIN_ -> s (JOIN <$> strP_ <*> strP_ <*> (strP_ <|> pure SMP.SMSubscribe) <*> binaryP)
|
||||
NEW_ -> s (NEW <$> strP_ <*> strP_ <*> pqIKP <*> (strP <|> pure SMP.SMSubscribe))
|
||||
JOIN_ -> s (JOIN <$> strP_ <*> strP_ <*> pqEncP <*> (strP_ <|> pure SMP.SMSubscribe) <*> binaryP)
|
||||
LET_ -> s (LET <$> A.takeTill (== ' ') <* A.space <*> binaryP)
|
||||
ACPT_ -> s (ACPT <$> A.takeTill (== ' ') <* A.space <*> binaryP)
|
||||
ACPT_ -> s (ACPT <$> A.takeTill (== ' ') <* A.space <*> pqEncP <*> binaryP)
|
||||
RJCT_ -> s (RJCT <$> A.takeByteString)
|
||||
SUB_ -> pure SUB
|
||||
SEND_ -> s (SEND <$> smpP <* A.space <*> binaryP)
|
||||
SEND_ -> s (SEND <$> pqEncP <*> smpP <* A.space <*> binaryP)
|
||||
ACK_ -> s (ACK <$> A.decimal <*> optional (A.space *> binaryP))
|
||||
SWCH_ -> pure SWCH
|
||||
OFF_ -> pure OFF
|
||||
@@ -1731,7 +1708,7 @@ commandP binaryP =
|
||||
CONF_ -> s (CONF <$> A.takeTill (== ' ') <* A.space <*> strListP <* A.space <*> binaryP)
|
||||
REQ_ -> s (REQ <$> A.takeTill (== ' ') <* A.space <*> strP_ <*> binaryP)
|
||||
INFO_ -> s (INFO <$> binaryP)
|
||||
CON_ -> pure CON
|
||||
CON_ -> s (CON <$> strP)
|
||||
END_ -> pure END
|
||||
CONNECT_ -> s (CONNECT <$> strP_ <*> strP)
|
||||
DISCONNECT_ -> s (DISCONNECT <$> strP_ <*> strP)
|
||||
@@ -1739,7 +1716,7 @@ commandP binaryP =
|
||||
UP_ -> s (UP <$> strP_ <*> connections)
|
||||
SWITCH_ -> s (SWITCH <$> strP_ <*> strP_ <*> strP)
|
||||
RSYNC_ -> s (RSYNC <$> strP_ <*> strP <*> strP)
|
||||
MID_ -> s (MID <$> A.decimal)
|
||||
MID_ -> s (MID <$> A.decimal <*> _strP)
|
||||
SENT_ -> s (SENT <$> A.decimal)
|
||||
MERR_ -> s (MERR <$> A.decimal <* A.space <*> strP)
|
||||
MERRS_ -> s (MERRS <$> strP_ <*> strP)
|
||||
@@ -1762,6 +1739,10 @@ commandP binaryP =
|
||||
where
|
||||
s :: Parser a -> Parser a
|
||||
s p = A.space *> p
|
||||
pqIKP :: Parser InitialKeys
|
||||
pqIKP = strP_ <|> pure (IKNoPQ PQEncOff)
|
||||
pqEncP :: Parser PQEncryption
|
||||
pqEncP = strP_ <|> pure PQEncOff
|
||||
connections :: Parser [ConnId]
|
||||
connections = strP `A.sepBy'` A.char ','
|
||||
sfDone :: Text -> Either String (ACommand 'Agent 'AESndFile)
|
||||
@@ -1777,13 +1758,13 @@ parseCommand = parse (commandP A.takeByteString) $ CMD SYNTAX
|
||||
-- | Serialize SMP agent command.
|
||||
serializeCommand :: ACommand p e -> ByteString
|
||||
serializeCommand = \case
|
||||
NEW ntfs cMode subMode -> s (NEW_, ntfs, cMode, subMode)
|
||||
NEW ntfs cMode pqIK subMode -> s (NEW_, ntfs, cMode, pqIK, subMode)
|
||||
INV cReq -> s (INV_, cReq)
|
||||
JOIN ntfs cReq subMode cInfo -> s (JOIN_, ntfs, cReq, subMode, Str $ serializeBinary cInfo)
|
||||
JOIN ntfs cReq pqEnc subMode cInfo -> s (JOIN_, ntfs, cReq, pqEnc, subMode, Str $ serializeBinary cInfo)
|
||||
CONF confId srvs cInfo -> B.unwords [s CONF_, confId, strEncodeList srvs, serializeBinary cInfo]
|
||||
LET confId cInfo -> B.unwords [s LET_, confId, serializeBinary cInfo]
|
||||
REQ invId srvs cInfo -> B.unwords [s REQ_, invId, s srvs, serializeBinary cInfo]
|
||||
ACPT invId cInfo -> B.unwords [s ACPT_, invId, serializeBinary cInfo]
|
||||
ACPT invId pqEnc cInfo -> B.unwords [s ACPT_, invId, s pqEnc, serializeBinary cInfo]
|
||||
RJCT invId -> B.unwords [s RJCT_, invId]
|
||||
INFO cInfo -> B.unwords [s INFO_, serializeBinary cInfo]
|
||||
SUB -> s SUB_
|
||||
@@ -1794,8 +1775,8 @@ serializeCommand = \case
|
||||
UP srv conns -> B.unwords [s UP_, s srv, connections conns]
|
||||
SWITCH dir phase srvs -> s (SWITCH_, dir, phase, srvs)
|
||||
RSYNC rrState cryptoErr cstats -> s (RSYNC_, rrState, cryptoErr, cstats)
|
||||
SEND msgFlags msgBody -> B.unwords [s SEND_, smpEncode msgFlags, serializeBinary msgBody]
|
||||
MID mId -> s (MID_, mId)
|
||||
SEND pqEnc msgFlags msgBody -> B.unwords [s SEND_, s pqEnc, smpEncode msgFlags, serializeBinary msgBody]
|
||||
MID mId pqEnc -> s (MID_, mId, pqEnc)
|
||||
SENT mId -> s (SENT_, mId)
|
||||
MERR mId e -> s (MERR_, mId, e)
|
||||
MERRS mIds e -> s (MERRS_, mIds, e)
|
||||
@@ -1811,7 +1792,7 @@ serializeCommand = \case
|
||||
DEL_USER userId -> s (DEL_USER_, userId)
|
||||
CHK -> s CHK_
|
||||
STAT srvs -> s (STAT_, srvs)
|
||||
CON -> s CON_
|
||||
CON pqEnc -> s (CON_, pqEnc)
|
||||
ERR e -> s (ERR_, e)
|
||||
OK -> s OK_
|
||||
SUSPENDED -> s SUSPENDED_
|
||||
@@ -1884,13 +1865,13 @@ tGet party h = liftIO (tGetRaw h) >>= tParseLoadBody
|
||||
cmdWithMsgBody :: APartyCmd p -> m (Either AgentErrorType (APartyCmd p))
|
||||
cmdWithMsgBody (APC e cmd) =
|
||||
APC e <$$> case cmd of
|
||||
SEND msgFlags body -> SEND msgFlags <$$> getBody body
|
||||
SEND kem msgFlags body -> SEND kem msgFlags <$$> getBody body
|
||||
MSG msgMeta msgFlags body -> MSG msgMeta msgFlags <$$> getBody body
|
||||
JOIN ntfs qUri subMode cInfo -> JOIN ntfs qUri subMode <$$> getBody cInfo
|
||||
JOIN ntfs qUri kem subMode cInfo -> JOIN ntfs qUri kem subMode <$$> getBody cInfo
|
||||
CONF confId srvs cInfo -> CONF confId srvs <$$> getBody cInfo
|
||||
LET confId cInfo -> LET confId <$$> getBody cInfo
|
||||
REQ invId srvs cInfo -> REQ invId srvs <$$> getBody cInfo
|
||||
ACPT invId cInfo -> ACPT invId <$$> getBody cInfo
|
||||
ACPT invId kem cInfo -> ACPT invId kem <$$> getBody cInfo
|
||||
INFO cInfo -> INFO <$$> getBody cInfo
|
||||
_ -> pure $ Right cmd
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ import Data.Type.Equality
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Protocol
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.RetryInterval (RI2State)
|
||||
import qualified Simplex.Messaging.Crypto as C
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Crypto.Ratchet (RatchetX448)
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Crypto.Ratchet (RatchetX448, PQEncryption)
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Encoding.String
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Protocol
|
||||
( MsgBody,
|
||||
@@ -61,8 +61,6 @@ data DBQueueId (q :: QueueStored) where
|
||||
DBQueueId :: Int64 -> DBQueueId 'QSStored
|
||||
DBNewQueue :: DBQueueId 'QSNew
|
||||
|
||||
deriving instance Eq (DBQueueId q)
|
||||
|
||||
deriving instance Show (DBQueueId q)
|
||||
|
||||
type RcvQueue = StoredRcvQueue 'QSStored
|
||||
@@ -101,7 +99,7 @@ data StoredRcvQueue (q :: QueueStored) = RcvQueue
|
||||
clientNtfCreds :: Maybe ClientNtfCreds,
|
||||
deleteErrors :: Int
|
||||
}
|
||||
deriving (Eq, Show)
|
||||
deriving (Show)
|
||||
|
||||
rcvQueueInfo :: RcvQueue -> RcvQueueInfo
|
||||
rcvQueueInfo rq@RcvQueue {server, rcvSwchStatus} =
|
||||
@@ -128,7 +126,7 @@ data ClientNtfCreds = ClientNtfCreds
|
||||
-- | shared DH secret used to encrypt/decrypt notification metadata (NMsgMeta) from server to recipient
|
||||
rcvNtfDhSecret :: RcvNtfDhSecret
|
||||
}
|
||||
deriving (Eq, Show)
|
||||
deriving (Show)
|
||||
|
||||
type SndQueue = StoredSndQueue 'QSStored
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -161,7 +159,7 @@ data StoredSndQueue (q :: QueueStored) = SndQueue
|
||||
-- | SMP client version
|
||||
smpClientVersion :: Version
|
||||
}
|
||||
deriving (Eq, Show)
|
||||
deriving (Show)
|
||||
|
||||
sndQueueInfo :: SndQueue -> SndQueueInfo
|
||||
sndQueueInfo SndQueue {server, sndSwchStatus} =
|
||||
@@ -256,8 +254,6 @@ data Connection (d :: ConnType) where
|
||||
DuplexConnection :: ConnData -> NonEmpty RcvQueue -> NonEmpty SndQueue -> Connection CDuplex
|
||||
ContactConnection :: ConnData -> RcvQueue -> Connection CContact
|
||||
|
||||
deriving instance Eq (Connection d)
|
||||
|
||||
deriving instance Show (Connection d)
|
||||
|
||||
toConnData :: Connection d -> ConnData
|
||||
@@ -290,8 +286,6 @@ connType SCSnd = CSnd
|
||||
connType SCDuplex = CDuplex
|
||||
connType SCContact = CContact
|
||||
|
||||
deriving instance Eq (SConnType d)
|
||||
|
||||
deriving instance Show (SConnType d)
|
||||
|
||||
instance TestEquality SConnType where
|
||||
@@ -305,11 +299,6 @@ instance TestEquality SConnType where
|
||||
-- Used to refer to an arbitrary connection when retrieving from store.
|
||||
data SomeConn = forall d. SomeConn (SConnType d) (Connection d)
|
||||
|
||||
instance Eq SomeConn where
|
||||
SomeConn d c == SomeConn d' c' = case testEquality d d' of
|
||||
Just Refl -> c == c'
|
||||
_ -> False
|
||||
|
||||
deriving instance Show SomeConn
|
||||
|
||||
data ConnData = ConnData
|
||||
@@ -319,7 +308,8 @@ data ConnData = ConnData
|
||||
enableNtfs :: Bool,
|
||||
lastExternalSndId :: PrevExternalSndId,
|
||||
deleted :: Bool,
|
||||
ratchetSyncState :: RatchetSyncState
|
||||
ratchetSyncState :: RatchetSyncState,
|
||||
pqEncryption :: PQEncryption
|
||||
}
|
||||
deriving (Eq, Show)
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -534,6 +524,7 @@ data SndMsgData = SndMsgData
|
||||
msgType :: AgentMessageType,
|
||||
msgFlags :: MsgFlags,
|
||||
msgBody :: MsgBody,
|
||||
pqEncryption :: PQEncryption,
|
||||
internalHash :: MsgHash,
|
||||
prevMsgHash :: MsgHash
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -551,6 +542,7 @@ data PendingMsgData = PendingMsgData
|
||||
msgType :: AgentMessageType,
|
||||
msgFlags :: MsgFlags,
|
||||
msgBody :: MsgBody,
|
||||
pqEncryption :: PQEncryption,
|
||||
msgRetryState :: Maybe RI2State,
|
||||
internalTs :: InternalTs
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -269,6 +269,7 @@ import qualified Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.SQLite.Migrations as Migrations
|
||||
import qualified Simplex.Messaging.Crypto as C
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Crypto.File (CryptoFile (..), CryptoFileArgs (..))
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Crypto.Ratchet (RatchetX448, SkippedMsgDiff (..), SkippedMsgKeys)
|
||||
import qualified Simplex.Messaging.Crypto.Ratchet as CR
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Encoding
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Encoding.String
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Notifications.Protocol (DeviceToken (..), NtfSubscriptionId, NtfTknStatus (..), NtfTokenId, SMPQueueNtf (..))
|
||||
@@ -575,14 +576,14 @@ createSndConn db gVar cData q@SndQueue {server} =
|
||||
insertSndQueue_ db connId q serverKeyHash_
|
||||
|
||||
createConnRecord :: DB.Connection -> ConnId -> ConnData -> SConnectionMode c -> IO ()
|
||||
createConnRecord db connId ConnData {userId, connAgentVersion, enableNtfs} cMode =
|
||||
createConnRecord db connId ConnData {userId, connAgentVersion, enableNtfs, pqEncryption} cMode =
|
||||
DB.execute
|
||||
db
|
||||
[sql|
|
||||
INSERT INTO connections
|
||||
(user_id, conn_id, conn_mode, smp_agent_version, enable_ntfs, duplex_handshake) VALUES (?,?,?,?,?,?)
|
||||
(user_id, conn_id, conn_mode, smp_agent_version, enable_ntfs, pq_encryption, duplex_handshake) VALUES (?,?,?,?,?,?,?)
|
||||
|]
|
||||
(userId, connId, cMode, connAgentVersion, enableNtfs, True)
|
||||
(userId, connId, cMode, connAgentVersion, enableNtfs, pqEncryption, True)
|
||||
|
||||
checkConfirmedSndQueueExists_ :: DB.Connection -> NewSndQueue -> IO Bool
|
||||
checkConfirmedSndQueueExists_ db SndQueue {server, sndId} = do
|
||||
@@ -1028,18 +1029,18 @@ getPendingQueueMsg db connId SndQueue {dbQueueId} =
|
||||
DB.query
|
||||
db
|
||||
[sql|
|
||||
SELECT m.msg_type, m.msg_flags, m.msg_body, m.internal_ts, s.retry_int_slow, s.retry_int_fast
|
||||
SELECT m.msg_type, m.msg_flags, m.msg_body, m.pq_encryption, m.internal_ts, s.retry_int_slow, s.retry_int_fast
|
||||
FROM messages m
|
||||
JOIN snd_messages s ON s.conn_id = m.conn_id AND s.internal_id = m.internal_id
|
||||
WHERE m.conn_id = ? AND m.internal_id = ?
|
||||
|]
|
||||
(connId, msgId)
|
||||
err = SEInternal $ "msg delivery " <> bshow msgId <> " returned []"
|
||||
pendingMsgData :: (AgentMessageType, Maybe MsgFlags, MsgBody, InternalTs, Maybe Int64, Maybe Int64) -> PendingMsgData
|
||||
pendingMsgData (msgType, msgFlags_, msgBody, internalTs, riSlow_, riFast_) =
|
||||
pendingMsgData :: (AgentMessageType, Maybe MsgFlags, MsgBody, CR.PQEncryption, InternalTs, Maybe Int64, Maybe Int64) -> PendingMsgData
|
||||
pendingMsgData (msgType, msgFlags_, msgBody, pqEncryption, internalTs, riSlow_, riFast_) =
|
||||
let msgFlags = fromMaybe SMP.noMsgFlags msgFlags_
|
||||
msgRetryState = RI2State <$> riSlow_ <*> riFast_
|
||||
in PendingMsgData {msgId, msgType, msgFlags, msgBody, msgRetryState, internalTs}
|
||||
in PendingMsgData {msgId, msgType, msgFlags, msgBody, pqEncryption, msgRetryState, internalTs}
|
||||
markMsgFailed msgId = DB.execute db "UPDATE snd_message_deliveries SET failed = 1 WHERE conn_id = ? AND internal_id = ?" (connId, msgId)
|
||||
|
||||
getWorkItem :: Show i => ByteString -> IO (Maybe i) -> (i -> IO (Either StoreError a)) -> (i -> IO ()) -> IO (Either StoreError (Maybe a))
|
||||
@@ -1108,7 +1109,7 @@ getRcvMsg db connId agentMsgId =
|
||||
[sql|
|
||||
SELECT
|
||||
r.internal_id, m.internal_ts, r.broker_id, r.broker_ts, r.external_snd_id, r.integrity, r.internal_hash,
|
||||
m.msg_type, m.msg_body, s.internal_id, s.rcpt_status, r.user_ack
|
||||
m.msg_type, m.msg_body, m.pq_encryption, s.internal_id, s.rcpt_status, r.user_ack
|
||||
FROM rcv_messages r
|
||||
JOIN messages m ON r.conn_id = m.conn_id AND r.internal_id = m.internal_id
|
||||
LEFT JOIN snd_messages s ON s.conn_id = r.conn_id AND s.rcpt_internal_id = r.internal_id
|
||||
@@ -1124,7 +1125,7 @@ getLastMsg db connId msgId =
|
||||
[sql|
|
||||
SELECT
|
||||
r.internal_id, m.internal_ts, r.broker_id, r.broker_ts, r.external_snd_id, r.integrity, r.internal_hash,
|
||||
m.msg_type, m.msg_body, s.internal_id, s.rcpt_status, r.user_ack
|
||||
m.msg_type, m.msg_body, m.pq_encryption, s.internal_id, s.rcpt_status, r.user_ack
|
||||
FROM rcv_messages r
|
||||
JOIN messages m ON r.conn_id = m.conn_id AND r.internal_id = m.internal_id
|
||||
JOIN connections c ON r.conn_id = c.conn_id AND c.last_internal_msg_id = r.internal_id
|
||||
@@ -1133,9 +1134,9 @@ getLastMsg db connId msgId =
|
||||
|]
|
||||
(connId, msgId)
|
||||
|
||||
toRcvMsg :: (Int64, InternalTs, BrokerId, BrokerTs, AgentMsgId, MsgIntegrity, MsgHash, AgentMessageType, MsgBody, Maybe AgentMsgId, Maybe MsgReceiptStatus, Bool) -> RcvMsg
|
||||
toRcvMsg (agentMsgId, internalTs, brokerId, brokerTs, sndMsgId, integrity, internalHash, msgType, msgBody, rcptInternalId_, rcptStatus_, userAck) =
|
||||
let msgMeta = MsgMeta {recipient = (agentMsgId, internalTs), broker = (brokerId, brokerTs), sndMsgId, integrity}
|
||||
toRcvMsg :: (Int64, InternalTs, BrokerId, BrokerTs) :. (AgentMsgId, MsgIntegrity, MsgHash, AgentMessageType, MsgBody, CR.PQEncryption, Maybe AgentMsgId, Maybe MsgReceiptStatus, Bool) -> RcvMsg
|
||||
toRcvMsg ((agentMsgId, internalTs, brokerId, brokerTs) :. (sndMsgId, integrity, internalHash, msgType, msgBody, pqEncryption, rcptInternalId_, rcptStatus_, userAck)) =
|
||||
let msgMeta = MsgMeta {recipient = (agentMsgId, internalTs), broker = (brokerId, brokerTs), sndMsgId, integrity, pqEncryption}
|
||||
msgReceipt = MsgReceipt <$> rcptInternalId_ <*> rcptStatus_
|
||||
in RcvMsg {internalId = InternalId agentMsgId, msgMeta, msgType, msgBody, internalHash, msgReceipt, userAck}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1195,34 +1196,34 @@ deleteSndMsgsExpired db ttl = do
|
||||
"DELETE FROM messages WHERE internal_ts < ? AND internal_snd_id IS NOT NULL"
|
||||
(Only cutoffTs)
|
||||
|
||||
createRatchetX3dhKeys :: DB.Connection -> ConnId -> C.PrivateKeyX448 -> C.PrivateKeyX448 -> IO ()
|
||||
createRatchetX3dhKeys db connId x3dhPrivKey1 x3dhPrivKey2 =
|
||||
DB.execute db "INSERT INTO ratchets (conn_id, x3dh_priv_key_1, x3dh_priv_key_2) VALUES (?, ?, ?)" (connId, x3dhPrivKey1, x3dhPrivKey2)
|
||||
createRatchetX3dhKeys :: DB.Connection -> ConnId -> C.PrivateKeyX448 -> C.PrivateKeyX448 -> Maybe CR.RcvPrivRKEMParams -> IO ()
|
||||
createRatchetX3dhKeys db connId x3dhPrivKey1 x3dhPrivKey2 pqPrivKem =
|
||||
DB.execute db "INSERT INTO ratchets (conn_id, x3dh_priv_key_1, x3dh_priv_key_2, pq_priv_kem) VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?)" (connId, x3dhPrivKey1, x3dhPrivKey2, pqPrivKem)
|
||||
|
||||
getRatchetX3dhKeys :: DB.Connection -> ConnId -> IO (Either StoreError (C.PrivateKeyX448, C.PrivateKeyX448))
|
||||
getRatchetX3dhKeys :: DB.Connection -> ConnId -> IO (Either StoreError (C.PrivateKeyX448, C.PrivateKeyX448, Maybe CR.RcvPrivRKEMParams))
|
||||
getRatchetX3dhKeys db connId =
|
||||
fmap hasKeys $
|
||||
firstRow id SEX3dhKeysNotFound $
|
||||
DB.query db "SELECT x3dh_priv_key_1, x3dh_priv_key_2 FROM ratchets WHERE conn_id = ?" (Only connId)
|
||||
firstRow' keys SEX3dhKeysNotFound $
|
||||
DB.query db "SELECT x3dh_priv_key_1, x3dh_priv_key_2, pq_priv_kem FROM ratchets WHERE conn_id = ?" (Only connId)
|
||||
where
|
||||
hasKeys = \case
|
||||
Right (Just k1, Just k2) -> Right (k1, k2)
|
||||
keys = \case
|
||||
(Just k1, Just k2, pKem) -> Right (k1, k2, pKem)
|
||||
_ -> Left SEX3dhKeysNotFound
|
||||
|
||||
-- used to remember new keys when starting ratchet re-synchronization
|
||||
-- TODO remove the columns for public keys in v5.7.
|
||||
-- Currently, the keys are not used but still stored to support app downgrade to the previous version.
|
||||
setRatchetX3dhKeys :: DB.Connection -> ConnId -> C.PrivateKeyX448 -> C.PrivateKeyX448 -> IO ()
|
||||
setRatchetX3dhKeys db connId x3dhPrivKey1 x3dhPrivKey2 =
|
||||
setRatchetX3dhKeys :: DB.Connection -> ConnId -> C.PrivateKeyX448 -> C.PrivateKeyX448 -> Maybe CR.RcvPrivRKEMParams -> IO ()
|
||||
setRatchetX3dhKeys db connId x3dhPrivKey1 x3dhPrivKey2 pqPrivKem =
|
||||
DB.execute
|
||||
db
|
||||
[sql|
|
||||
UPDATE ratchets
|
||||
SET x3dh_priv_key_1 = ?, x3dh_priv_key_2 = ?, x3dh_pub_key_1 = ?, x3dh_pub_key_2 = ?
|
||||
SET x3dh_priv_key_1 = ?, x3dh_priv_key_2 = ?, x3dh_pub_key_1 = ?, x3dh_pub_key_2 = ?, pq_priv_kem = ?
|
||||
WHERE conn_id = ?
|
||||
|]
|
||||
(x3dhPrivKey1, x3dhPrivKey2, C.publicKey x3dhPrivKey1, C.publicKey x3dhPrivKey2, connId)
|
||||
(x3dhPrivKey1, x3dhPrivKey2, C.publicKey x3dhPrivKey1, C.publicKey x3dhPrivKey2, pqPrivKem, connId)
|
||||
|
||||
-- TODO remove the columns for public keys in v5.7.
|
||||
createRatchet :: DB.Connection -> ConnId -> RatchetX448 -> IO ()
|
||||
createRatchet db connId rc =
|
||||
DB.executeNamed
|
||||
@@ -1233,7 +1234,10 @@ createRatchet db connId rc =
|
||||
ON CONFLICT (conn_id) DO UPDATE SET
|
||||
ratchet_state = :ratchet_state,
|
||||
x3dh_priv_key_1 = NULL,
|
||||
x3dh_priv_key_2 = NULL
|
||||
x3dh_priv_key_2 = NULL,
|
||||
x3dh_pub_key_1 = NULL,
|
||||
x3dh_pub_key_2 = NULL,
|
||||
pq_priv_kem = NULL
|
||||
|]
|
||||
[":conn_id" := connId, ":ratchet_state" := rc]
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1772,6 +1776,10 @@ instance ToField MsgReceiptStatus where toField = toField . decodeLatin1 . strEn
|
||||
|
||||
instance FromField MsgReceiptStatus where fromField = fromTextField_ $ eitherToMaybe . strDecode . encodeUtf8
|
||||
|
||||
instance ToField CR.PQEncryption where toField (CR.PQEncryption pqEnc) = toField pqEnc
|
||||
|
||||
instance FromField CR.PQEncryption where fromField f = CR.PQEncryption <$> fromField f
|
||||
|
||||
listToEither :: e -> [a] -> Either e a
|
||||
listToEither _ (x : _) = Right x
|
||||
listToEither e _ = Left e
|
||||
@@ -1923,14 +1931,14 @@ getConnData db connId' =
|
||||
[sql|
|
||||
SELECT
|
||||
user_id, conn_id, conn_mode, smp_agent_version, enable_ntfs,
|
||||
last_external_snd_msg_id, deleted, ratchet_sync_state
|
||||
last_external_snd_msg_id, deleted, ratchet_sync_state, pq_encryption
|
||||
FROM connections
|
||||
WHERE conn_id = ?
|
||||
|]
|
||||
(Only connId')
|
||||
where
|
||||
cData (userId, connId, cMode, connAgentVersion, enableNtfs_, lastExternalSndId, deleted, ratchetSyncState) =
|
||||
(ConnData {userId, connId, connAgentVersion, enableNtfs = fromMaybe True enableNtfs_, lastExternalSndId, deleted, ratchetSyncState}, cMode)
|
||||
cData (userId, connId, cMode, connAgentVersion, enableNtfs_, lastExternalSndId, deleted, ratchetSyncState, pqEncryption) =
|
||||
(ConnData {userId, connId, connAgentVersion, enableNtfs = fromMaybe True enableNtfs_, lastExternalSndId, deleted, ratchetSyncState, pqEncryption}, cMode)
|
||||
|
||||
setConnDeleted :: DB.Connection -> Bool -> ConnId -> IO ()
|
||||
setConnDeleted db waitDelivery connId
|
||||
@@ -2089,23 +2097,15 @@ updateLastIdsRcv_ dbConn connId newInternalId newInternalRcvId =
|
||||
|
||||
insertRcvMsgBase_ :: DB.Connection -> ConnId -> RcvMsgData -> IO ()
|
||||
insertRcvMsgBase_ dbConn connId RcvMsgData {msgMeta, msgType, msgFlags, msgBody, internalRcvId} = do
|
||||
let MsgMeta {recipient = (internalId, internalTs)} = msgMeta
|
||||
DB.executeNamed
|
||||
let MsgMeta {recipient = (internalId, internalTs), pqEncryption} = msgMeta
|
||||
DB.execute
|
||||
dbConn
|
||||
[sql|
|
||||
INSERT INTO messages
|
||||
( conn_id, internal_id, internal_ts, internal_rcv_id, internal_snd_id, msg_type, msg_flags, msg_body)
|
||||
VALUES
|
||||
(:conn_id,:internal_id,:internal_ts,:internal_rcv_id, NULL,:msg_type,:msg_flags,:msg_body);
|
||||
(conn_id, internal_id, internal_ts, internal_rcv_id, internal_snd_id, msg_type, msg_flags, msg_body, pq_encryption)
|
||||
VALUES (?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?);
|
||||
|]
|
||||
[ ":conn_id" := connId,
|
||||
":internal_id" := internalId,
|
||||
":internal_ts" := internalTs,
|
||||
":internal_rcv_id" := internalRcvId,
|
||||
":msg_type" := msgType,
|
||||
":msg_flags" := msgFlags,
|
||||
":msg_body" := msgBody
|
||||
]
|
||||
(connId, internalId, internalTs, internalRcvId, Nothing :: Maybe Int64, msgType, msgFlags, msgBody, pqEncryption)
|
||||
|
||||
insertRcvMsgDetails_ :: DB.Connection -> ConnId -> RcvQueue -> RcvMsgData -> IO ()
|
||||
insertRcvMsgDetails_ db connId RcvQueue {dbQueueId} RcvMsgData {msgMeta, internalRcvId, internalHash, externalPrevSndHash, encryptedMsgHash} = do
|
||||
@@ -2186,23 +2186,16 @@ updateLastIdsSnd_ dbConn connId newInternalId newInternalSndId =
|
||||
-- * createSndMsg helpers
|
||||
|
||||
insertSndMsgBase_ :: DB.Connection -> ConnId -> SndMsgData -> IO ()
|
||||
insertSndMsgBase_ dbConn connId SndMsgData {..} = do
|
||||
DB.executeNamed
|
||||
dbConn
|
||||
insertSndMsgBase_ db connId SndMsgData {internalId, internalTs, internalSndId, msgType, msgFlags, msgBody, pqEncryption} = do
|
||||
DB.execute
|
||||
db
|
||||
[sql|
|
||||
INSERT INTO messages
|
||||
( conn_id, internal_id, internal_ts, internal_rcv_id, internal_snd_id, msg_type, msg_flags, msg_body)
|
||||
(conn_id, internal_id, internal_ts, internal_rcv_id, internal_snd_id, msg_type, msg_flags, msg_body, pq_encryption)
|
||||
VALUES
|
||||
(:conn_id,:internal_id,:internal_ts, NULL,:internal_snd_id,:msg_type,:msg_flags,:msg_body);
|
||||
(?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?);
|
||||
|]
|
||||
[ ":conn_id" := connId,
|
||||
":internal_id" := internalId,
|
||||
":internal_ts" := internalTs,
|
||||
":internal_snd_id" := internalSndId,
|
||||
":msg_type" := msgType,
|
||||
":msg_flags" := msgFlags,
|
||||
":msg_body" := msgBody
|
||||
]
|
||||
(connId, internalId, internalTs, Nothing :: Maybe Int64, internalSndId, msgType, msgFlags, msgBody, pqEncryption)
|
||||
|
||||
insertSndMsgDetails_ :: DB.Connection -> ConnId -> SndMsgData -> IO ()
|
||||
insertSndMsgDetails_ dbConn connId SndMsgData {..} =
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -70,6 +70,7 @@ import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.SQLite.Migrations.M20231225_failed_work_ite
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.SQLite.Migrations.M20240121_message_delivery_indexes
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.SQLite.Migrations.M20240124_file_redirect
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.SQLite.Migrations.M20240223_connections_wait_delivery
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.SQLite.Migrations.M20240225_ratchet_kem
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Encoding.String
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Parsers (dropPrefix, sumTypeJSON)
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Transport.Client (TransportHost)
|
||||
@@ -108,7 +109,8 @@ schemaMigrations =
|
||||
("m20231225_failed_work_items", m20231225_failed_work_items, Just down_m20231225_failed_work_items),
|
||||
("m20240121_message_delivery_indexes", m20240121_message_delivery_indexes, Just down_m20240121_message_delivery_indexes),
|
||||
("m20240124_file_redirect", m20240124_file_redirect, Just down_m20240124_file_redirect),
|
||||
("m20240223_connections_wait_delivery", m20240223_connections_wait_delivery, Just down_m20240223_connections_wait_delivery)
|
||||
("m20240223_connections_wait_delivery", m20240223_connections_wait_delivery, Just down_m20240223_connections_wait_delivery),
|
||||
("m20240225_ratchet_kem", m20240225_ratchet_kem, Just down_m20240225_ratchet_kem)
|
||||
]
|
||||
|
||||
-- | The list of migrations in ascending order by date
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
|
||||
{-# LANGUAGE QuasiQuotes #-}
|
||||
|
||||
module Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.SQLite.Migrations.M20240225_ratchet_kem where
|
||||
|
||||
import Database.SQLite.Simple (Query)
|
||||
import Database.SQLite.Simple.QQ (sql)
|
||||
|
||||
m20240225_ratchet_kem :: Query
|
||||
m20240225_ratchet_kem =
|
||||
[sql|
|
||||
ALTER TABLE ratchets ADD COLUMN pq_priv_kem BLOB;
|
||||
ALTER TABLE connections ADD COLUMN pq_encryption INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0;
|
||||
ALTER TABLE messages ADD COLUMN pq_encryption INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0;
|
||||
|]
|
||||
|
||||
down_m20240225_ratchet_kem :: Query
|
||||
down_m20240225_ratchet_kem =
|
||||
[sql|
|
||||
ALTER TABLE ratchets DROP COLUMN pq_priv_kem;
|
||||
ALTER TABLE connections DROP COLUMN pq_encryption;
|
||||
ALTER TABLE messages DROP COLUMN pq_encryption;
|
||||
|]
|
||||
@@ -27,7 +27,8 @@ CREATE TABLE connections(
|
||||
user_id INTEGER CHECK(user_id NOT NULL)
|
||||
REFERENCES users ON DELETE CASCADE,
|
||||
ratchet_sync_state TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT 'ok',
|
||||
deleted_at_wait_delivery TEXT
|
||||
deleted_at_wait_delivery TEXT,
|
||||
pq_encryption INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0
|
||||
) WITHOUT ROWID;
|
||||
CREATE TABLE rcv_queues(
|
||||
host TEXT NOT NULL,
|
||||
@@ -90,6 +91,7 @@ CREATE TABLE messages(
|
||||
msg_type BLOB NOT NULL, --(H)ELLO,(R)EPLY,(D)ELETE. Should SMP confirmation be saved too?
|
||||
msg_body BLOB NOT NULL DEFAULT x'',
|
||||
msg_flags TEXT NULL,
|
||||
pq_encryption INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0,
|
||||
PRIMARY KEY(conn_id, internal_id),
|
||||
FOREIGN KEY(conn_id, internal_rcv_id) REFERENCES rcv_messages
|
||||
ON DELETE CASCADE DEFERRABLE INITIALLY DEFERRED,
|
||||
@@ -160,7 +162,8 @@ CREATE TABLE ratchets(
|
||||
e2e_version INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 1
|
||||
,
|
||||
x3dh_pub_key_1 BLOB,
|
||||
x3dh_pub_key_2 BLOB
|
||||
x3dh_pub_key_2 BLOB,
|
||||
pq_priv_kem BLOB
|
||||
) WITHOUT ROWID;
|
||||
CREATE TABLE skipped_messages(
|
||||
skipped_message_id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY,
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -101,6 +101,7 @@ module Simplex.Messaging.Crypto
|
||||
verify,
|
||||
verify',
|
||||
validSignatureSize,
|
||||
checkAlgorithm,
|
||||
|
||||
-- * crypto_box authenticator, as discussed in https://groups.google.com/g/sci.crypt/c/73yb5a9pz2Y/m/LNgRO7IYXOwJ
|
||||
CbAuthenticator (..),
|
||||
@@ -243,8 +244,6 @@ data SAlgorithm :: Algorithm -> Type where
|
||||
SX25519 :: SAlgorithm X25519
|
||||
SX448 :: SAlgorithm X448
|
||||
|
||||
deriving instance Eq (SAlgorithm a)
|
||||
|
||||
deriving instance Show (SAlgorithm a)
|
||||
|
||||
data Alg = forall a. AlgorithmI a => Alg (SAlgorithm a)
|
||||
@@ -297,11 +296,6 @@ data APublicKey
|
||||
AlgorithmI a =>
|
||||
APublicKey (SAlgorithm a) (PublicKey a)
|
||||
|
||||
instance Eq APublicKey where
|
||||
APublicKey a k == APublicKey a' k' = case testEquality a a' of
|
||||
Just Refl -> k == k'
|
||||
Nothing -> False
|
||||
|
||||
instance Encoding APublicKey where
|
||||
smpEncode = smpEncode . encodePubKey
|
||||
{-# INLINE smpEncode #-}
|
||||
@@ -342,11 +336,6 @@ data APrivateKey
|
||||
AlgorithmI a =>
|
||||
APrivateKey (SAlgorithm a) (PrivateKey a)
|
||||
|
||||
instance Eq APrivateKey where
|
||||
APrivateKey a k == APrivateKey a' k' = case testEquality a a' of
|
||||
Just Refl -> k == k'
|
||||
Nothing -> False
|
||||
|
||||
deriving instance Show APrivateKey
|
||||
|
||||
type PrivateKeyEd25519 = PrivateKey Ed25519
|
||||
@@ -372,11 +361,6 @@ data APrivateSignKey
|
||||
(AlgorithmI a, SignatureAlgorithm a) =>
|
||||
APrivateSignKey (SAlgorithm a) (PrivateKey a)
|
||||
|
||||
instance Eq APrivateSignKey where
|
||||
APrivateSignKey a k == APrivateSignKey a' k' = case testEquality a a' of
|
||||
Just Refl -> k == k'
|
||||
Nothing -> False
|
||||
|
||||
deriving instance Show APrivateSignKey
|
||||
|
||||
instance Encoding APrivateSignKey where
|
||||
@@ -396,11 +380,6 @@ data APublicVerifyKey
|
||||
(AlgorithmI a, SignatureAlgorithm a) =>
|
||||
APublicVerifyKey (SAlgorithm a) (PublicKey a)
|
||||
|
||||
instance Eq APublicVerifyKey where
|
||||
APublicVerifyKey a k == APublicVerifyKey a' k' = case testEquality a a' of
|
||||
Just Refl -> k == k'
|
||||
Nothing -> False
|
||||
|
||||
deriving instance Show APublicVerifyKey
|
||||
|
||||
data APrivateDhKey
|
||||
@@ -408,11 +387,6 @@ data APrivateDhKey
|
||||
(AlgorithmI a, DhAlgorithm a) =>
|
||||
APrivateDhKey (SAlgorithm a) (PrivateKey a)
|
||||
|
||||
instance Eq APrivateDhKey where
|
||||
APrivateDhKey a k == APrivateDhKey a' k' = case testEquality a a' of
|
||||
Just Refl -> k == k'
|
||||
Nothing -> False
|
||||
|
||||
deriving instance Show APrivateDhKey
|
||||
|
||||
data APublicDhKey
|
||||
@@ -420,11 +394,6 @@ data APublicDhKey
|
||||
(AlgorithmI a, DhAlgorithm a) =>
|
||||
APublicDhKey (SAlgorithm a) (PublicKey a)
|
||||
|
||||
instance Eq APublicDhKey where
|
||||
APublicDhKey a k == APublicDhKey a' k' = case testEquality a a' of
|
||||
Just Refl -> k == k'
|
||||
Nothing -> False
|
||||
|
||||
deriving instance Show APublicDhKey
|
||||
|
||||
data DhSecret (a :: Algorithm) where
|
||||
@@ -787,8 +756,6 @@ data Signature (a :: Algorithm) where
|
||||
SignatureEd25519 :: Ed25519.Signature -> Signature Ed25519
|
||||
SignatureEd448 :: Ed448.Signature -> Signature Ed448
|
||||
|
||||
deriving instance Eq (Signature a)
|
||||
|
||||
deriving instance Show (Signature a)
|
||||
|
||||
data ASignature
|
||||
@@ -796,11 +763,6 @@ data ASignature
|
||||
(AlgorithmI a, SignatureAlgorithm a) =>
|
||||
ASignature (SAlgorithm a) (Signature a)
|
||||
|
||||
instance Eq ASignature where
|
||||
ASignature a s == ASignature a' s' = case testEquality a a' of
|
||||
Just Refl -> s == s'
|
||||
_ -> False
|
||||
|
||||
deriving instance Show ASignature
|
||||
|
||||
class CryptoSignature s where
|
||||
@@ -885,6 +847,8 @@ data CryptoError
|
||||
CryptoHeaderError String
|
||||
| -- | no sending chain key in ratchet state
|
||||
CERatchetState
|
||||
| -- | no decapsulation key in ratchet state
|
||||
CERatchetKEMState
|
||||
| -- | header decryption error (could indicate that another key should be tried)
|
||||
CERatchetHeader
|
||||
| -- | too many skipped messages
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -5,16 +5,23 @@
|
||||
{-# LANGUAGE LambdaCase #-}
|
||||
{-# LANGUAGE NamedFieldPuns #-}
|
||||
{-# LANGUAGE OverloadedStrings #-}
|
||||
{-# LANGUAGE PatternSynonyms #-}
|
||||
{-# LANGUAGE PolyKinds #-}
|
||||
{-# LANGUAGE ScopedTypeVariables #-}
|
||||
{-# LANGUAGE StandaloneDeriving #-}
|
||||
{-# LANGUAGE StrictData #-}
|
||||
{-# LANGUAGE TemplateHaskell #-}
|
||||
{-# LANGUAGE TupleSections #-}
|
||||
{-# LANGUAGE TypeApplications #-}
|
||||
{-# LANGUAGE TypeFamilies #-}
|
||||
-- {-# LANGUAGE TypeOperators #-}
|
||||
{-# OPTIONS_GHC -fno-warn-redundant-constraints #-}
|
||||
|
||||
module Simplex.Messaging.Crypto.Ratchet where
|
||||
|
||||
import Control.Applicative ((<|>))
|
||||
import Control.Monad.Except
|
||||
import Control.Monad.IO.Class (liftIO)
|
||||
import Control.Monad.Trans.Except
|
||||
import Crypto.Cipher.AES (AES256)
|
||||
import Crypto.Hash (SHA512)
|
||||
@@ -23,22 +30,30 @@ import Crypto.Random (ChaChaDRG)
|
||||
import Data.Aeson (FromJSON (..), ToJSON (..))
|
||||
import qualified Data.Aeson as J
|
||||
import qualified Data.Aeson.TH as JQ
|
||||
import Data.Attoparsec.ByteString (Parser)
|
||||
import qualified Data.Attoparsec.ByteString.Char8 as A
|
||||
import qualified Data.ByteArray as BA
|
||||
import Data.ByteString.Char8 (ByteString)
|
||||
import qualified Data.ByteString.Char8 as B
|
||||
import qualified Data.ByteString.Lazy as LB
|
||||
import Data.Composition ((.:), (.:.))
|
||||
import Data.Functor (($>))
|
||||
import qualified Data.List.NonEmpty as L
|
||||
import Data.Map.Strict (Map)
|
||||
import qualified Data.Map.Strict as M
|
||||
import Data.Maybe (fromMaybe)
|
||||
import Data.Maybe (fromMaybe, isJust)
|
||||
import Data.Type.Equality
|
||||
import Data.Typeable (Typeable)
|
||||
import Data.Word (Word32)
|
||||
import Database.SQLite.Simple.FromField (FromField (..))
|
||||
import Database.SQLite.Simple.ToField (ToField (..))
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.QueryString
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Crypto
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Crypto.SNTRUP761.Bindings
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Encoding
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Encoding.String
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Parsers (blobFieldDecoder, defaultJSON, parseE, parseE')
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Util ((<$?>), ($>>=))
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Version
|
||||
import UnliftIO.STM
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -49,74 +64,319 @@ import UnliftIO.STM
|
||||
kdfX3DHE2EEncryptVersion :: Version
|
||||
kdfX3DHE2EEncryptVersion = 2
|
||||
|
||||
pqRatchetVersion :: Version
|
||||
pqRatchetVersion = 3
|
||||
|
||||
currentE2EEncryptVersion :: Version
|
||||
currentE2EEncryptVersion = 2
|
||||
currentE2EEncryptVersion = 3
|
||||
|
||||
supportedE2EEncryptVRange :: VersionRange
|
||||
supportedE2EEncryptVRange = mkVersionRange kdfX3DHE2EEncryptVersion currentE2EEncryptVersion
|
||||
|
||||
data E2ERatchetParams (a :: Algorithm)
|
||||
= E2ERatchetParams Version (PublicKey a) (PublicKey a)
|
||||
deriving (Eq, Show)
|
||||
data RatchetKEMState
|
||||
= RKSProposed -- only KEM encapsulation key
|
||||
| RKSAccepted -- KEM ciphertext and the next encapsulation key
|
||||
|
||||
instance AlgorithmI a => Encoding (E2ERatchetParams a) where
|
||||
smpEncode (E2ERatchetParams v k1 k2) = smpEncode (v, k1, k2)
|
||||
smpP = E2ERatchetParams <$> smpP <*> smpP <*> smpP
|
||||
data SRatchetKEMState (s :: RatchetKEMState) where
|
||||
SRKSProposed :: SRatchetKEMState 'RKSProposed
|
||||
SRKSAccepted :: SRatchetKEMState 'RKSAccepted
|
||||
|
||||
instance VersionI (E2ERatchetParams a) where
|
||||
type VersionRangeT (E2ERatchetParams a) = E2ERatchetParamsUri a
|
||||
version (E2ERatchetParams v _ _) = v
|
||||
toVersionRangeT (E2ERatchetParams _ k1 k2) vr = E2ERatchetParamsUri vr k1 k2
|
||||
deriving instance Show (SRatchetKEMState s)
|
||||
|
||||
instance VersionRangeI (E2ERatchetParamsUri a) where
|
||||
type VersionT (E2ERatchetParamsUri a) = (E2ERatchetParams a)
|
||||
versionRange (E2ERatchetParamsUri vr _ _) = vr
|
||||
toVersionT (E2ERatchetParamsUri _ k1 k2) v = E2ERatchetParams v k1 k2
|
||||
instance TestEquality SRatchetKEMState where
|
||||
testEquality SRKSProposed SRKSProposed = Just Refl
|
||||
testEquality SRKSAccepted SRKSAccepted = Just Refl
|
||||
testEquality _ _ = Nothing
|
||||
|
||||
data E2ERatchetParamsUri (a :: Algorithm)
|
||||
= E2ERatchetParamsUri VersionRange (PublicKey a) (PublicKey a)
|
||||
deriving (Eq, Show)
|
||||
class RatchetKEMStateI (s :: RatchetKEMState) where sRatchetKEMState :: SRatchetKEMState s
|
||||
|
||||
instance AlgorithmI a => StrEncoding (E2ERatchetParamsUri a) where
|
||||
strEncode (E2ERatchetParamsUri vs key1 key2) =
|
||||
strEncode $
|
||||
QSP QNoEscaping [("v", strEncode vs), ("x3dh", strEncodeList [key1, key2])]
|
||||
instance RatchetKEMStateI RKSProposed where sRatchetKEMState = SRKSProposed
|
||||
|
||||
instance RatchetKEMStateI RKSAccepted where sRatchetKEMState = SRKSAccepted
|
||||
|
||||
checkRatchetKEMState :: forall t s s' a. (RatchetKEMStateI s, RatchetKEMStateI s') => t s' a -> Either String (t s a)
|
||||
checkRatchetKEMState x = case testEquality (sRatchetKEMState @s) (sRatchetKEMState @s') of
|
||||
Just Refl -> Right x
|
||||
Nothing -> Left "bad ratchet KEM state"
|
||||
|
||||
checkRatchetKEMState' :: forall t s s'. (RatchetKEMStateI s, RatchetKEMStateI s') => t s' -> Either String (t s)
|
||||
checkRatchetKEMState' x = case testEquality (sRatchetKEMState @s) (sRatchetKEMState @s') of
|
||||
Just Refl -> Right x
|
||||
Nothing -> Left "bad ratchet KEM state"
|
||||
|
||||
data RKEMParams (s :: RatchetKEMState) where
|
||||
RKParamsProposed :: KEMPublicKey -> RKEMParams 'RKSProposed
|
||||
RKParamsAccepted :: KEMCiphertext -> KEMPublicKey -> RKEMParams 'RKSAccepted
|
||||
|
||||
deriving instance Show (RKEMParams s)
|
||||
|
||||
data ARKEMParams = forall s. RatchetKEMStateI s => ARKP (SRatchetKEMState s) (RKEMParams s)
|
||||
|
||||
deriving instance Show ARKEMParams
|
||||
|
||||
instance RatchetKEMStateI s => Encoding (RKEMParams s) where
|
||||
smpEncode = \case
|
||||
RKParamsProposed k -> smpEncode ('P', k)
|
||||
RKParamsAccepted ct k -> smpEncode ('A', ct, k)
|
||||
smpP = (\(ARKP _ ps) -> checkRatchetKEMState' ps) <$?> smpP
|
||||
|
||||
instance Encoding (ARKEMParams) where
|
||||
smpEncode (ARKP _ ps) = smpEncode ps
|
||||
smpP =
|
||||
smpP >>= \case
|
||||
'P' -> ARKP SRKSProposed . RKParamsProposed <$> smpP
|
||||
'A' -> ARKP SRKSAccepted .: RKParamsAccepted <$> smpP <*> smpP
|
||||
_ -> fail "bad ratchet KEM params"
|
||||
|
||||
data E2ERatchetParams (s :: RatchetKEMState) (a :: Algorithm)
|
||||
= E2ERatchetParams Version (PublicKey a) (PublicKey a) (Maybe (RKEMParams s))
|
||||
deriving (Show)
|
||||
|
||||
data AE2ERatchetParams (a :: Algorithm)
|
||||
= forall s.
|
||||
RatchetKEMStateI s =>
|
||||
AE2ERatchetParams (SRatchetKEMState s) (E2ERatchetParams s a)
|
||||
|
||||
deriving instance Show (AE2ERatchetParams a)
|
||||
|
||||
data AnyE2ERatchetParams
|
||||
= forall s a.
|
||||
(RatchetKEMStateI s, DhAlgorithm a, AlgorithmI a) =>
|
||||
AnyE2ERatchetParams (SRatchetKEMState s) (SAlgorithm a) (E2ERatchetParams s a)
|
||||
|
||||
deriving instance Show AnyE2ERatchetParams
|
||||
|
||||
instance (RatchetKEMStateI s, AlgorithmI a) => Encoding (E2ERatchetParams s a) where
|
||||
smpEncode (E2ERatchetParams v k1 k2 kem_)
|
||||
| v >= pqRatchetVersion = smpEncode (v, k1, k2, kem_)
|
||||
| otherwise = smpEncode (v, k1, k2)
|
||||
smpP = toParams <$?> smpP
|
||||
where
|
||||
toParams :: AE2ERatchetParams a -> Either String (E2ERatchetParams s a)
|
||||
toParams = \case
|
||||
AE2ERatchetParams _ (E2ERatchetParams v k1 k2 Nothing) -> Right $ E2ERatchetParams v k1 k2 Nothing
|
||||
AE2ERatchetParams _ ps -> checkRatchetKEMState ps
|
||||
|
||||
instance AlgorithmI a => Encoding (AE2ERatchetParams a) where
|
||||
smpEncode (AE2ERatchetParams _ ps) = smpEncode ps
|
||||
smpP = (\(AnyE2ERatchetParams s _ ps) -> (AE2ERatchetParams s) <$> checkAlgorithm ps) <$?> smpP
|
||||
|
||||
instance Encoding AnyE2ERatchetParams where
|
||||
smpEncode (AnyE2ERatchetParams _ _ ps) = smpEncode ps
|
||||
smpP = do
|
||||
v :: Version <- smpP
|
||||
APublicDhKey a k1 <- smpP
|
||||
APublicDhKey a' k2 <- smpP
|
||||
case testEquality a a' of
|
||||
Nothing -> fail "bad e2e params: different key algorithms"
|
||||
Just Refl ->
|
||||
kemP v >>= \case
|
||||
Just (ARKP s kem) -> pure $ AnyE2ERatchetParams s a $ E2ERatchetParams v k1 k2 (Just kem)
|
||||
Nothing -> pure $ AnyE2ERatchetParams SRKSProposed a $ E2ERatchetParams v k1 k2 Nothing
|
||||
where
|
||||
kemP :: Version -> Parser (Maybe (ARKEMParams))
|
||||
kemP v
|
||||
| v >= pqRatchetVersion = smpP
|
||||
| otherwise = pure Nothing
|
||||
|
||||
instance VersionI (E2ERatchetParams s a) where
|
||||
type VersionRangeT (E2ERatchetParams s a) = E2ERatchetParamsUri s a
|
||||
version (E2ERatchetParams v _ _ _) = v
|
||||
toVersionRangeT (E2ERatchetParams _ k1 k2 kem_) vr = E2ERatchetParamsUri vr k1 k2 kem_
|
||||
|
||||
instance VersionRangeI (E2ERatchetParamsUri s a) where
|
||||
type VersionT (E2ERatchetParamsUri s a) = (E2ERatchetParams s a)
|
||||
versionRange (E2ERatchetParamsUri vr _ _ _) = vr
|
||||
toVersionT (E2ERatchetParamsUri _ k1 k2 kem_) v = E2ERatchetParams v k1 k2 kem_
|
||||
|
||||
type RcvE2ERatchetParamsUri a = E2ERatchetParamsUri 'RKSProposed a
|
||||
|
||||
data E2ERatchetParamsUri (s :: RatchetKEMState) (a :: Algorithm)
|
||||
= E2ERatchetParamsUri VersionRange (PublicKey a) (PublicKey a) (Maybe (RKEMParams s))
|
||||
deriving (Show)
|
||||
|
||||
data AE2ERatchetParamsUri (a :: Algorithm)
|
||||
= forall s.
|
||||
RatchetKEMStateI s =>
|
||||
AE2ERatchetParamsUri (SRatchetKEMState s) (E2ERatchetParamsUri s a)
|
||||
|
||||
deriving instance Show (AE2ERatchetParamsUri a)
|
||||
|
||||
data AnyE2ERatchetParamsUri
|
||||
= forall s a.
|
||||
(RatchetKEMStateI s, DhAlgorithm a, AlgorithmI a) =>
|
||||
AnyE2ERatchetParamsUri (SRatchetKEMState s) (SAlgorithm a) (E2ERatchetParamsUri s a)
|
||||
|
||||
deriving instance Show AnyE2ERatchetParamsUri
|
||||
|
||||
instance (RatchetKEMStateI s, AlgorithmI a) => StrEncoding (E2ERatchetParamsUri s a) where
|
||||
strEncode (E2ERatchetParamsUri vs key1 key2 kem_) =
|
||||
strEncode . QSP QNoEscaping $
|
||||
[("v", strEncode vs), ("x3dh", strEncodeList [key1, key2])]
|
||||
<> maybe [] encodeKem kem_
|
||||
where
|
||||
encodeKem kem
|
||||
| maxVersion vs < pqRatchetVersion = []
|
||||
| otherwise = case kem of
|
||||
RKParamsProposed k -> [("kem_key", strEncode k)]
|
||||
RKParamsAccepted ct k -> [("kem_ct", strEncode ct), ("kem_key", strEncode k)]
|
||||
strP = toParamsURI <$?> strP
|
||||
where
|
||||
toParamsURI = \case
|
||||
AE2ERatchetParamsUri _ (E2ERatchetParamsUri vr k1 k2 Nothing) -> Right $ E2ERatchetParamsUri vr k1 k2 Nothing
|
||||
AE2ERatchetParamsUri _ ps -> checkRatchetKEMState ps
|
||||
|
||||
instance AlgorithmI a => StrEncoding (AE2ERatchetParamsUri a) where
|
||||
strEncode (AE2ERatchetParamsUri _ ps) = strEncode ps
|
||||
strP = (\(AnyE2ERatchetParamsUri s _ ps) -> (AE2ERatchetParamsUri s) <$> checkAlgorithm ps) <$?> strP
|
||||
|
||||
instance StrEncoding AnyE2ERatchetParamsUri where
|
||||
strEncode (AnyE2ERatchetParamsUri _ _ ps) = strEncode ps
|
||||
strP = do
|
||||
query <- strP
|
||||
vs <- queryParam "v" query
|
||||
vr :: VersionRange <- queryParam "v" query
|
||||
keys <- L.toList <$> queryParam "x3dh" query
|
||||
case keys of
|
||||
[key1, key2] -> pure $ E2ERatchetParamsUri vs key1 key2
|
||||
[APublicDhKey a k1, APublicDhKey a' k2] -> case testEquality a a' of
|
||||
Nothing -> fail "bad e2e params: different key algorithms"
|
||||
Just Refl ->
|
||||
kemP vr query >>= \case
|
||||
Just (ARKP s kem) -> pure $ AnyE2ERatchetParamsUri s a $ E2ERatchetParamsUri vr k1 k2 (Just kem)
|
||||
Nothing -> pure $ AnyE2ERatchetParamsUri SRKSProposed a $ E2ERatchetParamsUri vr k1 k2 Nothing
|
||||
_ -> fail "bad e2e params"
|
||||
where
|
||||
kemP vr query
|
||||
| maxVersion vr >= pqRatchetVersion =
|
||||
queryParam_ "kem_key" query
|
||||
$>>= \k -> (Just . kemParams k <$> queryParam_ "kem_ct" query)
|
||||
| otherwise = pure Nothing
|
||||
kemParams k = \case
|
||||
Nothing -> ARKP SRKSProposed $ RKParamsProposed k
|
||||
Just ct -> ARKP SRKSAccepted $ RKParamsAccepted ct k
|
||||
|
||||
generateE2EParams :: (AlgorithmI a, DhAlgorithm a) => TVar ChaChaDRG -> Version -> STM (PrivateKey a, PrivateKey a, E2ERatchetParams a)
|
||||
generateE2EParams g v = do
|
||||
(k1, pk1) <- generateKeyPair g
|
||||
(k2, pk2) <- generateKeyPair g
|
||||
pure (pk1, pk2, E2ERatchetParams v k1 k2)
|
||||
type RcvE2ERatchetParams a = E2ERatchetParams 'RKSProposed a
|
||||
|
||||
type SndE2ERatchetParams a = AE2ERatchetParams a
|
||||
|
||||
data PrivRKEMParams (s :: RatchetKEMState) where
|
||||
PrivateRKParamsProposed :: KEMKeyPair -> PrivRKEMParams 'RKSProposed
|
||||
PrivateRKParamsAccepted :: KEMCiphertext -> KEMSharedKey -> KEMKeyPair -> PrivRKEMParams 'RKSAccepted
|
||||
|
||||
data APrivRKEMParams = forall s. RatchetKEMStateI s => APRKP (SRatchetKEMState s) (PrivRKEMParams s)
|
||||
|
||||
type RcvPrivRKEMParams = PrivRKEMParams 'RKSProposed
|
||||
|
||||
instance RatchetKEMStateI s => Encoding (PrivRKEMParams s) where
|
||||
smpEncode = \case
|
||||
PrivateRKParamsProposed k -> smpEncode ('P', k)
|
||||
PrivateRKParamsAccepted ct shared k -> smpEncode ('A', ct, shared, k)
|
||||
smpP = (\(APRKP _ ps) -> checkRatchetKEMState' ps) <$?> smpP
|
||||
|
||||
instance Encoding (APrivRKEMParams) where
|
||||
smpEncode (APRKP _ ps) = smpEncode ps
|
||||
smpP =
|
||||
smpP >>= \case
|
||||
'P' -> APRKP SRKSProposed . PrivateRKParamsProposed <$> smpP
|
||||
'A' -> APRKP SRKSAccepted .:. PrivateRKParamsAccepted <$> smpP <*> smpP <*> smpP
|
||||
_ -> fail "bad APrivRKEMParams"
|
||||
|
||||
instance RatchetKEMStateI s => ToField (PrivRKEMParams s) where toField = toField . smpEncode
|
||||
|
||||
instance (Typeable s, RatchetKEMStateI s) => FromField (PrivRKEMParams s) where fromField = blobFieldDecoder smpDecode
|
||||
|
||||
data UseKEM (s :: RatchetKEMState) where
|
||||
ProposeKEM :: UseKEM 'RKSProposed
|
||||
AcceptKEM :: KEMPublicKey -> UseKEM 'RKSAccepted
|
||||
|
||||
data AUseKEM = forall s. RatchetKEMStateI s => AUseKEM (SRatchetKEMState s) (UseKEM s)
|
||||
|
||||
generateE2EParams :: forall s a. (AlgorithmI a, DhAlgorithm a) => TVar ChaChaDRG -> Version -> Maybe (UseKEM s) -> IO (PrivateKey a, PrivateKey a, Maybe (PrivRKEMParams s), E2ERatchetParams s a)
|
||||
generateE2EParams g v useKEM_ = do
|
||||
(k1, pk1) <- atomically $ generateKeyPair g
|
||||
(k2, pk2) <- atomically $ generateKeyPair g
|
||||
kems <- kemParams
|
||||
pure (pk1, pk2, snd <$> kems, E2ERatchetParams v k1 k2 (fst <$> kems))
|
||||
where
|
||||
kemParams :: IO (Maybe (RKEMParams s, PrivRKEMParams s))
|
||||
kemParams = case useKEM_ of
|
||||
Just useKem | v >= pqRatchetVersion -> Just <$> do
|
||||
ks@(k, _) <- sntrup761Keypair g
|
||||
case useKem of
|
||||
ProposeKEM -> pure (RKParamsProposed k, PrivateRKParamsProposed ks)
|
||||
AcceptKEM k' -> do
|
||||
(ct, shared) <- sntrup761Enc g k'
|
||||
pure (RKParamsAccepted ct k, PrivateRKParamsAccepted ct shared ks)
|
||||
_ -> pure Nothing
|
||||
|
||||
-- used by party initiating connection, Bob in double-ratchet spec
|
||||
generateRcvE2EParams :: (AlgorithmI a, DhAlgorithm a) => TVar ChaChaDRG -> Version -> PQEncryption -> IO (PrivateKey a, PrivateKey a, Maybe (PrivRKEMParams 'RKSProposed), E2ERatchetParams 'RKSProposed a)
|
||||
generateRcvE2EParams g v = generateE2EParams g v . proposeKEM_
|
||||
where
|
||||
proposeKEM_ :: PQEncryption -> Maybe (UseKEM 'RKSProposed)
|
||||
proposeKEM_ = \case
|
||||
PQEncOn -> Just ProposeKEM
|
||||
PQEncOff -> Nothing
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
-- used by party accepting connection, Alice in double-ratchet spec
|
||||
generateSndE2EParams :: forall a. (AlgorithmI a, DhAlgorithm a) => TVar ChaChaDRG -> Version -> Maybe AUseKEM -> IO (PrivateKey a, PrivateKey a, Maybe APrivRKEMParams, AE2ERatchetParams a)
|
||||
generateSndE2EParams g v = \case
|
||||
Nothing -> do
|
||||
(pk1, pk2, _, e2eParams) <- generateE2EParams g v Nothing
|
||||
pure (pk1, pk2, Nothing, AE2ERatchetParams SRKSProposed e2eParams)
|
||||
Just (AUseKEM s useKEM) -> do
|
||||
(pk1, pk2, pKem, e2eParams) <- generateE2EParams g v (Just useKEM)
|
||||
pure (pk1, pk2, APRKP s <$> pKem, AE2ERatchetParams s e2eParams)
|
||||
|
||||
data RatchetInitParams = RatchetInitParams
|
||||
{ assocData :: Str,
|
||||
ratchetKey :: RatchetKey,
|
||||
sndHK :: HeaderKey,
|
||||
rcvNextHK :: HeaderKey
|
||||
rcvNextHK :: HeaderKey,
|
||||
kemAccepted :: Maybe RatchetKEMAccepted
|
||||
}
|
||||
deriving (Eq, Show)
|
||||
deriving (Show)
|
||||
|
||||
x3dhSnd :: DhAlgorithm a => PrivateKey a -> PrivateKey a -> E2ERatchetParams a -> RatchetInitParams
|
||||
x3dhSnd spk1 spk2 (E2ERatchetParams _ rk1 rk2) =
|
||||
x3dh (publicKey spk1, rk1) (dh' rk1 spk2) (dh' rk2 spk1) (dh' rk2 spk2)
|
||||
-- this is used by the peer joining the connection
|
||||
pqX3dhSnd :: DhAlgorithm a => PrivateKey a -> PrivateKey a -> Maybe APrivRKEMParams -> E2ERatchetParams 'RKSProposed a -> Either CryptoError (RatchetInitParams, Maybe KEMKeyPair)
|
||||
-- 3. replied 2. received
|
||||
pqX3dhSnd spk1 spk2 spKem_ (E2ERatchetParams v rk1 rk2 rKem_) = do
|
||||
(ks_, kem_) <- sndPq
|
||||
let initParams = pqX3dh (publicKey spk1, rk1) (dh' rk1 spk2) (dh' rk2 spk1) (dh' rk2 spk2) kem_
|
||||
pure (initParams, ks_)
|
||||
where
|
||||
sndPq :: Either CryptoError (Maybe KEMKeyPair, Maybe RatchetKEMAccepted)
|
||||
sndPq = case spKem_ of
|
||||
Just (APRKP _ ps) | v >= pqRatchetVersion -> case (ps, rKem_) of
|
||||
(PrivateRKParamsAccepted ct shared ks, Just (RKParamsProposed k)) -> Right (Just ks, Just $ RatchetKEMAccepted k shared ct)
|
||||
(PrivateRKParamsProposed ks, _) -> Right (Just ks, Nothing) -- both parties can send "proposal" in case of ratchet renegotiation
|
||||
_ -> Left CERatchetKEMState
|
||||
_ -> Right (Nothing, Nothing)
|
||||
|
||||
x3dhRcv :: DhAlgorithm a => PrivateKey a -> PrivateKey a -> E2ERatchetParams a -> RatchetInitParams
|
||||
x3dhRcv rpk1 rpk2 (E2ERatchetParams _ sk1 sk2) =
|
||||
x3dh (sk1, publicKey rpk1) (dh' sk2 rpk1) (dh' sk1 rpk2) (dh' sk2 rpk2)
|
||||
-- this is used by the peer that created new connection, after receiving the reply
|
||||
pqX3dhRcv :: forall s a. (RatchetKEMStateI s, DhAlgorithm a) => PrivateKey a -> PrivateKey a -> Maybe (PrivRKEMParams 'RKSProposed) -> E2ERatchetParams s a -> ExceptT CryptoError IO (RatchetInitParams, Maybe KEMKeyPair)
|
||||
-- 1. sent 4. received in reply
|
||||
pqX3dhRcv rpk1 rpk2 rpKem_ (E2ERatchetParams v sk1 sk2 sKem_) = do
|
||||
kem_ <- rcvPq
|
||||
let initParams = pqX3dh (sk1, publicKey rpk1) (dh' sk2 rpk1) (dh' sk1 rpk2) (dh' sk2 rpk2) (snd <$> kem_)
|
||||
pure (initParams, fst <$> kem_)
|
||||
where
|
||||
rcvPq :: ExceptT CryptoError IO (Maybe (KEMKeyPair, RatchetKEMAccepted))
|
||||
rcvPq = case sKem_ of
|
||||
Just (RKParamsAccepted ct k') | v >= pqRatchetVersion -> case rpKem_ of
|
||||
Just (PrivateRKParamsProposed ks@(_, pk)) -> do
|
||||
shared <- liftIO $ sntrup761Dec ct pk
|
||||
pure $ Just (ks, RatchetKEMAccepted k' shared ct)
|
||||
Nothing -> throwError CERatchetKEMState
|
||||
_ -> pure Nothing -- both parties can send "proposal" in case of ratchet renegotiation
|
||||
|
||||
x3dh :: DhAlgorithm a => (PublicKey a, PublicKey a) -> DhSecret a -> DhSecret a -> DhSecret a -> RatchetInitParams
|
||||
x3dh (sk1, rk1) dh1 dh2 dh3 =
|
||||
RatchetInitParams {assocData, ratchetKey = RatchetKey sk, sndHK = Key hk, rcvNextHK = Key nhk}
|
||||
pqX3dh :: DhAlgorithm a => (PublicKey a, PublicKey a) -> DhSecret a -> DhSecret a -> DhSecret a -> Maybe RatchetKEMAccepted -> RatchetInitParams
|
||||
pqX3dh (sk1, rk1) dh1 dh2 dh3 kemAccepted =
|
||||
RatchetInitParams {assocData, ratchetKey = RatchetKey sk, sndHK = Key hk, rcvNextHK = Key nhk, kemAccepted}
|
||||
where
|
||||
assocData = Str $ pubKeyBytes sk1 <> pubKeyBytes rk1
|
||||
dhs = dhBytes' dh1 <> dhBytes' dh2 <> dhBytes' dh3
|
||||
dhs = dhBytes' dh1 <> dhBytes' dh2 <> dhBytes' dh3 <> pq
|
||||
pq = maybe "" (\RatchetKEMAccepted {rcPQRss = KEMSharedKey ss} -> BA.convert ss) kemAccepted
|
||||
(hk, nhk, sk) =
|
||||
let salt = B.replicate 64 '\0'
|
||||
in hkdf3 salt dhs "SimpleXX3DH"
|
||||
@@ -129,6 +389,11 @@ data Ratchet a = Ratchet
|
||||
-- associated data - must be the same in both parties ratchets
|
||||
rcAD :: Str,
|
||||
rcDHRs :: PrivateKey a,
|
||||
rcKEM :: Maybe RatchetKEM,
|
||||
-- TODO PQ make them optional via JSON parser for PQEncryption
|
||||
rcEnableKEM :: PQEncryption, -- will enable KEM on the next ratchet step
|
||||
rcSndKEM :: PQEncryption, -- used KEM hybrid secret for sending ratchet
|
||||
rcRcvKEM :: PQEncryption, -- used KEM hybrid secret for receiving ratchet
|
||||
rcRK :: RatchetKey,
|
||||
rcSnd :: Maybe (SndRatchet a),
|
||||
rcRcv :: Maybe RcvRatchet,
|
||||
@@ -138,20 +403,33 @@ data Ratchet a = Ratchet
|
||||
rcNHKs :: HeaderKey,
|
||||
rcNHKr :: HeaderKey
|
||||
}
|
||||
deriving (Eq, Show)
|
||||
deriving (Show)
|
||||
|
||||
data SndRatchet a = SndRatchet
|
||||
{ rcDHRr :: PublicKey a,
|
||||
rcCKs :: RatchetKey,
|
||||
rcHKs :: HeaderKey
|
||||
}
|
||||
deriving (Eq, Show)
|
||||
deriving (Show)
|
||||
|
||||
data RcvRatchet = RcvRatchet
|
||||
{ rcCKr :: RatchetKey,
|
||||
rcHKr :: HeaderKey
|
||||
}
|
||||
deriving (Eq, Show)
|
||||
deriving (Show)
|
||||
|
||||
data RatchetKEM = RatchetKEM
|
||||
{ rcPQRs :: KEMKeyPair,
|
||||
rcKEMs :: Maybe RatchetKEMAccepted
|
||||
}
|
||||
deriving (Show)
|
||||
|
||||
data RatchetKEMAccepted = RatchetKEMAccepted
|
||||
{ rcPQRr :: KEMPublicKey, -- received key
|
||||
rcPQRss :: KEMSharedKey, -- computed shared secret
|
||||
rcPQRct :: KEMCiphertext -- sent encaps(rcPQRr, rcPQRss)
|
||||
}
|
||||
deriving (Show)
|
||||
|
||||
type SkippedMsgKeys = Map HeaderKey SkippedHdrMsgKeys
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -189,7 +467,7 @@ instance Encoding MessageKey where
|
||||
|
||||
-- | Input key material for double ratchet HKDF functions
|
||||
newtype RatchetKey = RatchetKey ByteString
|
||||
deriving (Eq, Show)
|
||||
deriving (Show)
|
||||
|
||||
instance ToJSON RatchetKey where
|
||||
toJSON (RatchetKey k) = strToJSON k
|
||||
@@ -202,19 +480,32 @@ instance ToField MessageKey where toField = toField . smpEncode
|
||||
|
||||
instance FromField MessageKey where fromField = blobFieldDecoder smpDecode
|
||||
|
||||
-- | Sending ratchet initialization, equivalent to RatchetInitAliceHE in double ratchet spec
|
||||
-- | Sending ratchet initialization
|
||||
--
|
||||
-- Please note that sPKey is not stored, and its public part together with random salt
|
||||
-- is sent to the recipient.
|
||||
-- @
|
||||
-- RatchetInitAlicePQ2HE(state, SK, bob_dh_public_key, shared_hka, shared_nhkb, bob_pq_kem_encapsulation_key)
|
||||
-- // below added for post-quantum KEM
|
||||
-- state.PQRs = GENERATE_PQKEM()
|
||||
-- state.PQRr = bob_pq_kem_encapsulation_key
|
||||
-- state.PQRss = random // shared secret for KEM
|
||||
-- state.PQRct = PQKEM-ENC(state.PQRr, state.PQRss) // encapsulated additional shared secret
|
||||
-- // above added for KEM
|
||||
-- @
|
||||
initSndRatchet ::
|
||||
forall a. (AlgorithmI a, DhAlgorithm a) => VersionRange -> PublicKey a -> PrivateKey a -> RatchetInitParams -> Ratchet a
|
||||
initSndRatchet rcVersion rcDHRr rcDHRs RatchetInitParams {assocData, ratchetKey, sndHK, rcvNextHK} = do
|
||||
-- state.RK, state.CKs, state.NHKs = KDF_RK_HE(SK, DH(state.DHRs, state.DHRr))
|
||||
let (rcRK, rcCKs, rcNHKs) = rootKdf ratchetKey rcDHRr rcDHRs
|
||||
forall a. (AlgorithmI a, DhAlgorithm a) => VersionRange -> PublicKey a -> PrivateKey a -> (RatchetInitParams, Maybe KEMKeyPair) -> Ratchet a
|
||||
initSndRatchet rcVersion rcDHRr rcDHRs (RatchetInitParams {assocData, ratchetKey, sndHK, rcvNextHK, kemAccepted}, rcPQRs_) = do
|
||||
-- state.RK, state.CKs, state.NHKs = KDF_RK_HE(SK, DH(state.DHRs, state.DHRr) || state.PQRss)
|
||||
let (rcRK, rcCKs, rcNHKs) = rootKdf ratchetKey rcDHRr rcDHRs (rcPQRss <$> kemAccepted)
|
||||
in Ratchet
|
||||
{ rcVersion,
|
||||
rcAD = assocData,
|
||||
rcDHRs,
|
||||
rcKEM = (`RatchetKEM` kemAccepted) <$> rcPQRs_,
|
||||
rcEnableKEM = PQEncryption $ isJust rcPQRs_,
|
||||
rcSndKEM = PQEncryption $ isJust kemAccepted,
|
||||
rcRcvKEM = PQEncOff,
|
||||
rcRK,
|
||||
rcSnd = Just SndRatchet {rcDHRr, rcCKs, rcHKs = sndHK},
|
||||
rcRcv = Nothing,
|
||||
@@ -225,17 +516,28 @@ initSndRatchet rcVersion rcDHRr rcDHRs RatchetInitParams {assocData, ratchetKey,
|
||||
rcNHKr = rcvNextHK
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
-- | Receiving ratchet initialization, equivalent to RatchetInitBobHE in double ratchet spec
|
||||
-- | Receiving ratchet initialization, equivalent to RatchetInitBobPQ2HE in double ratchet spec
|
||||
--
|
||||
-- def RatchetInitBobPQ2HE(state, SK, bob_dh_key_pair, shared_hka, shared_nhkb, bob_pq_kem_key_pair)
|
||||
--
|
||||
-- Please note that the public part of rcDHRs was sent to the sender
|
||||
-- as part of the connection request and random salt was received from the sender.
|
||||
initRcvRatchet ::
|
||||
forall a. (AlgorithmI a, DhAlgorithm a) => VersionRange -> PrivateKey a -> RatchetInitParams -> Ratchet a
|
||||
initRcvRatchet rcVersion rcDHRs RatchetInitParams {assocData, ratchetKey, sndHK, rcvNextHK} =
|
||||
forall a. (AlgorithmI a, DhAlgorithm a) => VersionRange -> PrivateKey a -> (RatchetInitParams, Maybe KEMKeyPair) -> PQEncryption -> Ratchet a
|
||||
initRcvRatchet rcVersion rcDHRs (RatchetInitParams {assocData, ratchetKey, sndHK, rcvNextHK, kemAccepted}, rcPQRs_) rcEnableKEM =
|
||||
Ratchet
|
||||
{ rcVersion,
|
||||
rcAD = assocData,
|
||||
rcDHRs,
|
||||
-- rcKEM:
|
||||
-- state.PQRs = bob_pq_kem_key_pair
|
||||
-- state.PQRr = None
|
||||
-- state.PQRss = None
|
||||
-- state.PQRct = None
|
||||
rcKEM = (`RatchetKEM` kemAccepted) <$> rcPQRs_,
|
||||
rcEnableKEM,
|
||||
rcSndKEM = PQEncOff,
|
||||
rcRcvKEM = PQEncOff,
|
||||
rcRK = ratchetKey,
|
||||
rcSnd = Nothing,
|
||||
rcRcv = Nothing,
|
||||
@@ -246,14 +548,17 @@ initRcvRatchet rcVersion rcDHRs RatchetInitParams {assocData, ratchetKey, sndHK,
|
||||
rcNHKr = sndHK
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
-- encaps = state.PQRs.encaps, // added for KEM #2
|
||||
-- ct = state.PQRct // added for KEM #1
|
||||
data MsgHeader a = MsgHeader
|
||||
{ -- | max supported ratchet version
|
||||
msgMaxVersion :: Version,
|
||||
msgDHRs :: PublicKey a,
|
||||
msgKEM :: Maybe ARKEMParams,
|
||||
msgPN :: Word32,
|
||||
msgNs :: Word32
|
||||
}
|
||||
deriving (Eq, Show)
|
||||
deriving (Show)
|
||||
|
||||
data AMsgHeader
|
||||
= forall a.
|
||||
@@ -262,8 +567,10 @@ data AMsgHeader
|
||||
|
||||
-- to allow extension without increasing the size, the actual header length is:
|
||||
-- 69 = 2 (original size) + 2 + 1+56 (Curve448) + 4 + 4
|
||||
-- TODO PQ this must be version-dependent
|
||||
-- TODO this is the exact size, some reserve should be added
|
||||
paddedHeaderLen :: Int
|
||||
paddedHeaderLen = 88
|
||||
paddedHeaderLen = 2284
|
||||
|
||||
-- only used in tests to validate correct padding
|
||||
-- (2 bytes - version size, 1 byte - header size, not to have it fixed or version-dependent)
|
||||
@@ -271,14 +578,16 @@ fullHeaderLen :: Int
|
||||
fullHeaderLen = 2 + 1 + paddedHeaderLen + authTagSize + ivSize @AES256
|
||||
|
||||
instance AlgorithmI a => Encoding (MsgHeader a) where
|
||||
smpEncode MsgHeader {msgMaxVersion, msgDHRs, msgPN, msgNs} =
|
||||
smpEncode (msgMaxVersion, msgDHRs, msgPN, msgNs)
|
||||
smpEncode MsgHeader {msgMaxVersion, msgDHRs, msgKEM, msgPN, msgNs}
|
||||
| msgMaxVersion >= pqRatchetVersion = smpEncode (msgMaxVersion, msgDHRs, msgKEM, msgPN, msgNs)
|
||||
| otherwise = smpEncode (msgMaxVersion, msgDHRs, msgPN, msgNs)
|
||||
smpP = do
|
||||
msgMaxVersion <- smpP
|
||||
msgDHRs <- smpP
|
||||
msgKEM <- if msgMaxVersion >= pqRatchetVersion then smpP else pure Nothing
|
||||
msgPN <- smpP
|
||||
msgNs <- smpP
|
||||
pure MsgHeader {msgMaxVersion, msgDHRs, msgPN, msgNs}
|
||||
pure MsgHeader {msgMaxVersion, msgDHRs, msgKEM, msgPN, msgNs}
|
||||
|
||||
data EncMessageHeader = EncMessageHeader
|
||||
{ ehVersion :: Version,
|
||||
@@ -288,10 +597,12 @@ data EncMessageHeader = EncMessageHeader
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
instance Encoding EncMessageHeader where
|
||||
smpEncode EncMessageHeader {ehVersion, ehIV, ehAuthTag, ehBody} =
|
||||
smpEncode (ehVersion, ehIV, ehAuthTag, ehBody)
|
||||
smpEncode EncMessageHeader {ehVersion, ehIV, ehAuthTag, ehBody}
|
||||
| ehVersion >= pqRatchetVersion = smpEncode (ehVersion, ehIV, ehAuthTag, Large ehBody)
|
||||
| otherwise = smpEncode (ehVersion, ehIV, ehAuthTag, ehBody)
|
||||
smpP = do
|
||||
(ehVersion, ehIV, ehAuthTag, ehBody) <- smpP
|
||||
(ehVersion, ehIV, ehAuthTag) <- smpP
|
||||
ehBody <- if ehVersion >= pqRatchetVersion then unLarge <$> smpP else smpP
|
||||
pure EncMessageHeader {ehVersion, ehIV, ehAuthTag, ehBody}
|
||||
|
||||
data EncRatchetMessage = EncRatchetMessage
|
||||
@@ -300,37 +611,123 @@ data EncRatchetMessage = EncRatchetMessage
|
||||
emBody :: ByteString
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
instance Encoding EncRatchetMessage where
|
||||
smpEncode EncRatchetMessage {emHeader, emBody, emAuthTag} =
|
||||
smpEncode (emHeader, emAuthTag, Tail emBody)
|
||||
smpP = do
|
||||
(emHeader, emAuthTag, Tail emBody) <- smpP
|
||||
pure EncRatchetMessage {emHeader, emBody, emAuthTag}
|
||||
encodeEncRatchetMessage :: Version -> EncRatchetMessage -> ByteString
|
||||
encodeEncRatchetMessage v EncRatchetMessage {emHeader, emBody, emAuthTag}
|
||||
| v >= pqRatchetVersion = smpEncode (Large emHeader, emAuthTag, Tail emBody)
|
||||
| otherwise = smpEncode (emHeader, emAuthTag, Tail emBody)
|
||||
|
||||
rcEncrypt :: AlgorithmI a => Ratchet a -> Int -> ByteString -> ExceptT CryptoError IO (ByteString, Ratchet a)
|
||||
rcEncrypt Ratchet {rcSnd = Nothing} _ _ = throwE CERatchetState
|
||||
rcEncrypt rc@Ratchet {rcSnd = Just sr@SndRatchet {rcCKs, rcHKs}, rcDHRs, rcNs, rcPN, rcAD = Str rcAD, rcVersion} paddedMsgLen msg = do
|
||||
encRatchetMessageP :: Version -> Parser EncRatchetMessage
|
||||
encRatchetMessageP v = do
|
||||
emHeader <- if v >= pqRatchetVersion then unLarge <$> smpP else smpP
|
||||
(emAuthTag, Tail emBody) <- smpP
|
||||
pure EncRatchetMessage {emHeader, emBody, emAuthTag}
|
||||
|
||||
newtype PQEncryption = PQEncryption {enablePQ :: Bool}
|
||||
deriving (Eq, Show)
|
||||
|
||||
pattern PQEncOn :: PQEncryption
|
||||
pattern PQEncOn = PQEncryption True
|
||||
|
||||
pattern PQEncOff :: PQEncryption
|
||||
pattern PQEncOff = PQEncryption False
|
||||
|
||||
{-# COMPLETE PQEncOn, PQEncOff #-}
|
||||
|
||||
instance ToJSON PQEncryption where
|
||||
toEncoding (PQEncryption pq) = toEncoding pq
|
||||
toJSON (PQEncryption pq) = toJSON pq
|
||||
|
||||
instance FromJSON PQEncryption where
|
||||
parseJSON v = PQEncryption <$> parseJSON v
|
||||
|
||||
replyKEM_ :: PQEncryption -> Maybe (RKEMParams 'RKSProposed) -> Maybe AUseKEM
|
||||
replyKEM_ pqEnc kem_ = case pqEnc of
|
||||
PQEncOn -> Just $ case kem_ of
|
||||
Just (RKParamsProposed k) -> AUseKEM SRKSAccepted $ AcceptKEM k
|
||||
Nothing -> AUseKEM SRKSProposed ProposeKEM
|
||||
PQEncOff -> Nothing
|
||||
|
||||
instance StrEncoding PQEncryption where
|
||||
strEncode pqMode
|
||||
| enablePQ pqMode = "pq=enable"
|
||||
| otherwise = "pq=disable"
|
||||
strP =
|
||||
A.takeTill (== ' ') >>= \case
|
||||
"pq=enable" -> pq True
|
||||
"pq=disable" -> pq False
|
||||
_ -> fail "bad PQEncryption"
|
||||
where
|
||||
pq = pure . PQEncryption
|
||||
|
||||
data InitialKeys = IKUsePQ | IKNoPQ PQEncryption
|
||||
deriving (Eq, Show)
|
||||
|
||||
instance StrEncoding InitialKeys where
|
||||
strEncode = \case
|
||||
IKUsePQ -> "pq=invitation"
|
||||
IKNoPQ pq -> strEncode pq
|
||||
strP = IKNoPQ <$> strP <|> "pq=invitation" $> IKUsePQ
|
||||
|
||||
-- determines whether PQ key should be included in invitation link
|
||||
initialPQEncryption :: InitialKeys -> PQEncryption
|
||||
initialPQEncryption = \case
|
||||
IKUsePQ -> PQEncOn
|
||||
IKNoPQ _ -> PQEncOff -- default
|
||||
|
||||
-- determines whether PQ encryption should be used in connection
|
||||
connPQEncryption :: InitialKeys -> PQEncryption
|
||||
connPQEncryption = \case
|
||||
IKUsePQ -> PQEncOn
|
||||
IKNoPQ pq -> pq -- default for creating connection is IKNoPQ PQEncOn
|
||||
|
||||
-- determines whether PQ key should be included in invitation link sent to contact address
|
||||
joinContactInitialKeys :: PQEncryption -> InitialKeys
|
||||
joinContactInitialKeys = \case
|
||||
PQEncOn -> IKUsePQ -- default
|
||||
PQEncOff -> IKNoPQ PQEncOff
|
||||
|
||||
rcEncrypt :: AlgorithmI a => Ratchet a -> Int -> ByteString -> Maybe PQEncryption -> ExceptT CryptoError IO (ByteString, Ratchet a)
|
||||
rcEncrypt Ratchet {rcSnd = Nothing} _ _ _ = throwE CERatchetState
|
||||
rcEncrypt rc@Ratchet {rcSnd = Just sr@SndRatchet {rcCKs, rcHKs}, rcDHRs, rcKEM, rcNs, rcPN, rcAD = Str rcAD, rcVersion} paddedMsgLen msg pqMode_ = do
|
||||
-- state.CKs, mk = KDF_CK(state.CKs)
|
||||
let (ck', mk, iv, ehIV) = chainKdf rcCKs
|
||||
-- enc_header = HENCRYPT(state.HKs, header)
|
||||
(ehAuthTag, ehBody) <- encryptAEAD rcHKs ehIV paddedHeaderLen rcAD msgHeader
|
||||
-- return enc_header, ENCRYPT(mk, plaintext, CONCAT(AD, enc_header))
|
||||
let emHeader = smpEncode EncMessageHeader {ehVersion = minVersion rcVersion, ehBody, ehAuthTag, ehIV}
|
||||
-- TODO PQ versioning in Ratchet should change somehow
|
||||
let emHeader = smpEncode EncMessageHeader {ehVersion = maxVersion rcVersion, ehBody, ehAuthTag, ehIV}
|
||||
(emAuthTag, emBody) <- encryptAEAD mk iv paddedMsgLen (rcAD <> emHeader) msg
|
||||
let msg' = smpEncode EncRatchetMessage {emHeader, emBody, emAuthTag}
|
||||
let msg' = encodeEncRatchetMessage (maxVersion rcVersion) EncRatchetMessage {emHeader, emBody, emAuthTag}
|
||||
-- state.Ns += 1
|
||||
rc' = rc {rcSnd = Just sr {rcCKs = ck'}, rcNs = rcNs + 1}
|
||||
pure (msg', rc')
|
||||
rc'' = case pqMode_ of
|
||||
Nothing -> rc'
|
||||
Just rcEnableKEM
|
||||
| enablePQ rcEnableKEM -> rc' {rcEnableKEM}
|
||||
| otherwise ->
|
||||
let rcKEM' = (\rck -> rck {rcKEMs = Nothing}) <$> rcKEM
|
||||
in rc' {rcEnableKEM, rcKEM = rcKEM'}
|
||||
pure (msg', rc'')
|
||||
where
|
||||
-- header = HEADER(state.DHRs, state.PN, state.Ns)
|
||||
-- header = HEADER_PQ2(
|
||||
-- dh = state.DHRs.public,
|
||||
-- kem = state.PQRs.public, // added for KEM #2
|
||||
-- ct = state.PQRct, // added for KEM #1
|
||||
-- pn = state.PN,
|
||||
-- n = state.Ns
|
||||
-- )
|
||||
msgHeader =
|
||||
smpEncode
|
||||
MsgHeader
|
||||
{ msgMaxVersion = maxVersion rcVersion,
|
||||
msgDHRs = publicKey rcDHRs,
|
||||
msgKEM = msgKEMParams <$> rcKEM,
|
||||
msgPN = rcPN,
|
||||
msgNs = rcNs
|
||||
}
|
||||
msgKEMParams RatchetKEM {rcPQRs = (k, _), rcKEMs} = case rcKEMs of
|
||||
Nothing -> ARKP SRKSProposed $ RKParamsProposed k
|
||||
Just RatchetKEMAccepted {rcPQRct} -> ARKP SRKSAccepted $ RKParamsAccepted rcPQRct k
|
||||
|
||||
data SkippedMessage a
|
||||
= SMMessage (DecryptResult a)
|
||||
@@ -338,7 +735,7 @@ data SkippedMessage a
|
||||
| SMNone
|
||||
|
||||
data RatchetStep = AdvanceRatchet | SameRatchet
|
||||
deriving (Eq)
|
||||
deriving (Eq, Show)
|
||||
|
||||
type DecryptResult a = (Either CryptoError ByteString, Ratchet a, SkippedMsgDiff)
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -353,8 +750,9 @@ rcDecrypt ::
|
||||
SkippedMsgKeys ->
|
||||
ByteString ->
|
||||
ExceptT CryptoError IO (DecryptResult a)
|
||||
rcDecrypt g rc@Ratchet {rcRcv, rcAD = Str rcAD} rcMKSkipped msg' = do
|
||||
encMsg@EncRatchetMessage {emHeader} <- parseE CryptoHeaderError smpP msg'
|
||||
rcDecrypt g rc@Ratchet {rcRcv, rcAD = Str rcAD, rcVersion} rcMKSkipped msg' = do
|
||||
-- TODO PQ versioning should change
|
||||
encMsg@EncRatchetMessage {emHeader} <- parseE CryptoHeaderError (encRatchetMessageP $ maxVersion rcVersion) msg'
|
||||
encHdr <- parseE CryptoHeaderError smpP emHeader
|
||||
-- plaintext = TrySkippedMessageKeysHE(state, enc_header, cipher-text, AD)
|
||||
decryptSkipped encHdr encMsg >>= \case
|
||||
@@ -368,7 +766,7 @@ rcDecrypt g rc@Ratchet {rcRcv, rcAD = Str rcAD} rcMKSkipped msg' = do
|
||||
SMMessage r -> pure r
|
||||
where
|
||||
decryptRcMessage :: RatchetStep -> MsgHeader a -> EncRatchetMessage -> ExceptT CryptoError IO (DecryptResult a)
|
||||
decryptRcMessage rcStep MsgHeader {msgDHRs, msgPN, msgNs} encMsg = do
|
||||
decryptRcMessage rcStep MsgHeader {msgDHRs, msgKEM, msgPN, msgNs} encMsg = do
|
||||
-- if dh_ratchet:
|
||||
(rc', smks1) <- ratchetStep rcStep
|
||||
case skipMessageKeys msgNs rc' of
|
||||
@@ -392,15 +790,23 @@ rcDecrypt g rc@Ratchet {rcRcv, rcAD = Str rcAD} rcMKSkipped msg' = do
|
||||
case skipMessageKeys msgPN rc of
|
||||
Left e -> throwE e
|
||||
Right (rc'@Ratchet {rcDHRs, rcRK, rcNHKs, rcNHKr}, hmks) -> do
|
||||
-- DHRatchetHE(state, header)
|
||||
-- DHRatchetPQ2HE(state, header)
|
||||
(kemSS, kemSS', rcKEM') <- pqRatchetStep rc' msgKEM
|
||||
-- state.DHRs = GENERATE_DH()
|
||||
(_, rcDHRs') <- atomically $ generateKeyPair @a g
|
||||
-- state.RK, state.CKr, state.NHKr = KDF_RK_HE(state.RK, DH(state.DHRs, state.DHRr))
|
||||
let (rcRK', rcCKr', rcNHKr') = rootKdf rcRK msgDHRs rcDHRs
|
||||
-- state.RK, state.CKs, state.NHKs = KDF_RK_HE(state.RK, DH(state.DHRs, state.DHRr))
|
||||
(rcRK'', rcCKs', rcNHKs') = rootKdf rcRK' msgDHRs rcDHRs'
|
||||
-- state.RK, state.CKr, state.NHKr = KDF_RK_HE(state.RK, DH(state.DHRs, state.DHRr) || ss)
|
||||
let (rcRK', rcCKr', rcNHKr') = rootKdf rcRK msgDHRs rcDHRs kemSS
|
||||
-- state.RK, state.CKs, state.NHKs = KDF_RK_HE(state.RK, DH(state.DHRs, state.DHRr) || state.PQRss)
|
||||
(rcRK'', rcCKs', rcNHKs') = rootKdf rcRK' msgDHRs rcDHRs' kemSS'
|
||||
sndKEM = isJust kemSS'
|
||||
rcvKEM = isJust kemSS
|
||||
rc'' =
|
||||
rc'
|
||||
{ rcDHRs = rcDHRs',
|
||||
rcKEM = rcKEM',
|
||||
rcEnableKEM = PQEncryption $ sndKEM || rcvKEM,
|
||||
rcSndKEM = PQEncryption sndKEM,
|
||||
rcRcvKEM = PQEncryption rcvKEM,
|
||||
rcRK = rcRK'',
|
||||
rcSnd = Just SndRatchet {rcDHRr = msgDHRs, rcCKs = rcCKs', rcHKs = rcNHKs},
|
||||
rcRcv = Just RcvRatchet {rcCKr = rcCKr', rcHKr = rcNHKr},
|
||||
@@ -411,6 +817,39 @@ rcDecrypt g rc@Ratchet {rcRcv, rcAD = Str rcAD} rcMKSkipped msg' = do
|
||||
rcNHKr = rcNHKr'
|
||||
}
|
||||
pure (rc'', hmks)
|
||||
pqRatchetStep :: Ratchet a -> Maybe ARKEMParams -> ExceptT CryptoError IO (Maybe KEMSharedKey, Maybe KEMSharedKey, Maybe RatchetKEM)
|
||||
pqRatchetStep Ratchet {rcKEM, rcEnableKEM = PQEncryption pqEnc} = \case
|
||||
-- received message does not have KEM in header,
|
||||
-- but the user enabled KEM when sending previous message
|
||||
Nothing -> case rcKEM of
|
||||
Nothing | pqEnc -> do
|
||||
rcPQRs <- liftIO $ sntrup761Keypair g
|
||||
pure (Nothing, Nothing, Just RatchetKEM {rcPQRs, rcKEMs = Nothing})
|
||||
_ -> pure (Nothing, Nothing, Nothing)
|
||||
-- received message has KEM in header.
|
||||
Just (ARKP _ ps)
|
||||
| pqEnc -> do
|
||||
-- state.PQRr = header.kem
|
||||
(ss, rcPQRr) <- sharedSecret
|
||||
-- state.PQRct = PQKEM-ENC(state.PQRr, state.PQRss) // encapsulated additional shared secret KEM #1
|
||||
(rcPQRct, rcPQRss) <- liftIO $ sntrup761Enc g rcPQRr
|
||||
-- state.PQRs = GENERATE_PQKEM()
|
||||
rcPQRs <- liftIO $ sntrup761Keypair g
|
||||
let kem' = RatchetKEM {rcPQRs, rcKEMs = Just RatchetKEMAccepted {rcPQRr, rcPQRss, rcPQRct}}
|
||||
pure (ss, Just rcPQRss, Just kem')
|
||||
| otherwise -> do
|
||||
-- state.PQRr = header.kem
|
||||
(ss, _) <- sharedSecret
|
||||
pure (ss, Nothing, Nothing)
|
||||
where
|
||||
sharedSecret = case ps of
|
||||
RKParamsProposed k -> pure (Nothing, k)
|
||||
RKParamsAccepted ct k -> case rcKEM of
|
||||
Nothing -> throwE CERatchetKEMState
|
||||
-- ss = PQKEM-DEC(state.PQRs.private, header.ct)
|
||||
Just RatchetKEM {rcPQRs} -> do
|
||||
ss <- liftIO $ sntrup761Dec ct (snd rcPQRs)
|
||||
pure (Just ss, k)
|
||||
skipMessageKeys :: Word32 -> Ratchet a -> Either CryptoError (Ratchet a, SkippedMsgKeys)
|
||||
skipMessageKeys _ r@Ratchet {rcRcv = Nothing} = Right (r, M.empty)
|
||||
skipMessageKeys untilN r@Ratchet {rcRcv = Just rr@RcvRatchet {rcCKr, rcHKr}, rcNr}
|
||||
@@ -465,10 +904,13 @@ rcDecrypt g rc@Ratchet {rcRcv, rcAD = Str rcAD} rcMKSkipped msg' = do
|
||||
-- DECRYPT(mk, cipher-text, CONCAT(AD, enc_header))
|
||||
tryE $ decryptAEAD mk iv (rcAD <> emHeader) emBody emAuthTag
|
||||
|
||||
rootKdf :: (AlgorithmI a, DhAlgorithm a) => RatchetKey -> PublicKey a -> PrivateKey a -> (RatchetKey, RatchetKey, Key)
|
||||
rootKdf (RatchetKey rk) k pk =
|
||||
let dhOut = dhBytes' $ dh' k pk
|
||||
(rk', ck, nhk) = hkdf3 rk dhOut "SimpleXRootRatchet"
|
||||
rootKdf :: (AlgorithmI a, DhAlgorithm a) => RatchetKey -> PublicKey a -> PrivateKey a -> Maybe KEMSharedKey -> (RatchetKey, RatchetKey, Key)
|
||||
rootKdf (RatchetKey rk) k pk kemSecret_ =
|
||||
let dhOut = dhBytes' (dh' k pk)
|
||||
ss = case kemSecret_ of
|
||||
Just (KEMSharedKey s) -> dhOut <> BA.convert s
|
||||
Nothing -> dhOut
|
||||
(rk', ck, nhk) = hkdf3 rk ss "SimpleXRootRatchet"
|
||||
in (RatchetKey rk', RatchetKey ck, Key nhk)
|
||||
|
||||
chainKdf :: RatchetKey -> (RatchetKey, Key, IV, IV)
|
||||
@@ -487,6 +929,10 @@ hkdf3 salt ikm info = (s1, s2, s3)
|
||||
|
||||
$(JQ.deriveJSON defaultJSON ''RcvRatchet)
|
||||
|
||||
$(JQ.deriveJSON defaultJSON ''RatchetKEMAccepted)
|
||||
|
||||
$(JQ.deriveJSON defaultJSON ''RatchetKEM)
|
||||
|
||||
instance AlgorithmI a => ToJSON (SndRatchet a) where
|
||||
toEncoding = $(JQ.mkToEncoding defaultJSON ''SndRatchet)
|
||||
toJSON = $(JQ.mkToJSON defaultJSON ''SndRatchet)
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -19,16 +19,20 @@ import Simplex.Messaging.Encoding
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Encoding.String
|
||||
|
||||
newtype KEMPublicKey = KEMPublicKey ByteString
|
||||
deriving (Show)
|
||||
deriving (Eq, Show)
|
||||
|
||||
newtype KEMSecretKey = KEMSecretKey ScrubbedBytes
|
||||
deriving (Show)
|
||||
deriving (Eq, Show)
|
||||
|
||||
newtype KEMCiphertext = KEMCiphertext ByteString
|
||||
deriving (Show)
|
||||
deriving (Eq, Show)
|
||||
|
||||
newtype KEMSharedKey = KEMSharedKey ScrubbedBytes
|
||||
deriving (Show)
|
||||
deriving (Eq, Show)
|
||||
|
||||
unsafeRevealKEMSharedKey :: KEMSharedKey -> String
|
||||
unsafeRevealKEMSharedKey (KEMSharedKey scrubbed) = show (BA.convert scrubbed :: ByteString)
|
||||
{-# DEPRECATED unsafeRevealKEMSharedKey "unsafeRevealKEMSharedKey left in code" #-}
|
||||
|
||||
type KEMKeyPair = (KEMPublicKey, KEMSecretKey)
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -60,6 +64,18 @@ sntrup761Dec (KEMCiphertext c) (KEMSecretKey sk) =
|
||||
KEMSharedKey
|
||||
<$> BA.alloc c_SNTRUP761_SIZE (\kPtr -> c_sntrup761_dec kPtr cPtr skPtr)
|
||||
|
||||
instance Encoding KEMSecretKey where
|
||||
smpEncode (KEMSecretKey c) = smpEncode . Large $ BA.convert c
|
||||
smpP = KEMSecretKey . BA.convert . unLarge <$> smpP
|
||||
|
||||
instance StrEncoding KEMSecretKey where
|
||||
strEncode (KEMSecretKey pk) = strEncode (BA.convert pk :: ByteString)
|
||||
strP = KEMSecretKey . BA.convert <$> strP @ByteString
|
||||
|
||||
instance Encoding KEMPublicKey where
|
||||
smpEncode (KEMPublicKey pk) = smpEncode . Large $ BA.convert pk
|
||||
smpP = KEMPublicKey . BA.convert . unLarge <$> smpP
|
||||
|
||||
instance StrEncoding KEMPublicKey where
|
||||
strEncode (KEMPublicKey pk) = strEncode (BA.convert pk :: ByteString)
|
||||
strP = KEMPublicKey . BA.convert <$> strP @ByteString
|
||||
@@ -68,6 +84,25 @@ instance Encoding KEMCiphertext where
|
||||
smpEncode (KEMCiphertext c) = smpEncode . Large $ BA.convert c
|
||||
smpP = KEMCiphertext . BA.convert . unLarge <$> smpP
|
||||
|
||||
instance Encoding KEMSharedKey where
|
||||
smpEncode (KEMSharedKey c) = smpEncode (BA.convert c :: ByteString)
|
||||
smpP = KEMSharedKey . BA.convert <$> smpP @ByteString
|
||||
|
||||
instance StrEncoding KEMCiphertext where
|
||||
strEncode (KEMCiphertext pk) = strEncode (BA.convert pk :: ByteString)
|
||||
strP = KEMCiphertext . BA.convert <$> strP @ByteString
|
||||
|
||||
instance StrEncoding KEMSharedKey where
|
||||
strEncode (KEMSharedKey pk) = strEncode (BA.convert pk :: ByteString)
|
||||
strP = KEMSharedKey . BA.convert <$> strP @ByteString
|
||||
|
||||
instance ToJSON KEMSecretKey where
|
||||
toJSON = strToJSON
|
||||
toEncoding = strToJEncoding
|
||||
|
||||
instance FromJSON KEMSecretKey where
|
||||
parseJSON = strParseJSON "KEMSecretKey"
|
||||
|
||||
instance ToJSON KEMPublicKey where
|
||||
toJSON = strToJSON
|
||||
toEncoding = strToJEncoding
|
||||
@@ -75,8 +110,22 @@ instance ToJSON KEMPublicKey where
|
||||
instance FromJSON KEMPublicKey where
|
||||
parseJSON = strParseJSON "KEMPublicKey"
|
||||
|
||||
instance ToJSON KEMCiphertext where
|
||||
toJSON = strToJSON
|
||||
toEncoding = strToJEncoding
|
||||
|
||||
instance FromJSON KEMCiphertext where
|
||||
parseJSON = strParseJSON "KEMCiphertext"
|
||||
|
||||
instance ToField KEMSharedKey where
|
||||
toField (KEMSharedKey k) = toField (BA.convert k :: ByteString)
|
||||
|
||||
instance FromField KEMSharedKey where
|
||||
fromField f = KEMSharedKey . BA.convert @ByteString <$> fromField f
|
||||
|
||||
instance ToJSON KEMSharedKey where
|
||||
toJSON = strToJSON
|
||||
toEncoding = strToJEncoding
|
||||
|
||||
instance FromJSON KEMSharedKey where
|
||||
parseJSON = strParseJSON "KEMSharedKey"
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -179,6 +179,12 @@ instance (StrEncoding a, StrEncoding b, StrEncoding c, StrEncoding d, StrEncodin
|
||||
strP = (,,,,) <$> strP_ <*> strP_ <*> strP_ <*> strP_ <*> strP
|
||||
{-# INLINE strP #-}
|
||||
|
||||
instance (StrEncoding a, StrEncoding b, StrEncoding c, StrEncoding d, StrEncoding e, StrEncoding f) => StrEncoding (a, b, c, d, e, f) where
|
||||
strEncode (a, b, c, d, e, f) = B.unwords [strEncode a, strEncode b, strEncode c, strEncode d, strEncode e, strEncode f]
|
||||
{-# INLINE strEncode #-}
|
||||
strP = (,,,,,) <$> strP_ <*> strP_ <*> strP_ <*> strP_ <*> strP_ <*> strP
|
||||
{-# INLINE strP #-}
|
||||
|
||||
strP_ :: StrEncoding a => Parser a
|
||||
strP_ = strP <* A.space
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -175,7 +175,7 @@ import Data.Functor (($>))
|
||||
import Data.Kind
|
||||
import Data.List.NonEmpty (NonEmpty (..))
|
||||
import qualified Data.List.NonEmpty as L
|
||||
import Data.Maybe (isJust, isNothing)
|
||||
import Data.Maybe (isNothing)
|
||||
import Data.String
|
||||
import Data.Time.Clock.System (SystemTime (..))
|
||||
import Data.Type.Equality
|
||||
@@ -272,7 +272,7 @@ data RawTransmission = RawTransmission
|
||||
data TransmissionAuth
|
||||
= TASignature C.ASignature
|
||||
| TAAuthenticator C.CbAuthenticator
|
||||
deriving (Eq, Show)
|
||||
deriving (Show)
|
||||
|
||||
-- this encoding is backwards compatible with v6 that used Maybe C.ASignature instead of TAuthorization
|
||||
tAuthBytes :: Maybe TransmissionAuth -> ByteString
|
||||
@@ -338,8 +338,6 @@ data Command (p :: Party) where
|
||||
|
||||
deriving instance Show (Command p)
|
||||
|
||||
deriving instance Eq (Command p)
|
||||
|
||||
data SubscriptionMode = SMSubscribe | SMOnlyCreate
|
||||
deriving (Eq, Show)
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -746,9 +744,6 @@ data AProtocolType = forall p. ProtocolTypeI p => AProtocolType (SProtocolType p
|
||||
|
||||
deriving instance Show AProtocolType
|
||||
|
||||
instance Eq AProtocolType where
|
||||
AProtocolType p == AProtocolType p' = isJust $ testEquality p p'
|
||||
|
||||
instance TestEquality SProtocolType where
|
||||
testEquality SPSMP SPSMP = Just Refl
|
||||
testEquality SPNTF SPNTF = Just Refl
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -17,14 +17,14 @@ data QueueRec = QueueRec
|
||||
notifier :: !(Maybe NtfCreds),
|
||||
status :: !ServerQueueStatus
|
||||
}
|
||||
deriving (Eq, Show)
|
||||
deriving (Show)
|
||||
|
||||
data NtfCreds = NtfCreds
|
||||
{ notifierId :: !NotifierId,
|
||||
notifierKey :: !NtfPublicAuthKey,
|
||||
rcvNtfDhSecret :: !RcvNtfDhSecret
|
||||
}
|
||||
deriving (Eq, Show)
|
||||
deriving (Show)
|
||||
|
||||
instance StrEncoding NtfCreds where
|
||||
strEncode NtfCreds {notifierId, notifierKey, rcvNtfDhSecret} = strEncode (notifierId, notifierKey, rcvNtfDhSecret)
|
||||
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user