mirror of
https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq.git
synced 2026-07-27 12:21:45 +00:00
209f7826cb
* smp-server: namespaces resolver scaffolding * smp-server: Names resolver hardening + cleanup * smp-server: fuse parallel dispatchers * smp-server: JSON wire format for NameRecord + Names.hs restructure * smp-server: redact RpcAuth in Show * smp-server: JSON wire fixups + spec rewrite + small cleanups * plan: prepend implementation-diverged banner * move SimplexName into shared module * smp-server: name + contract whitelist on RSLV * smp-server: address audit findings (canonical JSON, INI guards, SSRF, TLD case, shutdown) * smp-server: round 2 audit fixes (label case, response cap, ipv6 link-local) * smp-server: round 3 audit fixes (SSRF coverage, drop noop closeManager, CSV order) * smp-server: round 4 audit fixes (0X-hex host, expanded IPv6 forms, pingEndpoint timeout) * smp-server: hardcode TldRegistries (drop registry_tld_* INI keys) * smp-server: round 6 audit fixes (IPv6 SSRF, redirects, ASCII labels) - Reject IPv6 aliases of 169.254.169.254 (IPv4-compatible / IPv4-mapped / 6to4 / NAT64) via numeric range check on parsed IPv6. - Disable HTTP redirects on the Eth RPC request. - Restrict SimplexName labels to ASCII (Cyrillic/Greek/full-width otherwise hash to different on-chain records and diverge from UTS-46 registrars). - pingEndpoint: only JsonRpcErr means "reachable"; transport/decode failures fail startup. boundedIniInt: readMaybe over partial read. - Add 127.0.0.0/8 and 0.0.0.0 to isLoopback. - Replace hand-rolled hex helpers with Data.ByteArray.Encoding; raise managerConnCount to match rpcMaxConcurrency; hex Show for NameOwner. - Fuse parallel http/https when into unless+case; drop reverse/re-reverse in mkDomain TLDWeb; first AbiInvariantViolated; Nothing <$ decodeAddress; forM_ (eitherToMaybe ...); >>= chain in NameOwner FromJSON. - Drop dead imports/exports/pragmas and two restating comments. - Tests: factor unsafeOwner/unsafeLink, addr1/2/3, testNamesConfig; add non-ASCII label rejection coverage. * namespace: bound parser input to 253 bytes (DoS defense) The bare-name fallback and bareDomain parser would otherwise consume arbitrarily many non-space bytes via takeWhile1 before any validation or length check. A crafted multi-megabyte token would be decoded as UTF-8 and re-parsed in full before being rejected. Introduce `boundedNonSpace` (scan with 253-byte cap) at the two takeWhile1 sites. Inputs longer than 253 bytes leave residue that parseOnly's implicit endOfInput rejects, so the parser fails fast without ever allocating the full input. The bound is the DNS full-domain limit, chosen for being a familiar ceiling generous enough to cover any realistic SimpleX name (longest plausible @user.subdomain.simplex stays well under 100 bytes). No per-label cap — SimpleX names don't go through DNS label resolution and there's no semantic reason to constrain individual labels. * namespace: switch to Python HTTP resolver + agent plumbing (#1796) * namespace: relax resolver_endpoint validation (path prefix, http without auth) validateUrl gains two operator-friendly relaxations and a regression test: - Allow a path prefix (e.g. https://gw.example.com:443/snrc) for a resolver behind a reverse-proxy sub-path; /resolve/<name> and /health are appended (HttpResolver already strips one trailing slash, so root and sub-path behave identically). Query/fragment/userinfo stay rejected. - Off-loopback, reject only http WITH resolver_auth (the Authorization header would travel in cleartext). http without auth is now allowed (no secret to leak; resolver data is public — also lets dev setups reach a host resolver via http://host.docker.internal). https is always allowed, with or without auth. Plain http has no response integrity; intended for trusted/local networks only. Exports validateUrl and adds validateUrlSpec (11 cases) to SMPNamesTests. * namespace: NameRecord links as arrays (multi-link, cap 5) * namespace: distinct RSLV error responses RSLV collapsed every non-hit (no resolver, malformed name, not found, backing-store failure) to ERR AUTH, so a client iterating its configured servers could not tell "this router has no resolver, try the next" from "name not registered, stop", and a transient backend error read as an authoritative miss. Names capability is runtime config, orthogonal to the linear SMP version (a future v21 router without [NAMES] must still advertise v21), so it is signalled by a command-time error like allowSMPProxy, not by the version range: no resolver configured -> ERR CMD PROHIBITED (client skips, tries next) backing-store failure -> ERR INTERNAL (transient: retry/surface) not found / malformed -> ERR AUTH (authoritative "no such name") Update the protocol spec error table and add agent tests for the no-resolver (CMD PROHIBITED) and backend-failure (INTERNAL) paths. * refactor(names): server role + one error type Addresses epoberezkin's review (PR #1784). Name resolution becomes a server role like proxy; the agent owns resolution + server selection; one error type flows through the whole stack. - ServerRoles gains `names`; UserServers gains `nameSrvs` (opt-in list); resolveSimplexName drops the explicit server arg and picks a names-capable server via getNextServer. - RSLV carries SimplexNameDomain (was RslvRequest): no JSON on the wire, contract dropped, name validated at parse (invalid -> CMD SYNTAX). - Version check moves from the encoder to Client.hs (no ERR to server). - ErrorType.NAME {nameErr :: NameErrorType} (+ AgentErrorType.NAME), wire- and JSON-encoded; resolver errors surface with diagnostics. Success response renamed NAME -> RNAME to free the collision. - NameOwner -> EthAddress (record selector); NameRecord derives FromJSON and gains field-ordered Encoding; per-field caps removed. - Remove newEnvWithNames / runSMPServerBlockingWithNames test seams; stub resolver folded into ServerConfig.namesResolverCall_. * test(server): update stats backup line count NameResolverStatsData adds 6 lines to the server stats backup (the "rslvStats:" header plus the reqs/succ/notFound/resolverErrs/disabled fields), so testRestoreMessages' expected stats-backup line count is 95 -> 101. * feat(names): public-namespace resolution via RSLV/RNAME SNRC names resolver role: RSLV command -> HTTP resolver -> RNAME record. Agent owns server selection (ServerRoles.names); NAME error family; async, concurrency-bounded resolution; length-prefixed extensible wire; spec. * remove comments Co-authored-by: Evgeny <evgeny@poberezkin.com> * simplify * move tests name * simplify: text addresses, Tail JSON, drop admitRslv * fix * remove spaghetti * reduce diff * async again, refactor * different threads limit for name resolutions * remove comment * FromField instance for SimplexNameInfo * remove comments * unStrJSON * add sameConnShortLink * remove scheme prefix * remove unused import * remove connecttarget tests * remove comment * comment --------- Co-authored-by: Evgeny Poberezkin <evgeny@poberezkin.com> Co-authored-by: Evgeny @ SimpleX Chat <259188159+evgeny-simplex@users.noreply.github.com>
942 lines
36 KiB
Haskell
942 lines
36 KiB
Haskell
{-# LANGUAGE AllowAmbiguousTypes #-}
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{-# LANGUAGE DataKinds #-}
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{-# LANGUAGE DeriveAnyClass #-}
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{-# LANGUAGE DerivingStrategies #-}
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{-# LANGUAGE DuplicateRecordFields #-}
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{-# LANGUAGE FlexibleContexts #-}
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{-# LANGUAGE FlexibleInstances #-}
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{-# LANGUAGE GADTs #-}
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{-# LANGUAGE GeneralizedNewtypeDeriving #-}
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{-# LANGUAGE InstanceSigs #-}
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{-# LANGUAGE KindSignatures #-}
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{-# LANGUAGE LambdaCase #-}
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{-# LANGUAGE NamedFieldPuns #-}
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{-# LANGUAGE OverloadedStrings #-}
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{-# LANGUAGE PatternSynonyms #-}
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{-# LANGUAGE ScopedTypeVariables #-}
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{-# LANGUAGE TemplateHaskell #-}
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{-# LANGUAGE TupleSections #-}
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{-# LANGUAGE TypeApplications #-}
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{-# LANGUAGE TypeFamilies #-}
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-- |
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-- Module : Simplex.Messaging.Transport
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-- Copyright : (c) simplex.chat
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-- License : AGPL-3
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--
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-- Maintainer : chat@simplex.chat
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-- Stability : experimental
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-- Portability : non-portable
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--
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-- This module defines basic TCP server and client and SMP protocol encrypted transport over TCP.
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--
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-- See https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq/blob/master/protocol/simplex-messaging.md#appendix-a
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module Simplex.Messaging.Transport
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( -- * SMP transport parameters
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SMPVersion,
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VersionSMP,
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VersionRangeSMP,
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THandleSMP,
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alpnSupportedSMPHandshakes,
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supportedClientSMPRelayVRange,
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supportedServerSMPRelayVRange,
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supportedProxyClientSMPRelayVRange,
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proxiedSMPRelayVRange,
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minClientSMPRelayVersion,
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minServerSMPRelayVersion,
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currentClientSMPRelayVersion,
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currentServerSMPRelayVersion,
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authCmdsSMPVersion,
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sendingProxySMPVersion,
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sndAuthKeySMPVersion,
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deletedEventSMPVersion,
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encryptedBlockSMPVersion,
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blockedEntitySMPVersion,
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shortLinksSMPVersion,
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serviceCertsSMPVersion,
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newNtfCredsSMPVersion,
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clientNoticesSMPVersion,
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rcvServiceSMPVersion,
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namesSMPVersion,
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simplexMQVersion,
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smpBlockSize,
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TransportConfig (..),
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-- * Transport connection class
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Transport (..),
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TProxy (..),
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ATransport (..),
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ASrvTransport,
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TransportPeer (..),
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STransportPeer (..),
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TransportPeerI (..),
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getServerVerifyKey,
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-- * TLS Transport
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TLS (..),
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SessionId,
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ServiceId,
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EntityId (..),
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pattern NoEntity,
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ALPN,
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connectTLS,
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closeTLS,
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defaultSupportedParams,
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defaultSupportedParamsHTTPS,
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withTlsUnique,
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-- * SMP transport
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THandle (..),
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THandleParams (..),
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THandleAuth (..),
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CertChainPubKey (..),
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ServiceCredentials (..),
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THClientService' (..),
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THClientService,
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THPeerClientService,
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SMPServiceRole (..),
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TSbChainKeys (..),
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TransportError (..),
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HandshakeError (..),
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smpServerHandshake,
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smpClientHandshake,
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tPutBlock,
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tGetBlock,
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sendHandshake,
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getHandshake,
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smpTHParamsSetVersion,
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)
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where
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import Control.Applicative (optional)
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import Control.Concurrent.STM
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import Control.Monad
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import Control.Monad.Except
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import Control.Monad.IO.Class
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import Control.Monad.Trans.Except (throwE)
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import qualified Data.Aeson.TH as J
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import Data.Attoparsec.ByteString.Char8 (Parser)
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import qualified Data.Attoparsec.ByteString.Char8 as A
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import Data.Bifunctor (first)
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import Data.Bitraversable (bimapM)
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import Data.ByteString.Char8 (ByteString)
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import qualified Data.ByteString.Char8 as B
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import qualified Data.ByteString.Lazy.Char8 as LB
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import Data.Default (def)
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import Data.Functor (($>))
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import Data.Kind (Type)
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import Data.Tuple (swap)
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import Data.Typeable (Typeable)
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import Data.Version (showVersion)
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import Data.Word (Word16)
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import qualified Data.X509 as X
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import qualified Data.X509.Validation as XV
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import GHC.IO.Handle.Internals (ioe_EOF)
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import Network.Socket
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import qualified Network.TLS as T
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import qualified Network.TLS.Extra as TE
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import qualified Paths_simplexmq as SMQ
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import qualified Simplex.Messaging.Crypto as C
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import Simplex.Messaging.Encoding
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import Simplex.Messaging.Encoding.String
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import Simplex.Messaging.Parsers (dropPrefix, parseRead1, sumTypeJSON)
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import Simplex.Messaging.Transport.Buffer
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import Simplex.Messaging.Transport.Shared
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import Simplex.Messaging.Util (bshow, catchAll, catchAll_, liftEitherWith)
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import Simplex.Messaging.Version
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import Simplex.Messaging.Version.Internal
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import System.IO.Error (isEOFError)
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import UnliftIO.Exception (Exception)
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import qualified UnliftIO.Exception as E
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-- * Transport parameters
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smpBlockSize :: Int
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smpBlockSize = 16384
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-- SMP protocol version history:
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-- 1 - binary protocol encoding (1/1/2022)
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-- 2 - message flags (used to control notifications, 6/6/2022)
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-- 3 - encrypt message timestamp and flags together with the body when delivered to the recipient (7/5/2022)
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-- 4 - support command batching (7/17/2022)
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-- 5 - basic auth for SMP servers (11/12/2022)
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-- 6 - allow creating queues without subscribing (9/10/2023)
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-- 7 - support authenticated encryption to verify senders' commands, imply but do NOT send session ID in signed part (4/30/2024)
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-- 8 - SMP proxy for sender commands (6/03/2024)
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-- 9 - faster handshake: SKEY command for sender to secure queue (6/30/2024)
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-- 10 - DELD event to subscriber when queue is deleted via another connnection (9/11/2024)
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-- 11 - additional encryption of transport blocks with forward secrecy (10/06/2024)
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-- 12 - BLOCKED error for blocked queues (1/11/2025)
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-- 14 - proxyServer handshake property to disable transport encryption between server and proxy (1/19/2025)
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-- 15 - short links, with associated data passed in NEW of LSET command (3/30/2025)
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-- 16 - service certificates (5/31/2025)
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-- 17 - create notification credentials with NEW (7/12/2025)
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-- 18 - support client notices (10/10/2025)
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-- 19 - service subscriptions to messages (10/20/2025)
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data SMPVersion
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instance VersionScope SMPVersion
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type VersionSMP = Version SMPVersion
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type VersionRangeSMP = VersionRange SMPVersion
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pattern VersionSMP :: Word16 -> VersionSMP
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pattern VersionSMP v = Version v
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_subModeSMPVersion :: VersionSMP
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_subModeSMPVersion = VersionSMP 6
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authCmdsSMPVersion :: VersionSMP
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authCmdsSMPVersion = VersionSMP 7
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sendingProxySMPVersion :: VersionSMP
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sendingProxySMPVersion = VersionSMP 8
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sndAuthKeySMPVersion :: VersionSMP
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sndAuthKeySMPVersion = VersionSMP 9
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deletedEventSMPVersion :: VersionSMP
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deletedEventSMPVersion = VersionSMP 10
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encryptedBlockSMPVersion :: VersionSMP
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encryptedBlockSMPVersion = VersionSMP 11
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blockedEntitySMPVersion :: VersionSMP
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blockedEntitySMPVersion = VersionSMP 12
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proxyServerHandshakeSMPVersion :: VersionSMP
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proxyServerHandshakeSMPVersion = VersionSMP 14
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shortLinksSMPVersion :: VersionSMP
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shortLinksSMPVersion = VersionSMP 15
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serviceCertsSMPVersion :: VersionSMP
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serviceCertsSMPVersion = VersionSMP 16
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newNtfCredsSMPVersion :: VersionSMP
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newNtfCredsSMPVersion = VersionSMP 17
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clientNoticesSMPVersion :: VersionSMP
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clientNoticesSMPVersion = VersionSMP 18
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rcvServiceSMPVersion :: VersionSMP
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rcvServiceSMPVersion = VersionSMP 19
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namesSMPVersion :: VersionSMP
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namesSMPVersion = VersionSMP 20
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minClientSMPRelayVersion :: VersionSMP
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minClientSMPRelayVersion = VersionSMP 6
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minServerSMPRelayVersion :: VersionSMP
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minServerSMPRelayVersion = VersionSMP 6
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currentClientSMPRelayVersion :: VersionSMP
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currentClientSMPRelayVersion = VersionSMP 20
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legacyServerSMPRelayVersion :: VersionSMP
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legacyServerSMPRelayVersion = VersionSMP 6
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currentServerSMPRelayVersion :: VersionSMP
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currentServerSMPRelayVersion = VersionSMP 20
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-- Max SMP protocol version to be used in e2e encrypted connection between
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-- client and server, as defined by SMP proxy. Normally set below the current
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-- version to prevent client version fingerprinting by the destination relays
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-- when clients upgrade at different times. Pinned to the current version (20)
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-- for this release because proxied name resolution is gated on namesSMPVersion
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-- (20), so the one-version anti-fingerprinting buffer does not apply yet; it
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-- reappears once the current version advances past 20.
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proxiedSMPRelayVersion :: VersionSMP
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proxiedSMPRelayVersion = VersionSMP 20
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-- minimal supported protocol version is 6
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-- TODO remove code that supports sending commands without batching
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supportedClientSMPRelayVRange :: VersionRangeSMP
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supportedClientSMPRelayVRange = mkVersionRange minClientSMPRelayVersion currentClientSMPRelayVersion
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legacyServerSMPRelayVRange :: VersionRangeSMP
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legacyServerSMPRelayVRange = mkVersionRange minServerSMPRelayVersion legacyServerSMPRelayVersion
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supportedServerSMPRelayVRange :: VersionRangeSMP
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supportedServerSMPRelayVRange = mkVersionRange minServerSMPRelayVersion currentServerSMPRelayVersion
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supportedProxyClientSMPRelayVRange :: VersionRangeSMP
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supportedProxyClientSMPRelayVRange = mkVersionRange minServerSMPRelayVersion currentServerSMPRelayVersion
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proxiedSMPRelayVRange :: VersionRangeSMP
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proxiedSMPRelayVRange = mkVersionRange sendingProxySMPVersion proxiedSMPRelayVersion
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alpnSupportedSMPHandshakes :: [ALPN]
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alpnSupportedSMPHandshakes = ["smp/1"]
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simplexMQVersion :: String
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simplexMQVersion = showVersion SMQ.version
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-- * Transport connection class
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data TransportConfig = TransportConfig
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{ logTLSErrors :: Bool,
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transportTimeout :: Maybe Int
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}
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class Typeable c => Transport (c :: TransportPeer -> Type) where
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transport :: forall p. ATransport p
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transport = ATransport (TProxy @c @p)
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transportName :: TProxy c p -> String
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transportConfig :: c p -> TransportConfig
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-- | Upgrade TLS context to connection
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getTransportConnection :: TransportPeerI p => TransportConfig -> Bool -> X.CertificateChain -> T.Context -> IO (c p)
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-- | Whether TLS certificate chain was provided to peer
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-- It is always True for the server.
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-- It is True for the client when server requested it AND non-empty chain is sent.
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certificateSent :: c p -> Bool
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-- | TLS certificate chain, server's in the client, client's in the server (empty chain for non-service clients)
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getPeerCertChain :: c p -> X.CertificateChain
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-- | tls-unique channel binding per RFC5929
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tlsUnique :: c p -> SessionId
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-- | ALPN value negotiated for the session
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getSessionALPN :: c p -> Maybe ALPN
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-- | Close connection
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closeConnection :: c p -> IO ()
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-- | Read fixed number of bytes from connection
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cGet :: c p -> Int -> IO ByteString
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-- | Write bytes to connection
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cPut :: c p -> ByteString -> IO ()
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-- | Receive ByteString from connection, allowing LF or CRLF termination.
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getLn :: c p -> IO ByteString
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-- | Send ByteString to connection terminating it with CRLF.
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putLn :: c p -> ByteString -> IO ()
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putLn c = cPut c . (<> "\r\n")
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data TransportPeer = TClient | TServer
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deriving (Eq, Show)
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data STransportPeer (p :: TransportPeer) where
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STClient :: STransportPeer 'TClient
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STServer :: STransportPeer 'TServer
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class TransportPeerI p where sTransportPeer :: STransportPeer p
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instance TransportPeerI 'TClient where sTransportPeer = STClient
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instance TransportPeerI 'TServer where sTransportPeer = STServer
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data TProxy (c :: TransportPeer -> Type) (p :: TransportPeer) = TProxy
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data ATransport p = forall c. Transport c => ATransport (TProxy c p)
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type ASrvTransport = ATransport 'TServer
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getServerVerifyKey :: Transport c => c 'TClient -> Either String C.APublicVerifyKey
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getServerVerifyKey c =
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case getPeerCertChain c of
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X.CertificateChain (server : _ca) -> getCertVerifyKey server
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_ -> Left "no certificate chain"
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getCertVerifyKey :: X.SignedCertificate -> Either String C.APublicVerifyKey
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getCertVerifyKey cert = C.x509ToPublic' $ X.certPubKey $ X.signedObject $ X.getSigned cert
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-- * TLS Transport
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data TLS (p :: TransportPeer) = TLS
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{ tlsContext :: T.Context,
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tlsUniq :: ByteString,
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tlsBuffer :: TBuffer,
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tlsALPN :: Maybe ALPN,
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tlsCertSent :: Bool, -- see comment for certificateSent
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tlsPeerCert :: X.CertificateChain,
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tlsTransportConfig :: TransportConfig
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}
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type ALPN = ByteString
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connectTLS :: T.TLSParams p => Maybe HostName -> TransportConfig -> p -> Socket -> IO T.Context
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connectTLS host_ TransportConfig {logTLSErrors} params sock =
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E.bracketOnError (T.contextNew sock params) closeTLS $ \ctx ->
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logHandshakeErrors (T.handshake ctx) $> ctx
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where
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logHandshakeErrors = if logTLSErrors then (`catchAll` logThrow) else id
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logThrow e = putStrLn ("TLS error" <> host <> ": " <> show e) >> E.throwIO e
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host = maybe "" (\h -> " (" <> h <> ")") host_
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getTLS :: forall p. TransportPeerI p => TransportConfig -> Bool -> X.CertificateChain -> T.Context -> IO (TLS p)
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getTLS cfg tlsCertSent tlsPeerCert cxt = withTlsUnique @TLS @p cxt newTLS
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where
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newTLS tlsUniq = do
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tlsBuffer <- newTBuffer
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tlsALPN <- T.getNegotiatedProtocol cxt
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pure TLS {tlsContext = cxt, tlsALPN, tlsTransportConfig = cfg, tlsCertSent, tlsPeerCert, tlsUniq, tlsBuffer}
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|
|
withTlsUnique :: forall c p. TransportPeerI p => T.Context -> (ByteString -> IO (c p)) -> IO (c p)
|
|
withTlsUnique cxt f =
|
|
cxtFinished cxt
|
|
>>= maybe (closeTLS cxt >> ioe_EOF) f
|
|
where
|
|
cxtFinished = case sTransportPeer @p of
|
|
STServer -> T.getPeerFinished
|
|
STClient -> T.getFinished
|
|
|
|
closeTLS :: T.Context -> IO ()
|
|
closeTLS ctx =
|
|
T.bye ctx -- sometimes socket was closed before 'TLS.bye' so we catch the 'Broken pipe' error here
|
|
`E.finally` T.contextClose ctx
|
|
`catchAll_` pure ()
|
|
|
|
defaultSupportedParams :: T.Supported
|
|
defaultSupportedParams =
|
|
def
|
|
{ T.supportedVersions = [T.TLS13, T.TLS12],
|
|
T.supportedCiphers =
|
|
[ TE.cipher_TLS13_CHACHA20POLY1305_SHA256, -- for TLS13
|
|
TE.cipher_ECDHE_ECDSA_CHACHA20POLY1305_SHA256 -- for TLS12
|
|
],
|
|
T.supportedHashSignatures = [(T.HashIntrinsic, T.SignatureEd448), (T.HashIntrinsic, T.SignatureEd25519)],
|
|
T.supportedGroups = [T.X448, T.X25519],
|
|
T.supportedSecureRenegotiation = False
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
-- | A selection of extra parameters to accomodate browser chains
|
|
defaultSupportedParamsHTTPS :: T.Supported
|
|
defaultSupportedParamsHTTPS =
|
|
defaultSupportedParams
|
|
{ T.supportedCiphers = TE.ciphersuite_strong,
|
|
T.supportedGroups = [T.X25519, T.X448, T.FFDHE4096, T.FFDHE6144, T.FFDHE8192, T.P521],
|
|
T.supportedHashSignatures =
|
|
[ (T.HashIntrinsic, T.SignatureEd448),
|
|
(T.HashIntrinsic, T.SignatureEd25519),
|
|
(T.HashSHA256, T.SignatureECDSA),
|
|
(T.HashSHA384, T.SignatureECDSA),
|
|
(T.HashSHA512, T.SignatureECDSA),
|
|
(T.HashIntrinsic, T.SignatureRSApssRSAeSHA512),
|
|
(T.HashIntrinsic, T.SignatureRSApssRSAeSHA384),
|
|
(T.HashIntrinsic, T.SignatureRSApssRSAeSHA256),
|
|
(T.HashSHA512, T.SignatureRSA),
|
|
(T.HashSHA384, T.SignatureRSA),
|
|
(T.HashSHA256, T.SignatureRSA)
|
|
]
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
instance Transport TLS where
|
|
transportName _ = "TLS"
|
|
{-# INLINE transportName #-}
|
|
transportConfig = tlsTransportConfig
|
|
{-# INLINE transportConfig #-}
|
|
getTransportConnection = getTLS
|
|
{-# INLINE getTransportConnection #-}
|
|
certificateSent = tlsCertSent
|
|
{-# INLINE certificateSent #-}
|
|
getPeerCertChain = tlsPeerCert
|
|
{-# INLINE getPeerCertChain #-}
|
|
getSessionALPN = tlsALPN
|
|
{-# INLINE getSessionALPN #-}
|
|
tlsUnique = tlsUniq
|
|
{-# INLINE tlsUnique #-}
|
|
closeConnection tls = closeTLS $ tlsContext tls
|
|
{-# INLINE closeConnection #-}
|
|
|
|
-- https://hackage.haskell.org/package/tls-1.6.0/docs/Network-TLS.html#v:recvData
|
|
-- this function may return less than requested number of bytes
|
|
cGet :: TLS p -> Int -> IO ByteString
|
|
cGet TLS {tlsContext, tlsBuffer, tlsTransportConfig = TransportConfig {transportTimeout = t_}} n =
|
|
getBuffered tlsBuffer n t_ (T.recvData tlsContext)
|
|
|
|
cPut :: TLS p -> ByteString -> IO ()
|
|
cPut TLS {tlsContext, tlsTransportConfig = TransportConfig {transportTimeout = t_}} =
|
|
withTimedErr t_ . T.sendData tlsContext . LB.fromStrict
|
|
|
|
getLn :: TLS p -> IO ByteString
|
|
getLn TLS {tlsContext, tlsBuffer} = do
|
|
getLnBuffered tlsBuffer (T.recvData tlsContext) `E.catches` [E.Handler handleTlsEOF, E.Handler handleEOF]
|
|
where
|
|
handleTlsEOF = \case
|
|
T.PostHandshake T.Error_EOF -> E.throwIO TEBadBlock
|
|
e -> E.throwIO e
|
|
handleEOF e = if isEOFError e then E.throwIO TEBadBlock else E.throwIO e
|
|
|
|
-- * SMP transport
|
|
|
|
-- | The handle for SMP encrypted transport connection over Transport.
|
|
data THandle v c p = THandle
|
|
{ connection :: c p,
|
|
params :: THandleParams v p
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
type THandleSMP c p = THandle SMPVersion c p
|
|
|
|
data THandleParams v p = THandleParams
|
|
{ sessionId :: SessionId,
|
|
blockSize :: Int,
|
|
-- | server protocol version range
|
|
thServerVRange :: VersionRange v,
|
|
-- | agreed server protocol version
|
|
thVersion :: Version v,
|
|
-- | peer public key for command authorization and shared secrets for entity ID encryption
|
|
thAuth :: Maybe (THandleAuth p),
|
|
-- | do NOT send session ID in transmission, but include it into signed message
|
|
-- based on protocol version
|
|
implySessId :: Bool,
|
|
-- | keys for additional transport encryption
|
|
encryptBlock :: Maybe TSbChainKeys,
|
|
-- | send multiple transmissions in a single block
|
|
-- based on protocol version
|
|
batch :: Bool,
|
|
-- | include service signature (or '0' if it is absent), based on protocol version
|
|
serviceAuth :: Bool
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
data THandleAuth (p :: TransportPeer) where
|
|
THAuthClient ::
|
|
{ peerServerPubKey :: C.PublicKeyX25519, -- used by the client to combine with client's private per-queue key
|
|
peerServerCertKey :: CertChainPubKey, -- the key here is peerServerCertKey signed with server certificate
|
|
clientService :: Maybe THClientService,
|
|
sessSecret :: Maybe C.DhSecretX25519 -- session secret (will be used in SMP proxy only)
|
|
} ->
|
|
THandleAuth 'TClient
|
|
THAuthServer ::
|
|
{ serverPrivKey :: C.PrivateKeyX25519, -- used by the server to combine with client's public per-queue key
|
|
peerClientService :: Maybe THPeerClientService,
|
|
sessSecret' :: Maybe C.DhSecretX25519 -- session secret (will be used in SMP proxy only)
|
|
} ->
|
|
THandleAuth 'TServer
|
|
|
|
type THClientService = THClientService' C.PrivateKeyEd25519
|
|
|
|
type THPeerClientService = THClientService' C.PublicKeyEd25519
|
|
|
|
data THClientService' k = THClientService
|
|
{ serviceId :: ServiceId,
|
|
serviceRole :: SMPServiceRole,
|
|
serviceCertHash :: XV.Fingerprint,
|
|
serviceKey :: k
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
data TSbChainKeys = TSbChainKeys
|
|
{ sndKey :: TVar C.SbChainKey,
|
|
rcvKey :: TVar C.SbChainKey
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
-- | TLS-unique channel binding
|
|
type SessionId = ByteString
|
|
|
|
type ServiceId = EntityId
|
|
|
|
-- this type is used for server entities only
|
|
newtype EntityId = EntityId {unEntityId :: ByteString}
|
|
deriving (Eq, Ord, Show)
|
|
deriving newtype (Encoding, StrEncoding)
|
|
|
|
pattern NoEntity :: EntityId
|
|
pattern NoEntity = EntityId ""
|
|
|
|
data SMPServerHandshake = SMPServerHandshake
|
|
{ smpVersionRange :: VersionRangeSMP,
|
|
sessionId :: SessionId,
|
|
-- pub key to agree shared secrets for command authorization and entity ID encryption.
|
|
-- todo C.PublicKeyX25519
|
|
authPubKey :: Maybe CertChainPubKey
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
-- This is the third handshake message that SMP server sends to services
|
|
-- in response to them sending `clientService` field.
|
|
-- The client would wait for this message in case `clientService` was sent
|
|
-- (and it can only be sent once client knows that service supports it.)
|
|
data SMPServerHandshakeResponse
|
|
= SMPServerHandshakeResponse {serviceId :: ServiceId}
|
|
| SMPServerHandshakeError {handshakeError :: TransportError}
|
|
|
|
data SMPClientHandshake = SMPClientHandshake
|
|
{ -- | agreed SMP server protocol version
|
|
smpVersion :: VersionSMP,
|
|
-- | server identity - CA certificate fingerprint
|
|
keyHash :: C.KeyHash,
|
|
-- | pub key to agree shared secret for entity ID encryption, shared secret for command authorization is agreed using per-queue keys.
|
|
authPubKey :: Maybe C.PublicKeyX25519,
|
|
-- | Whether connecting client is a proxy server (send from SMP v12).
|
|
-- This property, if True, disables additional transport encrytion inside TLS.
|
|
-- (Proxy server connection already has additional encryption, so this layer is not needed there).
|
|
proxyServer :: Bool,
|
|
-- | optional long-term service client certificate of a high-volume service using SMP server.
|
|
-- This certificate MUST be used both in TLS and in protocol handshake.
|
|
-- It signs the key that is used to authorize:
|
|
-- - queue creation commands (in addition to authorization by queue key) - it creates association of the queue with this certificate,
|
|
-- - "handover" subscription command (in addition to queue key) - it also creates association,
|
|
-- - bulk subscription command CSUB.
|
|
-- SHA512 hash of this certificate is stored to associate queues with this client.
|
|
-- These certificates are used by the servers and services connecting to SMP servers:
|
|
-- - chat relays,
|
|
-- - notification servers,
|
|
-- - high traffic chat bots,
|
|
-- - high traffic business support clients.
|
|
clientService :: Maybe SMPClientHandshakeService
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
data SMPClientHandshakeService = SMPClientHandshakeService
|
|
{ serviceRole :: SMPServiceRole,
|
|
serviceCertKey :: CertChainPubKey
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
data ServiceCredentials = ServiceCredentials
|
|
{ serviceRole :: SMPServiceRole,
|
|
serviceCreds :: T.Credential,
|
|
serviceCertHash :: XV.Fingerprint,
|
|
serviceSignKey :: C.APrivateSignKey
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
data SMPServiceRole = SRMessaging | SRNotifier | SRProxy deriving (Eq, Show)
|
|
|
|
instance Encoding SMPClientHandshake where
|
|
smpEncode SMPClientHandshake {smpVersion = v, keyHash, authPubKey, proxyServer, clientService} =
|
|
smpEncode (v, keyHash)
|
|
<> encodeAuthEncryptCmds v authPubKey
|
|
<> ifHasProxy v (smpEncode proxyServer) ""
|
|
<> ifHasService v (smpEncode clientService) ""
|
|
smpP = do
|
|
(v, keyHash) <- smpP
|
|
-- TODO drop SMP v6: remove special parser and make key non-optional
|
|
authPubKey <- authEncryptCmdsP v smpP
|
|
proxyServer <- ifHasProxy v smpP (pure False)
|
|
clientService <- ifHasService v smpP (pure Nothing)
|
|
pure SMPClientHandshake {smpVersion = v, keyHash, authPubKey, proxyServer, clientService}
|
|
|
|
instance Encoding SMPClientHandshakeService where
|
|
smpEncode SMPClientHandshakeService {serviceRole, serviceCertKey} =
|
|
smpEncode (serviceRole, serviceCertKey)
|
|
smpP = do
|
|
(serviceRole, serviceCertKey) <- smpP
|
|
pure SMPClientHandshakeService {serviceRole, serviceCertKey}
|
|
|
|
instance Encoding SMPServiceRole where
|
|
smpEncode = \case
|
|
SRMessaging -> "M"
|
|
SRNotifier -> "N"
|
|
SRProxy -> "P"
|
|
smpP =
|
|
A.anyChar >>= \case
|
|
'M' -> pure SRMessaging
|
|
'N' -> pure SRNotifier
|
|
'P' -> pure SRProxy
|
|
_ -> fail "bad SMPServiceRole"
|
|
|
|
ifHasProxy :: VersionSMP -> a -> a -> a
|
|
ifHasProxy v a b = if v >= proxyServerHandshakeSMPVersion then a else b
|
|
|
|
ifHasService :: VersionSMP -> a -> a -> a
|
|
ifHasService v a b = if v >= serviceCertsSMPVersion then a else b
|
|
|
|
instance Encoding SMPServerHandshake where
|
|
smpEncode SMPServerHandshake {smpVersionRange, sessionId, authPubKey} =
|
|
smpEncode (smpVersionRange, sessionId) <> auth
|
|
where
|
|
auth = encodeAuthEncryptCmds (maxVersion smpVersionRange) authPubKey
|
|
smpP = do
|
|
(smpVersionRange, sessionId) <- smpP
|
|
-- TODO drop SMP v6: remove special parser and make key non-optional
|
|
authPubKey <- authEncryptCmdsP (maxVersion smpVersionRange) smpP
|
|
pure SMPServerHandshake {smpVersionRange, sessionId, authPubKey}
|
|
|
|
-- newtype for CertificateChain and a session key signed with this certificate
|
|
data CertChainPubKey = CertChainPubKey
|
|
{ certChain :: X.CertificateChain,
|
|
signedPubKey :: X.SignedExact X.PubKey
|
|
}
|
|
deriving (Eq, Show)
|
|
|
|
instance Encoding CertChainPubKey where
|
|
smpEncode CertChainPubKey {certChain, signedPubKey} = smpEncode (C.encodeCertChain certChain, C.SignedObject signedPubKey)
|
|
smpP = do
|
|
certChain <- C.certChainP
|
|
C.SignedObject signedPubKey <- smpP
|
|
pure CertChainPubKey {certChain, signedPubKey}
|
|
|
|
encodeAuthEncryptCmds :: Encoding a => VersionSMP -> Maybe a -> ByteString
|
|
encodeAuthEncryptCmds v k
|
|
| v >= authCmdsSMPVersion = maybe "" smpEncode k
|
|
| otherwise = ""
|
|
|
|
authEncryptCmdsP :: VersionSMP -> Parser a -> Parser (Maybe a)
|
|
authEncryptCmdsP v p = if v >= authCmdsSMPVersion then optional p else pure Nothing
|
|
|
|
instance Encoding SMPServerHandshakeResponse where
|
|
smpEncode = \case
|
|
SMPServerHandshakeResponse serviceId -> smpEncode ('R', serviceId)
|
|
SMPServerHandshakeError handshakeError -> smpEncode ('E', handshakeError)
|
|
smpP =
|
|
A.anyChar >>= \case
|
|
'R' -> SMPServerHandshakeResponse <$> smpP
|
|
'E' -> SMPServerHandshakeError <$> smpP
|
|
_ -> fail "bad SMPServerHandshakeResponse"
|
|
|
|
-- | Error of SMP encrypted transport over TCP.
|
|
data TransportError
|
|
= -- | error parsing transport block
|
|
TEBadBlock
|
|
| -- | incompatible client or server version
|
|
TEVersion
|
|
| -- | message does not fit in transport block
|
|
TELargeMsg
|
|
| -- | incorrect session ID
|
|
TEBadSession
|
|
| -- | absent server key for v7 entity
|
|
-- This error happens when the server did not provide a DH key to authorize commands for the queue that should be authorized with a DH key.
|
|
TENoServerAuth
|
|
| -- | transport handshake error
|
|
TEHandshake {handshakeErr :: HandshakeError}
|
|
deriving (Eq, Read, Show, Exception)
|
|
|
|
-- | Transport handshake error.
|
|
data HandshakeError
|
|
= -- | parsing error
|
|
PARSE
|
|
| -- | incorrect server identity
|
|
IDENTITY
|
|
| -- | v7 authentication failed
|
|
BAD_AUTH
|
|
| -- | error reading/creating service record
|
|
BAD_SERVICE
|
|
deriving (Eq, Read, Show, Exception)
|
|
|
|
instance Encoding TransportError where
|
|
smpP =
|
|
A.takeTill (== ' ') >>= \case
|
|
"BLOCK" -> pure TEBadBlock
|
|
"VERSION" -> pure TEVersion
|
|
"LARGE_MSG" -> pure TELargeMsg
|
|
"SESSION" -> pure TEBadSession
|
|
"NO_AUTH" -> pure TENoServerAuth
|
|
"HANDSHAKE" -> TEHandshake <$> (A.space *> parseRead1)
|
|
_ -> fail "bad TransportError"
|
|
smpEncode = \case
|
|
TEBadBlock -> "BLOCK"
|
|
TEVersion -> "VERSION"
|
|
TELargeMsg -> "LARGE_MSG"
|
|
TEBadSession -> "SESSION"
|
|
TENoServerAuth -> "NO_AUTH"
|
|
TEHandshake e -> "HANDSHAKE " <> bshow e
|
|
|
|
-- | Pad and send block to SMP transport.
|
|
tPutBlock :: Transport c => THandle v c p -> ByteString -> IO (Either TransportError ())
|
|
tPutBlock THandle {connection = c, params = THandleParams {blockSize, encryptBlock}} block = do
|
|
block_ <- case encryptBlock of
|
|
Just TSbChainKeys {sndKey} -> do
|
|
(sk, nonce) <- atomically $ stateTVar sndKey C.sbcHkdf
|
|
pure $ C.sbEncrypt sk nonce block (blockSize - 16)
|
|
Nothing -> pure $ C.pad block blockSize
|
|
bimapM (const $ pure TELargeMsg) (cPut c) block_
|
|
|
|
-- | Receive block from SMP transport.
|
|
tGetBlock :: Transport c => THandle v c p -> IO (Either TransportError ByteString)
|
|
tGetBlock THandle {connection = c, params = THandleParams {blockSize, encryptBlock}} = do
|
|
msg <- cGet c blockSize
|
|
if B.length msg == blockSize
|
|
then
|
|
first (const TELargeMsg) <$>
|
|
case encryptBlock of
|
|
Just TSbChainKeys {rcvKey} -> do
|
|
(sk, nonce) <- atomically $ stateTVar rcvKey C.sbcHkdf
|
|
pure $ C.sbDecrypt sk nonce msg
|
|
Nothing -> pure $ C.unPad msg
|
|
else ioe_EOF
|
|
|
|
-- | Server SMP transport handshake.
|
|
--
|
|
-- See https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq/blob/master/protocol/simplex-messaging.md#appendix-a
|
|
smpServerHandshake ::
|
|
forall c. Transport c =>
|
|
X.CertificateChain ->
|
|
C.APrivateSignKey ->
|
|
c 'TServer ->
|
|
C.KeyPairX25519 ->
|
|
C.KeyHash ->
|
|
VersionRangeSMP ->
|
|
(SMPServiceRole -> X.CertificateChain -> XV.Fingerprint -> ExceptT TransportError IO ServiceId) ->
|
|
ExceptT TransportError IO (THandleSMP c 'TServer)
|
|
smpServerHandshake srvCert srvSignKey c (k, pk) kh smpVRange getService = do
|
|
let sk = C.signX509 srvSignKey $ C.publicToX509 k
|
|
smpVersionRange = maybe legacyServerSMPRelayVRange (const smpVRange) $ getSessionALPN c
|
|
sendHandshake th $ SMPServerHandshake {sessionId, smpVersionRange, authPubKey = Just (CertChainPubKey srvCert sk)}
|
|
SMPClientHandshake {smpVersion = v, keyHash, authPubKey = k', proxyServer, clientService} <- getHandshake th
|
|
when (keyHash /= kh) $ throwE $ TEHandshake IDENTITY
|
|
case compatibleVRange' smpVersionRange v of
|
|
Just (Compatible vr) -> do
|
|
service <- mapM getClientService clientService
|
|
liftIO $ smpTHandleServer th v vr pk k' proxyServer service
|
|
Nothing -> throwE TEVersion
|
|
where
|
|
th@THandle {params = THandleParams {sessionId}} = smpTHandle c
|
|
getClientService :: SMPClientHandshakeService -> ExceptT TransportError IO THPeerClientService
|
|
getClientService SMPClientHandshakeService {serviceRole, serviceCertKey = CertChainPubKey cc exact} = handleError sendErr $ do
|
|
unless (getPeerCertChain c == cc) $ throwE $ TEHandshake BAD_AUTH
|
|
(idCert, serviceKey) <- liftEitherWith (const $ TEHandshake BAD_AUTH) $ do
|
|
(leafCert, idCert) <- case chainIdCaCerts cc of
|
|
CCSelf cert -> pure (cert, cert)
|
|
CCValid {leafCert, idCert} -> pure (leafCert, idCert)
|
|
_ -> throwError "bad certificate"
|
|
serviceCertKey <- getCertVerifyKey leafCert
|
|
(idCert,) <$> (C.x509ToPublic' =<< C.verifyX509 serviceCertKey exact)
|
|
let fp = XV.getFingerprint idCert X.HashSHA256
|
|
serviceId <- getService serviceRole cc fp
|
|
sendHandshake th $ SMPServerHandshakeResponse {serviceId}
|
|
pure THClientService {serviceId, serviceRole, serviceCertHash = fp, serviceKey}
|
|
sendErr err = do
|
|
sendHandshake th $ SMPServerHandshakeError {handshakeError = err}
|
|
throwError err
|
|
|
|
-- | Client SMP transport handshake.
|
|
--
|
|
-- See https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq/blob/master/protocol/simplex-messaging.md#appendix-a
|
|
smpClientHandshake :: forall c. Transport c => c 'TClient -> Maybe C.KeyPairX25519 -> C.KeyHash -> VersionRangeSMP -> Bool -> Maybe (ServiceCredentials, C.KeyPairEd25519) -> ExceptT TransportError IO (THandleSMP c 'TClient)
|
|
smpClientHandshake c ks_ keyHash@(C.KeyHash kh) vRange proxyServer serviceKeys_ = do
|
|
SMPServerHandshake {sessionId = sessId, smpVersionRange, authPubKey} <- getHandshake th
|
|
when (sessionId /= sessId) $ throwE TEBadSession
|
|
-- Below logic downgrades version range in case the "client" is SMP proxy server and it is
|
|
-- connected to the destination server of the version 11 or older.
|
|
-- It disables transport encryption between SMP proxy and destination relay.
|
|
--
|
|
-- Prior to version v6.3 the version between proxy and destination was capped at 8,
|
|
-- by mistake, which also disables transport encryption and the latest features.
|
|
--
|
|
-- Transport encryption between proxy and destination breaks clients with version 10 or earlier,
|
|
-- because of a larger message size (see maxMessageLength).
|
|
--
|
|
-- To summarize:
|
|
-- - proxy and relay version 12: the agreed version is 12, transport encryption disabled (see blockEncryption with proxyServer == True).
|
|
-- - proxy is v 12, relay is 11: the agreed version is 10, because of this logic, transport encryption is disabled.
|
|
let smpVRange =
|
|
if proxyServer && maxVersion smpVersionRange < proxyServerHandshakeSMPVersion
|
|
then vRange {maxVersion = max (minVersion vRange) deletedEventSMPVersion}
|
|
else vRange
|
|
case smpVersionRange `compatibleVRange` smpVRange of
|
|
Just (Compatible vr) -> do
|
|
ck_ <- forM authPubKey $ \certKey@(CertChainPubKey chain exact) ->
|
|
liftEitherWith (const $ TEHandshake BAD_AUTH) $ do
|
|
case chainIdCaCerts chain of
|
|
CCValid {idCert} | XV.Fingerprint kh == XV.getFingerprint idCert X.HashSHA256 -> pure ()
|
|
_ -> throwError "bad certificate"
|
|
serverKey <- getServerVerifyKey c
|
|
(,certKey) <$> (C.x509ToPublic' =<< C.verifyX509 serverKey exact)
|
|
let v = maxVersion vr
|
|
serviceVersion ServiceCredentials {serviceRole} = if serviceRole == SRMessaging then rcvServiceSMPVersion else serviceCertsSMPVersion
|
|
serviceKeys = case serviceKeys_ of
|
|
Just sks | v >= serviceVersion (fst sks) && certificateSent c -> Just sks
|
|
_ -> Nothing
|
|
clientService = mkClientService <$> serviceKeys
|
|
hs = SMPClientHandshake {smpVersion = v, keyHash, authPubKey = fst <$> ks_, proxyServer, clientService}
|
|
sendHandshake th hs
|
|
service <- mapM getClientService serviceKeys
|
|
liftIO $ smpTHandleClient th v vr (snd <$> ks_) ck_ proxyServer service
|
|
Nothing -> throwE TEVersion
|
|
where
|
|
th@THandle {params = THandleParams {sessionId}} = smpTHandle c
|
|
mkClientService :: (ServiceCredentials, C.KeyPairEd25519) -> SMPClientHandshakeService
|
|
mkClientService (ServiceCredentials {serviceRole, serviceCreds, serviceSignKey}, (k, _)) =
|
|
let sk = C.signX509 serviceSignKey $ C.publicToX509 k
|
|
in SMPClientHandshakeService {serviceRole, serviceCertKey = CertChainPubKey (fst serviceCreds) sk}
|
|
getClientService :: (ServiceCredentials, C.KeyPairEd25519) -> ExceptT TransportError IO THClientService
|
|
getClientService (ServiceCredentials {serviceRole, serviceCertHash}, (_, pk)) =
|
|
getHandshake th >>= \case
|
|
SMPServerHandshakeResponse {serviceId} -> pure THClientService {serviceId, serviceRole, serviceCertHash, serviceKey = pk}
|
|
SMPServerHandshakeError {handshakeError} -> throwE handshakeError
|
|
|
|
smpTHandleServer :: forall c. THandleSMP c 'TServer -> VersionSMP -> VersionRangeSMP -> C.PrivateKeyX25519 -> Maybe C.PublicKeyX25519 -> Bool -> Maybe THPeerClientService -> IO (THandleSMP c 'TServer)
|
|
smpTHandleServer th v vr pk k_ proxyServer peerClientService = do
|
|
let thAuth = Just THAuthServer {serverPrivKey = pk, peerClientService, sessSecret' = (`C.dh'` pk) <$!> k_}
|
|
be <- blockEncryption th v proxyServer thAuth
|
|
pure $ smpTHandle_ th v vr thAuth $ uncurry TSbChainKeys <$> be
|
|
|
|
smpTHandleClient :: forall c. THandleSMP c 'TClient -> VersionSMP -> VersionRangeSMP -> Maybe C.PrivateKeyX25519 -> Maybe (C.PublicKeyX25519, CertChainPubKey) -> Bool -> Maybe THClientService -> IO (THandleSMP c 'TClient)
|
|
smpTHandleClient th v vr pk_ ck_ proxyServer clientService = do
|
|
let thAuth = clientTHParams <$!> ck_
|
|
be <- blockEncryption th v proxyServer thAuth
|
|
-- swap is needed to use client's sndKey as server's rcvKey and vice versa
|
|
pure $ smpTHandle_ th v vr thAuth $ uncurry TSbChainKeys . swap <$> be
|
|
where
|
|
clientTHParams (k, ck) =
|
|
THAuthClient
|
|
{ peerServerPubKey = k,
|
|
peerServerCertKey = forceCertChain ck,
|
|
clientService,
|
|
sessSecret = C.dh' k <$!> pk_
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
blockEncryption :: THandleSMP c p -> VersionSMP -> Bool -> Maybe (THandleAuth p) -> IO (Maybe (TVar C.SbChainKey, TVar C.SbChainKey))
|
|
blockEncryption THandle {params = THandleParams {sessionId}} v proxyServer = \case
|
|
Just thAuth | not proxyServer && v >= encryptedBlockSMPVersion -> case thAuth of
|
|
THAuthClient {sessSecret} -> be sessSecret
|
|
THAuthServer {sessSecret'} -> be sessSecret'
|
|
_ -> pure Nothing
|
|
where
|
|
be :: Maybe C.DhSecretX25519 -> IO (Maybe (TVar C.SbChainKey, TVar C.SbChainKey))
|
|
be = mapM $ \(C.DhSecretX25519 secret) -> bimapM newTVarIO newTVarIO $ C.sbcInit sessionId secret
|
|
|
|
smpTHandle_ :: forall c p. THandleSMP c p -> VersionSMP -> VersionRangeSMP -> Maybe (THandleAuth p) -> Maybe TSbChainKeys -> THandleSMP c p
|
|
smpTHandle_ th@THandle {params} v vr thAuth encryptBlock =
|
|
-- TODO drop SMP v6: make thAuth non-optional
|
|
-- * Note: update version-based parameters in smpTHParamsSetVersion as well.
|
|
let params' =
|
|
params
|
|
{ thVersion = v,
|
|
thServerVRange = vr,
|
|
thAuth,
|
|
implySessId = v >= authCmdsSMPVersion,
|
|
encryptBlock,
|
|
serviceAuth = v >= serviceCertsSMPVersion -- optional service signature will be encoded for all commands and responses
|
|
}
|
|
in (th :: THandleSMP c p) {params = params'}
|
|
|
|
forceCertChain :: CertChainPubKey -> CertChainPubKey
|
|
forceCertChain cert@(CertChainPubKey (X.CertificateChain cc) signedKey) = length (show cc) `seq` show signedKey `seq` cert
|
|
{-# INLINE forceCertChain #-}
|
|
|
|
-- This function is only used with v >= 8, so currently it's a simple record update.
|
|
-- * Note: it requires updating version-based parameters, to be consistent with smpTHandle_.
|
|
smpTHParamsSetVersion :: VersionSMP -> THandleParams SMPVersion p -> THandleParams SMPVersion p
|
|
smpTHParamsSetVersion v params =
|
|
params
|
|
{ thVersion = v,
|
|
serviceAuth = v >= serviceCertsSMPVersion
|
|
}
|
|
{-# INLINE smpTHParamsSetVersion #-}
|
|
|
|
sendHandshake :: (Transport c, Encoding smp) => THandle v c p -> smp -> ExceptT TransportError IO ()
|
|
sendHandshake th = ExceptT . tPutBlock th . smpEncode
|
|
|
|
-- ignores tail bytes to allow future extensions
|
|
getHandshake :: (Transport c, Encoding smp) => THandle v c p -> ExceptT TransportError IO smp
|
|
getHandshake th = ExceptT $ (first (\_ -> TEHandshake PARSE) . A.parseOnly smpP =<<) <$> tGetBlock th
|
|
|
|
smpTHandle :: Transport c => c p -> THandleSMP c p
|
|
smpTHandle c = THandle {connection = c, params}
|
|
where
|
|
v = VersionSMP 0
|
|
params =
|
|
THandleParams
|
|
{ sessionId = tlsUnique c,
|
|
blockSize = smpBlockSize,
|
|
thServerVRange = versionToRange v,
|
|
thVersion = v,
|
|
thAuth = Nothing,
|
|
implySessId = False,
|
|
encryptBlock = Nothing,
|
|
batch = True,
|
|
serviceAuth = False
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
$(J.deriveJSON (sumTypeJSON id) ''HandshakeError)
|
|
|
|
$(J.deriveJSON (sumTypeJSON $ dropPrefix "TE") ''TransportError)
|