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https://github.com/vicliu624/trail-mate.git
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Trail Mate Dev
6e613e382e
Compose the CM0 fullscreen application and standard Debian package, align the Cardputer Zero shell, and share protocol, configuration, audio and storage services with embedded targets through existing platform seams. Add the paginated on-device TMAP creator using Center's published producer, private workspace recovery and direct keyboard shortcuts. Preserve unfinished management work behind its existing opt-in capability. Include native, ARM and shared-core regression fixtures, integration records, packaging helpers and dependency/license updates. Keep local build trees, device credentials, produced packages and validation logs outside version control. Validation before integration: ESP stack hygiene, Reticulum scope guard, staged whitespace checks and GitNexus scope audit. Prior device/build evidence and remaining hardware/package boundaries are recorded in the acceptance documents.
81 lines
4.7 KiB
C++
81 lines
4.7 KiB
C++
#include "chat/infra/lxmf/lxmf_wire.h"
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#include "chat/linux_reticulum_links.h"
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#include <cassert>
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#include <cstring>
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#include <filesystem>
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#include <unistd.h>
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using Identity = platform::linux_runtime::LinuxReticulumIdentity;
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namespace r = chat::reticulum;
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std::vector<uint8_t> encrypted(Identity& recipient, Identity& author, Identity& ephemeral, bool valid_signature)
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{
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uint8_t body[256], domain[384], envelope[512], signature[64], hash[32], shared[32], key[r::kDerivedTokenKeySize], iv[16]{};
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size_t body_size = sizeof(body), domain_size = sizeof(domain), envelope_size = sizeof(envelope);
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assert(chat::lxmf::encodeTextPayload(123, "", "original author", body, &body_size));
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assert(chat::lxmf::buildSignedPart(recipient.destinationHash().data(), author.destinationHash().data(), body, body_size, domain, &domain_size, hash));
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assert(author.sign(domain, domain_size, signature));
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if (!valid_signature) signature[0] ^= 1;
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assert(chat::lxmf::packMessage(recipient.destinationHash().data(), author.destinationHash().data(), signature, body, body_size, envelope, &envelope_size));
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assert(ephemeral.sharedSecret(recipient.publicKey().data(), shared));
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assert(r::hkdfSha256(shared, sizeof(shared), recipient.identityHash().data(), 16, nullptr, 0, key, sizeof(key)));
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std::vector<uint8_t> message(1024);
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std::memcpy(message.data(), recipient.destinationHash().data(), 16);
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std::memcpy(message.data() + 16, ephemeral.publicKey().data(), 32);
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size_t token_size = message.size() - 48;
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assert(r::tokenEncrypt(key, iv, envelope + 16, envelope_size - 16, message.data() + 48, &token_size));
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message.resize(48 + token_size);
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return message;
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}
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int main()
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{
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char root[] = "/tmp/trailmate-propagated-text-XXXXXX";
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assert(mkdtemp(root));
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{
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Identity recipient(std::filesystem::path(root) / "recipient.db"), author(std::filesystem::path(root) / "author.db"), ephemeral(std::filesystem::path(root) / "ephemeral.db");
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assert(recipient.begin() && author.begin() && ephemeral.begin());
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trailmate::linux_app::LinuxReticulumLinks links(recipient);
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struct Resolver
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{
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Identity& author;
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bool known = true, ignored = false;
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unsigned deliveries = 0;
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} resolver{author};
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links.setIncomingHooks([](void* context, const chat::MeshIncomingText&)
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{ ++static_cast<Resolver*>(context)->deliveries; return true; },
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[](void* context, const uint8_t* destination, uint8_t* key, bool* ignored)
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{
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auto& state = *static_cast<Resolver*>(context);
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*ignored = state.ignored;
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if (!state.known || std::memcmp(destination, state.author.destinationHash().data(), 16)) return false;
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std::memcpy(key, state.author.publicKey().data(), 64);
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return true;
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},
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&resolver);
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auto message = encrypted(recipient, author, ephemeral, true);
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chat::MeshIncomingText incoming;
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uint8_t hash[32]{};
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assert(links.decodePropagatedText(message.data(), message.size(), nullptr, incoming, hash));
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assert(incoming.text == "original author" && incoming.encrypted && !incoming.source_unverified);
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assert(!std::memcmp(incoming.reticulum_identity.destination_hash, author.destinationHash().data(), 16));
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assert(!std::memcmp(hash, incoming.reticulum_lxmf_hash, 32));
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assert(resolver.deliveries == 0 && links.statistics().pending_incoming == 0);
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// Failed validation must not mutate caller-owned acceptance state.
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const auto original_hash = std::vector<uint8_t>(hash, hash + 32);
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incoming.text = "unchanged";
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resolver.known = false;
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assert(!links.decodePropagatedText(message.data(), message.size(), nullptr, incoming, hash));
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resolver.known = true;
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resolver.ignored = true;
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assert(!links.decodePropagatedText(message.data(), message.size(), nullptr, incoming, hash));
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resolver.ignored = false;
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auto invalid = encrypted(recipient, author, ephemeral, false);
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assert(!links.decodePropagatedText(invalid.data(), invalid.size(), nullptr, incoming, hash));
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message.back() ^= 1;
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assert(!links.decodePropagatedText(message.data(), message.size(), nullptr, incoming, hash));
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message[0] ^= 1;
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assert(!links.decodePropagatedText(message.data(), message.size(), nullptr, incoming, hash));
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assert(incoming.text == "unchanged" && !std::memcmp(hash, original_hash.data(), 32) && resolver.deliveries == 0);
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}
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std::filesystem::remove_all(root);
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}
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