security: revalidate MQTT auth and revoke owner sessions

backend/package.json

@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@
     "stats:seed-chart-snapshot": "node dist/tools/seedStatsChartSnapshot.js",
     "db:lifecycle": "node dist/tools/dataLifecycle.js",
     "owner-auth:inventory": "node dist/tools/inventoryOwnerAuthorization.js",
+    "owner-auth:revoke": "node dist/tools/revokeOwnerSessions.js",
     "analysis:cleanup-orphans": "node dist/tools/cleanupOrphanedAnalysisRuns.js",
     "bench:decode": "tsx src/tools/benchmarkPacketDecode.ts",
     "load:realtime": "tsx src/tools/loadRealtime.ts",

backend/src/api/routes.ts

@@ -138,9 +138,8 @@ async function requireOwnerSession(req: Request, res: Response): Promise<string[
     res.status(401).json({ error: 'Not logged in' });
     return null;
   }
-  // BUG-010: reject sessions minted under a revoked password. The generation
+  // Reject sessions minted before an operator password reset. The revocation
-  // is bumped when the broker rejects a previously-valid credential; sessions
+  // tool bumps the generation; every owner request checks it before authorizing.
-  // carrying an older generation are stale and must re-authenticate.
   const currentGen = await getOwnerCredentialGeneration(session.mqttUsername);
   if (session.gen !== currentGen) {
     res.clearCookie(OWNER_COOKIE_NAME, { path: '/' });

backend/src/api/routes/owner.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,84 @@
+import assert from 'node:assert/strict';
+import { once } from 'node:events';
+import type { AddressInfo } from 'node:net';
+import test from 'node:test';
+import express, { Router, type RequestHandler } from 'express';
+import type { QueryResultRow } from 'pg';
+import { registerOwnerRoutes } from './owner.js';
+import { getOwnerSession, encryptOwnerSession } from '../../owner/ownerSession.js';
+
+const NODE_ID = 'A1'.repeat(32);
+const passThroughLimiter: RequestHandler = (_req, _res, next) => next();
+const TEST_COOKIE_SECRET = 'test-owner-cookie-secret-at-least-32-bytes';
+
+async function startOwnerRoutes(options: {
+  currentGeneration?: () => Promise<number>;
+  verifyCredentials?: (username: string, password: string) => Promise<boolean>;
+} = {}): Promise<{ baseUrl: string; close: () => Promise<void>; restore: () => void }> {
+  const previousSecret = process.env['OWNER_COOKIE_SECRET'];
+  process.env['OWNER_COOKIE_SECRET'] = TEST_COOKIE_SECRET;
+  const router = Router();
+  registerOwnerRoutes(router, {
+    ownerCookieName: 'meshcore_owner_session',
+    ownerLiveCacheTtlMs: 1_000,
+    ownerLiveCache: new Map(),
+    ownerDashboardCacheTtlMs: 1_000,
+    ownerLastHopCacheTtlMs: 1_000,
+    ownerSessionTtlMs: 60_000,
+    mqttUsernameMaxLen: 128,
+    mqttPasswordMaxLen: 128,
+    ownerLoginLimiter: passThroughLimiter as Parameters<typeof registerOwnerRoutes>[1]['ownerLoginLimiter'],
+    hasControlChars: (value) => /[\u0000-\u001F\u007F]/.test(value),
+    verifyMqttCredentials: options.verifyCredentials ?? (async () => true),
+    resolveOwnerNodeIds: async () => [NODE_ID],
+    autoLinkOwnerNodeIds: async () => [NODE_ID],
+    buildOwnerDashboard: async (nodeIds) => ({ nodes: nodeIds.map((nodeId) => ({ node_id: nodeId })) }),
+    encryptOwnerSession,
+    isSecureRequest: () => false,
+    getOwnerSession: (req) => getOwnerSession(req, 'meshcore_owner_session'),
+    requireOwnerSession: async () => [NODE_ID],
+    getOwnerCredentialGeneration: options.currentGeneration ?? (async () => 2),
+    invalidateOwnerNodeIdCache: () => undefined,
+    query: async <T extends QueryResultRow = QueryResultRow>() => ({ rows: [] as T[] }),
+  });
+  const app = express();
+  app.use(express.json());
+  app.use(router);
+  const server = app.listen(0, '127.0.0.1');
+  await once(server, 'listening');
+  const { port } = server.address() as AddressInfo;
+
+  return {
+    baseUrl: `http://127.0.0.1:${port}`,
+    close: async () => {
+      server.close();
+      await once(server, 'close');
+    },
+    restore: () => {
+      if (previousSecret === undefined) delete process.env['OWNER_COOKIE_SECRET'];
+      else process.env['OWNER_COOKIE_SECRET'] = previousSecret;
+    },
+  };
+}
+
+test('owner session route rejects cookies from an older credential generation', async () => {
+  const ownerServer = await startOwnerRoutes();
+  const token = encryptOwnerSession({
+    v: 3,
+    mqttUsername: 'owner',
+    exp: Date.now() + 60_000,
+    gen: 1,
+  });
+
+  try {
+    const response = await fetch(`${ownerServer.baseUrl}/owner/session`, {
+      headers: { cookie: `meshcore_owner_session=${token}` },
+    });
+
+    assert.equal(response.status, 401);
+    assert.equal((await response.json() as { error: string }).error, 'Credentials have been rotated — please log in again');
+  } finally {
+    await ownerServer.close();
+    ownerServer.restore();
+  }
+});

backend/src/owner/mqttCredentialVerifier.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+import assert from 'node:assert/strict';
+import test from 'node:test';
+import { createMqttCredentialVerifier } from './mqttCredentialVerifier.js';
+
+test('rechecks unchanged MQTT credentials against the broker on every login', async () => {
+  let checks = 0;
+  const verify = createMqttCredentialVerifier(async (username, password) => {
+    checks++;
+    assert.equal(username, 'owner');
+    assert.equal(password, 'unchanged-password');
+    return checks === 1;
+  });
+
+  assert.equal(await verify('owner', 'unchanged-password'), true);
+  assert.equal(await verify('owner', 'unchanged-password'), false);
+  assert.equal(checks, 2);
+});

backend/src/owner/mqttCredentialVerifier.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
+export type BrokerCredentialCheck = (mqttUsername: string, mqttPassword: string) => Promise<boolean>;
+
+/** Verify each login against the broker so cached success cannot outlive a password reset. */
+export function createMqttCredentialVerifier(check: BrokerCredentialCheck): BrokerCredentialCheck {
+  return (mqttUsername, mqttPassword) => check(mqttUsername, mqttPassword);
+}

backend/src/owner/ownerAccess.ts

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 import mqtt from 'mqtt';
-import { createHash, randomBytes } from 'node:crypto';
+import { randomBytes } from 'node:crypto';
 import { Redis } from 'ioredis';
 import { BoundedTtlMap } from '../cache/boundedTtlMap.js';
 import { getOwnerNodeIdsForUsername } from '../db/ownerAuth.js';
@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ import { getRedisConnectionOptions, getRedisUrl } from '../platform/config/redis
 import { reconcileOwnerAuthorization } from './ownerAclReconciler.js';
 import { groupOwnerNodes, type OwnerDashboardRow } from './ownerDashboard.js';
 import { parseOwnerGrantConfig } from './ownerGrantConfig.js';
+import { createMqttCredentialVerifier } from './mqttCredentialVerifier.js';
 
 function normalizeNodeIds(nodeIds: string[]): string[] {
   return Array.from(new Set(
@@ -93,50 +94,12 @@ export async function autoLinkOwnerNodeIds(mqttUsername: string): Promise<string
   return resolveOwnerNodeIds(mqttUsername);
 }
 
-// Verifying credentials means opening a full MQTT connection to the broker
+export const verifyMqttCredentials = createMqttCredentialVerifier(verifyMqttCredentialsViaBroker);
-// (5s connect timeout, 6s hard cap) — the dominant cost of a login. Cache
-// successful verifications per username for a short window so repeat logins
-// (and the 30-day cookie re-auth flows) skip the broker round-trip. The cache
-// key is a hash of the exact username+password, so a changed/rotated password
-// misses and re-verifies. Only positive results are cached.
-const AUTH_CACHE_TTL_MS = Number(process.env['OWNER_AUTH_CACHE_TTL_MS'] ?? 5 * 60_000);
-const authCache = new BoundedTtlMap<string, { credentialHash: string; ts: number }>({
-  name: 'owner_auth',
-  maxEntries: Number(process.env['OWNER_AUTH_CACHE_MAX_ENTRIES'] ?? 512),
-  maxWeight: 2 * 1024 * 1024,
-  ttlMs: AUTH_CACHE_TTL_MS,
-});
-
-function credentialHash(mqttUsername: string, mqttPassword: string): string {
-  return createHash('sha256').update(`${mqttUsername}\u0000${mqttPassword}`).digest('hex');
-}
-
-export function verifyMqttCredentials(mqttUsername: string, mqttPassword: string): Promise<boolean> {
-  const hash = credentialHash(mqttUsername, mqttPassword);
-  const cached = authCache.get(mqttUsername);
-  if (cached && cached.credentialHash === hash && Date.now() - cached.ts < AUTH_CACHE_TTL_MS) {
-    return Promise.resolve(true);
-  }
-  return verifyMqttCredentialsViaBroker(mqttUsername, mqttPassword).then((ok) => {
-    if (ok) {
-      authCache.set(mqttUsername, { credentialHash: hash, ts: Date.now() });
-    } else if (cached && cached.credentialHash === hash) {
-      // Same credential that previously worked now rejected (revoked) — drop it
-      // AND bump the credential generation so every live owner session minted
-      // under the old password is invalidated immediately.
-      authCache.delete(mqttUsername);
-      void bumpOwnerCredentialGeneration(mqttUsername);
-    }
-    return ok;
-  });
-}
 
 // ---- Credential generation (BUG-010) ----
-// Owner sessions are stateless signed cookies with a 30-day TTL. To make
+// Owner sessions record the credential generation that minted them. The
-// password revocation effective immediately, every session records the
+// operator revocation command bumps this Redis value after a password reset,
-// credential generation that minted it. When the broker rejects a previously
+// and every authenticated owner request compares it with the cookie generation.
-// valid password (the only signal the backend has that a password changed),
-// the generation is bumped in Redis and all older sessions stop validating.
 const OWNER_CRED_GEN_KEY = (username: string) => `owner:credential-gen:${username}`;
 const OWNER_CRED_GEN_TTL_MS = 90 * 24 * 60 * 60 * 1000;
 
@@ -154,27 +117,35 @@ function getCredGenRedis(): Redis {
 export async function getOwnerCredentialGeneration(mqttUsername: string): Promise<number> {
   try {
     const value = await getCredGenRedis().get(OWNER_CRED_GEN_KEY(mqttUsername));
-    const parsed = value === null ? NaN : Number(value);
+    if (value === null) return 0;
-    return Number.isFinite(parsed) && parsed > 0 ? parsed : 0;
+    const parsed = Number(value);
+    if (!Number.isSafeInteger(parsed) || parsed < 0) {
+      throw new Error('INVALID_OWNER_CREDENTIAL_GENERATION');
+    }
+    return parsed;
   } catch (error) {
-    console.error('[owner-credgen] read failed, treating as 0', error instanceof Error ? error.message : error);
+    console.error('[owner-credgen] read failed', error instanceof Error ? error.message : error);
-    return 0;
+    throw new Error('OWNER_CREDENTIAL_GENERATION_UNAVAILABLE', { cause: error });
   }
 }
 
 /**
  * Bump the credential generation, invalidating every session minted under an
- * older password. Failures are logged but non-fatal: the next login still
+ * older password. Errors propagate so an operator reset cannot report success
- * succeeds and re-records the current generation.
+ * unless revocation was recorded.
  */
 export async function bumpOwnerCredentialGeneration(mqttUsername: string): Promise<void> {
-  try {
+  const redis = getCredGenRedis();
-    const redis = getCredGenRedis();
+  const key = OWNER_CRED_GEN_KEY(mqttUsername);
-    await redis.incr(OWNER_CRED_GEN_KEY(mqttUsername));
+  await redis.incr(key);
-    await redis.pexpire(OWNER_CRED_GEN_KEY(mqttUsername), OWNER_CRED_GEN_TTL_MS);
+  await redis.pexpire(key, OWNER_CRED_GEN_TTL_MS);
-  } catch (error) {
+}
-    console.error('[owner-credgen] bump failed', error instanceof Error ? error.message : error);
+
-  }
+export async function closeOwnerCredentialGenerationClient(): Promise<void> {
+  if (!credGenRedis) return;
+  const client = credGenRedis;
+  credGenRedis = null;
+  await client.quit();
 }
 
 function verifyMqttCredentialsViaBroker(mqttUsername: string, mqttPassword: string): Promise<boolean> {

backend/src/tools/revokeOwnerSessions.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+import {
+  bumpOwnerCredentialGeneration,
+  closeOwnerCredentialGenerationClient,
+} from '../owner/ownerAccess.js';
+
+async function main(): Promise<void> {
+  const mqttUsername = process.argv[2]?.trim() ?? '';
+  if (process.argv.length !== 3 || !/^[A-Za-z0-9_.@-]{1,128}$/.test(mqttUsername)) {
+    console.error('Usage: node dist/tools/revokeOwnerSessions.js <mqtt-username>');
+    process.exitCode = 2;
+    return;
+  }
+
+  try {
+    await bumpOwnerCredentialGeneration(mqttUsername);
+    console.log(`Revoked owner sessions for ${mqttUsername}`);
+  } catch (error) {
+    console.error(
+      'Could not revoke owner sessions:',
+      error instanceof Error ? error.message : String(error),
+    );
+    process.exitCode = 1;
+  } finally {
+    try {
+      await closeOwnerCredentialGenerationClient();
+    } catch (error) {
+      console.error(
+        'Could not close owner credential generation connection:',
+        error instanceof Error ? error.message : String(error),
+      );
+      process.exitCode = 1;
+    }
+  }
+}
+
+void main();

docs/runbook-owner-auth.md

@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+# Owner credential rotation
+
+Owner cookies include the Redis credential generation that was current at login.
+The owner session route and protected owner routes compare that generation on
+each request. Cookies expire after seven days.
+
+After changing a Mosquitto password, revoke existing owner sessions immediately
+by running the backend tool with the affected MQTT username:
+
+```sh
+docker exec meshcore-analytics-backend-1 \
+  node dist/tools/revokeOwnerSessions.js <mqtt-username>
+```
+
+The command fails if Redis cannot record the new generation. Confirm success
+before treating password rotation as complete. Do not pass the password to this
+command or record it in logs.