- clientErrors.ts: window.onerror/unhandledrejection for BOTH domains via main.tsx
(was app-only in App.tsx); resource-failure classification; telemetry=off gate;
console.error hook (kind warning) with terrain-tiles noise filter; page field
now pathname-only (no query strings)
- PrivacyPage at /privacy linked from footer + cookie banner; docs/privacy.md LIA
- retention: packet_decryptions added to row-table retention targets; packets
180d->30d in lifecycle policies; migration 050 schedules timescaledb retention
jobs (packets 30d, node_status 180d, node_neighbor 7d) that never existed
- migration 050: packet_paths hypertable (content-stripped path store, no
retention) + backfill of 2.56M path-bearing packets + ingest dual-write
* fix(owner): Wave 3 mediums — password handling, deploy rollback, newuser races, session revocation
- BUG-017: stop trimming MQTT passwords (frontend + backend). A valid
broker password may begin/end with whitespace; trimming made it
permanently unauthenticatable. Username trimming unchanged.
- BUG-013: deploy-website.sh now set -Eeuo pipefail with an EXIT rollback
trap armed only after the pin mutates; container-down and bundle-mismatch
paths fail loudly and restore the old pin + verify the restored service.
- BUG-012: newuser.sh installs an EXIT trap (ERR does not fire on explicit
exit 1 from die()) so every post-mutation failure rolls back; rollback is
idempotent and a no-op before any mutation flag. Disarm points clear EXIT.
- BUG-011: newuser.sh re-reads + re-validates OWNER_MQTT_USERNAME_MAP under
the re-acquired lock after the long unlocked discovery window, then merges
the new grant into the current map — concurrent provisioning runs can no
longer be overwritten by a stale snapshot.
- BUG-010: owner sessions are now v3 cookies carrying a credential
generation (Redis-backed). When the broker rejects a previously-valid
password (revocation detected), the generation bumps and every older
session is rejected on the next request. TTL shortened 30d -> 7d.
Verified: tsc clean, 310/310 backend tests pass, bash -n on both scripts.
* fix(alert-receiver): durable alert delivery with bounded retry + dead-letter (BUG-014)
Forwarding was fire-and-forget: failures logged asynchronously after HTTP 202,
/healthz stayed green, and alerts could be archived to the local JSONL while
operators never saw them. Now:
- Every receipt is enqueued for delivery with bounded exponential backoff
(ALERT_FORWARD_MAX_ATTEMPTS=5, base 1s, cap 60s) and dead-lettered to
receipts.jsonl.dead after exhausting attempts.
- /healthz keeps returning 200 (compose wget healthcheck must not restart
the container) but the body reports degraded status + detail; new /readyz
returns 503 when ALERT_FORWARD_URL is unset (archive-only), no successful
forward since startup, or alerts stuck undelivered >5min.
Verified: tsc clean, 310/310 tests pass.
* fix(ci): classify reviewed public channel keys + fixtures in gitleaks (BUG-009)
The nightly full-history secret scan flagged 42 findings spanning the
documented community channel keys (VALIDATED_CHANNELS — intentionally
public, each verified to decrypt real UK Mesh group text), fake test
fixtures, and a deployed-commit SHA in the website live manifests. That
made a genuine credential easy to dismiss among expected hits.
- Rule-scoped allowlists with exact fingerprints (regexTarget: secret,
anchored full-value matches) for the Public channel key, test fixtures
(0123456789... / abcdef0123...), and the manifest commit SHA.
- Structure-exact line allowlist for channelRegistry.ts VALIDATED_CHANNELS.
- Verified locally with gitleaks 8.24.3 full-history scan: 42 -> 0 findings.
* fix(viewshed): side-effect completion markers prevent skipped link jobs (BUG-006)
store_coverage() commits on an autocommit connection, then the worker queues
physical-link jobs and publishes Redis notifications. A Redis failure after
the DB commit NACKed the job; on retry already_calculated() saw the coverage
row and returned early — link work and frontend notifications were skipped
forever.
- Record a Redis completion marker (viewshed:side-effects:<node>) only after
EVERY side effect succeeds.
- On the already_calculated early return, a missing marker triggers an
idempotent replay: link jobs are re-enqueued from the stored node position
(admission is idempotent) and coverage_update/node_upsert notifications are
re-published from the stored coverage row.
- Redis read failures are treated as incomplete (replay attempt re-raises and
NACKs rather than silently skipping).
- Added tests/test_side_effect_markers.py (5 tests) with a conftest that stubs
osgeo/psycopg2 so pure-logic worker tests run without GDAL (CI keeps real
GDAL via setdefault). Verified: 5/5 new tests pass; full suite 34 passed,
2 GDAL-required terrain tests fail only in stub env (pass in CI image).
---------
Co-authored-by: hermes-gadget <hermes-gadget@users.noreply.github.com>
* fix(ci): pin gitleaks-action to valid commit after upstream force-push
Upstream deleted dcedce43 (force-push), so every ci.yml run fails at
workflow-parse with 0 jobs. The dependabot actions-group bump (#30)
contains this fix but cannot merge whole: its docker/* actions require
node24, which GitHub runners do not support yet. Pin gitleaks alone
(ff98106e is node20).
* fix(ci): downgrade v7 actions to node20-compatible versions
actions/checkout@v7, setup-node@v7, setup-python@v7 require node24,
which GitHub-hosted runners do not support yet — every ci.yml run has
failed at workflow-parse (0 jobs) since the Aug 3 v7 bump. Pin to the
latest node20 versions (checkout v4, setup-node v4, setup-python v5).
Also pins gitleaks-action to a valid commit (upstream force-pushed away
dcedce43).
* ci: noop retrigger
* fix(ci): escape literal ${{ in bash string so GitHub parser accepts workflow
The 'Validate tracked build and Compose inventory' step matched literal
${{ inside run-block strings, which GitHub's expression parser reads as
the start of an expression (${{'* is invalid) — the workflow fails at
parse time with 0 jobs. Split the literal as '$''{{' (bash concatenates
adjacent quoted strings at runtime; the source no longer contains a
contiguous ${{).
* fix(ci): resolve all three pre-existing ukmesh CI failures
Backend (packetBatchWriteCoalesce):
- 045: restore nodes_public_visibility_generation trigger — 015 is
superseded by 044 on fresh DBs so the trigger was never created,
leaving generation/visibility_generation out of sync and public
packet reads returning empty.
- 046: restore packet privacy classification — the 042 fence design
assumes sync_private_node_prefixes rewrites packets on privacy
change, but 026's version only maintains prefixes. Node flips to
private left old packets visible; direct SQL inserts were never
classified. Restore the packet rewrite in the sync trigger and add
a BEFORE INSERT trigger mirroring the batch path's is_private /
visibility_ok computation.
- packetBatch.integration.test.ts: exclude the prefix-cache refresh
query from statementCount (matches unit-test convention).
Frontend e2e:
- public.spec.ts: assert the TopologyMap component's actual labels
('Geographic repeater topology map', '2 mapped repeaters · 2
observed relationships') instead of the pre-map SVG graph labels.
Workers (pip install):
- viewshed-worker: bump numpy 1.26.4→2.3.5, scipy 1.13.1→1.16.3,
psycopg2-binary 2.9.10→2.9.11 (cp314 wheels); the base gdal image
ships Python 3.14 so the old pins had no wheels. Inherit shapely
from the image's python3-shapely apt package (no cp314 wheel
exists; source builds are GEOS 3.14-incompatible).
* fix(ci): restore data-plane services for compose validation and smoke test
Commit 8c5e1c8 split the long-lived data-plane services (timescaledb,
mosquitto, redis, mosquitto-reloader) into the external meshcore-infra
project on the live host, but the Workers-and-Compose CI job still
asserted their presence in the app compose project (max_worker_processes
check, inventory check, smoke-test execs). CI had been broken since
Aug 3 so the mismatch was never caught.
Add docker-compose.ci.yml — a CI-only overlay restoring the four
data-plane services from their pre-split definitions — and point every
compose invocation in the Workers-and-Compose job at
'-f docker-compose.yml -f docker-compose.ci.yml'.
Validated locally: merged config parses, the jq assertions and the full
inventory (db-migrate backend app-ukmesh website-ukmesh website-dev
mesh-health-check mosquitto-reloader link-worker link-backfill-worker
hopreach timescaledb mosquitto) all pass.
* fix(ci): include dev profile in compose inventory check
website-dev is a dev-profile service; the inventory gate compared the
base-config service list, so the merged stack never matched. This gate
has been red since the workflow was first written (CI parse-broken from
Aug 3 until the gitleaks pin landed).
* fix(ci): db-migrate must wait for timescaledb health
The Aug 9 data-plane split removed db-migrate's depends_on along with
the timescaledb service definition, so the migration runner raced the
fresh database init in the empty-volume smoke test and failed on the
not-yet-created base schema. Restore the pre-split condition:
timescaledb service_healthy.
* fix(ci): restore internal TCP MQTT listener for smoke test + exporter
Commit 40e843f dropped the 1883 TCP listener, breaking the CI smoke
(mosquitto_pub targets 1883) and the Prometheus mosquitto exporter.
The listener is internal-only: compose never publishes 1883 on the
host, and the password/ACL policy still applies.
---------
Co-authored-by: gadgethd <111318106+gadgethd@users.noreply.github.com>
gadgethd