docs(mqtt): correct what the WS buffer padding actually fixes

The comment claimed the (WS_BUFFER_SIZE + 1) padding makes an oversized
upgrade response "fail cleanly (Upgrade header not found)". Reading
release/v4.4 transport_ws.c against release/v5.3 shows it does not.

v4.4's response loop is

    } while (NULL == strstr(ws->buffer, "\r\n\r\n") && header_len < WS_BUFFER_SIZE);

so it also exits when the buffer fills without the terminator, and the code
then looks for "Sec-WebSocket-Accept:" and returns 0 if it is present. That
header appears early in a response, so an oversized header block yields a
BOGUS SUCCESS rather than a clean failure: the unread remainder stays queued
on the socket and is delivered as the first post-upgrade read, where the
deframer parses HTTP bytes as a WebSocket frame header.

Observed on hardware 2026-08-12 on a Heltec V4: a Cloudflare Page Shield CSP
report-uri header pushed the 101 response past the buffer, and the tail of
that header ("csp-reporting.cloudflare.com/cdn-cgi/script_monitor/report?")
reached the MQTT layer as payload, surfacing as
"Invalid MSG_TYPE response: 3" (0x35 = '5', high nibble 3).

The padding's real and only value is preventing the one-byte overflow of the
heap canary, which is still worth having. Narrow the comment to that claim and
record where the parser fix has to come from: IDF 5.2+ requires the "\r\n\r\n"
delimiter, memmoves the bytes following it, and fails cleanly when the buffer
fills. It cannot be patched here, since transport_ws.c ships precompiled in
libtcp_transport.a on Arduino 2.x.

No functional change.

(cherry picked from commit 9894e65e8ad961704d430a12a065baffda353f50)
This commit is contained in:
agessaman committed 2026-08-14 09:47:40 -07:00
1 parent 94c464cd61
commit 41d8bced18
1 file changed
+15 -4
+15 -4
View File
@@ -33,13 +33,24 @@
// Fix: [esp32_base] adds `-Wl,--wrap=esp_transport_ws_init`, so every
// creation of a WS transport (esp-mqtt does one per wss slot) is routed
// through __wrap_esp_transport_ws_init below, which replaces the freshly
// allocated 1024-byte buffer with a (WS_BUFFER_SIZE + 1)-byte one. The
// out-of-bounds index WS_BUFFER_SIZE then lands on our extra byte and the
// handshake fails cleanly ("Upgrade" header not found) instead of corrupting
// the heap. Upstream fixed this in ESP-IDF 5.x, so this file compiles to a
// allocated 1024-byte buffer with a (WS_BUFFER_SIZE + 1)-byte one, so the
// out-of-bounds index WS_BUFFER_SIZE lands on our extra byte instead of the
// heap canary. Upstream fixed this in ESP-IDF 5.x, so this file compiles to a
// pass-through there and can be deleted (together with the --wrap flag) when
// the fork moves to Arduino core 3.x.
//
// Scope: this stops the heap corruption and NOTHING else. It does not make an
// oversized response fail the handshake — v4.4's read loop also exits on
// `header_len < WS_BUFFER_SIZE` going false, and then still accepts the
// connection if "Sec-WebSocket-Accept:" was inside those first bytes (it comes
// early, so it usually is). ws_connect() therefore returns success on a partial
// header block and the unread remainder arrives as the first "payload" read,
// where the deframer parses HTTP bytes as a frame header. Observed on hardware
// 2026-08-12: a large Cloudflare CSP header produced exactly that, surfacing as
// `Invalid MSG_TYPE response: 3`. Only IDF 5.2+ fixes it (it requires the
// "\r\n\r\n" delimiter, preserves the bytes after it, and fails cleanly when the
// buffer fills); it cannot be patched here because transport_ws.c is precompiled.
//
// transport_ws_t below is copied verbatim from ESP-IDF release/v4.4
// transport_ws.c (the struct is file-private, so it is not in any shipped
// header). Source fidelity was verified against the shipped binary: addr2line