/api/login locked every client for 30 s after five failures from anyone.
Anyone who could reach the login page could keep the owner locked out by
failing on purpose. If no login succeeded after a lockout, the lock also
returned from 2^31 to 2^32 ms (about 24.9 to 49.7 days) later, because the
deadline was never cleared and was compared as a signed difference.
Count failures per remote address instead. Five failures lock that address
for 30 s, as before. A shared budget caps failures from all addresses
together, so changing address does not add guesses: it holds six failures
and refills one every 6 s, the old global rate, so one failing address can
never empty it on its own. While it is empty every client waits, as before.
Lock times are measured as elapsed time.
The policy is a pure header, WebConfigLoginThrottle.h.
test_webconfig_login_throttle.py runs it directly (isolation, boundaries,
one-hour rate bounds, millis() half-wrap, saturation, eviction) and runs the
real handleLogin with ArduinoJson under ASan/UBSan. Putting every client on
one key, as the old code did, fails the handler test.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The Wi-Fi, LoRa first-stage and Partition Expander bridges serve an
unauthenticated /update behind an AP whose password was fixed and published,
so anyone in range during a migration could upload firmware while the private
key is staged. Use the old node's saved admin password as the WPA2
passphrase, read from /com_prefs or /node_prefs at offset 56 as the firmware
loads it. The operator already used that password to start the old updater.
Fall back to the published password, with a serial warning, when the saved
admin password is missing, unreadable, shorter than 8 characters or not
printable ASCII, so no node becomes unreachable. The legacy filesystem is
mounted without formatting and the password is never printed. Migration
admission, flash sequencing, /update gating and the USB bridge are unchanged.
Update both guides and the package README.
Add a sanitizer-backed host test that compiles the bridge's actual Wi-Fi
block against fake SPIFFS and WiFi: both boots, file precedence, WPA2 length
and terminator bounds, printable characters, stock 1.10/1.11 file sizes,
truncated fields, and mount, seek and partial-read failures. It fails 8 of 8
on the previous code and catches 27 of 27 code mutations. Verified 13 related
host test files and the esp32_s3_4mb_partition_migrator build.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
On a room server the guest password grants Read/Write, which the login
replay store treats as a role that needs a durable record. Every new
guest-password identity therefore took one of the 128 permanent slots,
and once they were used up the store failed closed for every new
identity, including a new administrator device, until the filesystem was
erased. Rooms often publish the guest password.
A guest-password Read/Write session (one without explicitly assigned
permissions) now uses the policy public readers already use: it must
beat its in-boot timestamp and any record the identity already has,
which is still advanced, but it never creates a new record.
Administrator logins and explicitly assigned roles keep the durable
reservation and still fail closed on a full store.
Tests: test_room_login_replay_capacity.py runs the real room login
handler against the real ClientACL replay store with ASan/UBSan: guest
churn cannot lock out a new admin or assigned writer, a former admin's
record still binds guest-password logins, and a store full of privileged
records still refuses a new admin. It fails 2 of 3 on the previous code.
Two expectations in test_room_login_integration.py and the login profile
contract follow the new policy.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Adapt the optional onboard-radio probe for RAK3401 and RAK4631 cores using the external RAK13302 image. Preserve SPI1 radio ownership, external FEM startup, and ordinary RAK4631 primary-radio operation.
Probe before boot voltage protection, bound missing-chip waits, release temporary pads, and confirm cold sleep without waking the chip. Add sanitizer-backed host regression tests and CI coverage.
mikecarper