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docs(security): update SLSA provenance section to include Android APK and Flatpak attestation details

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Ivan
2026-05-03 00:37:00 -05:00
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SECURITY.md
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@@ -55,6 +55,6 @@ Official release binaries and packages are built in **automation on GitHub**, no
- **CI:** Automated pipelines (hosted on GitHub Actions) run dependency and configuration scanning (including **Trivy** and **pip-audit** on relevant paths), build checks, and security-relevant automated tests (authentication, path safety on dangerous operations, schema upgrades, backup/restore, rate limiting and access logging, and related areas). SRI integrity tests verify that external WASM/JS files match their declared hashes without regenerating the integrity manifests. CI will fail if you update these files without regenerating the integrity manifests.
- **Action pinning:** Third-party GitHub Actions are referenced with **pinned commit SHAs** in workflow definitions to reduce unexpected upgrades.
- **Releases:** Tagged release artifacts for Linux, Windows, and macOS are produced in CI. **SLSA Build Level 3–style provenance** for those artifacts is generated via the **generic** SLSA GitHub generator (`generator_generic_slsa3.yml` at release **v2.1.0**), which satisfies the **isolated builder and signed provenance** expectations for that tier; **distribution** (draft releases, mirrors) and **consumer verification** remain your operational controls, as described in upstream SLSA documentation.
- **Releases:** Tagged release artifacts for Linux, Windows, and macOS are produced in CI; when the pipeline also produces Android APK and/or Flatpak bundles for the tag, those binaries are included in a separate **SLSA** attestation (`meshchatx-android-flatpak-<tag>.intoto.jsonl`). **SLSA Build Level 3–style provenance** for those subjects is generated via the **generic** SLSA GitHub generator (`generator_generic_slsa3.yml` at release **v2.1.0**), which satisfies the **isolated builder and signed provenance** expectations for that tier; **distribution** (draft releases, mirrors) and **consumer verification** remain your operational controls, as described in upstream SLSA documentation.
- **Transparency logs:** Many Sigstore flows write to the **public Rekor** log (`https://rekor.sigstore.dev` by default). **Repository-key** `*.cosign.bundle` files next to release artifacts are built **without** a Rekor entry; with **Cosign v3+**, verify them against `cosign.pub` using `cosign verify-blob-attestation` and `--insecure-ignore-tlog=true` (signature and predicate are still checked against the public key). Private-repo or air-gapped policies may require different Sigstore settings; operators should align `COSIGN_REKOR_URL` and related variables with their own governance.
- **Cosign public key:** When repository key-based signing is used, the **public** key is published in-repo as `cosign.pub` so verifiers do not need a separate out-of-band key hunt. **Key rotation:** replace the GitHub secret holding the private key and update `cosign.pub` in the repository; older releases remain verifiable with the key that was current at build time.