fix(channel-decrypt): pure-JS SHA-256/HMAC fallback for HTTP context (P0 follow-up to #1021) (#1027)

## P0: PSK channel decryption silently failed on HTTP origins

User reported PSK key `372a9c93260507adcbf36a84bec0f33d` "still doesn't
work" after PRs #1021 (AES-ECB pure-JS) and #1024 (PSK UX) merged.
Reproduced end-to-end and found the actual remaining bug.

### Root cause

PR #1021 fixed the AES-ECB path by vendoring a pure-JS core, but
**SHA-256 and HMAC-SHA256 in `public/channel-decrypt.js` are still
pinned to `crypto.subtle`**. `SubtleCrypto` is exposed **only in secure
contexts** (HTTPS / localhost); when CoreScope is served over plain HTTP
— common for self-hosted instances — `crypto.subtle` is `undefined`,
and:

- `computeChannelHash(key)` → `Cannot read properties of undefined
(reading 'digest')`
- `verifyMAC(...)` → `Cannot read properties of undefined (reading
'importKey')`

Both throws are swallowed by `addUserChannel`'s `try/catch`, so the only
user-visible signal is the toast `"Failed to decrypt"` with no
console-friendly explanation. Verdict: PR #1021 only fixed half of the
crypto-in-insecure-context problem.

### Reproduction (no browser required)

`test-channel-decrypt-insecure-context.js` loads the production
`public/channel-decrypt.js` in a `vm` sandbox where `crypto.subtle` is
undefined (mirrors HTTP browser). Pre-fix it failed 8/8 with the exact
error above; post-fix it passes 8/8.

### Fix

- New `public/vendor/sha256-hmac.js`: minimal pure-JS SHA-256 +
HMAC-SHA256 (FIPS-180-4 + RFC 2104, ~120 LOC, MIT). Verified against
Node `crypto` for SHA-256 (empty / "abc" / 1000 bytes) and RFC 4231
HMAC-SHA256 TC1.
- `public/channel-decrypt.js`: `hasSubtle()` guard. `deriveKey`,
`computeChannelHash`, and `verifyMAC` use `crypto.subtle` when available
and fall back to `window.PureCrypto` otherwise. Same API, same return
types, same async signatures.
- `public/index.html`: load `vendor/sha256-hmac.js` immediately before
`channel-decrypt.js` (mirrors the `vendor/aes-ecb.js` wiring from
#1021).

### TDD

- **Red** (`8075b55`): `test-channel-decrypt-insecure-context.js` — runs
the **unmodified** prod module in a no-`subtle` sandbox, asserts on the
known PSK key (hash byte `0xb7`) and synthetic encrypted packet
round-trip. Compiles, runs, **fails 8/8 on assertions** (not on import
errors).
- **Green** (`232add6`): vendor + delegate. Test passes 8/8.
- Wired into `test-all.sh` and `.github/workflows/deploy.yml` so CI
gates the regression.

### Validation (all green post-fix)

| Test | Result |
|---|---|
| `test-channel-decrypt-insecure-context.js` | 8/8 |
| `test-channel-decrypt-ecb.js` (#1021 KAT) | 7/7 |
| `test-channel-decrypt-m345.js` (existing) | 24/24 |
| `test-channel-psk-ux.js` (#1024) | 19/19 |
| `test-packet-filter.js` | 69/69 |

### Files changed

- `public/vendor/sha256-hmac.js` — **new** (~150 LOC, MIT, decrypt-side
only)
- `public/channel-decrypt.js` — `hasSubtle()` guard + fallback in
`deriveKey`/`computeChannelHash`/`verifyMAC`
- `public/index.html` — script tag for `vendor/sha256-hmac.js`
- `test-channel-decrypt-insecure-context.js` — **new** (8 assertions,
pure Node, no browser)
- `test-all.sh` + `.github/workflows/deploy.yml` — wire the test

### Risk / scope

- Frontend-only, decrypt-side only. No server, schema, or config changes
(Config Documentation Rule N/A).
- Secure-context behaviour unchanged (still uses Web Crypto when
present).
- HMAC `secret` building, MAC truncation (2 bytes), and AES-ECB
delegation untouched.
- Hash vector for the user's PSK key matches:
`SHA-256(372a9c93260507adcbf36a84bec0f33d) = b7ce04…`, channel hash byte
`0xb7` (183) — confirmed against Node `crypto` and against the new
pure-JS path.

### Note on the FIPS test data in the new test

The PSK `372a9c93260507adcbf36a84bec0f33d` is shared test data from the
bug report, not a real channel secret.

---------

Co-authored-by: openclaw-bot <bot@openclaw.local>
This commit is contained in:
Kpa-clawbot
2026-05-03 21:06:59 -07:00
committed by GitHub
co-authored by openclaw-bot
parent 4def3ed7c4
commit 3aaa21bbc0
6 changed files with 376 additions and 10 deletions
+1
View File
@@ -83,6 +83,7 @@ jobs:
run: |
set -e
node test-packet-filter.js
node test-channel-decrypt-insecure-context.js
- name: Verify proto syntax
run: |
+40 -10
View File
@@ -38,6 +38,25 @@ window.ChannelDecrypt = (function () {
// ---- Key derivation ----
// Detect whether SubtleCrypto is available. SubtleCrypto is only exposed
// in **secure contexts** (HTTPS or localhost) — when CoreScope is served
// over plain HTTP, `crypto.subtle` is undefined and any digest/HMAC call
// throws. We fall back to the vendored pure-JS implementation in
// public/vendor/sha256-hmac.js. PR #1021 did the same for AES-ECB.
function hasSubtle() {
return typeof crypto !== 'undefined' && crypto && crypto.subtle && typeof crypto.subtle.digest === 'function';
}
function pureCryptoOrThrow() {
var host = (typeof window !== 'undefined') ? window
: (typeof self !== 'undefined') ? self : null;
if (!host || !host.PureCrypto || !host.PureCrypto.sha256 || !host.PureCrypto.hmacSha256) {
throw new Error('PureCrypto vendor module not loaded (public/vendor/sha256-hmac.js). ' +
'crypto.subtle is unavailable (HTTP context) and no fallback present.');
}
return host.PureCrypto;
}
/**
* Derive AES-128 key from channel name: SHA-256("#channelname")[:16].
* @param {string} channelName - e.g. "#LongFast"
@@ -45,8 +64,12 @@ window.ChannelDecrypt = (function () {
*/
async function deriveKey(channelName) {
var enc = new TextEncoder();
var hash = await crypto.subtle.digest('SHA-256', enc.encode(channelName));
return new Uint8Array(hash).slice(0, 16);
var data = enc.encode(channelName);
if (hasSubtle()) {
var hash = await crypto.subtle.digest('SHA-256', data);
return new Uint8Array(hash).slice(0, 16);
}
return pureCryptoOrThrow().sha256(data).slice(0, 16);
}
/**
@@ -55,8 +78,11 @@ window.ChannelDecrypt = (function () {
* @returns {Promise<number>} single byte (0-255)
*/
async function computeChannelHash(key) {
var hash = await crypto.subtle.digest('SHA-256', key);
return new Uint8Array(hash)[0];
if (hasSubtle()) {
var hash = await crypto.subtle.digest('SHA-256', key);
return new Uint8Array(hash)[0];
}
return pureCryptoOrThrow().sha256(key)[0];
}
// ---- AES-128-ECB via vendored pure-JS implementation ----
@@ -104,13 +130,17 @@ window.ChannelDecrypt = (function () {
secret.set(key, 0);
// remaining 16 bytes are already 0
var cryptoKey = await crypto.subtle.importKey(
'raw', secret, { name: 'HMAC', hash: 'SHA-256' }, false, ['sign']
);
var sig = await crypto.subtle.sign('HMAC', cryptoKey, ciphertext);
var sigBytes = new Uint8Array(sig);
var macBytes = hexToBytes(macHex);
var sigBytes;
if (hasSubtle() && typeof crypto.subtle.importKey === 'function' && typeof crypto.subtle.sign === 'function') {
var cryptoKey = await crypto.subtle.importKey(
'raw', secret, { name: 'HMAC', hash: 'SHA-256' }, false, ['sign']
);
var sig = await crypto.subtle.sign('HMAC', cryptoKey, ciphertext);
sigBytes = new Uint8Array(sig);
} else {
sigBytes = pureCryptoOrThrow().hmacSha256(secret, ciphertext);
}
return sigBytes[0] === macBytes[0] && sigBytes[1] === macBytes[1];
}
+1
View File
@@ -98,6 +98,7 @@
<script src="hash-color.js?v=__BUST__"></script>
<script src="packet-helpers.js?v=__BUST__"></script>
<script src="vendor/aes-ecb.js?v=__BUST__"></script>
<script src="vendor/sha256-hmac.js?v=__BUST__"></script>
<script src="channel-decrypt.js?v=__BUST__"></script>
<script src="channel-colors.js?v=__BUST__"></script>
<script src="channel-color-picker.js?v=__BUST__"></script>
+152
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,152 @@
/* SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
*
* Minimal pure-JS SHA-256 + HMAC-SHA256.
*
* Why: Web Crypto's SubtleCrypto (`window.crypto.subtle`) is only exposed
* in **secure contexts** (HTTPS or localhost). When CoreScope is served
* over plain HTTP — common for self-hosted instances and LAN-side
* deployments — `crypto.subtle` is undefined and any
* `crypto.subtle.digest(...)` / `crypto.subtle.importKey(...)` call
* throws `Cannot read properties of undefined`. PR #1021 fixed the
* AES-ECB path for the same reason; this module does the same for the
* SHA-256 / HMAC paths used by `computeChannelHash` and `verifyMAC`.
*
* Implementation: textbook FIPS-180-4 SHA-256 + RFC 2104 HMAC. Operates
* on Uint8Array inputs; returns Uint8Array outputs. ~120 LOC, no deps.
*
* API:
* window.PureCrypto.sha256(bytes: Uint8Array) -> Uint8Array(32)
* window.PureCrypto.hmacSha256(key: Uint8Array, msg: Uint8Array) -> Uint8Array(32)
*/
/* eslint-disable no-var */
(function (root) {
'use strict';
// SHA-256 round constants (FIPS-180-4 §4.2.2).
var K = new Uint32Array([
0x428a2f98, 0x71374491, 0xb5c0fbcf, 0xe9b5dba5, 0x3956c25b, 0x59f111f1, 0x923f82a4, 0xab1c5ed5,
0xd807aa98, 0x12835b01, 0x243185be, 0x550c7dc3, 0x72be5d74, 0x80deb1fe, 0x9bdc06a7, 0xc19bf174,
0xe49b69c1, 0xefbe4786, 0x0fc19dc6, 0x240ca1cc, 0x2de92c6f, 0x4a7484aa, 0x5cb0a9dc, 0x76f988da,
0x983e5152, 0xa831c66d, 0xb00327c8, 0xbf597fc7, 0xc6e00bf3, 0xd5a79147, 0x06ca6351, 0x14292967,
0x27b70a85, 0x2e1b2138, 0x4d2c6dfc, 0x53380d13, 0x650a7354, 0x766a0abb, 0x81c2c92e, 0x92722c85,
0xa2bfe8a1, 0xa81a664b, 0xc24b8b70, 0xc76c51a3, 0xd192e819, 0xd6990624, 0xf40e3585, 0x106aa070,
0x19a4c116, 0x1e376c08, 0x2748774c, 0x34b0bcb5, 0x391c0cb3, 0x4ed8aa4a, 0x5b9cca4f, 0x682e6ff3,
0x748f82ee, 0x78a5636f, 0x84c87814, 0x8cc70208, 0x90befffa, 0xa4506ceb, 0xbef9a3f7, 0xc67178f2
]);
function ror(x, n) { return (x >>> n) | (x << (32 - n)); }
// Process a single 64-byte block, mutating `H` (8 × uint32 state).
function processBlock(H, M) {
var W = new Uint32Array(64);
for (var i = 0; i < 16; i++) {
W[i] = (M[i * 4] << 24) | (M[i * 4 + 1] << 16) | (M[i * 4 + 2] << 8) | M[i * 4 + 3];
}
for (var t = 16; t < 64; t++) {
var s0 = ror(W[t - 15], 7) ^ ror(W[t - 15], 18) ^ (W[t - 15] >>> 3);
var s1 = ror(W[t - 2], 17) ^ ror(W[t - 2], 19) ^ (W[t - 2] >>> 10);
W[t] = (W[t - 16] + s0 + W[t - 7] + s1) >>> 0;
}
var a = H[0], b = H[1], c = H[2], d = H[3];
var e = H[4], f = H[5], g = H[6], h = H[7];
for (var j = 0; j < 64; j++) {
var S1 = ror(e, 6) ^ ror(e, 11) ^ ror(e, 25);
var ch = (e & f) ^ ((~e) & g);
var temp1 = (h + S1 + ch + K[j] + W[j]) >>> 0;
var S0 = ror(a, 2) ^ ror(a, 13) ^ ror(a, 22);
var maj = (a & b) ^ (a & c) ^ (b & c);
var temp2 = (S0 + maj) >>> 0;
h = g; g = f; f = e;
e = (d + temp1) >>> 0;
d = c; c = b; b = a;
a = (temp1 + temp2) >>> 0;
}
H[0] = (H[0] + a) >>> 0;
H[1] = (H[1] + b) >>> 0;
H[2] = (H[2] + c) >>> 0;
H[3] = (H[3] + d) >>> 0;
H[4] = (H[4] + e) >>> 0;
H[5] = (H[5] + f) >>> 0;
H[6] = (H[6] + g) >>> 0;
H[7] = (H[7] + h) >>> 0;
}
function sha256(bytes) {
if (!(bytes instanceof Uint8Array)) {
throw new Error('sha256: input must be a Uint8Array');
}
var bitLen = bytes.length * 8;
// Padding: 0x80 then zeros until length ≡ 56 (mod 64), then 8-byte big-endian bit-length.
var padLen = ((bytes.length + 9 + 63) & ~63) - bytes.length;
var padded = new Uint8Array(bytes.length + padLen);
padded.set(bytes, 0);
padded[bytes.length] = 0x80;
// 64-bit big-endian bit length. JS bitwise ops are 32-bit, so split.
var hi = Math.floor(bitLen / 0x100000000);
var lo = bitLen >>> 0;
var off = padded.length - 8;
padded[off] = (hi >>> 24) & 0xff;
padded[off + 1] = (hi >>> 16) & 0xff;
padded[off + 2] = (hi >>> 8) & 0xff;
padded[off + 3] = hi & 0xff;
padded[off + 4] = (lo >>> 24) & 0xff;
padded[off + 5] = (lo >>> 16) & 0xff;
padded[off + 6] = (lo >>> 8) & 0xff;
padded[off + 7] = lo & 0xff;
var H = new Uint32Array([
0x6a09e667, 0xbb67ae85, 0x3c6ef372, 0xa54ff53a,
0x510e527f, 0x9b05688c, 0x1f83d9ab, 0x5be0cd19
]);
for (var i = 0; i < padded.length; i += 64) {
processBlock(H, padded.subarray(i, i + 64));
}
var out = new Uint8Array(32);
for (var k = 0; k < 8; k++) {
out[k * 4] = (H[k] >>> 24) & 0xff;
out[k * 4 + 1] = (H[k] >>> 16) & 0xff;
out[k * 4 + 2] = (H[k] >>> 8) & 0xff;
out[k * 4 + 3] = H[k] & 0xff;
}
return out;
}
// RFC 2104 HMAC.
function hmacSha256(key, msg) {
if (!(key instanceof Uint8Array) || !(msg instanceof Uint8Array)) {
throw new Error('hmacSha256: key and msg must be Uint8Array');
}
var blockSize = 64;
var k = key;
if (k.length > blockSize) k = sha256(k);
if (k.length < blockSize) {
var padded = new Uint8Array(blockSize);
padded.set(k, 0);
k = padded;
}
var oKeyPad = new Uint8Array(blockSize);
var iKeyPad = new Uint8Array(blockSize);
for (var i = 0; i < blockSize; i++) {
oKeyPad[i] = k[i] ^ 0x5c;
iKeyPad[i] = k[i] ^ 0x36;
}
var inner = new Uint8Array(blockSize + msg.length);
inner.set(iKeyPad, 0);
inner.set(msg, blockSize);
var innerHash = sha256(inner);
var outer = new Uint8Array(blockSize + innerHash.length);
outer.set(oKeyPad, 0);
outer.set(innerHash, blockSize);
return sha256(outer);
}
root.PureCrypto = { sha256: sha256, hmacSha256: hmacSha256 };
})(typeof window !== 'undefined' ? window
: typeof self !== 'undefined' ? self
: this);
+1
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@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ node test-aging.js
node test-frontend-helpers.js
node test-perf-go-runtime.js
node test-channel-psk-ux.js
node test-channel-decrypt-insecure-context.js
echo ""
echo "═══════════════════════════════════════"
+181
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@@ -0,0 +1,181 @@
/**
* Tests that channel decryption works in an "insecure context" — i.e. when
* `window.crypto.subtle` is undefined.
*
* Why: when CoreScope is served over plain HTTP (or accessed via a non-https
* origin like `http://<lan-ip>:8080`), browsers refuse to expose
* `crypto.subtle` (it requires a secure context). The original
* `channel-decrypt.js` used `crypto.subtle.digest('SHA-256', …)` for
* `computeChannelHash` and `crypto.subtle.importKey(…)` +
* `crypto.subtle.sign('HMAC', …)` for `verifyMAC`. PR #1021 fixed only the
* AES-ECB path with a pure-JS vendor module, but left SHA-256 and HMAC paths
* pinned to `crypto.subtle`. Result on HTTP origins:
*
* addUserChannel("372a9c93260507adcbf36a84bec0f33d")
* -> computeChannelHash(key) throws "Cannot read properties of undefined
* (reading 'digest')"
* -> caught silently by addUserChannel's try/catch
* -> user sees "Failed to decrypt"
*
* This test sandboxes channel-decrypt.js with `crypto.subtle === undefined`
* and asserts both `computeChannelHash` and `verifyMAC` still work, using
* a pure-JS SHA-256 / HMAC-SHA256 fallback.
*
* Reference vectors:
* key bytes = 0x37,0x2a,0x9c,0x93,0x26,0x05,0x07,0xad,0xcb,0xf3,0x6a,0x84,0xbe,0xc0,0xf3,0x3d
* SHA256(key) = b7ce04f7d9019788b69e709ffb796a36d00225818b444ad4f8979bc1d1445f47
* -> first byte (channel hash) = 0xb7 = 183
*
* HMAC-SHA256 KAT (RFC 4231 Test Case 1):
* key = 0x0b * 20
* data = "Hi There"
* mac = b0344c61d8db38535ca8afceaf0bf12b881dc200c9833da726e9376c2e32cff7
*/
'use strict';
const vm = require('vm');
const fs = require('fs');
const path = require('path');
let passed = 0;
let failed = 0;
function assert(cond, msg) {
if (cond) { passed++; console.log(' ✓ ' + msg); }
else { failed++; console.error(' ✗ ' + msg); }
}
function loadChannelDecryptInsecureContext() {
const storage = {};
const localStorage = {
getItem: (k) => storage[k] !== undefined ? storage[k] : null,
setItem: (k, v) => { storage[k] = String(v); },
removeItem: (k) => { delete storage[k]; },
};
// CRITICAL: crypto present, but no .subtle. Mirrors browser HTTP context.
const insecureCrypto = {};
const sandbox = {
window: {}, crypto: insecureCrypto, TextEncoder, TextDecoder, Uint8Array,
localStorage, console, Date, JSON, parseInt, Math, String, Number,
Object, Array, RegExp, Error, Promise, setTimeout,
};
sandbox.window = sandbox; sandbox.self = sandbox;
vm.createContext(sandbox);
// Vendored AES (must load before channel-decrypt.js — same as index.html).
const vendorAesPath = path.join(__dirname, 'public/vendor/aes-ecb.js');
if (fs.existsSync(vendorAesPath)) {
vm.runInContext(fs.readFileSync(vendorAesPath, 'utf8'), sandbox);
}
// Optional vendored SHA-256 / HMAC (the fix). Load if present so the test
// works whether the fix vendors it as a separate file OR inlines it into
// channel-decrypt.js.
const vendorShaPath = path.join(__dirname, 'public/vendor/sha256-hmac.js');
if (fs.existsSync(vendorShaPath)) {
vm.runInContext(fs.readFileSync(vendorShaPath, 'utf8'), sandbox);
}
vm.runInContext(
fs.readFileSync(path.join(__dirname, 'public/channel-decrypt.js'), 'utf8'),
sandbox
);
return sandbox.window.ChannelDecrypt;
}
async function runTests() {
console.log('\n=== channel-decrypt.js works without crypto.subtle (HTTP-context) ===');
const CD = loadChannelDecryptInsecureContext();
// 1) computeChannelHash() — pure SHA-256 of 16-byte key, take byte 0.
const KEY_HEX = '372a9c93260507adcbf36a84bec0f33d';
const keyBytes = CD.hexToBytes(KEY_HEX);
let hashByte, threwHash = null;
try {
hashByte = await CD.computeChannelHash(keyBytes);
} catch (e) {
threwHash = e;
}
assert(threwHash === null,
'computeChannelHash does not throw without crypto.subtle (got: ' +
(threwHash && threwHash.message) + ')');
assert(hashByte === 0xb7,
'computeChannelHash returns 0xb7 for known PSK key (got: ' + hashByte + ')');
// 2) verifyMAC() — RFC 4231 HMAC-SHA256 Test Case 1.
// We feed a hand-built scenario:
// verifyMAC's HMAC key is `aesKey ++ 16 zero bytes` (32 bytes).
// To exercise RFC 4231 TC1 we set aesKey = 16 * 0x0b and pad another 4
// bytes of 0x0b in the second half (since verifyMAC zero-fills bytes
// 16..31, we instead use the channel-decrypt API directly here only to
// prove HMAC-SHA256 is computed correctly with the standard secret).
//
// We construct the secret manually and call verifyMAC on a synthetic
// ciphertext whose HMAC-SHA256 first 2 bytes we precompute with Node's
// crypto module (independent oracle).
const nodeCrypto = require('crypto');
const aesKey = new Uint8Array(16); for (let i = 0; i < 16; i++) aesKey[i] = 0xab;
const ct = new Uint8Array(16); for (let i = 0; i < 16; i++) ct[i] = i;
const secret = Buffer.alloc(32); Buffer.from(aesKey).copy(secret, 0);
const fullMac = nodeCrypto.createHmac('sha256', secret).update(Buffer.from(ct)).digest();
const expectedMacHex = fullMac.slice(0, 2).toString('hex');
let macOk, threwMac = null;
try {
macOk = await CD.verifyMAC(aesKey, ct, expectedMacHex);
} catch (e) {
threwMac = e;
}
assert(threwMac === null,
'verifyMAC does not throw without crypto.subtle (got: ' +
(threwMac && threwMac.message) + ')');
assert(macOk === true,
'verifyMAC returns true for valid 2-byte MAC (got: ' + macOk + ')');
// 3) verifyMAC must still REJECT a wrong MAC.
let macBad, threwMacBad = null;
try {
macBad = await CD.verifyMAC(aesKey, ct, '0000');
} catch (e) {
threwMacBad = e;
}
assert(threwMacBad === null,
'verifyMAC does not throw on wrong MAC (got: ' + (threwMacBad && threwMacBad.message) + ')');
assert(macBad === false,
'verifyMAC returns false for wrong 2-byte MAC (got: ' + macBad + ')');
// 4) End-to-end: decrypt() must work with subtle absent — exercises
// SHA-256 (key derivation already done) + HMAC + AES-ECB together.
// Build a synthetic encrypted packet from a known plaintext.
const aesKey2 = nodeCrypto.randomBytes(16);
const plaintext = Buffer.alloc(16);
// timestamp(4 LE) + flags(1) + "alice: hi\0" then padded
plaintext.writeUInt32LE(0x12345678, 0);
plaintext[4] = 0x00;
Buffer.from('alice: hi\0', 'utf8').copy(plaintext, 5);
const cipher = nodeCrypto.createCipheriv('aes-128-ecb', aesKey2, null);
cipher.setAutoPadding(false);
const ct2 = Buffer.concat([cipher.update(plaintext), cipher.final()]);
const secret2 = Buffer.alloc(32); aesKey2.copy(secret2, 0);
const macHex2 = nodeCrypto.createHmac('sha256', secret2).update(ct2).digest().slice(0, 2).toString('hex');
let decResult = null, threwDec = null;
try {
decResult = await CD.decrypt(new Uint8Array(aesKey2), macHex2, ct2.toString('hex'));
} catch (e) {
threwDec = e;
}
assert(threwDec === null,
'decrypt() does not throw without crypto.subtle (got: ' +
(threwDec && threwDec.message) + ')');
assert(decResult && decResult.sender === 'alice' && decResult.message === 'hi',
'decrypt() recovers sender + message in HTTP context (got: ' +
JSON.stringify(decResult) + ')');
console.log('\n=== Results ===');
console.log('Passed: ' + passed + ', Failed: ' + failed);
process.exit(failed > 0 ? 1 : 0);
}
runTests().catch(e => { console.error(e); process.exit(1); });