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6 Commits
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3290ff1ed5 |
fix(channels): auto-decrypt PSK channels on WebSocket live feed (#1029) (#1030)
Closes #1029. ## Problem PSK-decrypted channels show new messages only after a full page refresh. The WebSocket live feed delivers `GRP_TXT` packets as encrypted blobs and the channel UI has no hook to auto-decrypt them with stored keys. The REST fetch path (used on initial load + on `selectChannel`) already decrypts; the WS path silently dropped on the floor. ## Fix Two new helpers in `public/channel-decrypt.js`: - `buildKeyMap()` → `Map<channelHashByte, { channelName, keyBytes, keyHex }>` built from `getStoredKeys()`. Cached and invalidated on `saveKey` / `removeKey`, so the WS hot path is O(1) per packet after the first build. - `tryDecryptLive(payload, keyMap)` → returns `{ sender, text, channelName, channelHashByte }` when the payload is an encrypted `GRP_TXT` whose channel hash matches a stored key and whose MAC verifies; `null` otherwise. `public/channels.js` wraps `debouncedOnWS` with an async pre-pass (`decryptLivePSKBatch`) that: 1. Skips the work entirely when no encrypted `GRP_TXT` is in the batch or no PSK keys are stored. 2. For each match, rewrites `payload.channel`, `payload.sender`, and `payload.text` so the existing `processWSBatch` consumes the packet exactly the same way it consumes a server-decrypted `CHAN`. 3. Bumps a per-channel `unread` counter for any decrypted message whose channel is not currently selected. The badge renders in the sidebar (`.ch-unread-badge`) and resets on `selectChannel`. `processWSBatch` itself is untouched, so the existing channel-view behavior, dedup-by-packet-hash, region filtering, and timestamp ticker all continue to work as before. ## TDD - **Red** (`2e1ff05`): `test-channel-live-decrypt.js` asserts the new helpers + the channels.js integration contract. With stub `buildKeyMap`/`tryDecryptLive` returning empty/null, the test compiles and runs to completion with **8/14 assertion failures** (no crashes, no missing-symbol errors). - **Green** (`1783658`): real implementation lands; **14/14 pass**. ## Verification (Rule 18) - `node test-channel-live-decrypt.js` → 14/14 pass - All other channel tests still pass: - `test-channel-decrypt-ecb.js` 7/7 - `test-channel-decrypt-insecure-context.js` 8/8 - `test-channel-decrypt-m345.js` 24/24 - `test-channel-psk-ux.js` 19/19 - `cd cmd/server && go build ./...` clean - Booted the server against the fixture DB and curled `/channel-decrypt.js`, `/channels.js`, `/style.css` — all three serve the new code with the auto-injected `__BUST__` cache buster. ## Performance The WS pre-pass is gated by a quick scan: zero-cost when no encrypted `GRP_TXT` is present in the batch. When PSK keys exist, the key map is cached (sig-keyed on the stored-keys snapshot) so `crypto.subtle.digest` runs once per stored key per change, not per packet. Each match costs one MAC verify + one ECB decrypt — the same work `fetchAndDecryptChannel` already does, just amortized over time instead of in a single batch. ## Out of scope - Decoupling the badge from the live feed (server should ideally tag packets with `decryptionStatus` before broadcast). Tracked separately. - Persisting the `unread` counter across reloads (currently in-memory). --------- Co-authored-by: clawbot <bot@corescope.local> |
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3aaa21bbc0 |
fix(channel-decrypt): pure-JS SHA-256/HMAC fallback for HTTP context (P0 follow-up to #1021) (#1027)
## P0: PSK channel decryption silently failed on HTTP origins User reported PSK key `372a9c93260507adcbf36a84bec0f33d` "still doesn't work" after PRs #1021 (AES-ECB pure-JS) and #1024 (PSK UX) merged. Reproduced end-to-end and found the actual remaining bug. ### Root cause PR #1021 fixed the AES-ECB path by vendoring a pure-JS core, but **SHA-256 and HMAC-SHA256 in `public/channel-decrypt.js` are still pinned to `crypto.subtle`**. `SubtleCrypto` is exposed **only in secure contexts** (HTTPS / localhost); when CoreScope is served over plain HTTP — common for self-hosted instances — `crypto.subtle` is `undefined`, and: - `computeChannelHash(key)` → `Cannot read properties of undefined (reading 'digest')` - `verifyMAC(...)` → `Cannot read properties of undefined (reading 'importKey')` Both throws are swallowed by `addUserChannel`'s `try/catch`, so the only user-visible signal is the toast `"Failed to decrypt"` with no console-friendly explanation. Verdict: PR #1021 only fixed half of the crypto-in-insecure-context problem. ### Reproduction (no browser required) `test-channel-decrypt-insecure-context.js` loads the production `public/channel-decrypt.js` in a `vm` sandbox where `crypto.subtle` is undefined (mirrors HTTP browser). Pre-fix it failed 8/8 with the exact error above; post-fix it passes 8/8. ### Fix - New `public/vendor/sha256-hmac.js`: minimal pure-JS SHA-256 + HMAC-SHA256 (FIPS-180-4 + RFC 2104, ~120 LOC, MIT). Verified against Node `crypto` for SHA-256 (empty / "abc" / 1000 bytes) and RFC 4231 HMAC-SHA256 TC1. - `public/channel-decrypt.js`: `hasSubtle()` guard. `deriveKey`, `computeChannelHash`, and `verifyMAC` use `crypto.subtle` when available and fall back to `window.PureCrypto` otherwise. Same API, same return types, same async signatures. - `public/index.html`: load `vendor/sha256-hmac.js` immediately before `channel-decrypt.js` (mirrors the `vendor/aes-ecb.js` wiring from #1021). ### TDD - **Red** (`8075b55`): `test-channel-decrypt-insecure-context.js` — runs the **unmodified** prod module in a no-`subtle` sandbox, asserts on the known PSK key (hash byte `0xb7`) and synthetic encrypted packet round-trip. Compiles, runs, **fails 8/8 on assertions** (not on import errors). - **Green** (`232add6`): vendor + delegate. Test passes 8/8. - Wired into `test-all.sh` and `.github/workflows/deploy.yml` so CI gates the regression. ### Validation (all green post-fix) | Test | Result | |---|---| | `test-channel-decrypt-insecure-context.js` | 8/8 | | `test-channel-decrypt-ecb.js` (#1021 KAT) | 7/7 | | `test-channel-decrypt-m345.js` (existing) | 24/24 | | `test-channel-psk-ux.js` (#1024) | 19/19 | | `test-packet-filter.js` | 69/69 | ### Files changed - `public/vendor/sha256-hmac.js` — **new** (~150 LOC, MIT, decrypt-side only) - `public/channel-decrypt.js` — `hasSubtle()` guard + fallback in `deriveKey`/`computeChannelHash`/`verifyMAC` - `public/index.html` — script tag for `vendor/sha256-hmac.js` - `test-channel-decrypt-insecure-context.js` — **new** (8 assertions, pure Node, no browser) - `test-all.sh` + `.github/workflows/deploy.yml` — wire the test ### Risk / scope - Frontend-only, decrypt-side only. No server, schema, or config changes (Config Documentation Rule N/A). - Secure-context behaviour unchanged (still uses Web Crypto when present). - HMAC `secret` building, MAC truncation (2 bytes), and AES-ECB delegation untouched. - Hash vector for the user's PSK key matches: `SHA-256(372a9c93260507adcbf36a84bec0f33d) = b7ce04…`, channel hash byte `0xb7` (183) — confirmed against Node `crypto` and against the new pure-JS path. ### Note on the FIPS test data in the new test The PSK `372a9c93260507adcbf36a84bec0f33d` is shared test data from the bug report, not a real channel secret. --------- Co-authored-by: openclaw-bot <bot@openclaw.local> |
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a1f4cb9b5d |
fix(channels): PSK channel UX — delete, label, badge, toast (#1020) (#1024)
## Problem The PSK channel decrypt UX was unusable (#1020): 1. ✕ button only appeared when a `userAdded` flag happened to be set, which wasn't reliable for keys matching server-known hashes. 2. PSK channels visually indistinguishable from server-known encrypted channels — both rendered with 🔒. 3. No way to give a PSK channel a friendly name; sidebar always showed `psk:<hex8>`. 4. "Decrypt count" toast was scraped from `#chMessages .ch-msg` after a race, so it often reported zero or stale numbers. ## Changes ### `public/channel-decrypt.js` - **New API**: `saveLabel(name, label)`, `getLabel(name)`, `getLabels()`. - `storeKey(name, hex, label?)` — third optional `label` argument persists alongside the key under a separate `corescope_channel_labels` localStorage namespace. - `removeKey` now also clears the stored label. ### `public/channels.js` - Add-channel form gets a second row with `#chKeyLabelInput` ("optional name (e.g. My Crew)"). - `addUserChannel(val, label)` — passes the label through to `storeKey`. - `mergeUserChannels()` reads `getLabels()` and propagates `userLabel` onto channel objects (both new ones and ones that match an existing server-known hash). - `renderChannelList()` distinguishes user-added rows: - `.ch-user-added` class + `data-user-added="true"` attribute. - 🔓 badge icon (vs 🔒 for server-known no-key) and a 🔑 marker next to the name. - Display name uses the user-supplied label when present. - ✕ remove button is now keyed off `userAdded` (which `mergeUserChannels` always sets for stored keys). - `selectChannel` now returns `{ messageCount, wrongKey?, error?, stale? }`. `addUserChannel` uses that for the toast instead of scraping the DOM, and surfaces `wrongKey` explicitly: "Key does not match any packets for …". ## Acceptance criteria - [x] ✕ (delete) button on all user-added PSK channels in sidebar - [x] Clicking ✕ removes key + label + cache from localStorage and removes from sidebar - [x] Visual badge/icon distinguishing "my keys" (🔓 + 🔑 + `.ch-user-added`) from "unknown encrypted" (🔒 + `.ch-encrypted`) - [x] Optional name field in the add-channel form (`#chKeyLabelInput`), stored alongside key in localStorage - [x] Name displayed in sidebar instead of `psk:<hex>` - [x] Toast shows decrypt result count after adding (and reports `wrongKey` explicitly) ## Tests `test-channel-psk-ux.js` (added to `test-all.sh`) — 19 assertions: - ChannelDecrypt label storage + retrieval + `removeKey` cascade. - E2E DOM contract for `channels.js`: `#chKeyLabelInput`, `.ch-user-added`, 🔓 icon, `addUserChannel` accepts label, no DOM scraping for decrypt count. - End-to-end `mergeUserChannels` label propagation through a sandbox-loaded `ChannelDecrypt`. Red commit (`da6d477`) failed 8/15 assertions; green commit (`542bb1d`) — all 19 pass. Existing channel tests still green: ``` node test-channel-decrypt-ecb.js → 7/7 node test-channel-decrypt-m345.js → 24/24 node test-channel-psk-ux.js → 19/19 ``` (The pre-existing `test-frontend-helpers.js` failure on `nodes.js` `loadNodes` reproduces on `origin/master` — unrelated.) ## Notes - Decrypt logic untouched (PR #1021 already fixed it). - No config fields added. - Keys + labels stay in the user's browser; nothing transmitted. Fixes #1020 --------- Co-authored-by: corescope-bot <bot@corescope.local> |
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cb21305dc4 |
fix(channel-decrypt): replace AES-CBC ECB hack with pure-JS AES-128 ECB (P0) (#1021)
## P0: channel decryption broken on prod (`OperationError` in
`decryptECB`)
### Symptom
```
Uncaught (in promise) OperationError
at decryptECB (channel-decrypt.js:89)
at async Object.decrypt (channel-decrypt.js:181)
at async decryptCandidates (channels.js:568)
```
Channel message decryption fails for most ciphertext blocks in the
browser console on `analyzer.00id.net`.
### Root cause
The original `decryptECB()` simulated AES-128-ECB via Web Crypto AES-CBC
with a zero IV plus an appended dummy PKCS7 padding block (16 × `0x10`).
Web Crypto **always** validates PKCS7 padding on the decrypted output,
and after CBC-decrypting the dummy padding block it almost never
produces a valid PKCS7 sequence, so Chrome/Firefox throw
`OperationError`. There is no Web Crypto knob to disable that check —
and Web Crypto doesn't expose raw ECB at all.
This is a well-known dead end: every project that needs ECB in browsers
ends up with a small pure-JS AES core.
### Fix
- Vendor a minimal pure-JS **AES-128 ECB decrypt-only** core into
`public/vendor/aes-ecb.js`.
- **Source:** [aes-js](https://github.com/ricmoo/aes-js) by Richard
Moore — MIT License (cited in the header comment).
- **Trimmed to:** S-boxes, key expansion (FIPS-197 §5.2), inverse cipher
(FIPS-197 §5.3). No encrypt path. No other modes. No padding logic. ~150
lines.
- `decryptECB(key, ciphertext)` keeps the same API surface:
`Promise<Uint8Array | null>`. It now delegates to
`window.AES_ECB.decrypt(...)`.
- `verifyMAC` and `computeChannelHash` keep using Web Crypto
(HMAC-SHA256 / SHA-256 — no padding pathology).
- Wired `vendor/aes-ecb.js` into `public/index.html` immediately before
`channel-decrypt.js`.
### TDD
- **Red commit (`36f6882`)** — adds `test-channel-decrypt-ecb.js` pinned
to the **FIPS-197 Appendix C.1** AES-128 known-answer vector. Compiles,
runs, and fails on assertion (`OperationError`) against the existing
implementation.
- **Green commit (`bbbd2d1`)** — vendors the pure-JS AES core and
rewires `decryptECB`. Test now passes (7/7), including a multi-block
assertion that two identical ciphertext blocks decrypt to two identical
plaintext blocks (true ECB, no chaining).
- Existing `test-channel-decrypt-m345.js` still passes (24/24).
### Files changed
- `public/vendor/aes-ecb.js` — **new** (vendored AES-128 ECB decrypt,
MIT, ~150 LOC)
- `public/channel-decrypt.js` — `decryptECB()` rewritten to delegate to
vendor
- `public/index.html` — script tag added for `vendor/aes-ecb.js`
- `test-channel-decrypt-ecb.js` — **new** TDD test (FIPS-197 KAT +
multi-block + edge cases)
### Risk / scope
- Decrypt-only, client-side, no server changes, no schema changes, no
config changes (Config Documentation Rule N/A).
- ECB is a single 16-byte block per packet for MeshCore channel traffic,
so the perf delta vs Web Crypto is negligible (a single `decryptBlock`
is ~10 round transforms on 16 bytes).
- HTTP-context safe (no Web Crypto required for ECB anymore).
### Validation
- All 7 FIPS-197 KAT + multi-block tests pass.
- Existing channel-decrypt M3/M4/M5 tests still pass (24/24).
- `test-packet-filter.js` (62/62), `test-aging.js` (18/18) unaffected.
- `test-frontend-helpers.js` has a pre-existing failure on master
unrelated to this PR (verified by stashing the patch).
---------
Co-authored-by: openclaw-bot <bot@openclaw.local>
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1b315bf6d0 |
feat: PSK channels, channel removal, message caching (#725 M3+M4+M5) (#750)
## Summary Implements milestones M3, M4, and M5 from #725 — all client-side, zero server changes. ### M3: PSK channel support The channel input field now accepts both `#channelname` (hashtag derivation) and raw 32-char hex keys (PSK). Auto-detection: if input starts with `#`, derive key via SHA-256; otherwise validate as hex and store directly. Same decrypt pipeline — `ChannelDecrypt.decrypt()` takes key bytes regardless of source. Input placeholder updated to: `#LongFast or paste hex key` ### M4: Channel removal User-added channels now show a ✕ button on hover. Click → confirm dialog → removes: - Key from localStorage (`ChannelDecrypt.removeKey()`) - Cached messages from localStorage (`ChannelDecrypt.clearChannelCache()`) - Channel entry from sidebar If the removed channel was selected, the view resets to the empty state. ### M5: localStorage message caching with delta fetch After client-side decryption, results are cached in localStorage keyed by channel name: ``` { messages: [...], lastTimestamp: "...", count: N, ts: Date.now() } ``` On subsequent visits: 1. **Instant render** — cached messages displayed immediately via `onCacheHit` callback 2. **Delta fetch** — only packets newer than `lastTimestamp` are fetched and decrypted 3. **Merge** — new messages merged with cache, deduplicated by `packetHash` 4. **Cache invalidation** — if total candidate count changes, full re-decrypt triggered 5. **Size limit** — max 1000 messages cached per channel (most recent kept) ### Performance - Delta fetch avoids re-decrypting the full history on every page load - Cache-first rendering provides instant UI response - `deduplicateAndMerge()` uses a hash set for O(n) dedup - 1000-message cap prevents localStorage quota issues ### Tests (24 new) - M3: hex key detection (valid/invalid patterns) - M3: key derivation round-trip, channel hash computation - M3: PSK key storage and retrieval - M4: channel removal clears both key and cache - M5: cache size limit enforcement (1200 → 1000 stored) - M5: cache stores count and lastTimestamp - M5: clearChannelCache works independently - All existing tests pass (523 frontend helpers, 62 packet filter) ### Files changed | File | Change | |------|--------| | `public/channel-decrypt.js` | `removeKey()` now clears cache; `clearChannelCache()`; `setCache()` with count + size limit | | `public/channels.js` | Extracted `decryptCandidates()`, `deduplicateAndMerge()`; delta fetch logic; remove button handler; cache-first rendering | | `public/style.css` | `.ch-remove-btn` styles (hover-reveal ✕) | | `test-channel-decrypt-m345.js` | 24 new tests | Implements #725 Co-authored-by: you <you@example.com> |
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8158631d02 |
feat: client-side channel decryption — add custom channels in browser (#725 M2) (#733)
## Summary Pure client-side channel decryption. Users can add custom hashtag channels or PSK channels directly in the browser. **The server never sees the keys.** Implements #725 M2 (revised). Does NOT close #725. ## How it works 1. User types `#channelname` or pastes a hex PSK in the channels sidebar 2. Browser derives key (`SHA256("#name")[:16]`) using Web Crypto API 3. Key stored in **localStorage** — never sent to the server 4. Browser fetches encrypted GRP_TXT packets via existing API 5. Browser decrypts client-side: AES-128-ECB + HMAC-SHA256 MAC verification 6. Decrypted messages cached in localStorage 7. Progressive rendering — newest messages first, chunk-based ## Security - Keys never leave the browser - No new API endpoints - No server-side changes whatsoever - Channel interest partially observable via hash-based API requests (documented, acceptable tradeoff) ## Changes - `public/channels.js` — client-side decrypt module + UI integration (+307 lines) - `public/index.html` — no new script (inline in channels.js IIFE) - `public/style.css` — add-channel input styling --------- Co-authored-by: you <you@example.com> |