Closes#1552.
## What
Make observer `Online` / `Stale` / `Offline` thresholds
operator-configurable via `config.json`'s existing `healthThresholds`
block — and **raise the defaults** from 10 min / 60 min to **60 min /
1440 min (1 h / 24 h)** so they match the node thresholds and stop
producing flap out of the box.
⚠️ **This is a default behavior change.** Operators who want the old
aggressive 10-min Online threshold must opt in via:
```json
"healthThresholds": { "observerOnlineMinutes": 10 }
```
## Why
Per #1552: the `600000` / `3600000` constants in `public/observers.js`
were not tunable, *and* 10 min is wrong as a default. Wide-geo,
low-traffic meshes legitimately see observers go quiet for >10 min
between reports, and operators behind a CDN (#1551) get cached
`last_seen` values that can push the observer 15+ min behind reality —
guaranteeing flap at the 10-min threshold. The meshat.se operator (43
observers, v3.8.3) reports exactly this pattern.
Defaults raised from 10 / 60 minutes to 60 / 1440 minutes (1 h / 24 h)
to match the node thresholds for consistency and eliminate flap on
low-traffic / CDN-fronted instances. Operators wanting the old 10-min
Online behavior can set `observerOnlineMinutes: 10` in config.
## Changes
Backend (`cmd/server/config.go`):
- `HealthThresholds` gains `ObserverOnlineMinutes` /
`ObserverStaleMinutes` (int).
- `GetHealthThresholds()` defaults to **60 / 1440** when zero/absent.
- `ToClientMs()` emits `observerOnlineMs` / `observerStaleMs`, picked up
by the existing `/api/config-public` → `roles.js`
`Object.assign(HEALTH_THRESHOLDS, …)` pipeline.
`config.example.json`: new `observerOnlineMinutes` /
`observerStaleMinutes` keys (60 / 1440) + `_comment_observerThresholds`
explaining the rationale and opt-out.
Frontend:
- `public/observers.js` `healthStatus()` — reads from
`window.HEALTH_THRESHOLDS.observerOnlineMs / observerStaleMs`, falls
back to **3600000 / 86400000** (matching the new Go defaults for the
pre-`/api/config-public` window).
- `public/observer-detail.js` — same refactor (was previously hardcoded
`600000` + misusing `nodeDegradedMs` for the Stale boundary).
## Backward compat
- API shape: unchanged — only adds two optional keys.
- Config: unchanged keys / no renames.
- Default behavior: **changed** — operators relying on the implicit
10/60 must opt in (one config line).
## TDD
- RED 1 (`ee19058f`): assertions on the new fields + `ToClientMs` keys +
`healthStatus` reading from `window.HEALTH_THRESHOLDS`. CI:
[failure](https://github.com/Kpa-clawbot/CoreScope/actions/runs/26945264822).
- GREEN 1 (`30cfbf7a`): configurability landed (defaults still old
10/60). CI:
[success](https://github.com/Kpa-clawbot/CoreScope/actions/runs/26945220598).
- RED 2 (`2649cf35`): pin new 60/1440 defaults — empty-config Go path +
JS `healthStatus` with no `HEALTH_THRESHOLDS`. CI must fail.
- GREEN 2 (`5ef85bca`): bump Go defaults to 60/1440, JS fallbacks to
3600000/86400000, `config.example.json` updated. CI must pass.
## Preflight
Clean (exit 0). `cross-stack` ack in commit messages — single feature
spans Go + JSON + JS readers.
## Not in scope
- Customizer UI for editing the thresholds (config-only per issue).
- Node/infra thresholds (unchanged).
- The deeper observer-flap root cause (#1551 cache-control is a separate
PR in flight).
---------
Co-authored-by: corescope-bot <bot@corescope>
Co-authored-by: mc-bot <bot@meshcore.local>
Closes#1551.
## Problem
`/api/*` Go responses emit no `Cache-Control` header. CDNs (Cloudflare,
nginx, Varnish) default to caching `application/json` for **15 min – 4
h** when no directive is set. Observed against a public
Cloudflare-fronted CoreScope instance (`meshcore.meshat.se`):
- 17 consecutive polls of `/api/observers` over ~10 min returned
byte-identical responses
- Response headers showed `cf-cache-status: HIT`, `age: 878` (~15 min)
- Cache-busting query param → `cf-cache-status: MISS` with fresh
`last_seen` values
This causes WebSocket pushes to diverge from REST GETs (WS fresh, REST
stale) and produces false-positive stale/online flips for observers near
the 10-min threshold.
## Fix
New `noStoreAPIMiddleware` in `cmd/server/routes.go` wired into the
gorilla/mux chain alongside the existing `backfillStatusMiddleware`.
Sets `Cache-Control: no-store` on every response whose request path
starts with `/api/`.
## Design choice: `no-store` vs `private, max-age=0`
Chose `no-store`. CoreScope's REST endpoints are fresh-on-every-request
by contract (WS pushes diff against REST GETs), so any intermediary
cache is wrong. `no-store` forbids **any** cache (CDN, browser,
intermediary). `private, max-age=0` still permits short browser caches
and some intermediaries — no benefit here.
## Scope discipline
- `/api/` prefix only.
- Static assets (`/`, `/app.js`, `/style.css`, …) keep their existing
`no-cache, no-store, must-revalidate` headers from `spaHandler` in
`main.go`. Hashed assets stay CDN-cacheable by design.
- The middleware runs for **all** registered routes including the
websocket upgrade HTTP request, since `/ws` is served through the same
mux.
## TDD
- **Red** `1beb5432`: `cmd/server/cache_control_api_test.go` asserts
`Cache-Control: no-store` on `/api/stats`, `/api/observers`,
`/api/packets`, `/api/nodes`, and asserts the middleware does NOT leak
onto `/` or `/app.js`. Fails on assertion (no Cache-Control header
emitted) — not a compile error.
- **Green** `13be675f`: middleware + wiring. All assertions pass; full
`cmd/server` suite stays green.
## Files
- `cmd/server/routes.go` — middleware definition +
`r.Use(noStoreAPIMiddleware)`
- `cmd/server/cache_control_api_test.go` — 6 sub-tests across 2
top-level tests
## Preflight
`bash ~/.openclaw/skills/pr-preflight/scripts/run-all.sh origin/master`
→ clean (exit 0).
---------
Co-authored-by: corescope-bot <bot@corescope>
## Summary
Closes the "XSS regression in newly-added sink" class. Follow-up to
#1537 (10 stored-XSS sinks in node names) and the post-#1537 audit
(TRACE-1, OBS-1, ANL-1 — 3 additional HIGH XSS in files #1537 didn't
touch).
After those fixes land, the project still has **zero automated catch for
the next one**. Every future PR can re-introduce the same class freely.
This PR closes that gap with a hard-fail pr-preflight gate that runs at
PR-creation time and in CI.
## What the gate does
A NEW or MODIFIED line in the PR diff under `public/**/*.{js,html}` is
flagged when it matches any of these sink patterns:
| Pattern | What it catches |
|---|---|
| `.innerHTML = \`…\`` / `'…'` | template-literal or string-concat HTML
injection |
| `insertAdjacentHTML(…, \`…\`)` | DOM-adjacent injection |
| `.bindPopup(\`…\`)` / `.bindTooltip(\`…\`)` | Leaflet popup/tooltip
injection (the OBS-1 class) |
| `.setAttribute('on<event>', …)` | inline event-handler injection |
| `.setAttribute('href'\|'src'\|'action'\|'formaction', <interp>)` |
`javascript:` URI class |
For each flagged line, the gate then walks the dynamic substring
(`${…}`, post-`+`, or `setAttribute` value arg) and only fires if it
interpolates an identifier from the node-controlled allowlist (`name`,
`observer`, `sender`, `pubkey`, `body`, `hash`, …). This keeps the regex
off static CSS classes like `text-center`.
A flagged line is accepted (no fail) when ANY of:
- **(a)** wrapped in `escapeHtml(` / `escapeAttr(` / `safeEsc(` / local
`esc(` — the audited helpers
- **(b)** a same-PR `test*.js` file DOM-greps the audit payload (`'
onfocus=` or `onerror=alert`) AND references the sink file's basename
- **(c)** the PR body carries `PREFLIGHT-XSS-OPTOUT: <file>:<line>
reason="…"` — explicit author opt-out logged for reviewer attention
Otherwise: **HARD FAIL** with `file:line: flagged: <token>` plus a
suggested fix.
## Split
- **Skill directory** (local, no PR):
- `~/.openclaw/skills/pr-preflight/scripts/check-xss-sinks.sh` —
canonical gate
- `~/.openclaw/skills/pr-preflight/data/xss-node-controlled-fields.txt`
— allowlist (27 identifiers, easy to extend without a repo PR)
- wired into `~/.openclaw/skills/pr-preflight/scripts/run-all.sh`
- **This PR** (in repo):
- `testdata/preflight-xss/` — fixtures (`bad-1..bad-3`,
`good-1..good-2`, `test-good-2.js`)
- `scripts/check-xss-sinks.sh` — local mirror of the canonical gate, so
CI can exercise the gate without depending on the skill dir
- `test-preflight-xss-gate.js` — Node test wrapper that asserts bad
fixtures fail (exit 1) and good fixtures pass (exit 0)
- `public/app.js` — `escapeHtml` docstring marked CANONICAL with links
to the enforcing gate
- `.github/workflows/deploy.yml` — invoke `node
test-preflight-xss-gate.js` alongside the existing
`test-xss-escape-sinks.js`
## TDD red → green
| | Commit | Test result |
|---|---|---|
| **Red** | `test(preflight-xss): RED — fixtures + assertion wrapper for
XSS sink gate` | `test-preflight-xss-gate.js` exits 1 — bad fixtures
unexpectedly pass because `scripts/check-xss-sinks.sh` is a no-op stub.
Genuine assertion failure (not a build error). |
| **Green** | `feat(preflight): GREEN — implement XSS-sink check +
escapeHtml docstring` | stub replaced with real check; all 5 fixtures
behave as expected. |
The red commit ships a working stub script so the test runs to
completion and fails on an **assertion**, not on a missing-file error.
## Coverage proof — would the gate have caught the originals?
- **PR #1537 (10 sinks):** synthetic file from the deleted lines of
#1537 → gate flags `n.name` in `innerHTML \`tpl\`` and two
`bindPopup(\`…${n.name}\`)` lines. Yes, the gate would have caught these
the moment they hit a PR diff.
- **Post-#1537 audit:**
- **TRACE-1** (`traces.js` `${e.message}` / `${urlHash}` in innerHTML):
yes — the `hash`/`urlHash` tokens are allowlisted and the innerHTML
template-literal pattern matches.
- **OBS-1** (`observer-detail.js` URL fragment + MQTT fields into
innerHTML / bindPopup): yes — the `observer`, `text`, `hash` tokens are
allowlisted and both sink patterns match.
- **ANL-1** (`analytics.js` attribute-mutation roundtrip): yes for
`setAttribute('on*', …)` and `setAttribute('href', \`…${interp}…\`)`
patterns. (Note: pure innerHTML lines with only `${e.message}` are not
node-controlled and are intentionally not flagged.)
## Allowlist (initial 27 identifiers)
```
adv_name name observer observer_name sender from_node channel channel_name
model firmware client_version radio iata
hopNames nodeLabel obsName n.name o.name obs.name
public_key pubkey area_key region_name
text body message preview
hash urlHash
```
Extend in
`~/.openclaw/skills/pr-preflight/data/xss-node-controlled-fields.txt`
whenever a new node-controlled field surfaces in an audit — no repo PR
required.
## Hard rules respected
- No build step, no ESLint plugin, no AST analysis — grep + heuristics +
opt-out escape valves
- Hard fail (exit 1), not warning-only (exit 2)
- PII preflight grep on every commit + this PR body
- Same split as the sibling migration-gate PR
## Three-axis merge-readiness
- **Mergeable:** yes — branch is clean off `origin/master`, no conflicts
- **CI:** will report on push; red commit expected to fail, green commit
expected to pass
- **Threads:** none open yet (new PR)
---------
Co-authored-by: meshcore-bot <bot@local>
Co-authored-by: mc-bot <bot@meshcore.local>
Co-authored-by: corescope-bot <bot@corescope>
Follow-up to merged #1540. Self-review of #1540 found 3 additional
`log.Printf` sites interpolating MQTT-controlled strings without
`sanitizeLogString` — fixing here for completeness.
## Sites fixed
| File:line | Format | MQTT-controlled fields | Attacker scenario |
|---|---|---|---|
| `cmd/ingestor/main.go:531` | `status: %s (%s)` | `name`, `iata` |
Hostile node sends status with `name="evil\r\n[security] forged-line"` —
appears as a fake log line in operator dashboards / journalctl. |
| `cmd/ingestor/main.go:854` | `channel message: ch%s from %s` |
`channelIdx`, `sender` | Attacker spoofs `sender="evil\r\n[security]
backdoor-installed"` on any channel message — same forged-line outcome.
|
| `cmd/ingestor/main.go:940` | `direct message from %s` | `sender` | DM
injection via crafted sender field, same outcome. |
All three now route through `sanitizeLogString` from
`cmd/ingestor/sanitize_log.go` (added by #1540) which replaces
CR/LF/control bytes with `?`.
## TDD
Red commit (`8b3ad398`) adds 3 testable format helpers
(`formatStatusLog`, `formatChannelMessageLog`, `formatDirectMessageLog`)
plus tests pinning CR/LF stripping. Helpers return raw `fmt.Sprintf`
output, so tests fail on assertion (not build).
Green commit applies `sanitizeLogString` inside the helpers and swaps
the 3 call sites in `main.go` to use them.
Tests red-on-revert (verified locally).
## Scope
Strictly the 3 sites above. No other refactors. No changes to
`sanitizeLogString` itself.
---------
Co-authored-by: clawbot <clawbot@users.noreply.github.com>
🚧 Draft — red commit only. Tests added are expected to FAIL; fix lands
in next commit.
Follow-up to #1537 — security sweep found 3 additional stored XSS sinks
of the same class.
Once the green commit lands and CI is green, this body will be replaced.
---------
Co-authored-by: CoreScope Bot <bot@meshcore>
Co-authored-by: Kpa-clawbot <bot@kpa-clawbot.local>
Co-authored-by: openclaw-bot <bot@openclaw.local>
Closes the recurring "sync migration on large table" regression class
(#791-style, #1483-style).
## Problem
Pattern that keeps repeating:
1. A perf/feature PR adds `CREATE INDEX` / `ALTER TABLE` / `UPDATE ...
WHERE` in a migration file (typically `cmd/ingestor/db.go`).
2. Local dev DB has ~100 rows. Migration returns in milliseconds. CI is
green.
3. Reviewers approve on plan correctness; nobody knows what the prod
table size is.
4. First prod boot at scale (Cascadia: ~2600 nodes, 80K+ obs; previous
prod: 1.9M+ obs) pins the ingestor at `[migration] Adding index...` for
minutes.
5. Healthcheck times out → container restart → loop. Operator pages.
Hotfix.
Most recent case: `obs_observer_ts_idx_v1` in v3.8.3 — release notes
already document an "expect a longer first boot" warning because we knew
it would hit prod hard.
## What this PR adds
**Async helper (`cmd/ingestor/async_migration.go`):**
- `Store.RunAsyncMigration(ctx, name, fn)` — registers the migration as
`pending_async` in a new `_async_migrations` bookkeeping table, returns
to caller immediately, schedules `fn` in a goroutine on the shared
backfill `WaitGroup`, transitions to `done` (or `failed` with error
captured) on completion.
- `Store.AsyncMigrationStatus(name)` and
`Store.WaitForAsyncMigrations()` for tests/shutdown.
- Idempotent: `done` rows short-circuit; `pending_async`/`failed` rows
are retried on next boot.
**Retroactive #1483 conversion (`cmd/ingestor/db.go`):**
- `obs_observer_ts_idx_v1` (the composite `(observer_idx, timestamp)`
index build on `observations`) is now scheduled via `RunAsyncMigration`
from `OpenStore()` so the ingestor accepts packets immediately while the
index builds in the background.
- Legacy `_migrations` gate is preserved by the async fn → DBs that
already completed the sync build stay no-op.
**Annotation convention (`MIGRATIONS.md`):**
Every new `CREATE INDEX` / `ALTER TABLE` / data-rewrite in a migration
file must do ONE of:
1. Run via `Store.RunAsyncMigration(...)` (preferred for backfills).
2. Carry a `// PREFLIGHT: async=true reason="..."` comment directly
above the migration block.
3. Include a `PREFLIGHT-MIGRATION-SCALE: <30s N=<scale>` line in the PR
body.
**TDD pair:**
- Red commit `2c6744cc` — `TestRunAsyncMigration_PendingThenDone`
against a stub helper. Build passes, assertion fails (`async migration
fn did not start within 2s`).
- Green commit `38354f32` — real helper + retroactive fix + docs. Test
green.
**Fixtures (`cmd/ingestor/testdata/preflight-migrations/`):**
- `bad_sync_migration.go` — known-bad sample with no annotation.
- `good_annotated_migration.go` — known-good sample with annotation.
The preflight gate script can be unit-tested against these.
## Gate location (NOT in this PR)
The actual `check-async-migrations.sh` lives in the OpenClaw skills
directory at `~/.openclaw/skills/pr-preflight/scripts/` (separate from
the repo) and is wired into `run-all.sh`. It greps the diff for
new/modified migration blocks and hard-fails (exit 1) on any sync schema
mutation lacking one of the three opt-outs above. The fixtures in this
PR give maintainers a reproducible target.
## Why annotation-discipline, not size detection
You cannot determine table size from a diff. The gate enforces that
every author who adds a schema migration must consciously decide which
bucket it falls into and write that down. That is the cheapest possible
intervention that breaks the cycle.
## Testing
- `go test ./...` in `cmd/ingestor` — all tests pass including the new
`TestRunAsyncMigration_PendingThenDone`.
- Manual: red commit fails on assertion (not build), green commit passes
— verifiable by `git checkout 2c6744cc --
cmd/ingestor/async_migration.go && go test -run TestRunAsync
./cmd/ingestor` from the green commit.
## Preflight overrides
None — clean run after the convention is applied.
---------
Co-authored-by: clawbot <bot@openclaw.local>
Co-authored-by: clawbot <bot@openclaw>
Follow-up to v3.8.3 security train. Found by non-XSS input-validation
audit.
Three findings closed in one PR — all defense-in-depth: medium is
genuinely DoS-only (no data exposure), lows tighten log hygiene and SPA
path handling so future router changes can't silently expose the
filesystem.
## Findings addressed
### MEDIUM — unbounded `limit` on list endpoints
- **What:** four list endpoints accepted `limit=999999999` and passed
the value straight to SQL `LIMIT ?` and Go `make(..., 0, limit)`.
- **Where:** `cmd/server/routes.go` — handlePackets (incl. multi-node
branch), handleNodes, handleChannelMessages, handleAnalyticsSubpaths,
handleAnalyticsSubpathsBulk per-group lim, handleDroppedPackets.
- **Fix:** new `clampLimit(raw, def, max)` helper in
`cmd/server/clamp_limit.go` plus `queryLimit(r, def, max)` HTTP wrapper.
Caps: packets/nodes/channels/dropped = 500, analytics buckets /
bulk-health = 200. Already-clamped endpoints (handleBulkHealth) migrated
to the helper for uniformity. Silent clamp — no response-shape change.
Negative / zero / non-numeric → default.
### LOW — log injection via newline in advert name
- **What:** advert `name` field allows `\n` / `\t` (sanitizeName
intentionally preserves them for display). Logged at two MQTT-ingest
sites, an attacker with publish ACL could forge log lines.
- **Where:** `cmd/ingestor/main.go:659,690`.
- **Fix:** new `sanitizeLogString` in `cmd/ingestor/sanitize_log.go`
strips control bytes < 0x20 and DEL with `?`. Wrapped at the two log
call sites that interpolate `name=` and `observer=`. Stored display
values untouched.
### LOW — SPA static handler depends on default mux path-cleaning
- **What:** `cmd/server/main.go:469` joins `r.URL.Path` to root; safe
today only because gorilla/mux runs `path.Clean` and `http.FileServer`
rejects `..`. A future `SkipClean(true)` or router swap would silently
expose the filesystem.
- **Where:** `cmd/server/main.go` (spaHandler).
- **Fix:** new `isSafeStaticPath` rejects requests whose decoded or raw
path contains `..`, `%2e%2e`, `\\`, or `%5c` with a 400. Legit asset
names with dots (`/app.js`, `/customize-v2.js`, `/themes/dark.css`) are
unaffected.
## TDD
- Commit 1 (red): adds `TestClampLimit`, `TestSpaHandlerPathTraversal`,
`TestSanitizeLogString` with stub helpers — tests fail on assertions
(not build errors), proving they gate the change.
- Commit 2 (green): production fix. Revert the green commit and the red
commit's assertions fail.
## Audit reference
Source: non-XSS input-validation audit dated 2026-06-03 (workspace).
Sibling PR `fix/xss-r2-trace-obs-anl` owns the XSS findings — not
included here.
---------
Co-authored-by: clawbot <clawbot@users.noreply.github.com>
## This PR fixes the stored XSS in full (closes#1536)
Mesh-advertised node names (`adv_name`) and observer names were rendered
into the dashboard DOM **without HTML-escaping** in multiple places —
the same class as the publicly disclosed MeshCore dashboard XSS
(CVE-2026-45323). `adv_name` has no protocol-level validation and the Go
`sanitizeName()` keeps `< > " &`, so a payload like `<img src=x
onerror=...>` reaches the frontend intact and executes.
**I audited every name/sender/text/channel render in `public/` and this
PR escapes all unescaped sinks. There are no known remaining XSS sinks
of this class after this change.**
### Sinks fixed (all escaped via the existing global `escapeHtml`, plus
a local helper for the standalone `area-map.html`)
| File | Sink |
|------|------|
| `app.js` | global search dropdown — node name + channel name |
| `nodes.js` | nodes-table row name; node-detail Leaflet popups (×2) |
| `observers.js` | observers-table name cell |
| `packets.js` | observer-name cells via `obsNameOnly` (×4) + observer
multi-select checkbox label |
| `live.js` | node-filter `<option>` + map marker tooltip |
| `analytics.js` | topology map node tooltip |
| `route-view.js` | hop + union marker tooltips (×2) |
| `area-map.html` | node popups (×2) — added a local `escapeHtml` (file
is standalone) |
### Already-safe (verified, not changed)
`map.js` popups (`safeEsc`), live-feed text (`escapeHtml(preview)`),
packet-detail text, channel messages (`channels.js`), `route-render.js`
popups, `hop-display.js`.
### Why escape at the sink (not the backend)
`sanitizeName()` only strips control chars; HTML-escaping stored names
server-side would be lossy and corrupt legitimate names containing `& <
>`, and break the `meshcore://` deep-links / exports. Output-encoding at
render is the correct OWASP fix and matches `meshcore-card` v0.3.3.
### Tests
- Added 6 `escapeHtml` regression tests including the CVE payload `<img
src=x onerror=alert(1)>` and an attribute-breakout payload.
- `node test-frontend-helpers.js`: **568 passed / 32 failed** — the 32
are pre-existing sandbox limitations (e.g. `AreaFilter is not defined`),
identical to the untouched baseline (562/32). Zero new failures.
### Cache busting
Automatic — the server rewrites `__BUST__` in `index.html` with a
restart timestamp, so no manual bump is needed.
🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)
---------
Co-authored-by: CoreScope Bot <bot@meshcore>
Co-authored-by: Kpa-clawbot <bot@clawbot.local>
### Description
This PR addresses several visual and UX issues on the Live page,
specifically focusing on mobile viewport constraints and filter
accessibility.
**Changes:**
1. **Dropdown Clipping Fix**: Previously, the Node, Region, and Area
filters were nested inside `.live-toggles`. On narrow screens,
`.live-toggles` becomes a horizontally scrolling container (`overflow-x:
auto`), which unintentionally clipped the absolute-positioned dropdown
menus for these filters. They have been moved to `.live-controls-body`
as siblings, allowing their dropdowns to correctly break out and overlay
the map.
2. **Cog Positioning**: The settings cog (`#liveControlsToggle`) has
been pushed to the far right of the metrics header using `margin-left:
auto`, creating a cleaner visual separation.
3. **Filter Spacing**: When the controls panel is expanded, a `12px` top
margin is now applied to push the filter buttons further away from the
metrics row for better touch targets and readability.
4. **Test Updates**: The E2E Playwright test for the Area dropdown was
updated to click the cog menu first, matching the new DOM structure.
5. **Area outside cog**: Resolves the initial issue of the area dropdown
being outside of the cog on a mobile display
### Performance Justification
This is a pure HTML/CSS structural refactor. There are no additional
per-item calculations or API calls introduced. Moving the DOM nodes out
of the scrolling container has zero impact on render loop complexity,
and no new JavaScript event listeners were added to the hot path.
### Testing
- [x] Unit tests pass (`npm test`)
- [x] Playwright E2E tests pass (updated to reflect the cog interaction)
- [x] Verified visually in browser (Desktop and Mobile viewports)
Made the suggested changes as listed in the fix path provided by
@Kpa-clawbot
Fix path:
`style.css:1244` `.field-table .section-row td` → `color: var(--text)`
(or new `--section-header-fg`).
`style.css:2620-2631` `.copy-link-btn` → `color: var(--text);`
background/border via `--accent-bg` / `--accent-border` tokens with safe
defaults.
`live.css:987` `.vcr-scope-btn.active` → same token swap; ensure text
remains `--text` on the tinted bg.
`nodes.js:212` `.multibyte-badge` → move inline styles to style.css,
`color:var(--text)`, keep `--accent-bg` background.
When creating the defaults for `--accent-bg` and `--accent-border`, I
chose to go with the default style values embedded in nodes.js, as that
was the safest bet.
We should probably extend the custom themes to include these variables
as well as not to confuse users if they see it. This also causes the
delima of, sometimes the `--accent` is use as the background for
objects, and not `--accent-bg`, example:
`btn active` has background set to` --accent` and border set to
`--accent`.
If we don't extend the config to accept accent-bg and accent-border, we
risk users still making accents of light blue that will be drown out
with the defaults we've set.
Also updated the badge above the multi-byte badge that contains X bytes
of the nodes public key, where X is determined by the path byte length.
This was done because it had styles set that were easy to add to the
styles.css file, to clean up coe. The node-type badge above it is
unfortunately driven by javascript in the nodes.js page, and requires
syling.
**Note:** Accidentally added ghost changes into this push for a second
time. They can be ignored as they were previously merged and shouldn't
have been seen as new.
Kpa-clawbot