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3aaa21bbc0
## P0: PSK channel decryption silently failed on HTTP origins User reported PSK key `372a9c93260507adcbf36a84bec0f33d` "still doesn't work" after PRs #1021 (AES-ECB pure-JS) and #1024 (PSK UX) merged. Reproduced end-to-end and found the actual remaining bug. ### Root cause PR #1021 fixed the AES-ECB path by vendoring a pure-JS core, but **SHA-256 and HMAC-SHA256 in `public/channel-decrypt.js` are still pinned to `crypto.subtle`**. `SubtleCrypto` is exposed **only in secure contexts** (HTTPS / localhost); when CoreScope is served over plain HTTP — common for self-hosted instances — `crypto.subtle` is `undefined`, and: - `computeChannelHash(key)` → `Cannot read properties of undefined (reading 'digest')` - `verifyMAC(...)` → `Cannot read properties of undefined (reading 'importKey')` Both throws are swallowed by `addUserChannel`'s `try/catch`, so the only user-visible signal is the toast `"Failed to decrypt"` with no console-friendly explanation. Verdict: PR #1021 only fixed half of the crypto-in-insecure-context problem. ### Reproduction (no browser required) `test-channel-decrypt-insecure-context.js` loads the production `public/channel-decrypt.js` in a `vm` sandbox where `crypto.subtle` is undefined (mirrors HTTP browser). Pre-fix it failed 8/8 with the exact error above; post-fix it passes 8/8. ### Fix - New `public/vendor/sha256-hmac.js`: minimal pure-JS SHA-256 + HMAC-SHA256 (FIPS-180-4 + RFC 2104, ~120 LOC, MIT). Verified against Node `crypto` for SHA-256 (empty / "abc" / 1000 bytes) and RFC 4231 HMAC-SHA256 TC1. - `public/channel-decrypt.js`: `hasSubtle()` guard. `deriveKey`, `computeChannelHash`, and `verifyMAC` use `crypto.subtle` when available and fall back to `window.PureCrypto` otherwise. Same API, same return types, same async signatures. - `public/index.html`: load `vendor/sha256-hmac.js` immediately before `channel-decrypt.js` (mirrors the `vendor/aes-ecb.js` wiring from #1021). ### TDD - **Red** (`8075b55`): `test-channel-decrypt-insecure-context.js` — runs the **unmodified** prod module in a no-`subtle` sandbox, asserts on the known PSK key (hash byte `0xb7`) and synthetic encrypted packet round-trip. Compiles, runs, **fails 8/8 on assertions** (not on import errors). - **Green** (`232add6`): vendor + delegate. Test passes 8/8. - Wired into `test-all.sh` and `.github/workflows/deploy.yml` so CI gates the regression. ### Validation (all green post-fix) | Test | Result | |---|---| | `test-channel-decrypt-insecure-context.js` | 8/8 | | `test-channel-decrypt-ecb.js` (#1021 KAT) | 7/7 | | `test-channel-decrypt-m345.js` (existing) | 24/24 | | `test-channel-psk-ux.js` (#1024) | 19/19 | | `test-packet-filter.js` | 69/69 | ### Files changed - `public/vendor/sha256-hmac.js` — **new** (~150 LOC, MIT, decrypt-side only) - `public/channel-decrypt.js` — `hasSubtle()` guard + fallback in `deriveKey`/`computeChannelHash`/`verifyMAC` - `public/index.html` — script tag for `vendor/sha256-hmac.js` - `test-channel-decrypt-insecure-context.js` — **new** (8 assertions, pure Node, no browser) - `test-all.sh` + `.github/workflows/deploy.yml` — wire the test ### Risk / scope - Frontend-only, decrypt-side only. No server, schema, or config changes (Config Documentation Rule N/A). - Secure-context behaviour unchanged (still uses Web Crypto when present). - HMAC `secret` building, MAC truncation (2 bytes), and AES-ECB delegation untouched. - Hash vector for the user's PSK key matches: `SHA-256(372a9c93260507adcbf36a84bec0f33d) = b7ce04…`, channel hash byte `0xb7` (183) — confirmed against Node `crypto` and against the new pure-JS path. ### Note on the FIPS test data in the new test The PSK `372a9c93260507adcbf36a84bec0f33d` is shared test data from the bug report, not a real channel secret. --------- Co-authored-by: openclaw-bot <bot@openclaw.local>
182 lines
7.3 KiB
JavaScript
182 lines
7.3 KiB
JavaScript
/**
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* Tests that channel decryption works in an "insecure context" — i.e. when
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* `window.crypto.subtle` is undefined.
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*
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* Why: when CoreScope is served over plain HTTP (or accessed via a non-https
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* origin like `http://<lan-ip>:8080`), browsers refuse to expose
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* `crypto.subtle` (it requires a secure context). The original
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* `channel-decrypt.js` used `crypto.subtle.digest('SHA-256', …)` for
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* `computeChannelHash` and `crypto.subtle.importKey(…)` +
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* `crypto.subtle.sign('HMAC', …)` for `verifyMAC`. PR #1021 fixed only the
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* AES-ECB path with a pure-JS vendor module, but left SHA-256 and HMAC paths
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* pinned to `crypto.subtle`. Result on HTTP origins:
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*
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* addUserChannel("372a9c93260507adcbf36a84bec0f33d")
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* -> computeChannelHash(key) throws "Cannot read properties of undefined
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* (reading 'digest')"
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* -> caught silently by addUserChannel's try/catch
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* -> user sees "Failed to decrypt"
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*
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* This test sandboxes channel-decrypt.js with `crypto.subtle === undefined`
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* and asserts both `computeChannelHash` and `verifyMAC` still work, using
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* a pure-JS SHA-256 / HMAC-SHA256 fallback.
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*
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* Reference vectors:
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* key bytes = 0x37,0x2a,0x9c,0x93,0x26,0x05,0x07,0xad,0xcb,0xf3,0x6a,0x84,0xbe,0xc0,0xf3,0x3d
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* SHA256(key) = b7ce04f7d9019788b69e709ffb796a36d00225818b444ad4f8979bc1d1445f47
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* -> first byte (channel hash) = 0xb7 = 183
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*
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* HMAC-SHA256 KAT (RFC 4231 Test Case 1):
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* key = 0x0b * 20
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* data = "Hi There"
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* mac = b0344c61d8db38535ca8afceaf0bf12b881dc200c9833da726e9376c2e32cff7
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*/
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'use strict';
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const vm = require('vm');
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const fs = require('fs');
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const path = require('path');
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let passed = 0;
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let failed = 0;
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function assert(cond, msg) {
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if (cond) { passed++; console.log(' ✓ ' + msg); }
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else { failed++; console.error(' ✗ ' + msg); }
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}
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function loadChannelDecryptInsecureContext() {
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const storage = {};
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const localStorage = {
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getItem: (k) => storage[k] !== undefined ? storage[k] : null,
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setItem: (k, v) => { storage[k] = String(v); },
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removeItem: (k) => { delete storage[k]; },
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};
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// CRITICAL: crypto present, but no .subtle. Mirrors browser HTTP context.
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const insecureCrypto = {};
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const sandbox = {
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window: {}, crypto: insecureCrypto, TextEncoder, TextDecoder, Uint8Array,
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localStorage, console, Date, JSON, parseInt, Math, String, Number,
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Object, Array, RegExp, Error, Promise, setTimeout,
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};
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sandbox.window = sandbox; sandbox.self = sandbox;
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vm.createContext(sandbox);
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// Vendored AES (must load before channel-decrypt.js — same as index.html).
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const vendorAesPath = path.join(__dirname, 'public/vendor/aes-ecb.js');
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if (fs.existsSync(vendorAesPath)) {
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vm.runInContext(fs.readFileSync(vendorAesPath, 'utf8'), sandbox);
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}
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// Optional vendored SHA-256 / HMAC (the fix). Load if present so the test
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// works whether the fix vendors it as a separate file OR inlines it into
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// channel-decrypt.js.
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const vendorShaPath = path.join(__dirname, 'public/vendor/sha256-hmac.js');
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if (fs.existsSync(vendorShaPath)) {
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vm.runInContext(fs.readFileSync(vendorShaPath, 'utf8'), sandbox);
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}
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vm.runInContext(
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fs.readFileSync(path.join(__dirname, 'public/channel-decrypt.js'), 'utf8'),
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sandbox
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);
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return sandbox.window.ChannelDecrypt;
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}
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async function runTests() {
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console.log('\n=== channel-decrypt.js works without crypto.subtle (HTTP-context) ===');
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const CD = loadChannelDecryptInsecureContext();
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// 1) computeChannelHash() — pure SHA-256 of 16-byte key, take byte 0.
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const KEY_HEX = '372a9c93260507adcbf36a84bec0f33d';
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const keyBytes = CD.hexToBytes(KEY_HEX);
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let hashByte, threwHash = null;
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try {
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hashByte = await CD.computeChannelHash(keyBytes);
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} catch (e) {
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threwHash = e;
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}
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assert(threwHash === null,
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'computeChannelHash does not throw without crypto.subtle (got: ' +
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(threwHash && threwHash.message) + ')');
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assert(hashByte === 0xb7,
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'computeChannelHash returns 0xb7 for known PSK key (got: ' + hashByte + ')');
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// 2) verifyMAC() — RFC 4231 HMAC-SHA256 Test Case 1.
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// We feed a hand-built scenario:
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// verifyMAC's HMAC key is `aesKey ++ 16 zero bytes` (32 bytes).
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// To exercise RFC 4231 TC1 we set aesKey = 16 * 0x0b and pad another 4
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// bytes of 0x0b in the second half (since verifyMAC zero-fills bytes
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// 16..31, we instead use the channel-decrypt API directly here only to
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// prove HMAC-SHA256 is computed correctly with the standard secret).
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//
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// We construct the secret manually and call verifyMAC on a synthetic
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// ciphertext whose HMAC-SHA256 first 2 bytes we precompute with Node's
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// crypto module (independent oracle).
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const nodeCrypto = require('crypto');
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const aesKey = new Uint8Array(16); for (let i = 0; i < 16; i++) aesKey[i] = 0xab;
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const ct = new Uint8Array(16); for (let i = 0; i < 16; i++) ct[i] = i;
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const secret = Buffer.alloc(32); Buffer.from(aesKey).copy(secret, 0);
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const fullMac = nodeCrypto.createHmac('sha256', secret).update(Buffer.from(ct)).digest();
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const expectedMacHex = fullMac.slice(0, 2).toString('hex');
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let macOk, threwMac = null;
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try {
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macOk = await CD.verifyMAC(aesKey, ct, expectedMacHex);
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} catch (e) {
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threwMac = e;
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}
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assert(threwMac === null,
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'verifyMAC does not throw without crypto.subtle (got: ' +
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(threwMac && threwMac.message) + ')');
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assert(macOk === true,
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'verifyMAC returns true for valid 2-byte MAC (got: ' + macOk + ')');
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// 3) verifyMAC must still REJECT a wrong MAC.
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let macBad, threwMacBad = null;
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try {
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macBad = await CD.verifyMAC(aesKey, ct, '0000');
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} catch (e) {
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threwMacBad = e;
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}
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assert(threwMacBad === null,
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'verifyMAC does not throw on wrong MAC (got: ' + (threwMacBad && threwMacBad.message) + ')');
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assert(macBad === false,
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'verifyMAC returns false for wrong 2-byte MAC (got: ' + macBad + ')');
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// 4) End-to-end: decrypt() must work with subtle absent — exercises
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// SHA-256 (key derivation already done) + HMAC + AES-ECB together.
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// Build a synthetic encrypted packet from a known plaintext.
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const aesKey2 = nodeCrypto.randomBytes(16);
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const plaintext = Buffer.alloc(16);
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// timestamp(4 LE) + flags(1) + "alice: hi\0" then padded
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plaintext.writeUInt32LE(0x12345678, 0);
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plaintext[4] = 0x00;
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Buffer.from('alice: hi\0', 'utf8').copy(plaintext, 5);
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const cipher = nodeCrypto.createCipheriv('aes-128-ecb', aesKey2, null);
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cipher.setAutoPadding(false);
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const ct2 = Buffer.concat([cipher.update(plaintext), cipher.final()]);
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const secret2 = Buffer.alloc(32); aesKey2.copy(secret2, 0);
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const macHex2 = nodeCrypto.createHmac('sha256', secret2).update(ct2).digest().slice(0, 2).toString('hex');
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let decResult = null, threwDec = null;
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try {
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decResult = await CD.decrypt(new Uint8Array(aesKey2), macHex2, ct2.toString('hex'));
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} catch (e) {
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threwDec = e;
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}
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assert(threwDec === null,
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'decrypt() does not throw without crypto.subtle (got: ' +
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(threwDec && threwDec.message) + ')');
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assert(decResult && decResult.sender === 'alice' && decResult.message === 'hi',
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'decrypt() recovers sender + message in HTTP context (got: ' +
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JSON.stringify(decResult) + ')');
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console.log('\n=== Results ===');
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console.log('Passed: ' + passed + ', Failed: ' + failed);
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process.exit(failed > 0 ? 1 : 0);
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}
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runTests().catch(e => { console.error(e); process.exit(1); });
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