Merge branch 'master' into ep/smp-rcv-service

simplexmq.cabal

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 cabal-version: 1.12
 
 name:           simplexmq
-version:        6.4.0.9
+version:        6.4.0.10
 synopsis:       SimpleXMQ message broker
 description:    This package includes <./docs/Simplex-Messaging-Server.html server>,
                 <./docs/Simplex-Messaging-Client.html client> and

src/Simplex/Messaging/Agent.hs

@@ -859,7 +859,7 @@ setConnShortLink' c connId cMode userData clientData =
         Just ShortLinkCreds {shortLinkId, shortLinkKey, linkPrivSigKey, linkEncFixedData} -> do
           let (linkId, k) = SL.contactShortLinkKdf shortLinkKey
           unless (shortLinkId == linkId) $ throwE $ INTERNAL "setConnShortLink: link ID is not derived from link"
-          d <- liftError id $ SL.encryptUserData g k $ SL.encodeSignUserData linkPrivSigKey smpAgentVRange userData
+          d <- liftError id $ SL.encryptUserData g k $ SL.encodeSignUserData SCMContact linkPrivSigKey smpAgentVRange userData
           pure (rq, linkId, cslContact shortLinkKey, (linkEncFixedData, d))
         Nothing -> do
           sigKeys@(_, privSigKey) <- atomically $ C.generateKeyPair @'C.Ed25519 g
@@ -877,7 +877,7 @@ setConnShortLink' c connId cMode userData clientData =
         g <- asks random
         AgentConfig {smpAgentVRange} <- asks config
         let k = SL.invShortLinkKdf shortLinkKey
-        d <- liftError id $ SL.encryptUserData g k $ SL.encodeSignUserData linkPrivSigKey smpAgentVRange userData
+        d <- liftError id $ SL.encryptUserData g k $ SL.encodeSignUserData SCMInvitation linkPrivSigKey smpAgentVRange userData
         let sl = CSLInvitation SLSServer (qServer rq) shortLinkId shortLinkKey
         pure (rq, shortLinkId, sl, (linkEncFixedData, d))
       Nothing -> throwE $ CMD PROHIBITED "setConnShortLink: no ShortLinkCreds in invitation"

src/Simplex/Messaging/Agent/Protocol.hs

@@ -1697,13 +1697,13 @@ instance Encoding AConnLinkData where
   smpP =
     smpP >>= \case
       CMInvitation -> do
-        (vr, userData) <- smpP
+        (vr, userData) <- smpP <* A.takeByteString -- ignoring tail for forward compatibility with the future link data encoding
         pure $ ACLD SCMInvitation $ InvitationLinkData vr userData
       CMContact -> do
         (agentVRange, direct) <- smpP
         owners <- smpListP
         relays <- smpListP
-        userData <- smpP
+        userData <- smpP <* A.takeByteString -- ignoring tail for forward compatibility with the future link data encoding
         pure $ ACLD SCMContact ContactLinkData {agentVRange, direct, owners, relays, userData}
 
 data StoredClientService (s :: DBStored) = ClientService

src/Simplex/Messaging/Crypto/ShortLink.hs

@@ -54,9 +54,9 @@ encodeSignLinkData (rootKey, pk) agentVRange connReq userData =
       md = smpEncode $ connLinkData @c agentVRange userData
    in (LinkKey (C.sha3_256 fd), (encodeSign pk fd, encodeSign pk md))
 
-encodeSignUserData :: C.PrivateKeyEd25519 -> VersionRangeSMPA -> ConnInfo -> ByteString
-encodeSignUserData pk agentVRange userData =
-  encodeSign pk $ smpEncode $ connLinkData @'CMContact agentVRange userData
+encodeSignUserData :: forall c. ConnectionModeI c => SConnectionMode c -> C.PrivateKeyEd25519 -> VersionRangeSMPA -> ConnInfo -> ByteString
+encodeSignUserData _ pk agentVRange userData =
+  encodeSign pk $ smpEncode $ connLinkData @c agentVRange userData
 
 connLinkData :: forall c. ConnectionModeI c => VersionRangeSMPA -> ConnInfo -> ConnLinkData c
 connLinkData agentVRange userData = case sConnectionMode @c of

src/Simplex/Messaging/Server.hs

@@ -1271,8 +1271,8 @@ verifyCmdAuth thAuth k authenticator authorized (CorrId corrId) = case thAuth of
   Just THAuthServer {serverPrivKey = pk} -> C.cbVerify k pk (C.cbNonce corrId) authenticator authorized
   Nothing -> False
 
-dummyVerifyCmd :: Maybe (THandleAuth 'TServer) -> Maybe TAuthorizations -> ByteString -> CorrId -> Maybe Bool
-dummyVerifyCmd thAuth tAuth authorized corrId = verify <$> tAuth
+dummyVerifyCmd :: Maybe (THandleAuth 'TServer) -> Maybe TAuthorizations -> ByteString -> CorrId -> Bool
+dummyVerifyCmd thAuth tAuth authorized corrId = maybe False verify tAuth
   where
     verify = \case
       (TASignature (C.ASignature a s), _) -> C.verify' (dummySignKey a) s authorized

tests/AgentTests/ShortLinkTests.hs

@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ import AgentTests.ConnectionRequestTests (contactConnRequest, invConnRequest)
 import AgentTests.EqInstances ()
 import Control.Concurrent.STM
 import Control.Monad.Except
-import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Protocol (AgentErrorType (..), ConnectionMode (..), LinkKey (..), SMPAgentError (..), linkUserData, supportedSMPAgentVRange)
+import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Protocol (AgentErrorType (..), ConnectionMode (..), LinkKey (..), SConnectionMode (..), SMPAgentError (..), linkUserData, supportedSMPAgentVRange)
 import qualified Simplex.Messaging.Crypto as C
 import qualified Simplex.Messaging.Crypto.ShortLink as SL
 import Test.Hspec hiding (fit, it)
@@ -79,7 +79,7 @@ testUpdateContactShortLink = do
   Right (fd, _ud) <- runExceptT $ SL.encryptLinkData g k linkData
   -- encrypt updated user data
   let updatedUserData = "updated user data"
-      signed = SL.encodeSignUserData (snd sigKeys) supportedSMPAgentVRange updatedUserData
+      signed = SL.encodeSignUserData SCMContact (snd sigKeys) supportedSMPAgentVRange updatedUserData
   Right ud' <- runExceptT $ SL.encryptUserData g k signed
   -- decrypt
   Right (connReq, connData') <- pure $ SL.decryptLinkData linkKey k (fd, ud')
@@ -114,7 +114,7 @@ testContactShortLinkBadSignature = do
   let updatedUserData = "updated user data"
   -- another signature key
   (_, pk) <- atomically $ C.generateKeyPair @'C.Ed25519 g
-  let signed = SL.encodeSignUserData pk supportedSMPAgentVRange updatedUserData
+  let signed = SL.encodeSignUserData SCMContact pk supportedSMPAgentVRange updatedUserData
   Right ud' <- runExceptT $ SL.encryptUserData g k signed
   -- decryption fails
   SL.decryptLinkData @'CMContact linkKey k (fd, ud')

tests/ServerTests.hs

@@ -949,7 +949,7 @@ testTiming =
       ]
     timeRepeat n = fmap fst . timeItT . forM_ (replicate n ()) . const
     similarTime t1 t2
-      | t1 <= t2 = abs (1 - t1 / t2) < 0.35 -- normally the difference between "no queue" and "wrong key" is less than 5%
+      | t1 <= t2 = abs (1 - t1 / t2) < 0.3 -- normally the difference between "no queue" and "wrong key" is less than 5%
       | otherwise = similarTime t2 t1
     testSameTiming :: forall c. Transport c => THandleSMP c 'TClient -> THandleSMP c 'TClient -> (C.AuthAlg, C.AuthAlg, Int) -> Expectation
     testSameTiming rh sh (C.AuthAlg goodKeyAlg, C.AuthAlg badKeyAlg, n) = do