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Merge pull request #1095 from simplex-chat/proxy

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SMP proxy feature branch
This commit is contained in:
Evgeny Poberezkin
2024-05-14 21:35:51 +01:00
committed by GitHub
parent f51cf1deac 00a2dde727
commit 2d2cc86bd8
38 changed files with 1793 additions and 469 deletions
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.github/workflows/build.yml
+1 -1
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@@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ jobs:
run: cabal build --enable-tests
- name: Test
timeout-minutes: 30
timeout-minutes: 40
shell: bash
run: cabal test --test-show-details=direct
notes-flow.txt
+23
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@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
common:
corrId - random BS, used as CbNonce
entityId - p2r tlsUniq
# setup
s->p: "proxy", uri, auth?
# unless connected
p->r: "p_handshake"
p<-r: "r_key", tls-signed dh pub
s<-r: "r_key", tls-signed dh pub # reply entityId contains tlsUniq
# working
s ; generate random dh priv, make shared secret
s->p: s2r("forward", random dh pub, SEND command blob)
p->r: p2r("forward", random dh pub, s2r("forward", ...)))
r->c@ "msg", ...
p<-r: p2r("r_res", s2r("ok" / "error", error))
s<-p@ s2r("ok" / "error", error)
# expired
p<-r@ p2r("error", "key expired")
s<-p@ "error", "key expired"
s ; reconnect
rfcs/2023-09-12-second-relays.md
+96 -41
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@@ -2,9 +2,9 @@
## Problem
SMP protocol relays are chosen and can be controlled by the message recipients. It means that the recipients can find out IP addresses of message senders by modifying SMP relay code (or by using proxies and timing correlation), unless the senders use VPN or some overlay network. Tor is an audequate solution in most cases to mitigate it, but it requires additional technical knowledge to install and configure (even installing Orbot on Android is seen as "complex" by many users), and reduces usability because of higher latency.
SMP protocol relays are chosen and can be controlled by the message recipients. It means that the recipients can find out IP addresses of message senders by modifying SMP relay code (or by using proxies and timing correlation), unless the senders use VPN or some overlay network. Tor is an adequate solution in most cases to mitigate it, but it requires additional technical knowledge to install and configure (even installing Orbot on Android is seen as "complex" by many users), and reduces usability because of higher latency.
The lack of in-built IP address protection is the main concern of many users, particularly given that most people do not realise that it is lacking by default - without transport protection SimpleX is not perceived as a "whole product".
The lack of in-built IP address protection is the main concern of many users, particularly given that most people do not realize that it is lacking by default - without transport protection SimpleX is not perceived as a "whole product".
Similarly, XFTP protocol relays are chosen by senders, and they can be used to detect file recipients' IP addresses.
@@ -43,7 +43,7 @@ Overall, this is not a viable or even appropriate option for the current stage.
3. SMP / XFTP proxy.
Introduce SMP and XFTP protocol extenstions to allow message senders and file recipients to delegate the tasks of sending messages and receiving files to the proxies, so that peer-chosen relays can only observe IP addresses of the proxies and not of the users.
Introduce SMP and XFTP protocol extensions to allow message senders and file recipients to delegate the tasks of sending messages and receiving files to the proxies, so that peer-chosen relays can only observe IP addresses of the proxies and not of the users.
Pros:
- no dependency on and lower latency than via Tor
@@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ Below considers this design.
2. SMP proxy should not be able to observe queue addresses and their count on the destination relays. This requirement is not needed for XFTP proxies, as each file chunk is downloaded only once, so there is no need to hide its address.
3. There must be no identifiers and cyphertext in common in outgoing and incoming traffic inside TLS (the current designs have this quality).
3. There must be no identifiers and ciphertext in common in outgoing and incoming traffic inside TLS (the current designs have this quality).
4. Traffic between the client and destination relays must be e2e encrypted, with MITM-by-proxy mitigated, relying on the relay identity (certificate fingerprint), ideally without any additional fingerprint in relay address.
@@ -97,11 +97,11 @@ This would also reduce the difference in how the traffic looks to the observer -
The flow of the messages will be:
1. Client requests proxy to create session with the relay by sending `server` command with the SMP relay address and optional proxy basic AUTH (below). It should be possible to batch multiple session requests into one block, to reduce traffic.
1. Client requests proxy to create session with the relay by sending `PRXY` command with the SMP relay address and optional proxy basic AUTH (below). It should be possible to batch multiple session requests into one block, to reduce traffic.
2. Proxy connects to SMP relay, negotiating a shared secret in the handshake that will be used to encrypt all sender blocks inside TLS (proxy-relay encryption). SMP relay also returns in handshake its temporary DH key to agree e2e encryption with the client (sender-relay encryption, to hide metadata sent to the destination relay from proxy).
2. Proxy connects to SMP relay, negotiating a shared secret via a handshake headers - it will be used to encrypt all sender blocks inside TLS (proxy-relay encryption). DH key returned by SMP relay in handshake will also be used to encrypt client commands, combining it with random per-command keys (sender-relay encryption, to hide metadata sent to the destination relay from proxy).
3. Proxy replies with `server_id` command including relay session ID to identify it in further requests, relay DH key for e2e encryption with the client - this key is signed with the TLS online private key associated with the certificate (its fingerprint is included in the relay address), and the TLS session ID between proxy and relay (this session ID must be used in transmissions, to mitigate replay attacks as before).
3. Proxy replies to sender with `PKEY` message using "entityId" transmission field to indicate session ID for using in further requests, relay DH key for _s2r_ encryption with the client - this key is signed with the TLS online private key associated with the certificate (its fingerprint is included in the relay address), and the TLS session ID between proxy and relay (this session ID must be used in transmissions, to mitigate replay attacks as before).
A possible attack here is that proxy can use this TLS session to replay commands received from the client. Possibly, it could be mitigated with a bloom filter per proxy/SMP relay connection that would reject the repeated DH keys (that need to be used for replay), and also with DH key expiration (this mitigation should allow some acceptable rate of false positives from the bloom filter).
@@ -113,11 +113,11 @@ It is important that the same public key from destination relay is returned to a
*Unrelated cosideration for SMP protocol privacy improvement*: instead of signing commands to the destination relay, the sender could have a ratchet per queue agreed with the destination relay that would simply use authenticated encryption with per-message symmetric key to encrypt the message on the way to relay, and this encryption would be used as a proof of sender.
4. Now the client sends `forward` to proxy, which it then forwards to SMP relay, applying additional encryption layer.
4. Now the client sends `PFWD` to proxy, which it then forwards to SMP relay as `RFWD`, applying _p2r_ encryption layer.
5. SMP relay sends `response` to proxy applying additional encryption layer, which it then forwards to the client removing the additional encryption layer.
5. SMP relay sends `RRES` to proxy applying _p2r_ encryption layer, which it then forwards to the client as `PRES`, removing the _p2r_ encryption layer.
Effectively it works as a simplified two-hop onion routing with the first relay (proxy) chosen by the sending client and the second relay chosen by the recipient, not only protecting senders' IP addresses from the recipients' relays, but also preventing recipients relays from correlating senders' traffic to different queues, as TLS session is owned by the proxy now and it mixes the traffic from multiple senders. To correlate traffic to users, proxy and relay would have to combine their information. SMP relays are still able to correlate traffic to receiving users via transport session.
Effectively it works as a simplified two-hop onion routing with the first relay (proxy) chosen by the sending client and the second relay chosen by the recipient, not only protecting senders' IP addresses from the recipients' relays, but also preventing recipients' relays from correlating senders' traffic to different queues, as TLS session is owned by the proxy now and it mixes the traffic from multiple senders. To correlate traffic to users, proxy and relay would have to combine their information. SMP relays are still able to correlate traffic to receiving users via transport session.
Sequence diagram for sending the message via SMP proxy:
@@ -126,33 +126,33 @@ Sequence diagram for sending the message via SMP proxy:
| sending | | SMP | | SMP | | receiving |
| client | | proxy | | relay | | client |
------------- ------------- ------------- -------------
| `server` | | |
| -------------------------> | create TLS session, get keys | |
| `PRXY` | | |
| -------------------------> | | |
| | ------------------------------> | |
| `server_id` | (if doesn't exist) | |
| | SMP handshake | |
| | <------------------------------ | |
| `PKEY` | | |
| <------------------------- | | |
| | | |
| TLS(F:s2r(SEND(e2e(msg)))) | | |
| -------------------------> | TLS(F:p2r(s2r(SEND(e2e(msg))))) | |
| `PFWD` (s2r) | | |
| -------------------------> | | |
| | `RFWD` (p2r) | |
| | ------------------------------> | |
| | | |
| | TLS(R:p2r(s2r(OK/ERR))) | |
| TLS(R:s2r(OK/ERR)) | <------------------------------ | |
| <------------------------- | | TLS(MSG(r2c(e2e(msg)))) |
| | | -----------------------> |
| | | |
| | | TLS(ACK) |
| | `RRES` (p2r) | |
| | <------------------------------ | |
| `PRES` (s2r) | | `MSG` |
| <------------------------- | | -----------------------> |
| | | `ACK` |
| | | <----------------------- |
| | | |
| | | |
```
Below diagram shows the encrypttion layers for `forward` and `response` commands:
Below diagram shows the encrypttion layers for `PFWD`/`RFWD` commands and `RRES`/`PRES` responses:
- s2r (added) - encryption between client and SMP relay, with relay key returned in server_id command, with MITM by proxy mitigated by verifying the certificate fingerprint included in the relay address.
- s2r (added) - encryption between client and SMP relay, with relay key returned in relay handshake, with MITM by proxy mitigated by verifying the certificate fingerprint included in the relay address.
- e2e (exists now) - end-to-end encryption per SMP queue, with double ratchet e2e encryption inside it.
- p2r (added) - additional encryption between proxy and SMP relay with key agreed in the handshake, to mitigate traffic correlation inside TLS. This key could also be signed by the same certificate, if we don't want to rely on TLS security.
- p2r (added) - additional encryption between proxy and SMP relay with the shared secret agreed in the handshake, to mitigate traffic correlation inside TLS.
- r2c (exists now) additional encryption between SMP relay and client to prevent traffic correlation inside TLS.
```
@@ -167,30 +167,85 @@ Below diagram shows the encrypttion layers for `forward` and `response` commands
----------------- ----------------- -- TLS -- ----------------- -----------------
```
When proxy connects to SMP relay it would indicate in the handshake that it will use proxy protocol and the SMP relay would expect the same `forward` commands and reply with `response`s.
Question: should proxy declare its role in handshake? When proxy connects to SMP relay it would indicate in the handshake that it will act as a proxy and the SMP relay would expect the same `forward` commands and reply with `response`s.
Below syntax aims to fit in 16kb block using spare capacity in SMP protocol.
Common SMP transmission format (v4), for reference:
```abnf
proxy_block = padded(proxy_transmission, 16384)
proxy_transmission = corr_id relay_session_id proxy_command
corr_id = length *8 OCTET
proxy_command = server / server_id / forward / response / error
server = "S" address [relay_basic_auth] ; creates transport session between proxy and relay
server_id = "I" relay_session_id tls_session_id signed_relay_key ;
; session_id is the TLS session ID between proxy and relay, it has to be included inside encrypted block to prevent replay attacks
forward = %s"F" random_dh_pub_key encrypted_block ; it's important that a new key is used for each command, to prevent any correlation by proxy or by destination relay
response = %s"R" encrypted_block; response received from the destination SMP relay
relay_session_id = length *8 OCTET
error = %s"E" error
paddedTransmission = <padded(transmission), 16384>
transmission = signature signed
signature = 0 ; empty signatures here
signed = sessionIdentifier corrId entityId (smpCommand / brokerMsg)
```
The overhead is: 1+8 (corrId) + 1+8 (relay_session_id) + 1 (command) + 1+32 (random_dh_pub_key) + 2 (original length) + 16 (auth tag for e2e encryption) + 16 (auth tag for proxy to relay encryption) = 86 bytes. The reserve for sent messages in SMP is ~84 bytes, so it should about fit with some reduced bytes somewhere.
- `corrId` is fully random each time and used as a nonce for encrypted blocks.
- `entityId` carries tlsUniq from the current proxy-to-relay connection.
- `smpCommand` gets extended with `s2p_command / p2r_command`.
- `brokerMsg` gets extended with `r_key / r_response`.
Another possible design is to allow mixing sent messages and normal SMP commands in the same transport connection, but it can make fitting in the block a bit harder, additional overhead would be: 1 (transmission count) + 2 (transmission size) + 1 (empty signature) = 4 bytes.
```abnf
s2p_command = proxy / forward
p2r_command = p_handshake ; forward is
proxy = %s"PRXY" SP relayUri SP basicAuth
relayUri = length %s"smp://" serverIdentity "@" srvHost [":" port]
forward = %s"PFWD" SP dhPublic SP encryptedBlock
r_key = %s"PKEY" SP dhPublic
r_response = %s"RRES" SP encryptedBlock
dhPublic = length x509encoded
```
The above assumes that the client can only send one message to an SMP relay and then has to wait for response before sending the next message. Missing the response would cause re-delivery (further improvement is possible when proxy detects these redelieveries and not send them to relays but simply reply with the same response).
### Implementation considerations for the client
While client/server protocol is rather straightforward to implement, and it is already working, there are some decisions to make about how the client makes decisions about.
1. When to use proxy and when to connect directly to the destination relay.
While from the perspective of threat model improvement it may be beneficial to always use the proxy, choosing the proxy that is different from other relays in the connection, initially we need to make it opt-in, with an option to only use it for unknown destination relays, to minimize any unexpected adverse effect on the delivery latency.
Proxy mode will be passed from the client via NetworkConfig.
2. Which proxying relays to use.
Ability to request access to the session with the destination relay (and to create such session) is protected with the same basic auth approach as creating queues - the logic here is that opening private servers to all users as proxies would increase the scenarios for DoS attacks (which is the case with the public servers).
The open question is whether the client should choose proxies from:
- all configured relays.
- there should be a subset of configured relays.
- there should be a separate list.
E.g., there could be a second toggle in the relay configuration to allow using relay as proxy, in addition to the current toggle that allows creating queues.
For simplicity, initially we will just use all enabled relays as potential proxies.
3. How many proxying relays should be used during one session.
This is not a simple question, and it creates a contradiction between two risks:
- collusion between proxies and destination relays simplifies correlating sending clients by session - from the point of view of this risk, clients should follow the same policy for creating connections with proxies, that is to create a new connection for each user profile, and if transport isolation is set to "per connection" - for each destination queue.
- traffic correlation by observable traffic sessions (particularly if an attacker can observe user's ISP traffic or multiple proxies) - from this point of view, it would be beneficial to use fewer proxies and fewer connections with proxies and see the risk of proxy colluding with the destination relay as lower than the risk of traffic observation that in the case of multiple sessions would allow to correlate traffic to rarely used destination relays (any private self-hosted relays) and the traffic of the user to a given proxy, to prove the fact of user communicating with the destination relay via the proxy.
While we can transfer this choice on the users, it seems a complex decision to make, and overall the second risk (traffic correlation) seems more important to address than the first.
In any case possible options are:
1. Extreme option 1: Create a new proxy session, with the new random proxy, for each potential transport session that would exist if the user were to be connected to destination relays directly. That is, never to mix access to multiple relays from multiple user profiles (and in case of per-connection isolation, to multiple queues) into a one client session with proxy. This is a rather radical option that nullifies any advantages of having fewer sessions with proxies than there would have been with the destination relays and removes any benefits of batching destination server session requests (PRXY comands).
2. Extreme option 2: Use only one proxy session at the time, mixing traffic from all user profiles and to all destination servers (and for all queues) into a session with one proxy. This minimizes the risks of traffic correlation in case of non-colluding proxy, but maximises the risk in case it colludes with the destination relays.
3. Balanced option: Use one proxy session per user profile, but mix traffic to multiple queues irrespective of connection isolation option and to all destination servers. Given that connection isolation is an experimental option, this makes the most sense, but it would have to be disclosed.
4. Less balanced option: take connection isolation option into account and create a new proxy connection for each destination queue. This feels worse than option 3.
If option 3 is chosen, then the transport session key with the proxy would be different from the transport session key with the relay - proxy session will only use UserId as the key, and the relay session uses (UserId, Server, Maybe EntityId) as the key.
If option 4 is chosen, the keys would also be different, as the proxy would then use (UserId, Maybe (Server, EntityId)) as the key.
We could potentially key proxy sessions (and create proxy connections) per each destination relay, in the same way as we key relays themselves, but it seems to have the least sense, as we neither achieve isolation by queue in case proxy and destination relay collude, nor we sufficiently protect from traffic correlation by any observers.
The implemented design is this:
- for each destination relay a random proxy is chosen and used to send all messages - all requests from a client coalesce to a single session.
- transport isolation mode is taken into account, that is if per-connection isolation is enabled, then a separate proxy connection will be created for each messaging queue.
- supported modes when proxy is used: always, for unknown relays, for unknown relays when IP address is not protected, never.
This decision is made because the argument for protection against collusion between proxy and relay and more balanced traffic distribution is stronger than the argument for protection against traffic correlation, because even mixing all messages to one proxy connection does not provide protection against traffic correlation by time, so in any case it requires adding delays.
### Threat model for SMP proxy and changes to threat model for SMP
#### SMP proxy
simplexmq.cabal
+1
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@@ -652,6 +652,7 @@ test-suite simplexmq-test
ServerTests
SMPAgentClient
SMPClient
SMPProxyTests
Util
XFTPAgent
XFTPCLI
src/Simplex/FileTransfer/Client.hs
+20 -15
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@@ -51,13 +51,13 @@ import Simplex.Messaging.Protocol
RecipientId,
SenderId,
)
import Simplex.Messaging.Transport (ALPN, HandshakeError (VERSION), THandleAuth (..), THandleParams (..), TransportError (..), TransportPeer (..), supportedParameters)
import Simplex.Messaging.Transport (ALPN, THandleAuth (..), THandleParams (..), TransportError (..), TransportPeer (..), supportedParameters)
import Simplex.Messaging.Transport.Client (TransportClientConfig, TransportHost, alpn)
import Simplex.Messaging.Transport.HTTP2
import Simplex.Messaging.Transport.HTTP2.Client
import Simplex.Messaging.Transport.HTTP2.File
import Simplex.Messaging.Util (bshow, liftEitherWith, liftError', tshow, whenM)
import Simplex.Messaging.Version (compatibleVersion, pattern Compatible)
import Simplex.Messaging.Version
import UnliftIO
import UnliftIO.Directory
@@ -99,22 +99,24 @@ defaultXFTPClientConfig =
getXFTPClient :: TransportSession FileResponse -> XFTPClientConfig -> (XFTPClient -> IO ()) -> IO (Either XFTPClientError XFTPClient)
getXFTPClient transportSession@(_, srv, _) config@XFTPClientConfig {clientALPN, xftpNetworkConfig, serverVRange} disconnected = runExceptT $ do
let tcConfig = (transportClientConfig xftpNetworkConfig) {alpn = clientALPN}
http2Config = xftpHTTP2Config tcConfig config
username = proxyUsername transportSession
let username = proxyUsername transportSession
ProtocolServer _ host port keyHash = srv
useHost <- liftEither $ chooseTransportHost xftpNetworkConfig host
let tcConfig = (transportClientConfig xftpNetworkConfig useHost) {alpn = clientALPN}
http2Config = xftpHTTP2Config tcConfig config
clientVar <- newTVarIO Nothing
let usePort = if null port then "443" else port
clientDisconnected = readTVarIO clientVar >>= mapM_ disconnected
http2Client <- liftError' xftpClientError $ getVerifiedHTTP2Client (Just username) useHost usePort (Just keyHash) Nothing http2Config clientDisconnected
let HTTP2Client {sessionId, sessionALPN} = http2Client
thParams0 = THandleParams {sessionId, blockSize = xftpBlockSize, thVersion = VersionXFTP 1, thAuth = Nothing, implySessId = False, batch = True}
v = VersionXFTP 1
thServerVRange = versionToRange v
thParams0 = THandleParams {sessionId, blockSize = xftpBlockSize, thVersion = v, thServerVRange, thAuth = Nothing, implySessId = False, batch = True}
logDebug $ "Client negotiated handshake protocol: " <> tshow sessionALPN
thParams@THandleParams {thVersion} <- case sessionALPN of
Just "xftp/1" -> xftpClientHandshakeV1 serverVRange keyHash http2Client thParams0
Nothing -> pure thParams0
_ -> throwError $ PCETransportError (TEHandshake VERSION)
_ -> throwError $ PCETransportError TEVersion
logDebug $ "Client negotiated protocol: " <> tshow thVersion
let c = XFTPClient {http2Client, thParams, transportSession, config}
atomically $ writeTVar clientVar $ Just c
@@ -123,9 +125,10 @@ getXFTPClient transportSession@(_, srv, _) config@XFTPClientConfig {clientALPN,
xftpClientHandshakeV1 :: VersionRangeXFTP -> C.KeyHash -> HTTP2Client -> THandleParamsXFTP 'TClient -> ExceptT XFTPClientError IO (THandleParamsXFTP 'TClient)
xftpClientHandshakeV1 serverVRange keyHash@(C.KeyHash kh) c@HTTP2Client {sessionId, serverKey} thParams0 = do
shs@XFTPServerHandshake {authPubKey = ck} <- getServerHandshake
(v, sk) <- processServerHandshake shs
(vr, sk) <- processServerHandshake shs
let v = maxVersion vr
sendClientHandshake XFTPClientHandshake {xftpVersion = v, keyHash}
pure thParams0 {thAuth = Just THAuthClient {serverPeerPubKey = sk, serverCertKey = ck, sessSecret = Nothing}, thVersion = v}
pure thParams0 {thAuth = Just THAuthClient {serverPeerPubKey = sk, serverCertKey = ck, sessSecret = Nothing}, thVersion = v, thServerVRange = vr}
where
getServerHandshake :: ExceptT XFTPClientError IO XFTPServerHandshake
getServerHandshake = do
@@ -133,13 +136,13 @@ xftpClientHandshakeV1 serverVRange keyHash@(C.KeyHash kh) c@HTTP2Client {session
HTTP2Response {respBody = HTTP2Body {bodyHead = shsBody}} <-
liftError' (const $ PCEResponseError HANDSHAKE) $ sendRequest c helloReq Nothing
liftHS . smpDecode =<< liftHS (C.unPad shsBody)
processServerHandshake :: XFTPServerHandshake -> ExceptT XFTPClientError IO (VersionXFTP, C.PublicKeyX25519)
processServerHandshake :: XFTPServerHandshake -> ExceptT XFTPClientError IO (VersionRangeXFTP, C.PublicKeyX25519)
processServerHandshake XFTPServerHandshake {xftpVersionRange, sessionId = serverSessId, authPubKey = serverAuth} = do
unless (sessionId == serverSessId) $ throwError $ PCEResponseError SESSION
case xftpVersionRange `compatibleVersion` serverVRange of
Nothing -> throwError $ PCEResponseError HANDSHAKE
Just (Compatible v) ->
fmap (v,) . liftHS $ do
case xftpVersionRange `compatibleVRange` serverVRange of
Nothing -> throwError $ PCETransportError TEVersion
Just (Compatible vr) ->
fmap (vr,) . liftHS $ do
let (X.CertificateChain cert, exact) = serverAuth
case cert of
[_leaf, ca] | XV.Fingerprint kh == XV.getFingerprint ca X.HashSHA256 -> pure ()
@@ -185,9 +188,11 @@ xftpClientError = \case
sendXFTPCommand :: forall p. FilePartyI p => XFTPClient -> C.APrivateAuthKey -> XFTPFileId -> FileCommand p -> Maybe XFTPChunkSpec -> ExceptT XFTPClientError IO (FileResponse, HTTP2Body)
sendXFTPCommand c@XFTPClient {thParams} pKey fId cmd chunkSpec_ = do
-- TODO random corrId
let corrIdUsedAsNonce = ""
t <-
liftEither . first PCETransportError $
xftpEncodeAuthTransmission thParams pKey ("", fId, FileCmd (sFileParty @p) cmd)
xftpEncodeAuthTransmission thParams pKey (corrIdUsedAsNonce, fId, FileCmd (sFileParty @p) cmd)
sendXFTPTransmission c t chunkSpec_
sendXFTPTransmission :: XFTPClient -> ByteString -> Maybe XFTPChunkSpec -> ExceptT XFTPClientError IO (FileResponse, HTTP2Body)
src/Simplex/FileTransfer/Protocol.hs
+2 -1
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@@ -48,6 +48,7 @@ import Simplex.Messaging.Protocol
SndPublicAuthKey,
Transmission,
TransmissionForAuth (..),
CorrId (..),
encodeTransmission,
encodeTransmissionForAuth,
messageTagP,
@@ -328,7 +329,7 @@ checkParty' c = case testEquality (sFileParty @p) (sFileParty @p') of
xftpEncodeAuthTransmission :: ProtocolEncoding XFTPVersion e c => THandleParams XFTPVersion 'TClient -> C.APrivateAuthKey -> Transmission c -> Either TransportError ByteString
xftpEncodeAuthTransmission thParams@THandleParams {thAuth} pKey (corrId, fId, msg) = do
let TransmissionForAuth {tForAuth, tToSend} = encodeTransmissionForAuth thParams (corrId, fId, msg)
xftpEncodeBatch1 . (,tToSend) =<< authTransmission thAuth (Just pKey) corrId tForAuth
xftpEncodeBatch1 . (,tToSend) =<< authTransmission thAuth (Just pKey) (C.cbNonce $ bs corrId) tForAuth
xftpEncodeTransmission :: ProtocolEncoding XFTPVersion e c => THandleParams XFTPVersion p -> Transmission c -> Either TransportError ByteString
xftpEncodeTransmission thParams (corrId, fId, msg) = do
src/Simplex/FileTransfer/Server.hs
+18 -13
View File
@@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ import Simplex.Messaging.Transport.HTTP2.File (fileBlockSize)
import Simplex.Messaging.Transport.HTTP2.Server
import Simplex.Messaging.Transport.Server (runTCPServer, tlsServerCredentials)
import Simplex.Messaging.Util
import Simplex.Messaging.Version (isCompatible)
import Simplex.Messaging.Version
import System.Exit (exitFailure)
import System.FilePath ((</>))
import System.IO (hPrint, hPutStrLn, universalNewlineMode)
@@ -91,10 +91,10 @@ runXFTPServerBlocking started cfg = newXFTPServerEnv cfg >>= runReaderT (xftpSer
data Handshake
= HandshakeSent C.PrivateKeyX25519
| HandshakeAccepted (THandleAuth 'TServer) VersionXFTP
| HandshakeAccepted (THandleParams XFTPVersion 'TServer)
xftpServer :: XFTPServerConfig -> TMVar Bool -> M ()
xftpServer cfg@XFTPServerConfig {xftpPort, transportConfig, inactiveClientExpiration, fileExpiration} started = do
xftpServer cfg@XFTPServerConfig {xftpPort, transportConfig, inactiveClientExpiration, fileExpiration, xftpServerVRange} started = do
mapM_ (expireServerFiles Nothing) fileExpiration
restoreServerStats
raceAny_ (runServer : expireFilesThread_ cfg <> serverStatsThread_ cfg <> controlPortThread_ cfg) `finally` stopServer
@@ -111,7 +111,9 @@ xftpServer cfg@XFTPServerConfig {xftpPort, transportConfig, inactiveClientExpira
let cleanup sessionId = atomically $ TM.delete sessionId sessions
liftIO . runHTTP2Server started xftpPort defaultHTTP2BufferSize serverParams transportConfig inactiveClientExpiration cleanup $ \sessionId sessionALPN r sendResponse -> do
reqBody <- getHTTP2Body r xftpBlockSize
let thParams0 = THandleParams {sessionId, blockSize = xftpBlockSize, thVersion = VersionXFTP 1, thAuth = Nothing, implySessId = False, batch = True}
let v = VersionXFTP 1
thServerVRange = versionToRange v
thParams0 = THandleParams {sessionId, blockSize = xftpBlockSize, thVersion = v, thServerVRange, thAuth = Nothing, implySessId = False, batch = True}
req0 = XFTPTransportRequest {thParams = thParams0, request = r, reqBody, sendResponse}
flip runReaderT env $ case sessionALPN of
Nothing -> processRequest req0
@@ -121,12 +123,12 @@ xftpServer cfg@XFTPServerConfig {xftpPort, transportConfig, inactiveClientExpira
Just thParams -> processRequest req0 {thParams} -- proceed with new version (XXX: may as well switch the request handler here)
_ -> liftIO . sendResponse $ H.responseNoBody N.ok200 [] -- shouldn't happen: means server picked handshake protocol it doesn't know about
xftpServerHandshakeV1 :: X.CertificateChain -> C.APrivateSignKey -> TMap SessionId Handshake -> XFTPTransportRequest -> M (Maybe (THandleParams XFTPVersion 'TServer))
xftpServerHandshakeV1 chain serverSignKey sessions XFTPTransportRequest {thParams = thParams@THandleParams {sessionId}, reqBody = HTTP2Body {bodyHead}, sendResponse} = do
xftpServerHandshakeV1 chain serverSignKey sessions XFTPTransportRequest {thParams = thParams0@THandleParams {sessionId}, reqBody = HTTP2Body {bodyHead}, sendResponse} = do
s <- atomically $ TM.lookup sessionId sessions
r <- runExceptT $ case s of
Nothing -> processHello
Just (HandshakeSent pk) -> processClientHandshake pk
Just (HandshakeAccepted auth v) -> pure $ Just thParams {thAuth = Just auth, thVersion = v}
Just (HandshakeAccepted thParams) -> pure $ Just thParams
either sendError pure r
where
processHello = do
@@ -134,21 +136,24 @@ xftpServer cfg@XFTPServerConfig {xftpPort, transportConfig, inactiveClientExpira
(k, pk) <- atomically . C.generateKeyPair =<< asks random
atomically $ TM.insert sessionId (HandshakeSent pk) sessions
let authPubKey = (chain, C.signX509 serverSignKey $ C.publicToX509 k)
let hs = XFTPServerHandshake {xftpVersionRange = supportedFileServerVRange, sessionId, authPubKey}
let hs = XFTPServerHandshake {xftpVersionRange = xftpServerVRange, sessionId, authPubKey}
shs <- encodeXftp hs
liftIO . sendResponse $ H.responseBuilder N.ok200 [] shs
pure Nothing
processClientHandshake pk = do
unless (B.length bodyHead == xftpBlockSize) $ throwError HANDSHAKE
body <- liftHS $ C.unPad bodyHead
XFTPClientHandshake {xftpVersion, keyHash} <- liftHS $ smpDecode body
XFTPClientHandshake {xftpVersion = v, keyHash} <- liftHS $ smpDecode body
kh <- asks serverIdentity
unless (keyHash == kh) $ throwError HANDSHAKE
unless (xftpVersion `isCompatible` supportedFileServerVRange) $ throwError HANDSHAKE
let auth = THAuthServer {serverPrivKey = pk, sessSecret' = Nothing}
atomically $ TM.insert sessionId (HandshakeAccepted auth xftpVersion) sessions
liftIO . sendResponse $ H.responseNoBody N.ok200 []
pure Nothing
case compatibleVRange' xftpServerVRange v of
Just (Compatible vr) -> do
let auth = THAuthServer {serverPrivKey = pk, sessSecret' = Nothing}
thParams = thParams0 {thAuth = Just auth, thVersion = v, thServerVRange = vr}
atomically $ TM.insert sessionId (HandshakeAccepted thParams) sessions
liftIO . sendResponse $ H.responseNoBody N.ok200 []
pure Nothing
Nothing -> throwError HANDSHAKE
sendError :: XFTPErrorType -> M (Maybe (THandleParams XFTPVersion 'TServer))
sendError err = do
runExceptT (encodeXftp err) >>= \case
src/Simplex/FileTransfer/Server/Env.hs
+3
View File
@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ import Simplex.FileTransfer.Protocol (FileCmd, FileInfo (..), XFTPFileId)
import Simplex.FileTransfer.Server.Stats
import Simplex.FileTransfer.Server.Store
import Simplex.FileTransfer.Server.StoreLog
import Simplex.FileTransfer.Transport (VersionRangeXFTP)
import qualified Simplex.Messaging.Crypto as C
import Simplex.Messaging.Protocol (BasicAuth, RcvPublicAuthKey)
import Simplex.Messaging.Server.Expiration
@@ -61,6 +62,8 @@ data XFTPServerConfig = XFTPServerConfig
caCertificateFile :: FilePath,
privateKeyFile :: FilePath,
certificateFile :: FilePath,
-- | XFTP client-server protocol version range
xftpServerVRange :: VersionRangeXFTP,
-- stats config - see SMP server config
logStatsInterval :: Maybe Int64,
logStatsStartTime :: Int64,
src/Simplex/FileTransfer/Server/Main.hs
+2
View File
@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@ import Simplex.FileTransfer.Chunks
import Simplex.FileTransfer.Description (FileSize (..))
import Simplex.FileTransfer.Server (runXFTPServer)
import Simplex.FileTransfer.Server.Env (XFTPServerConfig (..), defFileExpirationHours, defaultFileExpiration, defaultInactiveClientExpiration, supportedXFTPhandshakes)
import Simplex.FileTransfer.Transport (supportedFileServerVRange)
import qualified Simplex.Messaging.Crypto as C
import Simplex.Messaging.Encoding.String
import Simplex.Messaging.Protocol (ProtoServerWithAuth (..), pattern XFTPServer)
@@ -174,6 +175,7 @@ xftpServerCLI cfgPath logPath = do
caCertificateFile = c caCrtFile,
privateKeyFile = c serverKeyFile,
certificateFile = c serverCrtFile,
xftpServerVRange = supportedFileServerVRange,
logStatsInterval = logStats $> 86400, -- seconds
logStatsStartTime = 0, -- seconds from 00:00 UTC
serverStatsLogFile = combine logPath "file-server-stats.daily.log",
src/Simplex/FileTransfer/Transport.hs
+3 -2
View File
@@ -37,6 +37,7 @@ import qualified Control.Exception as E
import Control.Monad
import Control.Monad.Except
import Control.Monad.IO.Class
import Control.Monad.Trans.Except
import qualified Data.Aeson.TH as J
import qualified Data.Attoparsec.ByteString.Char8 as A
import Data.Bifunctor (bimap, first)
@@ -53,7 +54,7 @@ import Simplex.Messaging.Encoding
import Simplex.Messaging.Encoding.String
import Simplex.Messaging.Parsers
import Simplex.Messaging.Protocol (CommandError)
import Simplex.Messaging.Transport (HandshakeError (..), SessionId, THandle (..), THandleParams (..), TransportError (..), TransportPeer (..))
import Simplex.Messaging.Transport (SessionId, THandle (..), THandleParams (..), TransportError (..), TransportPeer (..))
import Simplex.Messaging.Transport.HTTP2.File
import Simplex.Messaging.Util (bshow)
import Simplex.Messaging.Version
@@ -95,7 +96,7 @@ supportedFileServerVRange = mkVersionRange initialXFTPVersion currentXFTPVersion
-- XFTP protocol does not use this handshake method
xftpClientHandshakeStub :: c -> Maybe C.KeyPairX25519 -> C.KeyHash -> VersionRangeXFTP -> ExceptT TransportError IO (THandle XFTPVersion c 'TClient)
xftpClientHandshakeStub _c _ks _keyHash _xftpVRange = throwError $ TEHandshake VERSION
xftpClientHandshakeStub _c _ks _keyHash _xftpVRange = throwE TEVersion
data XFTPServerHandshake = XFTPServerHandshake
{ xftpVersionRange :: VersionRangeXFTP,
src/Simplex/Messaging/Agent.hs
+20 -16
View File
@@ -849,7 +849,7 @@ joinConnSrv c userId connId hasNewConn enableNtfs cReqUri@CRContactUri {} cInfo
lift (compatibleContactUri cReqUri) >>= \case
Just (qInfo, vrsn) -> do
(connId', cReq) <- newConnSrv c userId connId hasNewConn enableNtfs SCMInvitation Nothing (CR.IKNoPQ pqSup) subMode srv
sendInvitation c userId qInfo vrsn cReq cInfo
void $ sendInvitation c userId qInfo vrsn cReq cInfo
pure connId'
Nothing -> throwError $ AGENT A_VERSION
@@ -1358,13 +1358,17 @@ runSmpQueueMsgDelivery c@AgentClient {subQ} ConnData {connId} sq (Worker {doWork
| temporaryOrHostError e -> do
let msgTimeout = if msgType == AM_HELLO_ then helloTimeout else messageTimeout
expireTs <- addUTCTime (-msgTimeout) <$> liftIO getCurrentTime
if internalTs < expireTs then notifyDelMsgs msgId e expireTs else retrySndMsg RIFast
if internalTs < expireTs
then notifyDelMsgs msgId e expireTs
else do
when (serverHostError e) $ notify $ MWARN (unId msgId) e
retrySndMsg RIFast
| otherwise -> notifyDel msgId err
where
retrySndMsg riMode = do
withStore' c $ \db -> updatePendingMsgRIState db connId msgId riState
retrySndOp c $ loop riMode
Right () -> do
Right proxySrv_ -> do
case msgType of
AM_CONN_INFO -> setConfirmed
AM_CONN_INFO_REPLY -> setConfirmed
@@ -1386,7 +1390,7 @@ runSmpQueueMsgDelivery c@AgentClient {subQ} ConnData {connId} sq (Worker {doWork
when (status == Active) $ notify $ CON pqEncryption
-- this branch should never be reached as receive queue is created before the confirmation,
_ -> logError "HELLO sent without receive queue"
AM_A_MSG_ -> notify $ SENT mId
AM_A_MSG_ -> notify $ SENT mId proxySrv_
AM_A_RCVD_ -> pure ()
AM_QCONT_ -> pure ()
AM_QADD_ -> pure ()
@@ -2089,10 +2093,10 @@ processSMPTransmission c@AgentClient {smpClients, subQ} (tSess@(_, srv, _), _v,
conn
cData@ConnData {userId, connId, connAgentVersion, ratchetSyncState = rss} =
withConnLock c connId "processSMP" $ case cmd of
Right (SMP.MSG msg@SMP.RcvMessage {msgId = srvMsgId}) ->
Right r@(SMP.MSG msg@SMP.RcvMessage {msgId = srvMsgId}) ->
void . handleNotifyAck $ do
isGET <- atomically $ hasGetLock c rq
unless isGET checkExpiredResponse
unless isGET $ checkExpiredResponse r
msg' <- decryptSMPMessage rq msg
ack' <- handleNotifyAck $ case msg' of
SMP.ClientRcvMsgBody {msgTs = srvTs, msgFlags, msgBody} -> processClientMsg srvTs msgFlags msgBody
@@ -2262,7 +2266,7 @@ processSMPTransmission c@AgentClient {smpClients, subQ} (tSess@(_, srv, _), _v,
where
processEND = \case
Just (Right clnt)
| sessId == sessionId (thParams clnt) -> do
| sessId == sessionId (thParams $ connectedClient clnt) -> do
removeSubscription c connId
notify' END
pure "END"
@@ -2270,8 +2274,8 @@ processSMPTransmission c@AgentClient {smpClients, subQ} (tSess@(_, srv, _), _v,
_ -> ignored
ignored = pure "END from disconnected client - ignored"
Right (SMP.ERR e) -> notify $ ERR $ SMP (B.unpack $ strEncode srv) e
Right SMP.OK -> checkExpiredResponse
Right _ -> unexpected
Right r@SMP.OK -> checkExpiredResponse r
Right r -> unexpected r
Left e -> notify $ ERR $ protocolClientError SMP (B.unpack $ strEncode srv) e
where
notify :: forall e m. MonadIO m => AEntityI e => ACommand 'Agent e -> m ()
@@ -2286,16 +2290,16 @@ processSMPTransmission c@AgentClient {smpClients, subQ} (tSess@(_, srv, _), _v,
enqueueCmd :: InternalCommand -> AM ()
enqueueCmd = enqueueCommand c "" connId (Just srv) . AInternalCommand
unexpected :: AM ()
unexpected = do
unexpected :: BrokerMsg -> AM ()
unexpected r = do
logServer "<--" c srv rId $ "unexpected: " <> bshow cmd
-- TODO add extended information about transmission type once UNEXPECTED has string
notify . ERR $ BROKER (B.unpack $ strEncode srv) UNEXPECTED
notify . ERR $ BROKER (B.unpack $ strEncode srv) $ UNEXPECTED (take 32 $ show r)
checkExpiredResponse :: AM ()
checkExpiredResponse = case tType of
checkExpiredResponse :: BrokerMsg -> AM ()
checkExpiredResponse r = case tType of
TTEvent -> pure ()
TTUncorrelatedResponse -> unexpected
TTUncorrelatedResponse -> unexpected r
TTExpiredResponse (SMP.Cmd _ cmd') -> case cmd' of
SMP.SUB -> do
added <-
@@ -2643,7 +2647,7 @@ confirmQueueAsync c cData sq srv connInfo e2eEncryption_ subMode = do
confirmQueue :: AgentClient -> ConnData -> SndQueue -> SMPServerWithAuth -> ConnInfo -> Maybe (CR.SndE2ERatchetParams 'C.X448) -> SubscriptionMode -> AM ()
confirmQueue c cData@ConnData {connId, connAgentVersion, pqSupport} sq srv connInfo e2eEncryption_ subMode = do
msg <- mkConfirmation =<< mkAgentConfirmation c cData sq srv connInfo subMode
sendConfirmation c sq msg
void $ sendConfirmation c sq msg
withStore' c $ \db -> setSndQueueStatus db sq Confirmed
where
mkConfirmation :: AgentMessage -> AM MsgBody
src/Simplex/Messaging/Agent/Client.hs
+247 -84
View File
@@ -47,6 +47,7 @@ module Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Client
sendInvitation,
temporaryAgentError,
temporaryOrHostError,
serverHostError,
secureQueue,
enableQueueNotifications,
enableQueuesNtfs,
@@ -136,6 +137,8 @@ module Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Client
SMPTransportSession,
NtfTransportSession,
XFTPTransportSession,
ProxiedRelay (..),
SMPConnectedClient (..),
)
where
@@ -149,6 +152,7 @@ import Control.Monad
import Control.Monad.Except
import Control.Monad.IO.Unlift
import Control.Monad.Reader
import Control.Monad.Trans.Except
import Crypto.Random (ChaChaDRG)
import qualified Data.Aeson as J
import qualified Data.Aeson.TH as J
@@ -234,8 +238,8 @@ import qualified Simplex.Messaging.Protocol as SMP
import Simplex.Messaging.Session
import Simplex.Messaging.TMap (TMap)
import qualified Simplex.Messaging.TMap as TM
import Simplex.Messaging.Transport (SMPVersion, SessionId, THandleParams (sessionId))
import Simplex.Messaging.Transport.Client (TransportHost)
import Simplex.Messaging.Transport (SMPVersion, SessionId, THandleParams (sessionId), TransportError (..))
import Simplex.Messaging.Transport.Client (TransportHost (..))
import Simplex.Messaging.Util
import Simplex.Messaging.Version
import System.Mem.Weak (Weak)
@@ -268,6 +272,10 @@ data AgentClient = AgentClient
msgQ :: TBQueue (ServerTransmission SMPVersion ErrorType BrokerMsg),
smpServers :: TMap UserId (NonEmpty SMPServerWithAuth),
smpClients :: TMap SMPTransportSession SMPClientVar,
-- smpProxiedRelays:
-- SMPTransportSession defines connection from proxy to relay,
-- SMPServerWithAuth defines client connected to SMP proxy (with the same userId and entityId in TransportSession)
smpProxiedRelays :: TMap SMPTransportSession SMPServerWithAuth,
ntfServers :: TVar [NtfServer],
ntfClients :: TMap NtfTransportSession NtfClientVar,
xftpServers :: TMap UserId (NonEmpty XFTPServerWithAuth),
@@ -303,6 +311,13 @@ data AgentClient = AgentClient
agentEnv :: Env
}
data SMPConnectedClient = SMPConnectedClient
{ connectedClient :: SMPClient,
proxiedRelays :: TMap SMPServer ProxiedRelayVar
}
type ProxiedRelayVar = SessionVar (Either AgentErrorType ProxiedRelay)
getAgentWorker :: (Ord k, Show k) => String -> Bool -> AgentClient -> k -> TMap k Worker -> (Worker -> AM ()) -> AM' Worker
getAgentWorker = getAgentWorker' id pure
{-# INLINE getAgentWorker #-}
@@ -434,6 +449,7 @@ newAgentClient clientId InitialAgentServers {smp, ntf, xftp, netCfg} agentEnv =
msgQ <- newTBQueue qSize
smpServers <- newTVar smp
smpClients <- TM.empty
smpProxiedRelays <- TM.empty
ntfServers <- newTVar ntf
ntfClients <- TM.empty
xftpServers <- newTVar xftp
@@ -470,6 +486,7 @@ newAgentClient clientId InitialAgentServers {smp, ntf, xftp, netCfg} agentEnv =
msgQ,
smpServers,
smpClients,
smpProxiedRelays,
ntfServers,
ntfClients,
xftpServers,
@@ -519,15 +536,19 @@ agentDRG AgentClient {agentEnv = Env {random}} = random
class (Encoding err, Show err) => ProtocolServerClient v err msg | msg -> v, msg -> err where
type Client msg = c | c -> msg
getProtocolServerClient :: AgentClient -> TransportSession msg -> AM (Client msg)
type ProtoClient msg = c | c -> msg
protocolClient :: Client msg -> ProtoClient msg
clientProtocolError :: HostName -> err -> AgentErrorType
closeProtocolServerClient :: Client msg -> IO ()
clientServer :: Client msg -> String
clientTransportHost :: Client msg -> TransportHost
clientSessionTs :: Client msg -> UTCTime
closeProtocolServerClient :: ProtoClient msg -> IO ()
clientServer :: ProtoClient msg -> String
clientTransportHost :: ProtoClient msg -> TransportHost
clientSessionTs :: ProtoClient msg -> UTCTime
instance ProtocolServerClient SMPVersion ErrorType BrokerMsg where
type Client BrokerMsg = ProtocolClient SMPVersion ErrorType BrokerMsg
type Client BrokerMsg = SMPConnectedClient
getProtocolServerClient = getSMPServerClient
type ProtoClient BrokerMsg = ProtocolClient SMPVersion ErrorType BrokerMsg
protocolClient = connectedClient
clientProtocolError = SMP
closeProtocolServerClient = closeProtocolClient
clientServer = protocolClientServer
@@ -537,6 +558,8 @@ instance ProtocolServerClient SMPVersion ErrorType BrokerMsg where
instance ProtocolServerClient NTFVersion ErrorType NtfResponse where
type Client NtfResponse = ProtocolClient NTFVersion ErrorType NtfResponse
getProtocolServerClient = getNtfServerClient
type ProtoClient NtfResponse = ProtocolClient NTFVersion ErrorType NtfResponse
protocolClient = id
clientProtocolError = NTF
closeProtocolServerClient = closeProtocolClient
clientServer = protocolClientServer
@@ -546,61 +569,121 @@ instance ProtocolServerClient NTFVersion ErrorType NtfResponse where
instance ProtocolServerClient XFTPVersion XFTPErrorType FileResponse where
type Client FileResponse = XFTPClient
getProtocolServerClient = getXFTPServerClient
type ProtoClient FileResponse = XFTPClient
protocolClient = id
clientProtocolError = XFTP
closeProtocolServerClient = X.closeXFTPClient
clientServer = X.xftpClientServer
clientTransportHost = X.xftpTransportHost
clientSessionTs = X.xftpSessionTs
getSMPServerClient :: AgentClient -> SMPTransportSession -> AM SMPClient
getSMPServerClient c@AgentClient {active, smpClients, msgQ, workerSeq} tSess@(userId, srv, _) = do
getSMPServerClient :: AgentClient -> SMPTransportSession -> AM SMPConnectedClient
getSMPServerClient c@AgentClient {active, smpClients, workerSeq} tSess = do
unlessM (readTVarIO active) . throwError $ INACTIVE
atomically (getSessVar workerSeq tSess smpClients)
>>= either newClient (waitForProtocolClient c tSess)
where
-- we resubscribe only on newClient error, but not on waitForProtocolClient error,
-- as the large number of delivery workers waiting for the client TMVar
-- make it expensive to check for pending subscriptions.
newClient v =
newProtocolClient c tSess smpClients connectClient v
`catchAgentError` \e -> lift (resubscribeSMPSession c tSess) >> throwError e
connectClient :: SMPClientVar -> AM SMPClient
connectClient v = do
newClient v = do
prs <- atomically TM.empty
smpConnectClient c tSess prs v
getSMPProxyClient :: AgentClient -> SMPTransportSession -> AM (SMPConnectedClient, Either AgentErrorType ProxiedRelay)
getSMPProxyClient c@AgentClient {active, smpClients, smpProxiedRelays, workerSeq} destSess@(userId, destSrv, qId) = do
unlessM (readTVarIO active) . throwError $ INACTIVE
proxySrv <- getNextServer c userId [destSrv]
atomically (getClientVar proxySrv) >>= \(tSess, auth, v) ->
either (newProxyClient tSess auth) (waitForProxyClient tSess auth) v
where
getClientVar :: SMPServerWithAuth -> STM (SMPTransportSession, Maybe SMP.BasicAuth, Either SMPClientVar SMPClientVar)
getClientVar proxySrv = do
ProtoServerWithAuth srv auth <- TM.lookup destSess smpProxiedRelays >>= maybe (TM.insert destSess proxySrv smpProxiedRelays $> proxySrv) pure
let tSess = (userId, srv, qId)
(tSess,auth,) <$> getSessVar workerSeq tSess smpClients
newProxyClient :: SMPTransportSession -> Maybe SMP.BasicAuth -> SMPClientVar -> AM (SMPConnectedClient, Either AgentErrorType ProxiedRelay)
newProxyClient tSess auth v = do
(prs, rv) <- atomically $ do
prs <- TM.empty
-- we do not need to check if it is a new proxied relay session,
-- as the client is just created and there are no sessions yet
(prs,) . either id id <$> getSessVar workerSeq destSrv prs
clnt <- smpConnectClient c tSess prs v
(clnt,) <$> newProxiedRelay clnt auth rv
waitForProxyClient :: SMPTransportSession -> Maybe SMP.BasicAuth -> SMPClientVar -> AM (SMPConnectedClient, Either AgentErrorType ProxiedRelay)
waitForProxyClient tSess auth v = do
clnt@(SMPConnectedClient _ prs) <- waitForProtocolClient c tSess v
sess <-
atomically (getSessVar workerSeq destSrv prs)
>>= either (newProxiedRelay clnt auth) (waitForProxiedRelay tSess)
pure (clnt, sess)
newProxiedRelay :: SMPConnectedClient -> Maybe SMP.BasicAuth -> ProxiedRelayVar -> AM (Either AgentErrorType ProxiedRelay)
newProxiedRelay clnt@(SMPConnectedClient smp prs) proxyAuth rv =
tryAgentError (liftClient SMP (clientServer smp) $ connectSMPProxiedRelay smp destSrv proxyAuth) >>= \case
Right sess -> do
atomically $ putTMVar (sessionVar rv) (Right sess)
liftIO $ incClientStat c userId clnt "PROXY" "OK"
pure $ Right sess
Left e -> do
liftIO $ incClientStat c userId clnt "PROXY" $ strEncode e
atomically $ do
unless (serverHostError e) $ do
removeSessVar rv destSrv prs
TM.delete destSess smpProxiedRelays
putTMVar (sessionVar rv) (Left e)
pure $ Left e
waitForProxiedRelay :: SMPTransportSession -> ProxiedRelayVar -> AM (Either AgentErrorType ProxiedRelay)
waitForProxiedRelay (_, srv, _) rv = do
NetworkConfig {tcpConnectTimeout} <- atomically $ getNetworkConfig c
sess_ <- liftIO $ tcpConnectTimeout `timeout` atomically (readTMVar $ sessionVar rv)
pure $ case sess_ of
Just (Right sess) -> Right sess
Just (Left e) -> Left e
Nothing -> Left $ BROKER (B.unpack $ strEncode srv) TIMEOUT
smpConnectClient :: AgentClient -> SMPTransportSession -> TMap SMPServer ProxiedRelayVar -> SMPClientVar -> AM SMPConnectedClient
smpConnectClient c@AgentClient {smpClients, msgQ} tSess@(_, srv, _) prs v =
newProtocolClient c tSess smpClients connectClient v
`catchAgentError` \e -> lift (resubscribeSMPSession c tSess) >> throwError e
where
connectClient :: SMPClientVar -> AM SMPConnectedClient
connectClient v' = do
cfg <- lift $ getClientConfig c smpCfg
g <- asks random
env <- ask
liftError' (protocolClientError SMP $ B.unpack $ strEncode srv) $
getProtocolClient g tSess cfg (Just msgQ) $
clientDisconnected env v
liftError (protocolClientError SMP $ B.unpack $ strEncode srv) $ do
smp <- ExceptT $ getProtocolClient g tSess cfg (Just msgQ) $ smpClientDisconnected c tSess env v' prs
pure SMPConnectedClient {connectedClient = smp, proxiedRelays = prs}
clientDisconnected :: Env -> SMPClientVar -> SMPClient -> IO ()
clientDisconnected env v client = do
removeClientAndSubs >>= serverDown
logInfo . decodeUtf8 $ "Agent disconnected from " <> showServer srv
smpClientDisconnected :: AgentClient -> SMPTransportSession -> Env -> SMPClientVar -> TMap SMPServer ProxiedRelayVar -> SMPClient -> IO ()
smpClientDisconnected c@AgentClient {active, smpClients, smpProxiedRelays} tSess@(userId, srv, qId) env v prs client = do
removeClientAndSubs >>= serverDown
logInfo . decodeUtf8 $ "Agent disconnected from " <> showServer srv
where
-- we make active subscriptions pending only if the client for tSess was current (in the map) and active,
-- because we can have a race condition when a new current client could have already
-- made subscriptions active, and the old client would be processing diconnection later.
removeClientAndSubs :: IO ([RcvQueue], [ConnId])
removeClientAndSubs = atomically $ ifM currentActiveClient removeSubs $ pure ([], [])
where
-- we make active subscriptions pending only if the client for tSess was current (in the map) and active,
-- because we can have a race condition when a new current client could have already
-- made subscriptions active, and the old client would be processing diconnection later.
removeClientAndSubs :: IO ([RcvQueue], [ConnId])
removeClientAndSubs = atomically $ ifM currentActiveClient removeSubs $ pure ([], [])
where
currentActiveClient = (&&) <$> removeSessVar' v tSess smpClients <*> readTVar active
removeSubs = do
(qs, cs) <- RQ.getDelSessQueues tSess $ activeSubs c
RQ.batchAddQueues (pendingSubs c) qs
pure (qs, cs)
currentActiveClient = (&&) <$> removeSessVar' v tSess smpClients <*> readTVar active
removeSubs = do
(qs, cs) <- RQ.getDelSessQueues tSess $ activeSubs c
RQ.batchAddQueues (pendingSubs c) qs
-- this removes proxied relays that this client created sessions to
destSrvs <- M.keys <$> readTVar prs
forM_ destSrvs $ \destSrv -> TM.delete (userId, destSrv, qId) smpProxiedRelays
pure (qs, cs)
serverDown :: ([RcvQueue], [ConnId]) -> IO ()
serverDown (qs, conns) = whenM (readTVarIO active) $ do
incClientStat c userId client "DISCONNECT" ""
notifySub "" $ hostEvent DISCONNECT client
unless (null conns) $ notifySub "" $ DOWN srv conns
unless (null qs) $ do
atomically $ mapM_ (releaseGetLock c) qs
runReaderT (resubscribeSMPSession c tSess) env
serverDown :: ([RcvQueue], [ConnId]) -> IO ()
serverDown (qs, conns) = whenM (readTVarIO active) $ do
incClientStat' c userId client "DISCONNECT" ""
notifySub "" $ hostEvent' DISCONNECT client
unless (null conns) $ notifySub "" $ DOWN srv conns
unless (null qs) $ do
atomically $ mapM_ (releaseGetLock c) qs
runReaderT (resubscribeSMPSession c tSess) env
notifySub :: forall e. AEntityI e => ConnId -> ACommand 'Agent e -> IO ()
notifySub connId cmd = atomically $ writeTBQueue (subQ c) ("", connId, APC (sAEntity @e) cmd)
notifySub :: forall e. AEntityI e => ConnId -> ACommand 'Agent e -> IO ()
notifySub connId cmd = atomically $ writeTBQueue (subQ c) ("", connId, APC (sAEntity @e) cmd)
resubscribeSMPSession :: AgentClient -> SMPTransportSession -> AM' ()
resubscribeSMPSession c@AgentClient {smpSubWorkers, workerSeq} tSess =
@@ -750,7 +833,11 @@ newProtocolClient c tSess@(userId, srv, entityId_) clients connectClient v =
throwError e -- signal error to caller
hostEvent :: forall v err msg. (ProtocolTypeI (ProtoType msg), ProtocolServerClient v err msg) => (AProtocolType -> TransportHost -> ACommand 'Agent 'AENone) -> Client msg -> ACommand 'Agent 'AENone
hostEvent event = event (AProtocolType $ protocolTypeI @(ProtoType msg)) . clientTransportHost
hostEvent event = hostEvent' event . protocolClient
{-# INLINE hostEvent #-}
hostEvent' :: forall v err msg. (ProtocolTypeI (ProtoType msg), ProtocolServerClient v err msg) => (AProtocolType -> TransportHost -> ACommand 'Agent 'AENone) -> ProtoClient msg -> ACommand 'Agent 'AENone
hostEvent' event = event (AProtocolType $ protocolTypeI @(ProtoType msg)) . clientTransportHost
getClientConfig :: AgentClient -> (AgentConfig -> ProtocolClientConfig v) -> AM' (ProtocolClientConfig v)
getClientConfig c cfgSel = do
@@ -805,6 +892,7 @@ closeAgentClient c = do
closeProtocolServerClients c smpClients
closeProtocolServerClients c ntfClients
closeProtocolServerClients c xftpClients
atomically $ writeTVar (smpProxiedRelays c) M.empty
atomically (swapTVar (smpSubWorkers c) M.empty) >>= mapM_ cancelReconnect
clearWorkers smpDeliveryWorkers >>= mapM_ (cancelWorker . fst)
clearWorkers asyncCmdWorkers >>= mapM_ cancelWorker
@@ -857,7 +945,7 @@ closeClient_ c v = do
NetworkConfig {tcpConnectTimeout} <- atomically $ getNetworkConfig c
E.handle (\BlockedIndefinitelyOnSTM -> pure ()) $
tcpConnectTimeout `timeout` atomically (readTMVar $ sessionVar v) >>= \case
Just (Right client) -> closeProtocolServerClient client `catchAll_` pure ()
Just (Right client) -> closeProtocolServerClient (protocolClient client) `catchAll_` pure ()
_ -> pure ()
closeXFTPServerClient :: AgentClient -> UserId -> XFTPServer -> FileDigest -> IO ()
@@ -910,6 +998,25 @@ withClient_ c tSess@(userId, srv, _) statCmd action = do
stat cl $ strEncode e
throwError e
withProxySession :: AgentClient -> SMPTransportSession -> SMP.SenderId -> ByteString -> ((SMPConnectedClient, ProxiedRelay) -> AM a) -> AM a
withProxySession c destSess@(userId, destSrv, _) entId cmdStr action = do
(cl, sess_) <- getSMPProxyClient c destSess
logServer ("--> " <> proxySrv cl <> " >") c destSrv entId cmdStr
case sess_ of
Right sess -> do
r <- (action (cl, sess) <* stat cl "OK") `catchAgentError` logServerError cl
logServer ("<-- " <> proxySrv cl <> " <") c destSrv entId "OK"
pure r
Left e -> logServerError cl e
where
stat cl = liftIO . incClientStat c userId cl cmdStr
proxySrv = showServer . protocolClientServer' . protocolClient
logServerError :: SMPConnectedClient -> AgentErrorType -> AM a
logServerError cl e = do
logServer ("<-- " <> proxySrv cl <> " <") c destSrv "" $ strEncode e
stat cl $ strEncode e
throwError e
withLogClient_ :: ProtocolServerClient v err msg => AgentClient -> TransportSession msg -> EntityId -> ByteString -> (Client msg -> AM a) -> AM a
withLogClient_ c tSess@(_, srv, _) entId cmdStr action = do
logServer "-->" c srv entId cmdStr
@@ -918,22 +1025,64 @@ withLogClient_ c tSess@(_, srv, _) entId cmdStr action = do
return res
withClient :: forall v err msg a. ProtocolServerClient v err msg => AgentClient -> TransportSession msg -> ByteString -> (Client msg -> ExceptT (ProtocolClientError err) IO a) -> AM a
withClient c tSess statKey action = withClient_ c tSess statKey $ \client -> liftClient (clientProtocolError @v @err @msg) (clientServer client) $ action client
withClient c tSess statKey action = withClient_ c tSess statKey $ \client -> liftClient (clientProtocolError @v @err @msg) (clientServer $ protocolClient client) $ action client
{-# INLINE withClient #-}
withLogClient :: forall v err msg a. ProtocolServerClient v err msg => AgentClient -> TransportSession msg -> EntityId -> ByteString -> (Client msg -> ExceptT (ProtocolClientError err) IO a) -> AM a
withLogClient c tSess entId cmdStr action = withLogClient_ c tSess entId cmdStr $ \client -> liftClient (clientProtocolError @v @err @msg) (clientServer client) $ action client
withLogClient c tSess entId cmdStr action = withLogClient_ c tSess entId cmdStr $ \client -> liftClient (clientProtocolError @v @err @msg) (clientServer $ protocolClient client) $ action client
{-# INLINE withLogClient #-}
withSMPClient :: SMPQueueRec q => AgentClient -> q -> ByteString -> (SMPClient -> ExceptT SMPClientError IO a) -> AM a
withSMPClient c q cmdStr action = do
tSess <- liftIO $ mkSMPTransportSession c q
withLogClient c tSess (queueId q) cmdStr action
withLogClient c tSess (queueId q) cmdStr $ action . connectedClient
withSMPClient_ :: SMPQueueRec q => AgentClient -> q -> ByteString -> (SMPClient -> AM a) -> AM a
withSMPClient_ c q cmdStr action = do
tSess <- liftIO $ mkSMPTransportSession c q
withLogClient_ c tSess (queueId q) cmdStr action
sendOrProxySMPMessage :: AgentClient -> UserId -> SMPServer -> ByteString -> Maybe SMP.SndPrivateAuthKey -> SMP.SenderId -> MsgFlags -> SMP.MsgBody -> AM (Maybe SMPServer)
sendOrProxySMPMessage c userId destSrv cmdStr spKey_ senderId msgFlags msg = do
sess <- liftIO $ mkTransportSession c userId destSrv senderId
ifM (atomically shouldUseProxy) (sendViaProxy sess) (sendDirectly sess $> Nothing)
where
shouldUseProxy = do
cfg <- getNetworkConfig c
case smpProxyMode cfg of
SPMAlways -> pure True
SPMUnknown -> unknownServer
SPMUnprotected
| ipAddressProtected cfg destSrv -> pure False
| otherwise -> unknownServer
SPMNever -> pure False
directAllowed = do
cfg <- getNetworkConfig c
pure $ case smpProxyFallback cfg of
SPFAllow -> True
SPFAllowProtected -> ipAddressProtected cfg destSrv
SPFProhibit -> False
unknownServer = maybe True (all ((destSrv /=) . protoServer)) <$> TM.lookup userId (userServers c)
sendViaProxy destSess = do
r <- tryAgentError . withProxySession c destSess senderId ("PFWD " <> cmdStr) $ \(SMPConnectedClient smp _, proxySess) -> do
liftClient SMP (clientServer smp) (proxySMPMessage smp proxySess spKey_ senderId msgFlags msg) >>= \case
Right () -> pure . Just $ protocolClientServer' smp
Left proxyErr ->
throwE
PROXY
{ proxyServer = protocolClientServer smp,
relayServer = B.unpack $ strEncode destSrv,
proxyErr
}
case r of
Right r' -> pure r'
Left e
| serverHostError e -> ifM (atomically directAllowed) (sendDirectly destSess $> Nothing) (throwE e)
| otherwise -> throwE e
sendDirectly tSess =
withLogClient_ c tSess senderId ("SEND " <> cmdStr) $ \(SMPConnectedClient smp _) ->
liftClient SMP (clientServer smp) $ sendSMPMessage smp spKey_ senderId msgFlags msg
ipAddressProtected :: NetworkConfig -> ProtocolServer p -> Bool
ipAddressProtected NetworkConfig {socksProxy, hostMode} (ProtocolServer _ hosts _ _) = do
isJust socksProxy || (hostMode == HMOnion && any isOnionHost hosts)
where
isOnionHost = \case THOnionHost _ -> True; _ -> False
withNtfClient :: AgentClient -> NtfServer -> EntityId -> ByteString -> (NtfClient -> ExceptT NtfClientError IO a) -> AM a
withNtfClient c srv = withLogClient c (0, srv, Nothing)
@@ -957,7 +1106,7 @@ protocolClientError :: (Show err, Encoding err) => (HostName -> err -> AgentErro
protocolClientError protocolError_ host = \case
PCEProtocolError e -> protocolError_ host e
PCEResponseError e -> BROKER host $ RESPONSE $ B.unpack $ smpEncode e
PCEUnexpectedResponse _ -> BROKER host UNEXPECTED
PCEUnexpectedResponse r -> BROKER host $ UNEXPECTED $ take 32 $ show r
PCEResponseTimeout -> BROKER host TIMEOUT
PCENetworkError -> BROKER host NETWORK
PCEIncompatibleHost -> BROKER host HOST
@@ -1004,7 +1153,6 @@ runSMPServerTest c userId (ProtoServerWithAuth srv auth) = do
liftError (testErr TSSecureQueue) $ secureSMPQueue smp rpKey rcvId sKey
liftError (testErr TSDeleteQueue) $ deleteSMPQueue smp rpKey rcvId
ok <- tcpTimeout (networkConfig cfg) `timeout` closeProtocolClient smp
incClientStat c userId smp "SMP_TEST" "OK"
pure $ either Just (const Nothing) r <|> maybe (Just (ProtocolTestFailure TSDisconnect $ BROKER addr TIMEOUT)) (const Nothing) ok
Left e -> pure (Just $ testErr TSConnect e)
where
@@ -1119,7 +1267,7 @@ newRcvQueue c userId connId (ProtoServerWithAuth srv auth) vRange subMode = do
logServer "-->" c srv "" "NEW"
tSess <- liftIO $ mkTransportSession c userId srv connId
(sessId, QIK {rcvId, sndId, rcvPublicDhKey}) <-
withClient c tSess "NEW" $ \smp ->
withClient c tSess "NEW" $ \(SMPConnectedClient smp _) ->
(sessionId $ thParams smp,) <$> createSMPQueue smp rKeys dhKey auth subMode
liftIO . logServer "<--" c srv "" $ B.unwords ["IDS", logSecret rcvId, logSecret sndId]
let rq =
@@ -1157,18 +1305,33 @@ processSubResult c rq@RcvQueue {connId} = \case
temporaryAgentError :: AgentErrorType -> Bool
temporaryAgentError = \case
BROKER _ NETWORK -> True
BROKER _ TIMEOUT -> True
BROKER _ e -> tempBrokerError e
SMP _ (SMP.PROXY (SMP.BROKER e)) -> tempBrokerError e
PROXY _ _ (ProxyProtocolError (SMP.PROXY (SMP.BROKER e))) -> tempBrokerError e
INACTIVE -> True
_ -> False
{-# INLINE temporaryAgentError #-}
where
tempBrokerError = \case
NETWORK -> True
TIMEOUT -> True
_ -> False
temporaryOrHostError :: AgentErrorType -> Bool
temporaryOrHostError = \case
BROKER _ HOST -> True
e -> temporaryAgentError e
temporaryOrHostError e = temporaryAgentError e || serverHostError e
{-# INLINE temporaryOrHostError #-}
serverHostError :: AgentErrorType -> Bool
serverHostError = \case
BROKER _ e -> brokerHostError e
SMP _ (SMP.PROXY (SMP.BROKER e)) -> brokerHostError e
PROXY _ _ (ProxyProtocolError (SMP.PROXY (SMP.BROKER e))) -> brokerHostError e
_ -> False
where
brokerHostError = \case
HOST -> True
SMP.TRANSPORT TEVersion -> True
_ -> False
-- | Subscribe to queues. The list of results can have a different order.
subscribeQueues :: AgentClient -> [RcvQueue] -> AM' ([(RcvQueue, Either AgentErrorType ())], Maybe SessionId)
subscribeQueues c qs = do
@@ -1211,7 +1374,7 @@ activeClientSession :: AgentClient -> SMPTransportSession -> SessionId -> STM Bo
activeClientSession c tSess sessId = sameSess <$> tryReadSessVar tSess (smpClients c)
where
sameSess = \case
Just (Right smp) -> sessId == sessionId (thParams smp)
Just (Right (SMPConnectedClient smp _)) -> sessId == sessionId (thParams smp)
_ -> False
type BatchResponses e r = NonEmpty (RcvQueue, Either e r)
@@ -1233,7 +1396,7 @@ sendTSessionBatches statCmd statBatchSize toRQ action c qs =
sendClientBatch (tSess@(userId, srv, _), qs') =
tryAgentError' (getSMPServerClient c tSess) >>= \case
Left e -> pure $ L.map ((,Left e) . toRQ) qs'
Right smp -> liftIO $ do
Right (SMPConnectedClient smp _) -> liftIO $ do
logServer "-->" c srv (bshow (length qs') <> " queues") statCmd
rs <- L.map agentError <$> action smp qs'
statBatch
@@ -1302,20 +1465,17 @@ logSecret :: ByteString -> ByteString
logSecret bs = encode $ B.take 3 bs
{-# INLINE logSecret #-}
sendConfirmation :: AgentClient -> SndQueue -> ByteString -> AM ()
sendConfirmation c sq@SndQueue {sndId, sndPublicKey = Just sndPublicKey, e2ePubKey = e2ePubKey@Just {}} agentConfirmation =
withSMPClient_ c sq "SEND <CONF>" $ \smp -> do
let clientMsg = SMP.ClientMessage (SMP.PHConfirmation sndPublicKey) agentConfirmation
msg <- agentCbEncrypt sq e2ePubKey $ smpEncode clientMsg
liftClient SMP (clientServer smp) $ sendSMPMessage smp Nothing sndId (SMP.MsgFlags {notification = True}) msg
sendConfirmation :: AgentClient -> SndQueue -> ByteString -> AM (Maybe SMPServer)
sendConfirmation c sq@SndQueue {userId, server, sndId, sndPublicKey = Just sndPublicKey, e2ePubKey = e2ePubKey@Just {}} agentConfirmation = do
let clientMsg = SMP.ClientMessage (SMP.PHConfirmation sndPublicKey) agentConfirmation
msg <- agentCbEncrypt sq e2ePubKey $ smpEncode clientMsg
sendOrProxySMPMessage c userId server "<CONF>" Nothing sndId (MsgFlags {notification = True}) msg
sendConfirmation _ _ _ = throwError $ INTERNAL "sendConfirmation called without snd_queue public key(s) in the database"
sendInvitation :: AgentClient -> UserId -> Compatible SMPQueueInfo -> Compatible VersionSMPA -> ConnectionRequestUri 'CMInvitation -> ConnInfo -> AM ()
sendInvitation :: AgentClient -> UserId -> Compatible SMPQueueInfo -> Compatible VersionSMPA -> ConnectionRequestUri 'CMInvitation -> ConnInfo -> AM (Maybe SMPServer)
sendInvitation c userId (Compatible (SMPQueueInfo v SMPQueueAddress {smpServer, senderId, dhPublicKey})) (Compatible agentVersion) connReq connInfo = do
tSess <- liftIO $ mkTransportSession c userId smpServer senderId
withLogClient_ c tSess senderId "SEND <INV>" $ \smp -> do
msg <- mkInvitation
liftClient SMP (clientServer smp) $ sendSMPMessage smp Nothing senderId MsgFlags {notification = True} msg
msg <- mkInvitation
sendOrProxySMPMessage c userId smpServer "<INV>" Nothing senderId (MsgFlags {notification = True}) msg
where
mkInvitation :: AM ByteString
-- this is only encrypted with per-queue E2E, not with double ratchet
@@ -1399,12 +1559,11 @@ deleteQueue c rq@RcvQueue {rcvId, rcvPrivateKey} = do
deleteQueues :: AgentClient -> [RcvQueue] -> AM' [(RcvQueue, Either AgentErrorType ())]
deleteQueues = sendTSessionBatches "DEL" 90 id $ sendBatch deleteSMPQueues
sendAgentMessage :: AgentClient -> SndQueue -> MsgFlags -> ByteString -> AM ()
sendAgentMessage c sq@SndQueue {sndId, sndPrivateKey} msgFlags agentMsg =
withSMPClient_ c sq "SEND <MSG>" $ \smp -> do
let clientMsg = SMP.ClientMessage SMP.PHEmpty agentMsg
msg <- agentCbEncrypt sq Nothing $ smpEncode clientMsg
liftClient SMP (clientServer smp) $ sendSMPMessage smp (Just sndPrivateKey) sndId msgFlags msg
sendAgentMessage :: AgentClient -> SndQueue -> MsgFlags -> ByteString -> AM (Maybe SMPServer)
sendAgentMessage c sq@SndQueue {userId, server, sndId, sndPrivateKey} msgFlags agentMsg = do
let clientMsg = SMP.ClientMessage SMP.PHEmpty agentMsg
msg <- agentCbEncrypt sq Nothing $ smpEncode clientMsg
sendOrProxySMPMessage c userId server "<MSG>" (Just sndPrivateKey) sndId msgFlags msg
agentNtfRegisterToken :: AgentClient -> NtfToken -> NtfPublicAuthKey -> C.PublicKeyX25519 -> AM (NtfTokenId, C.PublicKeyX25519)
agentNtfRegisterToken c NtfToken {deviceToken, ntfServer, ntfPrivKey} ntfPubKey pubDhKey =
@@ -1672,9 +1831,13 @@ incStat AgentClient {agentStats} n k = do
_ -> newTVar n >>= \v -> TM.insert k v agentStats
incClientStat :: ProtocolServerClient v err msg => AgentClient -> UserId -> Client msg -> ByteString -> ByteString -> IO ()
incClientStat c userId pc = incClientStatN c userId pc 1
incClientStat c userId = incClientStat' c userId . protocolClient
{-# INLINE incClientStat #-}
incClientStat' :: ProtocolServerClient v err msg => AgentClient -> UserId -> ProtoClient msg -> ByteString -> ByteString -> IO ()
incClientStat' c userId pc = incClientStatN c userId pc 1
{-# INLINE incClientStat' #-}
incServerStat :: AgentClient -> UserId -> ProtocolServer p -> ByteString -> ByteString -> IO ()
incServerStat c userId ProtocolServer {host} cmd res = do
threadDelay 100000
@@ -1682,7 +1845,7 @@ incServerStat c userId ProtocolServer {host} cmd res = do
where
statsKey = AgentStatsKey {userId, host = strEncode $ L.head host, clientTs = "", cmd, res}
incClientStatN :: ProtocolServerClient v err msg => AgentClient -> UserId -> Client msg -> Int -> ByteString -> ByteString -> IO ()
incClientStatN :: ProtocolServerClient v err msg => AgentClient -> UserId -> ProtoClient msg -> Int -> ByteString -> ByteString -> IO ()
incClientStatN c userId pc n cmd res = do
atomically $ incStat c n statsKey
where
src/Simplex/Messaging/Agent/Protocol.hs
+66 -53
View File
@@ -189,6 +189,7 @@ import Simplex.FileTransfer.Description
import Simplex.FileTransfer.Protocol (FileParty (..))
import Simplex.FileTransfer.Transport (XFTPErrorType)
import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.QueryString
import Simplex.Messaging.Client (ProxyClientError)
import qualified Simplex.Messaging.Crypto as C
import Simplex.Messaging.Crypto.Ratchet
( InitialKeys (..),
@@ -206,6 +207,7 @@ import Simplex.Messaging.Encoding.String
import Simplex.Messaging.Parsers
import Simplex.Messaging.Protocol
( AProtocolType,
BrokerErrorType (..),
EntityId,
ErrorType,
MsgBody,
@@ -233,7 +235,7 @@ import Simplex.Messaging.Protocol
)
import qualified Simplex.Messaging.Protocol as SMP
import Simplex.Messaging.ServiceScheme
import Simplex.Messaging.Transport (Transport (..), TransportError, serializeTransportError, transportErrorP)
import Simplex.Messaging.Transport (Transport (..))
import Simplex.Messaging.Transport.Client (TransportHost, TransportHosts_ (..))
import Simplex.Messaging.Util
import Simplex.Messaging.Version
@@ -393,7 +395,8 @@ data ACommand (p :: AParty) (e :: AEntity) where
RSYNC :: RatchetSyncState -> Maybe AgentCryptoError -> ConnectionStats -> ACommand Agent AEConn
SEND :: PQEncryption -> MsgFlags -> MsgBody -> ACommand Client AEConn
MID :: AgentMsgId -> PQEncryption -> ACommand Agent AEConn
SENT :: AgentMsgId -> ACommand Agent AEConn
SENT :: AgentMsgId -> Maybe SMPServer -> ACommand Agent AEConn
MWARN :: AgentMsgId -> AgentErrorType -> ACommand Agent AEConn
MERR :: AgentMsgId -> AgentErrorType -> ACommand Agent AEConn
MERRS :: NonEmpty AgentMsgId -> AgentErrorType -> ACommand Agent AEConn
MSG :: MsgMeta -> MsgFlags -> MsgBody -> ACommand Agent AEConn
@@ -457,6 +460,7 @@ data ACommandTag (p :: AParty) (e :: AEntity) where
SEND_ :: ACommandTag Client AEConn
MID_ :: ACommandTag Agent AEConn
SENT_ :: ACommandTag Agent AEConn
MWARN_ :: ACommandTag Agent AEConn
MERR_ :: ACommandTag Agent AEConn
MERRS_ :: ACommandTag Agent AEConn
MSG_ :: ACommandTag Agent AEConn
@@ -512,7 +516,8 @@ aCommandTag = \case
RSYNC {} -> RSYNC_
SEND {} -> SEND_
MID {} -> MID_
SENT _ -> SENT_
SENT {} -> SENT_
MWARN {} -> MWARN_
MERR {} -> MERR_
MERRS {} -> MERRS_
MSG {} -> MSG_
@@ -1300,6 +1305,7 @@ instance VersionRangeI SMPClientVersion SMPQueueUri where
type VersionT SMPClientVersion SMPQueueUri = SMPQueueInfo
versionRange = clientVRange
toVersionT (SMPQueueUri _vr addr) v = SMPQueueInfo v addr
toVersionRange (SMPQueueUri _vr addr) vr = SMPQueueUri vr addr
-- | SMP queue information sent out-of-band.
--
@@ -1474,6 +1480,8 @@ data AgentErrorType
NTF {serverAddress :: String, ntfErr :: ErrorType}
| -- | XFTP protocol errors forwarded to agent clients
XFTP {serverAddress :: String, xftpErr :: XFTPErrorType}
| -- | SMP proxy errors
PROXY {proxyServer :: String, relayServer :: String, proxyErr :: ProxyClientError}
| -- | XRCP protocol errors forwarded to agent clients
RCP {rcpErr :: RCErrorType}
| -- | SMP server errors
@@ -1516,22 +1524,6 @@ data ConnectionErrorType
NOT_AVAILABLE
deriving (Eq, Read, Show, Exception)
-- | SMP server errors.
data BrokerErrorType
= -- | invalid server response (failed to parse)
RESPONSE {smpErr :: String}
| -- | unexpected response
UNEXPECTED
| -- | network error
NETWORK
| -- | no compatible server host (e.g. onion when public is required, or vice versa)
HOST
| -- | handshake or other transport error
TRANSPORT {transportErr :: TransportError}
| -- | command response timeout
TIMEOUT
deriving (Eq, Read, Show, Exception)
-- | Errors of another SMP agent.
data SMPAgentError
= -- | client or agent message that failed to parse
@@ -1566,12 +1558,14 @@ data AgentCryptoError
instance StrEncoding AgentCryptoError where
strP =
"DECRYPT_AES" $> DECRYPT_AES
<|> "DECRYPT_CB" $> DECRYPT_CB
<|> "RATCHET_HEADER" $> RATCHET_HEADER
<|> "RATCHET_EARLIER " *> (RATCHET_EARLIER <$> strP)
<|> "RATCHET_SKIPPED " *> (RATCHET_SKIPPED <$> strP)
<|> "RATCHET_SYNC" $> RATCHET_SYNC
A.takeTill (== ' ') >>= \case
"DECRYPT_AES" -> pure DECRYPT_AES
"DECRYPT_CB" -> pure DECRYPT_CB
"RATCHET_HEADER" -> pure RATCHET_HEADER
"RATCHET_EARLIER" -> RATCHET_EARLIER <$> _strP
"RATCHET_SKIPPED" -> RATCHET_SKIPPED <$> _strP
"RATCHET_SYNC" -> pure RATCHET_SYNC
_ -> fail "AgentCryptoError"
strEncode = \case
DECRYPT_AES -> "DECRYPT_AES"
DECRYPT_CB -> "DECRYPT_CB"
@@ -1582,42 +1576,59 @@ instance StrEncoding AgentCryptoError where
instance StrEncoding AgentErrorType where
strP =
"CMD " *> (CMD <$> parseRead1)
<|> "CONN " *> (CONN <$> parseRead1)
<|> "SMP " *> (SMP <$> textP <*> _strP)
<|> "NTF " *> (NTF <$> textP <*> _strP)
<|> "XFTP " *> (XFTP <$> textP <*> _strP)
<|> "RCP " *> (RCP <$> strP)
<|> "BROKER " *> (BROKER <$> textP <* " RESPONSE " <*> (RESPONSE <$> textP))
<|> "BROKER " *> (BROKER <$> textP <* " TRANSPORT " <*> (TRANSPORT <$> transportErrorP))
<|> "BROKER " *> (BROKER <$> textP <* A.space <*> parseRead1)
<|> "AGENT CRYPTO " *> (AGENT . A_CRYPTO <$> parseRead A.takeByteString)
<|> "AGENT QUEUE " *> (AGENT . A_QUEUE <$> parseRead A.takeByteString)
<|> "AGENT " *> (AGENT <$> parseRead1)
<|> "INTERNAL " *> (INTERNAL <$> parseRead A.takeByteString)
<|> "CRITICAL " *> (CRITICAL <$> parseRead1 <* A.space <*> parseRead A.takeByteString)
<|> "INACTIVE" $> INACTIVE
A.takeTill (== ' ')
>>= \case
"CMD" -> CMD <$> (A.space *> parseRead1)
"CONN" -> CONN <$> (A.space *> parseRead1)
"SMP" -> SMP <$> (A.space *> srvP) <*> _strP
"NTF" -> NTF <$> (A.space *> srvP) <*> _strP
"XFTP" -> XFTP <$> (A.space *> srvP) <*> _strP
"PROXY" -> PROXY <$> (A.space *> srvP) <* A.space <*> srvP <*> _strP
"RCP" -> RCP <$> _strP
"BROKER" -> BROKER <$> (A.space *> srvP) <*> _strP
"AGENT" -> AGENT <$> _strP
"INTERNAL" -> INTERNAL <$> (A.space *> textP)
"CRITICAL" -> CRITICAL <$> (A.space *> parseRead1) <*> (A.space *> textP)
"INACTIVE" -> pure INACTIVE
_ -> fail "bad AgentErrorType"
where
textP = T.unpack . safeDecodeUtf8 <$> A.takeTill (== ' ')
srvP = T.unpack . safeDecodeUtf8 <$> A.takeTill (== ' ')
textP = T.unpack . safeDecodeUtf8 <$> A.takeByteString
strEncode = \case
CMD e -> "CMD " <> bshow e
CONN e -> "CONN " <> bshow e
SMP srv e -> "SMP " <> text srv <> " " <> strEncode e
NTF srv e -> "NTF " <> text srv <> " " <> strEncode e
XFTP srv e -> "XFTP " <> text srv <> " " <> strEncode e
PROXY pxy srv e -> B.unwords ["PROXY", text pxy, text srv, strEncode e]
RCP e -> "RCP " <> strEncode e
BROKER srv (RESPONSE e) -> "BROKER " <> text srv <> " RESPONSE " <> text e
BROKER srv (TRANSPORT e) -> "BROKER " <> text srv <> " TRANSPORT " <> serializeTransportError e
BROKER srv e -> "BROKER " <> text srv <> " " <> bshow e
AGENT (A_CRYPTO e) -> "AGENT CRYPTO " <> bshow e
AGENT (A_QUEUE e) -> "AGENT QUEUE " <> bshow e
AGENT e -> "AGENT " <> bshow e
INTERNAL e -> "INTERNAL " <> bshow e
CRITICAL restart e -> "CRITICAL " <> bshow restart <> " " <> bshow e
BROKER srv e -> B.unwords ["BROKER", text srv, strEncode e]
AGENT e -> "AGENT " <> strEncode e
INTERNAL e -> "INTERNAL " <> encodeUtf8 (T.pack e)
CRITICAL restart e -> "CRITICAL " <> bshow restart <> " " <> encodeUtf8 (T.pack e)
INACTIVE -> "INACTIVE"
where
text = encodeUtf8 . T.pack
instance StrEncoding SMPAgentError where
strP =
A.takeTill (== ' ')
>>= \case
"MESSAGE" -> pure A_MESSAGE
"PROHIBITED" -> pure A_PROHIBITED
"VERSION" -> pure A_VERSION
"CRYPTO" -> A_CRYPTO <$> _strP
"DUPLICATE" -> pure A_DUPLICATE
"QUEUE" -> A_QUEUE . T.unpack . safeDecodeUtf8 <$> (A.space *> A.takeByteString)
_ -> fail "bad SMPAgentError"
strEncode = \case
A_MESSAGE -> "MESSAGE"
A_PROHIBITED -> "PROHIBITED"
A_VERSION -> "VERSION"
A_CRYPTO e -> "CRYPTO " <> strEncode e
A_DUPLICATE -> "DUPLICATE"
A_QUEUE e -> "QUEUE " <> encodeUtf8 (T.pack e)
cryptoErrToSyncState :: AgentCryptoError -> RatchetSyncState
cryptoErrToSyncState = \case
DECRYPT_AES -> RSAllowed
@@ -1660,6 +1671,7 @@ instance StrEncoding ACmdTag where
"SEND" -> t SEND_
"MID" -> ct MID_
"SENT" -> ct SENT_
"MWARN" -> ct MWARN_
"MERR" -> ct MERR_
"MERRS" -> ct MERRS_
"MSG" -> ct MSG_
@@ -1718,6 +1730,7 @@ instance (APartyI p, AEntityI e) => StrEncoding (ACommandTag p e) where
SEND_ -> "SEND"
MID_ -> "MID"
SENT_ -> "SENT"
MWARN_ -> "MWARN"
MERR_ -> "MERR"
MERRS_ -> "MERRS"
MSG_ -> "MSG"
@@ -1788,7 +1801,8 @@ commandP binaryP =
SWITCH_ -> s (SWITCH <$> strP_ <*> strP_ <*> strP)
RSYNC_ -> s (RSYNC <$> strP_ <*> strP <*> strP)
MID_ -> s (MID <$> A.decimal <*> _strP)
SENT_ -> s (SENT <$> A.decimal)
SENT_ -> s (SENT <$> A.decimal <*> _strP)
MWARN_ -> s (MWARN <$> A.decimal <* A.space <*> strP)
MERR_ -> s (MERR <$> A.decimal <* A.space <*> strP)
MERRS_ -> s (MERRS <$> strP_ <*> strP)
MSG_ -> s (MSG <$> strP <* A.space <*> smpP <* A.space <*> binaryP)
@@ -1851,7 +1865,8 @@ serializeCommand = \case
RSYNC rrState cryptoErr cstats -> s (RSYNC_, rrState, cryptoErr, cstats)
SEND pqEnc msgFlags msgBody -> B.unwords [s SEND_, s pqEnc, smpEncode msgFlags, serializeBinary msgBody]
MID mId pqEnc -> s (MID_, mId, pqEnc)
SENT mId -> s (SENT_, mId)
SENT mId proxySrv_ -> s (SENT_, mId, proxySrv_)
MWARN mId e -> s (MWARN_, mId, e)
MERR mId e -> s (MERR_, mId, e)
MERRS mIds e -> s (MERRS_, mIds, e)
MSG msgMeta msgFlags msgBody -> B.unwords [s MSG_, s msgMeta, smpEncode msgFlags, serializeBinary msgBody]
@@ -1977,8 +1992,6 @@ $(J.deriveJSON (sumTypeJSON id) ''CommandErrorType)
$(J.deriveJSON (sumTypeJSON id) ''ConnectionErrorType)
$(J.deriveJSON (sumTypeJSON id) ''BrokerErrorType)
$(J.deriveJSON (sumTypeJSON id) ''AgentCryptoError)
$(J.deriveJSON (sumTypeJSON id) ''SMPAgentError)
src/Simplex/Messaging/Client.hs
+261 -27
View File
@@ -30,9 +30,11 @@ module Simplex.Messaging.Client
TransportSession,
ProtocolClient (thParams, sessionTs),
SMPClient,
ProxiedRelay (..),
getProtocolClient,
closeProtocolClient,
protocolClientServer,
protocolClientServer',
transportHost',
transportSession',
@@ -54,14 +56,22 @@ module Simplex.Messaging.Client
suspendSMPQueue,
deleteSMPQueue,
deleteSMPQueues,
connectSMPProxiedRelay,
proxySMPMessage,
forwardSMPMessage,
sendProtocolCommand,
-- * Supporting types and client configuration
ProtocolClientError (..),
SMPClientError,
ProxyClientError (..),
ProtocolClientConfig (..),
NetworkConfig (..),
TransportSessionMode (..),
HostMode (..),
SocksMode (..),
SMPProxyMode (..),
SMPProxyFallback (..),
defaultClientConfig,
defaultSMPClientConfig,
defaultNetworkConfig,
@@ -69,6 +79,7 @@ module Simplex.Messaging.Client
chooseTransportHost,
proxyUsername,
temporaryClientError,
smpProxyError,
ServerTransmission,
TransmissionType (..),
ClientCommand,
@@ -92,6 +103,7 @@ import Control.Monad.IO.Class (liftIO)
import Control.Monad.Trans.Except
import Crypto.Random (ChaChaDRG)
import qualified Data.Aeson.TH as J
import qualified Data.Attoparsec.ByteString.Char8 as A
import Data.ByteString.Char8 (ByteString)
import qualified Data.ByteString.Char8 as B
import Data.Functor (($>))
@@ -101,9 +113,12 @@ import Data.List.NonEmpty (NonEmpty (..))
import qualified Data.List.NonEmpty as L
import Data.Maybe (fromMaybe)
import Data.Time.Clock (UTCTime (..), diffUTCTime, getCurrentTime)
import qualified Data.X509 as X
import qualified Data.X509.Validation as XV
import Network.Socket (ServiceName)
import Numeric.Natural
import qualified Simplex.Messaging.Crypto as C
import Simplex.Messaging.Encoding
import Simplex.Messaging.Encoding.String
import Simplex.Messaging.Parsers (defaultJSON, dropPrefix, enumJSON)
import Simplex.Messaging.Protocol
@@ -113,7 +128,7 @@ import Simplex.Messaging.Transport
import Simplex.Messaging.Transport.Client (SocksProxy, TransportClientConfig (..), TransportHost (..), defaultTcpConnectTimeout, runTransportClient)
import Simplex.Messaging.Transport.KeepAlive
import Simplex.Messaging.Transport.WebSockets (WS)
import Simplex.Messaging.Util (bshow, diffToMicroseconds, ifM, raceAny_, threadDelay', tshow, whenM)
import Simplex.Messaging.Util (bshow, diffToMicroseconds, ifM, liftEitherWith, raceAny_, threadDelay', tshow, whenM)
import Simplex.Messaging.Version
import System.Timeout (timeout)
@@ -131,6 +146,7 @@ data PClient v err msg = PClient
{ connected :: TVar Bool,
transportSession :: TransportSession msg,
transportHost :: TransportHost,
tcpConnectTimeout :: Int,
tcpTimeout :: Int,
sendPings :: TVar Bool,
lastReceived :: TVar UTCTime,
@@ -160,6 +176,7 @@ smpClientStub g sessionId thVersion thAuth = do
THandleParams
{ sessionId,
thVersion,
thServerVRange = supportedServerSMPRelayVRange,
thAuth,
blockSize = smpBlockSize,
implySessId = thVersion >= authCmdsSMPVersion,
@@ -171,6 +188,7 @@ smpClientStub g sessionId thVersion thAuth = do
{ connected,
transportSession = (1, "smp://LcJUMfVhwD8yxjAiSaDzzGF3-kLG4Uh0Fl_ZIjrRwjI=@localhost:5001", Nothing),
transportHost = "localhost",
tcpConnectTimeout = 20_000_000,
tcpTimeout = 15_000_000,
sendPings,
lastReceived,
@@ -202,16 +220,30 @@ data HostMode
HMPublic
deriving (Eq, Show)
data SocksMode
= -- | always use SOCKS proxy when enabled
SMAlways
| -- | use SOCKS proxy only for .onion hosts when no public host is available
-- This mode is used in SMP proxy to minimize SOCKS proxy usage.
SMOnion
deriving (Eq, Show)
-- | network configuration for the client
data NetworkConfig = NetworkConfig
{ -- | use SOCKS5 proxy
socksProxy :: Maybe SocksProxy,
-- | when to use SOCKS proxy
socksMode :: SocksMode,
-- | determines critera which host is chosen from the list
hostMode :: HostMode,
-- | if above criteria is not met, if the below setting is True return error, otherwise use the first host
requiredHostMode :: Bool,
-- | transport sessions are created per user or per entity
sessionMode :: TransportSessionMode,
-- | SMP proxy mode
smpProxyMode :: SMPProxyMode,
-- | Fallback to direct connection when destination SMP relay does not support SMP proxy protocol extensions
smpProxyFallback :: SMPProxyFallback,
-- | timeout for the initial client TCP/TLS connection (microseconds)
tcpConnectTimeout :: Int,
-- | timeout of protocol commands (microseconds)
@@ -233,13 +265,30 @@ data NetworkConfig = NetworkConfig
data TransportSessionMode = TSMUser | TSMEntity
deriving (Eq, Show)
-- SMP proxy mode for sending messages
data SMPProxyMode
= SPMAlways
| SPMUnknown -- use with unknown relays
| SPMUnprotected -- use with unknown relays when IP address is not protected (i.e., when neither SOCKS proxy nor .onion address is used)
| SPMNever
deriving (Eq, Show)
data SMPProxyFallback
= SPFAllow -- connect directly when chosen proxy or destination relay do not support proxy protocol.
| SPFAllowProtected -- connect directly only when IP address is protected (SOCKS proxy or .onion address is used).
| SPFProhibit -- prohibit direct connection to destination relay.
deriving (Eq, Show)
defaultNetworkConfig :: NetworkConfig
defaultNetworkConfig =
NetworkConfig
{ socksProxy = Nothing,
socksMode = SMAlways,
hostMode = HMOnionViaSocks,
requiredHostMode = False,
sessionMode = TSMUser,
smpProxyMode = SPMNever,
smpProxyFallback = SPFAllow,
tcpConnectTimeout = defaultTcpConnectTimeout,
tcpTimeout = 15_000_000,
tcpTimeoutPerKb = 5_000,
@@ -250,9 +299,14 @@ defaultNetworkConfig =
logTLSErrors = False
}
transportClientConfig :: NetworkConfig -> TransportClientConfig
transportClientConfig NetworkConfig {socksProxy, tcpConnectTimeout, tcpKeepAlive, logTLSErrors} =
TransportClientConfig {socksProxy, tcpConnectTimeout, tcpKeepAlive, logTLSErrors, clientCredentials = Nothing, alpn = Nothing}
transportClientConfig :: NetworkConfig -> TransportHost -> TransportClientConfig
transportClientConfig NetworkConfig {socksProxy, socksMode, tcpConnectTimeout, tcpKeepAlive, logTLSErrors} host =
TransportClientConfig {socksProxy = useSocksProxy socksMode, tcpConnectTimeout, tcpKeepAlive, logTLSErrors, clientCredentials = Nothing, alpn = Nothing}
where
useSocksProxy SMAlways = socksProxy
useSocksProxy SMOnion = case host of
THOnionHost _ -> socksProxy
_ -> Nothing
{-# INLINE transportClientConfig #-}
-- | protocol client configuration.
@@ -266,7 +320,7 @@ data ProtocolClientConfig v = ProtocolClientConfig
clientALPN :: Maybe [ALPN],
-- | client-server protocol version range
serverVRange :: VersionRange v,
-- | agree shared session secret (used in SMP proxy)
-- | agree shared session secret (used in SMP proxy for additional encryption layer)
agreeSecret :: Bool
}
@@ -315,10 +369,14 @@ chooseTransportHost NetworkConfig {socksProxy, hostMode, requiredHostMode} hosts
publicHost = find (not . isOnionHost) hosts
protocolClientServer :: ProtocolTypeI (ProtoType msg) => ProtocolClient v err msg -> String
protocolClientServer = B.unpack . strEncode . snd3 . transportSession . client_
protocolClientServer = B.unpack . strEncode . protocolClientServer'
{-# INLINE protocolClientServer #-}
protocolClientServer' :: ProtocolClient v err msg -> ProtoServer msg
protocolClientServer' = snd3 . transportSession . client_
where
snd3 (_, s, _) = s
{-# INLINE protocolClientServer #-}
{-# INLINE protocolClientServer' #-}
transportHost' :: ProtocolClient v err msg -> TransportHost
transportHost' = transportHost . client_
@@ -362,6 +420,7 @@ getProtocolClient g transportSession@(_, srv, _) cfg@ProtocolClientConfig {qSize
{ connected,
transportSession,
transportHost,
tcpConnectTimeout,
tcpTimeout,
sendPings,
lastReceived,
@@ -376,7 +435,7 @@ getProtocolClient g transportSession@(_, srv, _) cfg@ProtocolClientConfig {qSize
runClient :: (ServiceName, ATransport) -> TransportHost -> PClient v err msg -> IO (Either (ProtocolClientError err) (ProtocolClient v err msg))
runClient (port', ATransport t) useHost c = do
cVar <- newEmptyTMVarIO
let tcConfig = (transportClientConfig networkConfig) {alpn = clientALPN}
let tcConfig = (transportClientConfig networkConfig useHost) {alpn = clientALPN}
username = proxyUsername transportSession
action <-
async $
@@ -521,6 +580,19 @@ temporaryClientError = \case
_ -> False
{-# INLINE temporaryClientError #-}
-- converts error of client running on proxy to the error sent to client connected to proxy
smpProxyError :: SMPClientError -> ErrorType
smpProxyError = \case
PCEProtocolError e -> PROXY $ PROTOCOL e
PCEResponseError e -> PROXY $ BROKER $ RESPONSE $ B.unpack $ strEncode e
PCEUnexpectedResponse s -> PROXY $ BROKER $ UNEXPECTED $ B.unpack $ B.take 32 s
PCEResponseTimeout -> PROXY $ BROKER TIMEOUT
PCENetworkError -> PROXY $ BROKER NETWORK
PCEIncompatibleHost -> PROXY $ BROKER HOST
PCETransportError t -> PROXY $ BROKER $ TRANSPORT t
PCECryptoError _ -> CRYPTO
PCEIOError _ -> INTERNAL
-- | Create a new SMP queue.
--
-- https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq/blob/master/protocol/simplex-messaging.md#create-queue-command
@@ -674,6 +746,156 @@ deleteSMPQueues :: SMPClient -> NonEmpty (RcvPrivateAuthKey, RecipientId) -> IO
deleteSMPQueues = okSMPCommands DEL
{-# INLINE deleteSMPQueues #-}
-- send PRXY :: SMPServer -> Maybe BasicAuth -> Command Sender
-- receives PKEY :: SessionId -> X.CertificateChain -> X.SignedExact X.PubKey -> BrokerMsg
connectSMPProxiedRelay :: SMPClient -> SMPServer -> Maybe BasicAuth -> ExceptT SMPClientError IO ProxiedRelay
connectSMPProxiedRelay c@ProtocolClient {client_ = PClient {tcpConnectTimeout, tcpTimeout}} relayServ@ProtocolServer {keyHash = C.KeyHash kh} proxyAuth
| thVersion (thParams c) >= sendingProxySMPVersion =
sendProtocolCommand_ c Nothing tOut Nothing "" (Cmd SProxiedClient (PRXY relayServ proxyAuth)) >>= \case
PKEY sId vr (chain, key) ->
case supportedClientSMPRelayVRange `compatibleVersion` vr of
Nothing -> throwE $ transportErr TEVersion
Just (Compatible v) -> liftEitherWith (const $ transportErr $ TEHandshake IDENTITY) $ ProxiedRelay sId v <$> validateRelay chain key
r -> throwE . PCEUnexpectedResponse $ bshow r
| otherwise = throwE $ PCETransportError TEVersion
where
tOut = Just $ tcpConnectTimeout + tcpTimeout
transportErr = PCEProtocolError . PROXY . BROKER . TRANSPORT
validateRelay :: X.CertificateChain -> X.SignedExact X.PubKey -> Either String C.PublicKeyX25519
validateRelay (X.CertificateChain cert) exact = do
serverKey <- case cert of
[leaf, ca]
| XV.Fingerprint kh == XV.getFingerprint ca X.HashSHA256 ->
C.x509ToPublic (X.certPubKey . X.signedObject $ X.getSigned leaf, []) >>= C.pubKey
_ -> throwError "bad certificate"
pubKey <- C.verifyX509 serverKey exact
C.x509ToPublic (pubKey, []) >>= C.pubKey
data ProxiedRelay = ProxiedRelay
{ prSessionId :: SessionId,
prVersion :: VersionSMP,
prServerKey :: C.PublicKeyX25519
}
data ProxyClientError
= -- | protocol error response from proxy
ProxyProtocolError ErrorType
| -- | unexpexted response
ProxyUnexpectedResponse String
| -- | error between proxy and server
ProxyResponseError ErrorType
deriving (Eq, Show, Exception)
instance StrEncoding ProxyClientError where
strEncode = \case
ProxyProtocolError e -> "PROTOCOL " <> strEncode e
ProxyUnexpectedResponse s -> "UNEXPECTED " <> B.pack s
ProxyResponseError e -> "SYNTAX " <> strEncode e
strP =
A.takeTill (== ' ') >>= \case
"PROTOCOL" -> ProxyProtocolError <$> _strP
"UNEXPECTED" -> ProxyUnexpectedResponse . B.unpack <$> (A.space *> A.takeByteString)
"SYNTAX" -> ProxyResponseError <$> _strP
_ -> fail "bad ProxyClientError"
-- consider how to process slow responses - is it handled somehow locally or delegated to the caller
-- this method is used in the client
-- sends PFWD :: C.PublicKeyX25519 -> EncTransmission -> Command Sender
-- receives PRES :: EncResponse -> BrokerMsg -- proxy to client
-- When client sends message via proxy, there may be one successful scenario and 9 error scenarios
-- as shown below (WTF stands for unexpected response, ??? for response that failed to parse).
-- client proxy relay proxy client
-- 0) PFWD(SEND) -> RFWD -> RRES -> PRES(OK) -> ok
-- 1) PFWD(SEND) -> RFWD -> RRES -> PRES(ERR) -> PCEProtocolError - business logic error for client
-- 2) PFWD(SEND) -> RFWD -> RRES -> PRES(WTF) -> PCEUnexpectedReponse - relay/client protocol logic error
-- 3) PFWD(SEND) -> RFWD -> RRES -> PRES(???) -> PCEResponseError - relay/client syntax error
-- 4) PFWD(SEND) -> RFWD -> ERR -> ERR PROXY PROTOCOL -> ProxyProtocolError - proxy/relay business logic error
-- 5) PFWD(SEND) -> RFWD -> WTF -> ERR PROXY $ BROKER (UNEXPECTED s) -> ProxyProtocolError - proxy/relay protocol logic
-- 6) PFWD(SEND) -> RFWD -> ??? -> ERR PROXY $ BROKER (RESPONSE s) -> ProxyProtocolError - - proxy/relay syntax
-- 7) PFWD(SEND) -> ERR -> ProxyProtocolError - client/proxy business logic
-- 8) PFWD(SEND) -> WTF -> ProxyUnexpectedResponse - client/proxy protocol logic
-- 9) PFWD(SEND) -> ??? -> ProxyResponseError - client/proxy syntax
--
-- We report as proxySMPMessage error (ExceptT error) the errors of two kinds:
-- - protocol errors from the destination relay wrapped in PRES - to simplify processing of AUTH and QUOTA errors, in this case proxy is "transparent" for such errors (PCEProtocolError, PCEUnexpectedResponse, PCEResponseError)
-- - other response/transport/connection errors from the client connected to proxy itself
-- Other errors are reported in the function result as `Either ProxiedRelayError ()`, including
-- - protocol errors from the client connected to proxy in ProxyClientError (PCEProtocolError, PCEUnexpectedResponse, PCEResponseError)
-- - other errors from the client running on proxy and connected to relay in PREProxiedRelayError
proxySMPMessage ::
SMPClient ->
-- proxy session from PKEY
ProxiedRelay ->
-- message to deliver
Maybe SndPrivateAuthKey ->
SenderId ->
MsgFlags ->
MsgBody ->
ExceptT SMPClientError IO (Either ProxyClientError ())
proxySMPMessage c@ProtocolClient {thParams = proxyThParams, client_ = PClient {clientCorrId = g, tcpTimeout}} (ProxiedRelay sessionId v serverKey) spKey sId flags msg = do
-- prepare params
let serverThAuth = (\ta -> ta {serverPeerPubKey = serverKey}) <$> thAuth proxyThParams
serverThParams = smpTHParamsSetVersion v proxyThParams {sessionId, thAuth = serverThAuth}
(cmdPubKey, cmdPrivKey) <- liftIO . atomically $ C.generateKeyPair @'C.X25519 g
let cmdSecret = C.dh' serverKey cmdPrivKey
nonce@(C.CbNonce corrId) <- liftIO . atomically $ C.randomCbNonce g
-- encode
let TransmissionForAuth {tForAuth, tToSend} = encodeTransmissionForAuth serverThParams (CorrId corrId, sId, Cmd SSender (SEND flags msg))
auth <- liftEitherWith PCETransportError $ authTransmission serverThAuth spKey nonce tForAuth
b <- case batchTransmissions (batch serverThParams) (blockSize serverThParams) [Right (auth, tToSend)] of
[] -> throwE $ PCETransportError TELargeMsg
TBError e _ : _ -> throwE $ PCETransportError e
TBTransmission s _ : _ -> pure s
TBTransmissions s _ _ : _ -> pure s
et <- liftEitherWith PCECryptoError $ EncTransmission <$> C.cbEncrypt cmdSecret nonce b paddedProxiedMsgLength
-- proxy interaction errors are wrapped
let tOut = Just $ 2 * tcpTimeout
tryE (sendProtocolCommand_ c (Just nonce) tOut Nothing sessionId (Cmd SProxiedClient (PFWD v cmdPubKey et))) >>= \case
Right r -> case r of
PRES (EncResponse er) -> do
-- server interaction errors are thrown directly
t' <- liftEitherWith PCECryptoError $ C.cbDecrypt cmdSecret (C.reverseNonce nonce) er
case tParse serverThParams t' of
t'' :| [] -> case tDecodeParseValidate serverThParams t'' of
(_auth, _signed, (_c, _e, cmd)) -> case cmd of
Right OK -> pure $ Right ()
Right (ERR e) -> throwE $ PCEProtocolError e -- this is the error from the destination relay
Right e -> throwE $ PCEUnexpectedResponse $ B.take 32 $ bshow e
Left e -> throwE $ PCEResponseError e
_ -> throwE $ PCETransportError TEBadBlock
ERR e -> pure . Left $ ProxyProtocolError e -- this will not happen, this error is returned via Left
_ -> pure . Left $ ProxyUnexpectedResponse $ take 32 $ show r
Left e -> case e of
PCEProtocolError e' -> pure . Left $ ProxyProtocolError e'
PCEUnexpectedResponse r -> pure . Left $ ProxyUnexpectedResponse $ B.unpack r
PCEResponseError e' -> pure . Left $ ProxyResponseError e'
_ -> throwE e
-- this method is used in the proxy
-- sends RFWD :: EncFwdTransmission -> Command Sender
-- receives RRES :: EncFwdResponse -> BrokerMsg
-- proxy should send PRES to the client with EncResponse
forwardSMPMessage :: SMPClient -> CorrId -> VersionSMP -> C.PublicKeyX25519 -> EncTransmission -> ExceptT SMPClientError IO EncResponse
forwardSMPMessage c@ProtocolClient {thParams, client_ = PClient {clientCorrId = g}} fwdCorrId fwdVersion fwdKey fwdTransmission = do
-- prepare params
sessSecret <- case thAuth thParams of
Nothing -> throwError $ PCETransportError TENoServerAuth
Just THAuthClient {sessSecret} -> maybe (throwError $ PCETransportError TENoServerAuth) pure sessSecret
nonce <- liftIO . atomically $ C.randomCbNonce g
-- wrap
let fwdT = FwdTransmission {fwdCorrId, fwdVersion, fwdKey, fwdTransmission}
eft = EncFwdTransmission $ C.cbEncryptNoPad sessSecret nonce (smpEncode fwdT)
-- send
sendProtocolCommand_ c (Just nonce) Nothing Nothing "" (Cmd SSender (RFWD eft)) >>= \case
RRES (EncFwdResponse efr) -> do
-- unwrap
r' <- liftEitherWith PCECryptoError $ C.cbDecryptNoPad sessSecret (C.reverseNonce nonce) efr
FwdResponse {fwdCorrId = _, fwdResponse} <- liftEitherWith (const $ PCEResponseError BLOCK) $ smpDecode r'
pure fwdResponse
r -> throwE . PCEUnexpectedResponse $ B.take 32 $ bshow r
okSMPCommand :: PartyI p => Command p -> SMPClient -> C.APrivateAuthKey -> QueueId -> ExceptT SMPClientError IO ()
okSMPCommand cmd c pKey qId =
sendSMPCommand c (Just pKey) qId cmd >>= \case
@@ -729,16 +951,19 @@ sendBatch c@ProtocolClient {client_ = PClient {sndQ}} b = do
TBTransmissions s n rs
| n > 0 -> do
atomically $ writeTBQueue sndQ s
mapConcurrently (getResponse c) rs
mapConcurrently (getResponse c Nothing) rs
| otherwise -> pure []
TBTransmission s r -> do
atomically $ writeTBQueue sndQ s
(: []) <$> getResponse c r
(: []) <$> getResponse c Nothing r
-- | Send Protocol command
sendProtocolCommand :: forall v err msg. Protocol v err msg => ProtocolClient v err msg -> Maybe C.APrivateAuthKey -> EntityId -> ProtoCommand msg -> ExceptT (ProtocolClientError err) IO msg
sendProtocolCommand c@ProtocolClient {client_ = PClient {sndQ}, thParams = THandleParams {batch, blockSize}} pKey entId cmd =
ExceptT $ uncurry sendRecv =<< mkTransmission c (pKey, entId, cmd)
sendProtocolCommand c = sendProtocolCommand_ c Nothing Nothing
sendProtocolCommand_ :: forall v err msg. Protocol v err msg => ProtocolClient v err msg -> Maybe C.CbNonce -> Maybe Int -> Maybe C.APrivateAuthKey -> EntityId -> ProtoCommand msg -> ExceptT (ProtocolClientError err) IO msg
sendProtocolCommand_ c@ProtocolClient {client_ = PClient {sndQ}, thParams = THandleParams {batch, blockSize}} nonce_ tOut pKey entId cmd =
ExceptT $ uncurry sendRecv =<< mkTransmission_ c nonce_ (pKey, entId, cmd)
where
-- two separate "atomically" needed to avoid blocking
sendRecv :: Either TransportError SentRawTransmission -> Request err msg -> IO (Either (ProtocolClientError err) msg)
@@ -748,15 +973,15 @@ sendProtocolCommand c@ProtocolClient {client_ = PClient {sndQ}, thParams = THand
| B.length s > blockSize - 2 -> pure . Left $ PCETransportError TELargeMsg
| otherwise -> do
atomically $ writeTBQueue sndQ s
response <$> getResponse c r
response <$> getResponse c tOut r
where
s
| batch = tEncodeBatch1 t
| otherwise = tEncode t
getResponse :: ProtocolClient v err msg -> Request err msg -> IO (Response err msg)
getResponse ProtocolClient {client_ = PClient {tcpTimeout, timeoutErrorCount}} Request {entityId, pending, responseVar} = do
r <- tcpTimeout `timeout` atomically (takeTMVar responseVar)
getResponse :: ProtocolClient v err msg -> Maybe Int -> Request err msg -> IO (Response err msg)
getResponse ProtocolClient {client_ = PClient {tcpTimeout, timeoutErrorCount}} tOut Request {entityId, pending, responseVar} = do
r <- fromMaybe tcpTimeout tOut `timeout` atomically (takeTMVar responseVar)
response <- atomically $ do
writeTVar pending False
-- Try to read response again in case it arrived after timeout expired
@@ -767,16 +992,17 @@ getResponse ProtocolClient {client_ = PClient {tcpTimeout, timeoutErrorCount}} R
Nothing -> modifyTVar' timeoutErrorCount (+ 1) $> Left PCEResponseTimeout
pure Response {entityId, response}
mkTransmission :: forall v err msg. Protocol v err msg => ProtocolClient v err msg -> ClientCommand msg -> IO (PCTransmission err msg)
mkTransmission ProtocolClient {thParams, client_ = PClient {clientCorrId, sentCommands}} (pKey_, entityId, command) = do
corrId <- atomically getNextCorrId
let TransmissionForAuth {tForAuth, tToSend} = encodeTransmissionForAuth thParams (corrId, entityId, command)
auth = authTransmission (thAuth thParams) pKey_ corrId tForAuth
r <- atomically $ mkRequest corrId
mkTransmission :: Protocol v err msg => ProtocolClient v err msg -> ClientCommand msg -> IO (PCTransmission err msg)
mkTransmission c = mkTransmission_ c Nothing
mkTransmission_ :: forall v err msg. Protocol v err msg => ProtocolClient v err msg -> Maybe C.CbNonce -> ClientCommand msg -> IO (PCTransmission err msg)
mkTransmission_ ProtocolClient {thParams, client_ = PClient {clientCorrId, sentCommands}} nonce_ (pKey_, entityId, command) = do
nonce@(C.CbNonce corrId) <- maybe (atomically $ C.randomCbNonce clientCorrId) pure nonce_
let TransmissionForAuth {tForAuth, tToSend} = encodeTransmissionForAuth thParams (CorrId corrId, entityId, command)
auth = authTransmission (thAuth thParams) pKey_ nonce tForAuth
r <- atomically $ mkRequest (CorrId corrId)
pure ((,tToSend) <$> auth, r)
where
getNextCorrId :: STM CorrId
getNextCorrId = CorrId <$> C.randomBytes 24 clientCorrId -- also used as nonce
mkRequest :: CorrId -> STM (Request err msg)
mkRequest corrId = do
pending <- newTVar True
@@ -792,13 +1018,13 @@ mkTransmission ProtocolClient {thParams, client_ = PClient {clientCorrId, sentCo
TM.insert corrId r sentCommands
pure r
authTransmission :: Maybe (THandleAuth 'TClient) -> Maybe C.APrivateAuthKey -> CorrId -> ByteString -> Either TransportError (Maybe TransmissionAuth)
authTransmission thAuth pKey_ (CorrId corrId) t = traverse authenticate pKey_
authTransmission :: Maybe (THandleAuth 'TClient) -> Maybe C.APrivateAuthKey -> C.CbNonce -> ByteString -> Either TransportError (Maybe TransmissionAuth)
authTransmission thAuth pKey_ nonce t = traverse authenticate pKey_
where
authenticate :: C.APrivateAuthKey -> Either TransportError TransmissionAuth
authenticate (C.APrivateAuthKey a pk) = case a of
C.SX25519 -> case thAuth of
Just THAuthClient {serverPeerPubKey = k} -> Right $ TAAuthenticator $ C.cbAuthenticate k pk (C.cbNonce corrId) t
Just THAuthClient {serverPeerPubKey = k} -> Right $ TAAuthenticator $ C.cbAuthenticate k pk nonce t
Nothing -> Left TENoServerAuth
C.SEd25519 -> sign pk
C.SEd448 -> sign pk
@@ -807,6 +1033,14 @@ authTransmission thAuth pKey_ (CorrId corrId) t = traverse authenticate pKey_
$(J.deriveJSON (enumJSON $ dropPrefix "HM") ''HostMode)
$(J.deriveJSON (enumJSON $ dropPrefix "SM") ''SocksMode)
$(J.deriveJSON (enumJSON $ dropPrefix "TSM") ''TransportSessionMode)
$(J.deriveJSON (enumJSON $ dropPrefix "SPM") ''SMPProxyMode)
$(J.deriveJSON (enumJSON $ dropPrefix "SPF") ''SMPProxyFallback)
$(J.deriveJSON defaultJSON ''NetworkConfig)
$(J.deriveJSON (enumJSON $ dropPrefix "Proxy") ''ProxyClientError)
src/Simplex/Messaging/Client/Agent.hs
+15 -6
View File
@@ -98,6 +98,7 @@ data SMPClientAgent = SMPClientAgent
agentQ :: TBQueue SMPClientAgentEvent,
randomDrg :: TVar ChaChaDRG,
smpClients :: TMap SMPServer SMPClientVar,
smpSessions :: TMap SessionId SMPClient,
srvSubs :: TMap SMPServer (TMap SMPSub C.APrivateAuthKey),
pendingSrvSubs :: TMap SMPServer (TMap SMPSub C.APrivateAuthKey),
reconnections :: TVar [Async ()],
@@ -135,6 +136,7 @@ newSMPClientAgent agentCfg@SMPClientAgentConfig {msgQSize, agentQSize} randomDrg
msgQ <- newTBQueue msgQSize
agentQ <- newTBQueue agentQSize
smpClients <- TM.empty
smpSessions <- TM.empty
srvSubs <- TM.empty
pendingSrvSubs <- TM.empty
reconnections <- newTVar []
@@ -147,6 +149,7 @@ newSMPClientAgent agentCfg@SMPClientAgentConfig {msgQSize, agentQSize} randomDrg
agentQ,
randomDrg,
smpClients,
smpSessions,
srvSubs,
pendingSrvSubs,
reconnections,
@@ -155,7 +158,7 @@ newSMPClientAgent agentCfg@SMPClientAgentConfig {msgQSize, agentQSize} randomDrg
}
getSMPServerClient' :: SMPClientAgent -> SMPServer -> ExceptT SMPClientError IO SMPClient
getSMPServerClient' ca@SMPClientAgent {agentCfg, smpClients, msgQ, randomDrg, workerSeq} srv =
getSMPServerClient' ca@SMPClientAgent {agentCfg, smpClients, smpSessions, msgQ, randomDrg, workerSeq} srv =
atomically getClientVar >>= either newSMPClient waitForSMPClient
where
getClientVar :: STM (Either SMPClientVar SMPClientVar)
@@ -178,7 +181,9 @@ getSMPServerClient' ca@SMPClientAgent {agentCfg, smpClients, msgQ, randomDrg, wo
tryE (connectClient v) >>= \r -> case r of
Right smp -> do
logInfo . decodeUtf8 $ "Agent connected to " <> showServer srv
atomically $ putTMVar (sessionVar v) r
atomically $ do
putTMVar (sessionVar v) r
TM.insert (sessionId $ thParams smp) smp smpSessions
successAction smp
Left e -> do
if e == PCENetworkError || e == PCEResponseTimeout
@@ -200,13 +205,14 @@ getSMPServerClient' ca@SMPClientAgent {agentCfg, smpClients, msgQ, randomDrg, wo
connectClient v = ExceptT $ getProtocolClient randomDrg (1, srv, Nothing) (smpCfg agentCfg) (Just msgQ) (clientDisconnected v)
clientDisconnected :: SMPClientVar -> SMPClient -> IO ()
clientDisconnected v _ = do
removeClientAndSubs v >>= (`forM_` serverDown)
clientDisconnected v smp = do
removeClientAndSubs v smp >>= (`forM_` serverDown)
logInfo . decodeUtf8 $ "Agent disconnected from " <> showServer srv
removeClientAndSubs :: SMPClientVar -> IO (Maybe (Map SMPSub C.APrivateAuthKey))
removeClientAndSubs v = atomically $ do
removeClientAndSubs :: SMPClientVar -> SMPClient -> IO (Maybe (Map SMPSub C.APrivateAuthKey))
removeClientAndSubs v smp = atomically $ do
removeSessVar v srv smpClients
TM.delete (sessionId $ thParams smp) smpSessions
TM.lookupDelete srv (srvSubs ca) >>= mapM updateSubs
where
updateSubs sVar = do
@@ -271,6 +277,9 @@ getSMPServerClient' ca@SMPClientAgent {agentCfg, smpClients, msgQ, randomDrg, wo
notify :: SMPClientAgentEvent -> IO ()
notify evt = atomically $ writeTBQueue (agentQ ca) evt
lookupSMPServerClient :: SMPClientAgent -> SessionId -> STM (Maybe SMPClient)
lookupSMPServerClient SMPClientAgent {smpSessions} sessId = TM.lookup sessId smpSessions
closeSMPClientAgent :: SMPClientAgent -> IO ()
closeSMPClientAgent c = do
closeSMPServerClients c
src/Simplex/Messaging/Crypto.hs
+6
View File
@@ -141,6 +141,7 @@ module Simplex.Messaging.Crypto
sbEncrypt_,
cbNonce,
randomCbNonce,
reverseNonce,
-- * NaCl crypto_secretbox
SbKey (unSbKey),
@@ -756,6 +757,8 @@ data Signature (a :: Algorithm) where
SignatureEd25519 :: Ed25519.Signature -> Signature Ed25519
SignatureEd448 :: Ed448.Signature -> Signature Ed448
deriving instance Eq (Signature a)
deriving instance Show (Signature a)
data ASignature
@@ -1290,6 +1293,9 @@ randomCbNonce = fmap CryptoBoxNonce . randomBytes 24
randomBytes :: Int -> TVar ChaChaDRG -> STM ByteString
randomBytes n gVar = stateTVar gVar $ randomBytesGenerate n
reverseNonce :: CbNonce -> CbNonce
reverseNonce (CryptoBoxNonce s) = CryptoBoxNonce (B.reverse s)
instance Encoding CbNonce where
smpEncode = unCbNonce
smpP = CryptoBoxNonce <$> A.take 24
src/Simplex/Messaging/Crypto/Ratchet.hs
+16 -15
View File
@@ -117,7 +117,7 @@ import Simplex.Messaging.Crypto.SNTRUP761.Bindings
import Simplex.Messaging.Encoding
import Simplex.Messaging.Encoding.String
import Simplex.Messaging.Parsers (blobFieldDecoder, defaultJSON, parseE, parseE')
import Simplex.Messaging.Util ((<$?>), ($>>=))
import Simplex.Messaging.Util (($>>=), (<$?>))
import Simplex.Messaging.Version
import Simplex.Messaging.Version.Internal
import UnliftIO.STM
@@ -266,6 +266,7 @@ instance VersionRangeI E2EVersion (E2ERatchetParamsUri s a) where
type VersionT E2EVersion (E2ERatchetParamsUri s a) = (E2ERatchetParams s a)
versionRange (E2ERatchetParamsUri vr _ _ _) = vr
toVersionT (E2ERatchetParamsUri _ k1 k2 kem_) v = E2ERatchetParams v k1 k2 kem_
toVersionRange (E2ERatchetParamsUri _ k1 k2 kem_) vr = E2ERatchetParamsUri vr k1 k2 kem_
type RcvE2ERatchetParamsUri a = E2ERatchetParamsUri 'RKSProposed a
@@ -377,13 +378,15 @@ generateE2EParams g v useKEM_ = do
where
kemParams :: IO (Maybe (RKEMParams s, PrivRKEMParams s))
kemParams = case useKEM_ of
Just useKem | v >= pqRatchetE2EEncryptVersion -> Just <$> do
ks@(k, _) <- sntrup761Keypair g
case useKem of
ProposeKEM -> pure (RKParamsProposed k, PrivateRKParamsProposed ks)
AcceptKEM k' -> do
(ct, shared) <- sntrup761Enc g k'
pure (RKParamsAccepted ct k, PrivateRKParamsAccepted ct shared ks)
Just useKem
| v >= pqRatchetE2EEncryptVersion ->
Just <$> do
ks@(k, _) <- sntrup761Keypair g
case useKem of
ProposeKEM -> pure (RKParamsProposed k, PrivateRKParamsProposed ks)
AcceptKEM k' -> do
(ct, shared) <- sntrup761Enc g k'
pure (RKParamsAccepted ct k, PrivateRKParamsAccepted ct shared ks)
_ -> pure Nothing
-- used by party initiating connection, Bob in double-ratchet spec
@@ -456,7 +459,7 @@ pqX3dh (sk1, rk1) dh1 dh2 dh3 kemAccepted =
pq = maybe "" (\RatchetKEMAccepted {rcPQRss = KEMSharedKey ss} -> BA.convert ss) kemAccepted
(hk, nhk, sk) =
let salt = B.replicate 64 '\0'
in hkdf3 salt dhs "SimpleXX3DH"
in hkdf3 salt dhs "SimpleXX3DH"
type RatchetX448 = Ratchet 'X448
@@ -698,8 +701,8 @@ data EncMessageHeader = EncMessageHeader
-- this encoding depends on version in EncMessageHeader because it is "current" ratchet version
instance Encoding EncMessageHeader where
smpEncode EncMessageHeader {ehVersion, ehIV, ehAuthTag, ehBody}
= smpEncode (ehVersion, ehIV, ehAuthTag) <> encodeLarge ehVersion ehBody
smpEncode EncMessageHeader {ehVersion, ehIV, ehAuthTag, ehBody} =
smpEncode (ehVersion, ehIV, ehAuthTag) <> encodeLarge ehVersion ehBody
smpP = do
(ehVersion, ehIV, ehAuthTag) <- smpP
ehBody <- largeP
@@ -708,8 +711,6 @@ instance Encoding EncMessageHeader where
-- the encoder always uses 2-byte lengths for the new version, even for short headers without PQ keys.
encodeLarge :: VersionE2E -> ByteString -> ByteString
encodeLarge v s
-- the condition for length is not necessary, it's here as a fallback.
-- | v >= pqRatchetE2EEncryptVersion || B.length s > 255 = smpEncode $ Large s
| v >= pqRatchetE2EEncryptVersion = smpEncode $ Large s
| otherwise = smpEncode s
@@ -729,8 +730,8 @@ data EncRatchetMessage = EncRatchetMessage
}
encodeEncRatchetMessage :: VersionE2E -> EncRatchetMessage -> ByteString
encodeEncRatchetMessage v EncRatchetMessage {emHeader, emBody, emAuthTag}
= encodeLarge v emHeader <> smpEncode (emAuthTag, Tail emBody)
encodeEncRatchetMessage v EncRatchetMessage {emHeader, emBody, emAuthTag} =
encodeLarge v emHeader <> smpEncode (emAuthTag, Tail emBody)
encRatchetMessageP :: Parser EncRatchetMessage
encRatchetMessageP = do
src/Simplex/Messaging/Encoding/String.hs
+2
View File
@@ -75,6 +75,8 @@ instance StrEncoding Str where
strEncode = unStr
strP = Str <$> A.takeTill (== ' ') <* optional A.space
-- inherited from ByteString, the parser only allows non-empty strings
-- only Char8 elements may round-trip as B.pack truncates unicode
instance StrEncoding String where
strEncode = strEncode . B.pack
strP = B.unpack <$> strP
src/Simplex/Messaging/Notifications/Transport.hs
+30 -17
View File
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ module Simplex.Messaging.Notifications.Transport where
import Control.Monad (forM)
import Control.Monad.Except
import Control.Monad.Trans.Except
import Data.Attoparsec.ByteString.Char8 (Parser)
import Data.ByteString.Char8 (ByteString)
import qualified Data.ByteString.Char8 as B
@@ -116,9 +117,10 @@ ntfServerHandshake serverSignKey c (k, pk) kh ntfVRange = do
NtfClientHandshake {ntfVersion = v, keyHash}
| keyHash /= kh ->
throwError $ TEHandshake IDENTITY
| v `isCompatible` ntfVersionRange ->
pure $ ntfThHandleServer th v pk
| otherwise -> throwError $ TEHandshake VERSION
| otherwise ->
case compatibleVRange' ntfVersionRange v of
Just (Compatible vr) -> pure $ ntfThHandleServer th v vr pk
Nothing -> throwE TEVersion
-- | Notifcations server client transport handshake.
ntfClientHandshake :: forall c. Transport c => c -> C.KeyHash -> VersionRangeNTF -> ExceptT TransportError IO (THandleNTF c 'TClient)
@@ -127,34 +129,45 @@ ntfClientHandshake c keyHash ntfVRange = do
NtfServerHandshake {sessionId = sessId, ntfVersionRange, authPubKey = sk'} <- getHandshake th
if sessionId /= sessId
then throwError TEBadSession
else case ntfVersionRange `compatibleVersion` ntfVRange of
Just (Compatible v) -> do
else case ntfVersionRange `compatibleVRange` ntfVRange of
Just (Compatible vr) -> do
ck_ <- forM sk' $ \signedKey -> liftEitherWith (const $ TEHandshake BAD_AUTH) $ do
serverKey <- getServerVerifyKey c
pubKey <- C.verifyX509 serverKey signedKey
(,(getServerCerts c, signedKey)) <$> (C.x509ToPublic (pubKey, []) >>= C.pubKey)
let v = maxVersion vr
sendHandshake th $ NtfClientHandshake {ntfVersion = v, keyHash}
pure $ ntfThHandleClient th v ck_
Nothing -> throwError $ TEHandshake VERSION
pure $ ntfThHandleClient th v vr ck_
Nothing -> throwE TEVersion
ntfThHandleServer :: forall c. THandleNTF c 'TServer -> VersionNTF -> C.PrivateKeyX25519 -> THandleNTF c 'TServer
ntfThHandleServer th v pk =
ntfThHandleServer :: forall c. THandleNTF c 'TServer -> VersionNTF -> VersionRangeNTF -> C.PrivateKeyX25519 -> THandleNTF c 'TServer
ntfThHandleServer th v vr pk =
let thAuth = THAuthServer {serverPrivKey = pk, sessSecret' = Nothing}
in ntfThHandle_ th v (Just thAuth)
in ntfThHandle_ th v vr (Just thAuth)
ntfThHandleClient :: forall c. THandleNTF c 'TClient -> VersionNTF -> Maybe (C.PublicKeyX25519, (X.CertificateChain, X.SignedExact X.PubKey)) -> THandleNTF c 'TClient
ntfThHandleClient th v ck_ =
ntfThHandleClient :: forall c. THandleNTF c 'TClient -> VersionNTF -> VersionRangeNTF -> Maybe (C.PublicKeyX25519, (X.CertificateChain, X.SignedExact X.PubKey)) -> THandleNTF c 'TClient
ntfThHandleClient th v vr ck_ =
let thAuth = (\(k, ck) -> THAuthClient {serverPeerPubKey = k, serverCertKey = ck, sessSecret = Nothing}) <$> ck_
in ntfThHandle_ th v thAuth
in ntfThHandle_ th v vr thAuth
ntfThHandle_ :: forall c p. THandleNTF c p -> VersionNTF -> Maybe (THandleAuth p) -> THandleNTF c p
ntfThHandle_ th@THandle {params} v thAuth =
ntfThHandle_ :: forall c p. THandleNTF c p -> VersionNTF -> VersionRangeNTF -> Maybe (THandleAuth p) -> THandleNTF c p
ntfThHandle_ th@THandle {params} v vr thAuth =
-- TODO drop SMP v6: make thAuth non-optional
let v3 = v >= authBatchCmdsNTFVersion
params' = params {thVersion = v, thAuth, implySessId = v3, batch = v3}
params' = params {thVersion = v, thServerVRange = vr, thAuth, implySessId = v3, batch = v3}
in (th :: THandleNTF c p) {params = params'}
ntfTHandle :: Transport c => c -> THandleNTF c p
ntfTHandle c = THandle {connection = c, params}
where
params = THandleParams {sessionId = tlsUnique c, blockSize = ntfBlockSize, thVersion = VersionNTF 0, thAuth = Nothing, implySessId = False, batch = False}
v = VersionNTF 0
params =
THandleParams
{ sessionId = tlsUnique c,
blockSize = ntfBlockSize,
thVersion = v,
thServerVRange = versionToRange v,
thAuth = Nothing,
implySessId = False,
batch = False
}
src/Simplex/Messaging/Protocol.hs
+268 -22
View File
@@ -43,6 +43,7 @@ module Simplex.Messaging.Protocol
( -- * SMP protocol parameters
supportedSMPClientVRange,
maxMessageLength,
paddedProxiedMsgLength,
e2eEncConfirmationLength,
e2eEncMessageLength,
@@ -56,6 +57,7 @@ module Simplex.Messaging.Protocol
SubscriptionMode (..),
Party (..),
Cmd (..),
DirectParty,
BrokerMsg (..),
SParty (..),
PartyI (..),
@@ -63,6 +65,8 @@ module Simplex.Messaging.Protocol
ProtocolErrorType (..),
ErrorType (..),
CommandError (..),
ProxyError (..),
BrokerErrorType (..),
Transmission,
TransmissionAuth (..),
SignedTransmission,
@@ -121,6 +125,12 @@ module Simplex.Messaging.Protocol
EncNMsgMeta,
SMPMsgMeta (..),
NMsgMeta (..),
EncFwdResponse (..),
EncFwdTransmission (..),
EncResponse (..),
EncTransmission (..),
FwdResponse (..),
FwdTransmission (..),
MsgFlags (..),
initialSMPClientVersion,
userProtocol,
@@ -167,6 +177,7 @@ module Simplex.Messaging.Protocol
where
import Control.Applicative (optional, (<|>))
import Control.Exception (Exception)
import Control.Monad
import Control.Monad.Except
import Data.Aeson (FromJSON (..), ToJSON (..))
@@ -185,10 +196,15 @@ import Data.List.NonEmpty (NonEmpty (..))
import qualified Data.List.NonEmpty as L
import Data.Maybe (isJust, isNothing)
import Data.String
import qualified Data.Text as T
import Data.Text.Encoding (encodeUtf8)
import Data.Time.Clock.System (SystemTime (..))
import Data.Type.Equality
import Data.Word (Word16)
import qualified Data.X509 as X
import GHC.TypeLits (ErrorMessage (..), TypeError, type (+))
import qualified GHC.TypeLits as TE
import qualified GHC.TypeLits as Type
import Network.Socket (ServiceName)
import qualified Simplex.Messaging.Crypto as C
import Simplex.Messaging.Encoding
@@ -197,7 +213,7 @@ import Simplex.Messaging.Parsers
import Simplex.Messaging.ServiceScheme
import Simplex.Messaging.Transport
import Simplex.Messaging.Transport.Client (TransportHost, TransportHosts (..))
import Simplex.Messaging.Util (bshow, eitherToMaybe, (<$?>))
import Simplex.Messaging.Util (bshow, eitherToMaybe, safeDecodeUtf8, (<$?>))
import Simplex.Messaging.Version
import Simplex.Messaging.Version.Internal
@@ -228,9 +244,16 @@ currentSMPClientVersion = VersionSMPC 2
supportedSMPClientVRange :: VersionRangeSMPC
supportedSMPClientVRange = mkVersionRange initialSMPClientVersion currentSMPClientVersion
maxMessageLength :: Int
maxMessageLength = 16088
-- TODO v6.0 remove dependency on version
maxMessageLength :: VersionSMP -> Int
maxMessageLength v
| v >= sendingProxySMPVersion = 16064 -- max 16067
| otherwise = 16088 -- 16064 - always use this size to determine allowed ranges
paddedProxiedMsgLength :: Int
paddedProxiedMsgLength = 16242 -- 16241 .. 16243
-- TODO v6.0 change to 16064
type MaxMessageLen = 16088
-- 16 extra bytes: 8 for timestamp and 8 for flags (7 flags and the space, only 1 flag is currently used)
@@ -244,7 +267,7 @@ e2eEncMessageLength :: Int
e2eEncMessageLength = 16016 -- 16004 .. 16021
-- | SMP protocol clients
data Party = Recipient | Sender | Notifier
data Party = Recipient | Sender | Notifier | ProxiedClient
deriving (Show)
-- | Singleton types for SMP protocol clients
@@ -252,11 +275,13 @@ data SParty :: Party -> Type where
SRecipient :: SParty Recipient
SSender :: SParty Sender
SNotifier :: SParty Notifier
SProxiedClient :: SParty ProxiedClient
instance TestEquality SParty where
testEquality SRecipient SRecipient = Just Refl
testEquality SSender SSender = Just Refl
testEquality SNotifier SNotifier = Just Refl
testEquality SProxiedClient SProxiedClient = Just Refl
testEquality _ _ = Nothing
deriving instance Show (SParty p)
@@ -269,6 +294,15 @@ instance PartyI Sender where sParty = SSender
instance PartyI Notifier where sParty = SNotifier
instance PartyI ProxiedClient where sParty = SProxiedClient
type family DirectParty (p :: Party) :: Constraint where
DirectParty Recipient = ()
DirectParty Sender = ()
DirectParty Notifier = ()
DirectParty p =
(Int ~ Bool, TypeError (Type.Text "Party " :<>: ShowType p :<>: Type.Text " is not direct"))
-- | Type for client command of any participant.
data Cmd = forall p. PartyI p => Cmd (SParty p) (Command p)
@@ -359,6 +393,17 @@ data Command (p :: Party) where
PING :: Command Sender
-- SMP notification subscriber commands
NSUB :: Command Notifier
PRXY :: SMPServer -> Maybe BasicAuth -> Command ProxiedClient -- request a relay server connection by URI
-- Transmission to proxy:
-- - entity ID: ID of the session with relay returned in PKEY (response to PRXY)
-- - corrId: also used as a nonce to encrypt transmission to relay, corrId + 1 - from relay
-- - key (1st param in the command) is used to agree DH secret for this particular transmission and its response
-- Encrypted transmission should include session ID (tlsunique) from proxy-relay connection.
PFWD :: VersionSMP -> C.PublicKeyX25519 -> EncTransmission -> Command ProxiedClient -- use CorrId as CbNonce, client to proxy
-- Transmission forwarded to relay:
-- - entity ID: empty
-- - corrId: unique correlation ID between proxy and relay, also used as a nonce to encrypt forwarded transmission
RFWD :: EncFwdTransmission -> Command Sender -- use CorrId as CbNonce, proxy to relay
deriving instance Show (Command p)
@@ -384,6 +429,26 @@ instance Encoding SubscriptionMode where
'C' -> pure SMOnlyCreate
_ -> fail "bad SubscriptionMode"
newtype EncTransmission = EncTransmission ByteString
deriving (Show)
data FwdTransmission = FwdTransmission
{ fwdCorrId :: CorrId,
fwdVersion :: VersionSMP,
fwdKey :: C.PublicKeyX25519,
fwdTransmission :: EncTransmission
}
instance Encoding FwdTransmission where
smpEncode FwdTransmission {fwdCorrId = CorrId corrId, fwdVersion, fwdKey, fwdTransmission = EncTransmission t} =
smpEncode (corrId, fwdVersion, fwdKey, Tail t)
smpP = do
(corrId, fwdVersion, fwdKey, Tail t) <- smpP
pure FwdTransmission {fwdCorrId = CorrId corrId, fwdVersion, fwdKey, fwdTransmission = EncTransmission t}
newtype EncFwdTransmission = EncFwdTransmission ByteString
deriving (Show)
data BrokerMsg where
-- SMP broker messages (responses, client messages, notifications)
IDS :: QueueIdsKeys -> BrokerMsg
@@ -393,6 +458,10 @@ data BrokerMsg where
MSG :: RcvMessage -> BrokerMsg
NID :: NotifierId -> RcvNtfPublicDhKey -> BrokerMsg
NMSG :: C.CbNonce -> EncNMsgMeta -> BrokerMsg
-- Should include certificate chain
PKEY :: SessionId -> VersionRangeSMP -> (X.CertificateChain, X.SignedExact X.PubKey) -> BrokerMsg -- TLS-signed server key for proxy shared secret and initial sender key
RRES :: EncFwdResponse -> BrokerMsg -- relay to proxy
PRES :: EncResponse -> BrokerMsg -- proxy to client
END :: BrokerMsg
OK :: BrokerMsg
ERR :: ErrorType -> BrokerMsg
@@ -405,6 +474,24 @@ data RcvMessage = RcvMessage
}
deriving (Eq, Show)
newtype EncFwdResponse = EncFwdResponse ByteString
deriving (Eq, Show)
data FwdResponse = FwdResponse
{ fwdCorrId :: CorrId,
fwdResponse :: EncResponse
}
instance Encoding FwdResponse where
smpEncode FwdResponse {fwdCorrId = CorrId corrId, fwdResponse = EncResponse t} =
smpEncode (corrId, Tail t)
smpP = do
(corrId, Tail t) <- smpP
pure FwdResponse {fwdCorrId = CorrId corrId, fwdResponse = EncResponse t}
newtype EncResponse = EncResponse ByteString
deriving (Eq, Show)
-- | received message without server/recipient encryption
data Message
= Message
@@ -567,6 +654,9 @@ data CommandTag (p :: Party) where
DEL_ :: CommandTag Recipient
SEND_ :: CommandTag Sender
PING_ :: CommandTag Sender
PRXY_ :: CommandTag ProxiedClient
PFWD_ :: CommandTag ProxiedClient
RFWD_ :: CommandTag Sender
NSUB_ :: CommandTag Notifier
data CmdTag = forall p. PartyI p => CT (SParty p) (CommandTag p)
@@ -580,6 +670,9 @@ data BrokerMsgTag
| MSG_
| NID_
| NMSG_
| PKEY_
| RRES_
| PRES_
| END_
| OK_
| ERR_
@@ -607,6 +700,9 @@ instance PartyI p => Encoding (CommandTag p) where
DEL_ -> "DEL"
SEND_ -> "SEND"
PING_ -> "PING"
PRXY_ -> "PRXY"
PFWD_ -> "PFWD"
RFWD_ -> "RFWD"
NSUB_ -> "NSUB"
smpP = messageTagP
@@ -623,6 +719,9 @@ instance ProtocolMsgTag CmdTag where
"DEL" -> Just $ CT SRecipient DEL_
"SEND" -> Just $ CT SSender SEND_
"PING" -> Just $ CT SSender PING_
"PRXY" -> Just $ CT SProxiedClient PRXY_
"PFWD" -> Just $ CT SProxiedClient PFWD_
"RFWD" -> Just $ CT SSender RFWD_
"NSUB" -> Just $ CT SNotifier NSUB_
_ -> Nothing
@@ -639,6 +738,9 @@ instance Encoding BrokerMsgTag where
MSG_ -> "MSG"
NID_ -> "NID"
NMSG_ -> "NMSG"
PKEY_ -> "PKEY"
RRES_ -> "RRES"
PRES_ -> "PRES"
END_ -> "END"
OK_ -> "OK"
ERR_ -> "ERR"
@@ -651,6 +753,9 @@ instance ProtocolMsgTag BrokerMsgTag where
"MSG" -> Just MSG_
"NID" -> Just NID_
"NMSG" -> Just NMSG_
"PKEY" -> Just PKEY_
"RRES" -> Just RRES_
"PRES" -> Just PRES_
"END" -> Just END_
"OK" -> Just OK_
"ERR" -> Just ERR_
@@ -829,7 +934,7 @@ type family UserProtocol (p :: ProtocolType) :: Constraint where
UserProtocol PSMP = ()
UserProtocol PXFTP = ()
UserProtocol a =
(Int ~ Bool, TypeError (Text "Servers for protocol " :<>: ShowType a :<>: Text " cannot be configured by the users"))
(Int ~ Bool, TypeError (TE.Text "Servers for protocol " :<>: ShowType a :<>: TE.Text " cannot be configured by the users"))
userProtocol :: SProtocolType p -> Maybe (Dict (UserProtocol p))
userProtocol = \case
@@ -1038,14 +1143,20 @@ data ErrorType
SESSION
| -- | SMP command is unknown or has invalid syntax
CMD {cmdErr :: CommandError}
| -- | error from proxied relay
PROXY {proxyErr :: ProxyError}
| -- | command authorization error - bad signature or non-existing SMP queue
AUTH
| -- | encryption/decryption error in proxy protocol
CRYPTO
| -- | SMP queue capacity is exceeded on the server
QUOTA
| -- | ACK command is sent without message to be acknowledged
NO_MSG
| -- | sent message is too large (> maxMessageLength = 16088 bytes)
LARGE_MSG
| -- | relay public key is expired
EXPIRED
| -- | internal server error
INTERNAL
| -- | used internally, never returned by the server (to be removed)
@@ -1055,8 +1166,12 @@ data ErrorType
instance StrEncoding ErrorType where
strEncode = \case
CMD e -> "CMD " <> bshow e
PROXY e -> "PROXY " <> strEncode e
e -> bshow e
strP = "CMD " *> (CMD <$> parseRead1) <|> parseRead1
strP =
"CMD " *> (CMD <$> parseRead1)
<|> "PROXY " *> (PROXY <$> strP)
<|> parseRead1
-- | SMP command error type.
data CommandError
@@ -1074,6 +1189,34 @@ data CommandError
NO_ENTITY
deriving (Eq, Read, Show)
data ProxyError
= -- | Correctly parsed SMP server ERR response.
-- This error is forwarded to the agent client as AgentErrorType `ERR PROXY PROTOCOL err`.
PROTOCOL {protocolErr :: ErrorType}
| -- | destination server error
BROKER {brokerErr :: BrokerErrorType}
| -- | basic auth provided to proxy is invalid
BASIC_AUTH
| -- no destination server error
NO_SESSION
deriving (Eq, Read, Show)
-- | SMP server errors.
data BrokerErrorType
= -- | invalid server response (failed to parse)
RESPONSE {respErr :: String}
| -- | unexpected response
UNEXPECTED {respErr :: String}
| -- | network error
NETWORK
| -- | no compatible server host (e.g. onion when public is required, or vice versa)
HOST
| -- | handshake or other transport error
TRANSPORT {transportErr :: TransportError}
| -- | command response timeout
TIMEOUT
deriving (Eq, Read, Show, Exception)
-- | SMP transmission parser.
transmissionP :: THandleParams v p -> Parser RawTransmission
transmissionP THandleParams {sessionId, implySessId} = do
@@ -1135,6 +1278,9 @@ instance PartyI p => ProtocolEncoding SMPVersion ErrorType (Command p) where
SEND flags msg -> e (SEND_, ' ', flags, ' ', Tail msg)
PING -> e PING_
NSUB -> e NSUB_
PRXY host auth_ -> e (PRXY_, ' ', host, auth_)
PFWD fwdV pubKey (EncTransmission s) -> e (PFWD_, ' ', fwdV, pubKey, Tail s)
RFWD (EncFwdTransmission s) -> e (RFWD_, ' ', Tail s)
where
e :: Encoding a => a -> ByteString
e = smpEncode
@@ -1144,24 +1290,33 @@ instance PartyI p => ProtocolEncoding SMPVersion ErrorType (Command p) where
fromProtocolError = fromProtocolError @SMPVersion @ErrorType @BrokerMsg
{-# INLINE fromProtocolError #-}
checkCredentials (auth, _, queueId, _) cmd = case cmd of
checkCredentials (auth, _, entId, _) cmd = case cmd of
-- NEW must have signature but NOT queue ID
NEW {}
| isNothing auth -> Left $ CMD NO_AUTH
| not (B.null queueId) -> Left $ CMD HAS_AUTH
| not (B.null entId) -> Left $ CMD HAS_AUTH
| otherwise -> Right cmd
-- SEND must have queue ID, signature is not always required
SEND {}
| B.null queueId -> Left $ CMD NO_ENTITY
| B.null entId -> Left $ CMD NO_ENTITY
| otherwise -> Right cmd
-- PING must not have queue ID or signature
PING
| isNothing auth && B.null queueId -> Right cmd
PING -> noAuthCmd
PRXY {} -> noAuthCmd
PFWD {}
| B.null entId -> Left $ CMD NO_ENTITY
| isNothing auth -> Right cmd
| otherwise -> Left $ CMD HAS_AUTH
RFWD _ -> noAuthCmd
-- other client commands must have both signature and queue ID
_
| isNothing auth || B.null queueId -> Left $ CMD NO_AUTH
| isNothing auth || B.null entId -> Left $ CMD NO_AUTH
| otherwise -> Right cmd
where
-- command must not have entity ID (queue or session ID) or signature
noAuthCmd :: Either ErrorType (Command p)
noAuthCmd
| isNothing auth && B.null entId = Right cmd
| otherwise = Left $ CMD HAS_AUTH
instance ProtocolEncoding SMPVersion ErrorType Cmd where
type Tag Cmd = CmdTag
@@ -1189,6 +1344,11 @@ instance ProtocolEncoding SMPVersion ErrorType Cmd where
Cmd SSender <$> case tag of
SEND_ -> SEND <$> _smpP <*> (unTail <$> _smpP)
PING_ -> pure PING
RFWD_ -> RFWD <$> (EncFwdTransmission . unTail <$> _smpP)
CT SProxiedClient tag ->
Cmd SProxiedClient <$> case tag of
PFWD_ -> PFWD <$> _smpP <*> smpP <*> (EncTransmission . unTail <$> smpP)
PRXY_ -> PRXY <$> _smpP <*> smpP
CT SNotifier NSUB_ -> pure $ Cmd SNotifier NSUB
fromProtocolError = fromProtocolError @SMPVersion @ErrorType @BrokerMsg
@@ -1204,6 +1364,9 @@ instance ProtocolEncoding SMPVersion ErrorType BrokerMsg where
e (MSG_, ' ', msgId, Tail body)
NID nId srvNtfDh -> e (NID_, ' ', nId, srvNtfDh)
NMSG nmsgNonce encNMsgMeta -> e (NMSG_, ' ', nmsgNonce, encNMsgMeta)
PKEY sid vr (cert, key) -> e (PKEY_, ' ', sid, vr, C.encodeCertChain cert, C.SignedObject key)
RRES (EncFwdResponse encBlock) -> e (RRES_, ' ', Tail encBlock)
PRES (EncResponse encBlock) -> e (PRES_, ' ', Tail encBlock)
END -> e END_
OK -> e OK_
ERR err -> e (ERR_, ' ', err)
@@ -1221,6 +1384,9 @@ instance ProtocolEncoding SMPVersion ErrorType BrokerMsg where
IDS_ -> IDS <$> (QIK <$> _smpP <*> smpP <*> smpP)
NID_ -> NID <$> _smpP <*> smpP
NMSG_ -> NMSG <$> _smpP <*> smpP
PKEY_ -> PKEY <$> _smpP <*> smpP <*> ((,) <$> C.certChainP <*> (C.getSignedExact <$> smpP))
RRES_ -> RRES <$> (EncFwdResponse . unTail <$> _smpP)
PRES_ -> PRES <$> (EncResponse . unTail <$> _smpP)
END_ -> pure END
OK_ -> pure OK
ERR_ -> ERR <$> _smpP
@@ -1233,19 +1399,24 @@ instance ProtocolEncoding SMPVersion ErrorType BrokerMsg where
PEBlock -> BLOCK
{-# INLINE fromProtocolError #-}
checkCredentials (_, _, queueId, _) cmd = case cmd of
checkCredentials (_, _, entId, _) cmd = case cmd of
-- IDS response should not have queue ID
IDS _ -> Right cmd
-- ERR response does not always have queue ID
ERR _ -> Right cmd
-- PONG response must not have queue ID
PONG
| B.null queueId -> Right cmd
| otherwise -> Left $ CMD HAS_AUTH
PONG -> noEntityMsg
PKEY {} -> noEntityMsg
RRES _ -> noEntityMsg
-- other broker responses must have queue ID
_
| B.null queueId -> Left $ CMD NO_ENTITY
| B.null entId -> Left $ CMD NO_ENTITY
| otherwise -> Right cmd
where
noEntityMsg :: Either ErrorType BrokerMsg
noEntityMsg
| B.null entId = Right cmd
| otherwise = Left $ CMD HAS_AUTH
-- | Parse SMP protocol commands and broker messages
parseProtocol :: forall v err msg. ProtocolEncoding v err msg => Version v -> ByteString -> Either err msg
@@ -1268,8 +1439,11 @@ instance Encoding ErrorType where
BLOCK -> "BLOCK"
SESSION -> "SESSION"
CMD err -> "CMD " <> smpEncode err
PROXY err -> "PROXY " <> smpEncode err
AUTH -> "AUTH"
CRYPTO -> "CRYPTO"
QUOTA -> "QUOTA"
EXPIRED -> "EXPIRED"
NO_MSG -> "NO_MSG"
LARGE_MSG -> "LARGE_MSG"
INTERNAL -> "INTERNAL"
@@ -1280,13 +1454,16 @@ instance Encoding ErrorType where
"BLOCK" -> pure BLOCK
"SESSION" -> pure SESSION
"CMD" -> CMD <$> _smpP
"PROXY" -> PROXY <$> _smpP
"AUTH" -> pure AUTH
"CRYPTO" -> pure CRYPTO
"QUOTA" -> pure QUOTA
"EXPIRED" -> pure EXPIRED
"NO_MSG" -> pure NO_MSG
"LARGE_MSG" -> pure LARGE_MSG
"INTERNAL" -> pure INTERNAL
"DUPLICATE_" -> pure DUPLICATE_
_ -> fail "bad error type"
_ -> fail "bad ErrorType"
instance Encoding CommandError where
smpEncode e = case e of
@@ -1304,8 +1481,74 @@ instance Encoding CommandError where
"NO_AUTH" -> pure NO_AUTH
"HAS_AUTH" -> pure HAS_AUTH
"NO_ENTITY" -> pure NO_ENTITY
"NO_QUEUE" -> pure NO_ENTITY
_ -> fail "bad command error type"
"NO_QUEUE" -> pure NO_ENTITY -- for backward compatibility
_ -> fail "bad CommandError"
instance Encoding ProxyError where
smpEncode = \case
PROTOCOL e -> "PROTOCOL " <> smpEncode e
BROKER e -> "BROKER " <> smpEncode e
BASIC_AUTH -> "BASIC_AUTH"
NO_SESSION -> "NO_SESSION"
smpP =
A.takeTill (== ' ') >>= \case
"PROTOCOL" -> PROTOCOL <$> _smpP
"BROKER" -> BROKER <$> _smpP
"BASIC_AUTH" -> pure BASIC_AUTH
"NO_SESSION" -> pure NO_SESSION
_ -> fail "bad ProxyError"
instance StrEncoding ProxyError where
strEncode = \case
PROTOCOL e -> "PROTOCOL " <> strEncode e
BROKER e -> "BROKER " <> strEncode e
BASIC_AUTH -> "BASIC_AUTH"
NO_SESSION -> "NO_SESSION"
strP =
A.takeTill (== ' ') >>= \case
"PROTOCOL" -> PROTOCOL <$> _strP
"BROKER" -> BROKER <$> _strP
"BASIC_AUTH" -> pure BASIC_AUTH
"NO_SESSION" -> pure NO_SESSION
_ -> fail "bad ProxyError"
instance Encoding BrokerErrorType where
smpEncode = \case
RESPONSE e -> "RESPONSE " <> smpEncode e
UNEXPECTED e -> "UNEXPECTED " <> smpEncode e
TRANSPORT e -> "TRANSPORT " <> smpEncode e
NETWORK -> "NETWORK"
TIMEOUT -> "TIMEOUT"
HOST -> "HOST"
smpP =
A.takeTill (== ' ') >>= \case
"RESPONSE" -> RESPONSE <$> _smpP
"UNEXPECTED" -> UNEXPECTED <$> _smpP
"TRANSPORT" -> TRANSPORT <$> _smpP
"NETWORK" -> pure NETWORK
"TIMEOUT" -> pure TIMEOUT
"HOST" -> pure HOST
_ -> fail "bad BrokerErrorType"
instance StrEncoding BrokerErrorType where
strEncode = \case
RESPONSE e -> "RESPONSE " <> encodeUtf8 (T.pack e)
UNEXPECTED e -> "UNEXPECTED " <> encodeUtf8 (T.pack e)
TRANSPORT e -> "TRANSPORT " <> smpEncode e
NETWORK -> "NETWORK"
TIMEOUT -> "TIMEOUT"
HOST -> "HOST"
strP =
A.takeTill (== ' ') >>= \case
"RESPONSE" -> RESPONSE <$> _textP
"UNEXPECTED" -> UNEXPECTED <$> _textP
"TRANSPORT" -> TRANSPORT <$> _smpP
"NETWORK" -> pure NETWORK
"TIMEOUT" -> pure TIMEOUT
"HOST" -> pure HOST
_ -> fail "bad BrokerErrorType"
where
_textP = A.space *> (T.unpack . safeDecodeUtf8 <$> A.takeByteString)
-- | Send signed SMP transmission to TCP transport.
tPut :: Transport c => THandle v c p -> NonEmpty (Either TransportError SentRawTransmission) -> IO [Either TransportError ()]
@@ -1444,4 +1687,7 @@ $(J.deriveJSON defaultJSON ''MsgFlags)
$(J.deriveJSON (sumTypeJSON id) ''CommandError)
$(J.deriveJSON (sumTypeJSON id) ''ErrorType)
$(J.deriveJSON (sumTypeJSON id) ''BrokerErrorType)
-- run deriveJSON in one TH splice to allow mutual instance
$(concat <$> mapM @[] (J.deriveJSON (sumTypeJSON id)) [''ProxyError, ''ErrorType])
src/Simplex/Messaging/Server.hs
+143 -31
View File
@@ -13,7 +13,6 @@
{-# LANGUAGE RankNTypes #-}
{-# LANGUAGE ScopedTypeVariables #-}
{-# LANGUAGE TupleSections #-}
{-# LANGUAGE TypeApplications #-}
-- |
-- Module : Simplex.Messaging.Server
@@ -43,6 +42,7 @@ import Control.Monad
import Control.Monad.Except
import Control.Monad.IO.Unlift
import Control.Monad.Reader
import Control.Monad.Trans.Except
import Crypto.Random
import Data.Bifunctor (first)
import Data.ByteString.Base64 (encode)
@@ -54,7 +54,7 @@ import Data.Functor (($>))
import Data.Int (Int64)
import qualified Data.IntMap.Strict as IM
import Data.List (intercalate, mapAccumR)
import Data.List.NonEmpty (NonEmpty)
import Data.List.NonEmpty (NonEmpty (..))
import qualified Data.List.NonEmpty as L
import qualified Data.Map.Strict as M
import Data.Maybe (isNothing)
@@ -68,8 +68,10 @@ import GHC.Stats (getRTSStats)
import GHC.TypeLits (KnownNat)
import Network.Socket (ServiceName, Socket, socketToHandle)
import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Lock
import Simplex.Messaging.Client (ProtocolClient (thParams), ProtocolClientError (..), forwardSMPMessage, smpProxyError)
import Simplex.Messaging.Client.Agent (SMPClientAgent (..), SMPClientAgentEvent (..), getSMPServerClient', lookupSMPServerClient)
import qualified Simplex.Messaging.Crypto as C
import Simplex.Messaging.Encoding (Encoding (smpEncode))
import Simplex.Messaging.Encoding
import Simplex.Messaging.Encoding.String
import Simplex.Messaging.Protocol
import Simplex.Messaging.Server.Control
@@ -87,10 +89,12 @@ import Simplex.Messaging.Transport
import Simplex.Messaging.Transport.Buffer (trimCR)
import Simplex.Messaging.Transport.Server
import Simplex.Messaging.Util
import Simplex.Messaging.Version
import System.Exit (exitFailure)
import System.IO (hPrint, hPutStrLn, hSetNewlineMode, universalNewlineMode)
import System.Mem.Weak (deRefWeak)
import UnliftIO (timeout)
import UnliftIO.Async (mapConcurrently)
import UnliftIO.Concurrent
import UnliftIO.Directory (doesFileExist, renameFile)
import UnliftIO.Exception
@@ -123,11 +127,13 @@ type M a = ReaderT Env IO a
smpServer :: TMVar Bool -> ServerConfig -> M ()
smpServer started cfg@ServerConfig {transports, transportConfig = tCfg} = do
s <- asks server
pa <- asks proxyAgent
expired <- restoreServerMessages
restoreServerStats expired
raceAny_
( serverThread s "server subscribedQ" subscribedQ subscribers subscriptions cancelSub
: serverThread s "server ntfSubscribedQ" ntfSubscribedQ Env.notifiers ntfSubscriptions (\_ -> pure ())
: receiveFromProxyAgent pa
: map runServer transports <> expireMessagesThread_ cfg <> serverStatsThread_ cfg <> controlPortThread_ cfg
)
`finally` withLock' (savingLock s) "final" (saveServer False)
@@ -180,6 +186,19 @@ smpServer started cfg@ServerConfig {transports, transportConfig = tCfg} = do
mkWeakThreadId t >>= atomically . modifyTVar' (endThreads c) . IM.insert tId
atomically $ TM.lookupDelete qId (clientSubs c)
receiveFromProxyAgent :: ProxyAgent -> M ()
receiveFromProxyAgent ProxyAgent {smpAgent = SMPClientAgent {agentQ}} =
forever $
atomically (readTBQueue agentQ) >>= \case
CAConnected srv -> logInfo $ "SMP server connected " <> showServer' srv
CADisconnected srv [] -> logInfo $ "SMP server disconnected " <> showServer' srv
CADisconnected srv subs -> logError $ "SMP server disconnected " <> showServer' srv <> " / subscriptions: " <> tshow (length subs)
CAReconnected srv -> logInfo $ "SMP server reconnected " <> showServer' srv
CAResubscribed srv subs -> logError $ "SMP server resubscribed " <> showServer' srv <> " / subscriptions: " <> tshow (length subs)
CASubError srv errs -> logError $ "SMP server subscription errors " <> showServer' srv <> " / errors: " <> tshow (length errs)
where
showServer' = decodeLatin1 . strEncode . host
expireMessagesThread_ :: ServerConfig -> [M ()]
expireMessagesThread_ ServerConfig {messageExpiration = Just msgExp} = [expireMessages msgExp]
expireMessagesThread_ _ = []
@@ -315,7 +334,7 @@ smpServer started cfg@ServerConfig {transports, transportConfig = tCfg} = do
CPResume -> withAdminRole $ hPutStrLn h "resume not implemented"
CPClients -> withAdminRole $ do
active <- unliftIO u (asks clients) >>= readTVarIO
hPutStrLn h $ "clientId,sessionId,connected,createdAt,rcvActiveAt,sndActiveAt,age,subscriptions"
hPutStrLn h "clientId,sessionId,connected,createdAt,rcvActiveAt,sndActiveAt,age,subscriptions"
forM_ (IM.toList active) $ \(cid, Client {sessionId, connected, createdAt, rcvActiveAt, sndActiveAt, subscriptions}) -> do
connected' <- bshow <$> readTVarIO connected
rcvActiveAt' <- strEncode <$> readTVarIO rcvActiveAt
@@ -411,7 +430,7 @@ smpServer started cfg@ServerConfig {transports, transportConfig = tCfg} = do
hPutStrLn h "AUTH"
runClientTransport :: Transport c => THandleSMP c 'TServer -> M ()
runClientTransport h@THandle {params = THandleParams {thVersion, sessionId}} = do
runClientTransport h@THandle {params = thParams@THandleParams {thVersion, sessionId}} = do
q <- asks $ tbqSize . config
ts <- liftIO getSystemTime
active <- asks clients
@@ -424,7 +443,7 @@ runClientTransport h@THandle {params = THandleParams {thVersion, sessionId}} = d
expCfg <- asks $ inactiveClientExpiration . config
th <- newMVar h -- put TH under a fair lock to interleave messages and command responses
labelMyThread . B.unpack $ "client $" <> encode sessionId
raceAny_ ([liftIO $ send th c, liftIO $ sendMsg th c, client c s, receive h c] <> disconnectThread_ c expCfg)
raceAny_ ([liftIO $ send th c, liftIO $ sendMsg th c, client thParams c s, receive h c] <> disconnectThread_ c expCfg)
`finally` clientDisconnected c
where
disconnectThread_ c (Just expCfg) = [liftIO $ disconnectTransport h (rcvActiveAt c) (sndActiveAt c) expCfg (noSubscriptions c)]
@@ -465,19 +484,19 @@ receive h@THandle {params = THandleParams {thAuth}} Client {rcvQ, sndQ, rcvActiv
forever $ do
ts <- L.toList <$> liftIO (tGet h)
atomically . writeTVar rcvActiveAt =<< liftIO getSystemTime
as <- partitionEithers <$> mapM cmdAction ts
write sndQ $ fst as
write rcvQ $ snd as
(errs, cmds) <- partitionEithers <$> mapM cmdAction ts
write sndQ errs
write rcvQ cmds
where
cmdAction :: SignedTransmission ErrorType Cmd -> M (Either (Transmission BrokerMsg) (Maybe QueueRec, Transmission Cmd))
cmdAction (tAuth, authorized, (corrId, queueId, cmdOrError)) =
cmdAction (tAuth, authorized, (corrId, entId, cmdOrError)) =
case cmdOrError of
Left e -> pure $ Left (corrId, queueId, ERR e)
Right cmd -> verified <$> verifyTransmission ((,C.cbNonce (bs corrId)) <$> thAuth) tAuth authorized queueId cmd
Left e -> pure $ Left (corrId, entId, ERR e)
Right cmd -> verified <$> verifyTransmission ((,C.cbNonce (bs corrId)) <$> thAuth) tAuth authorized entId cmd
where
verified = \case
VRVerified qr -> Right (qr, (corrId, queueId, cmd))
VRFailed -> Left (corrId, queueId, ERR AUTH)
VRVerified qr -> Right (qr, (corrId, entId, cmd))
VRFailed -> Left (corrId, entId, ERR AUTH)
write q = mapM_ (atomically . writeTBQueue q) . L.nonEmpty
send :: Transport c => MVar (THandleSMP c 'TServer) -> Client -> IO ()
@@ -545,16 +564,18 @@ verifyTransmission auth_ tAuth authorized queueId cmd =
-- SEND will be accepted without authorization before the queue is secured with KEY command
Cmd SSender SEND {} -> verifyQueue (\q -> Just q `verified` maybe (isNothing tAuth) verify (senderKey q)) <$> get SSender
Cmd SSender PING -> pure $ VRVerified Nothing
Cmd SSender RFWD {} -> pure $ VRVerified Nothing
-- NSUB will not be accepted without authorization
Cmd SNotifier NSUB -> verifyQueue (\q -> maybe dummyVerify (Just q `verifiedWith`) (notifierKey <$> notifier q)) <$> get SNotifier
Cmd SNotifier NSUB -> verifyQueue (\q -> maybe dummyVerify (\n -> Just q `verifiedWith` notifierKey n) (notifier q)) <$> get SNotifier
Cmd SProxiedClient _ -> pure $ VRVerified Nothing
where
verify = verifyCmdAuthorization auth_ tAuth authorized
dummyVerify = verify (dummyAuthKey tAuth) `seq` VRFailed
verifyQueue :: (QueueRec -> VerificationResult) -> Either ErrorType QueueRec -> VerificationResult
verifyQueue = either (\_ -> dummyVerify)
verifyQueue = either (const dummyVerify)
verified q cond = if cond then VRVerified q else VRFailed
verifiedWith q k = q `verified` verify k
get :: SParty p -> M (Either ErrorType QueueRec)
get :: DirectParty p => SParty p -> M (Either ErrorType QueueRec)
get party = do
st <- asks queueStore
atomically $ getQueue st party queueId
@@ -604,25 +625,65 @@ dummyKeyEd448 = "MEMwBQYDK2VxAzoA6ibQc9XpkSLtwrf7PLvp81qW/etiumckVFImCMRdftcG/Xo
dummyKeyX25519 :: C.PublicKey 'C.X25519
dummyKeyX25519 = "MCowBQYDK2VuAyEA4JGSMYht18H4mas/jHeBwfcM7jLwNYJNOAhi2/g4RXg="
client :: Client -> Server -> M ()
client clnt@Client {subscriptions, ntfSubscriptions, rcvQ, sndQ, sessionId} Server {subscribedQ, ntfSubscribedQ, notifiers} = do
client :: THandleParams SMPVersion 'TServer -> Client -> Server -> M ()
client thParams' clnt@Client {subscriptions, ntfSubscriptions, rcvQ, sndQ, sessionId} Server {subscribedQ, ntfSubscribedQ, notifiers} = do
labelMyThread . B.unpack $ "client $" <> encode sessionId <> " commands"
forever $
atomically (readTBQueue rcvQ)
>>= mapM processCommand
>>= atomically . writeTBQueue sndQ
forever $ do
(proxied, rs) <- partitionEithers . L.toList <$> (mapM processCommand =<< atomically (readTBQueue rcvQ))
forM_ (L.nonEmpty rs) reply
-- TODO cancel this thread if the client gets disconnected
-- TODO limit client concurrency
forM_ (L.nonEmpty proxied) $ \cmds -> forkIO $ mapConcurrently processProxiedCmd cmds >>= reply
where
processCommand :: (Maybe QueueRec, Transmission Cmd) -> M (Transmission BrokerMsg)
reply :: MonadIO m => NonEmpty (Transmission BrokerMsg) -> m ()
reply = atomically . writeTBQueue sndQ
processProxiedCmd :: Transmission (Command 'ProxiedClient) -> M (Transmission BrokerMsg)
processProxiedCmd (corrId, sessId, command) = (corrId, sessId,) <$> case command of
PRXY srv auth -> ifM allowProxy getRelay (pure $ ERR $ PROXY BASIC_AUTH)
where
allowProxy = do
ServerConfig {allowSMPProxy, newQueueBasicAuth} <- asks config
pure $ allowSMPProxy && maybe True ((== auth) . Just) newQueueBasicAuth
getRelay = do
ProxyAgent {smpAgent} <- asks proxyAgent
liftIO $ proxyResp <$> runExceptT (getSMPServerClient' smpAgent srv) `catch` (pure . Left . PCEIOError)
where
proxyResp = \case
Left err -> ERR $ smpProxyError err
Right smp ->
let THandleParams {sessionId = srvSessId, thVersion, thServerVRange, thAuth} = thParams smp
in case compatibleVRange thServerVRange proxiedSMPRelayVRange of
-- Cap the destination relay version range to prevent client version fingerprinting.
-- See comment for proxiedSMPRelayVersion.
Just (Compatible vr) | thVersion >= sendingProxySMPVersion -> case thAuth of
Just THAuthClient {serverCertKey} -> PKEY srvSessId vr serverCertKey
Nothing -> ERR $ transportErr TENoServerAuth
_ -> ERR $ transportErr TEVersion
PFWD fwdV pubKey encBlock -> do
ProxyAgent {smpAgent} <- asks proxyAgent
atomically (lookupSMPServerClient smpAgent sessId) >>= \case
Just smp
| v >= sendingProxySMPVersion ->
liftIO $ either (ERR . smpProxyError) PRES <$>
runExceptT (forwardSMPMessage smp corrId fwdV pubKey encBlock) `catchError` (pure . Left . PCEIOError)
| otherwise -> pure . ERR $ transportErr TEVersion
where
THandleParams {thVersion = v} = thParams smp
Nothing -> pure $ ERR $ PROXY NO_SESSION
transportErr :: TransportError -> ErrorType
transportErr = PROXY . BROKER . TRANSPORT
processCommand :: (Maybe QueueRec, Transmission Cmd) -> M (Either (Transmission (Command 'ProxiedClient)) (Transmission BrokerMsg))
processCommand (qr_, (corrId, queueId, cmd)) = do
st <- asks queueStore
case cmd of
Cmd SSender command ->
case command of
SEND flags msgBody -> withQueue $ \qr -> sendMessage qr flags msgBody
PING -> pure (corrId, "", PONG)
Cmd SNotifier NSUB -> subscribeNotifications
Cmd SProxiedClient command -> pure $ Left (corrId, queueId, command)
Cmd SSender command -> Right <$> case command of
SEND flags msgBody -> withQueue $ \qr -> sendMessage qr flags msgBody
PING -> pure (corrId, "", PONG)
RFWD encBlock -> (corrId, "",) <$> processForwardedCommand encBlock
Cmd SNotifier NSUB -> Right <$> subscribeNotifications
Cmd SRecipient command ->
case command of
Right <$> case command of
NEW rKey dhKey auth subMode ->
ifM
allowNew
@@ -828,7 +889,7 @@ client clnt@Client {subscriptions, ntfSubscriptions, rcvQ, sndQ, sessionId} Serv
sendMessage :: QueueRec -> MsgFlags -> MsgBody -> M (Transmission BrokerMsg)
sendMessage qr msgFlags msgBody
| B.length msgBody > maxMessageLength = pure $ err LARGE_MSG
| B.length msgBody > maxMessageLength thVersion = pure $ err LARGE_MSG
| otherwise = case status qr of
QueueOff -> return $ err AUTH
QueueActive ->
@@ -852,6 +913,7 @@ client clnt@Client {subscriptions, ntfSubscriptions, rcvQ, sndQ, sessionId} Serv
atomically $ updatePeriodStats (activeQueues stats) (recipientId qr)
pure ok
where
THandleParams {thVersion} = thParams'
mkMessage :: C.MaxLenBS MaxMessageLen -> M Message
mkMessage body = do
msgId <- randomId =<< asks (msgIdBytes . config)
@@ -886,6 +948,56 @@ client clnt@Client {subscriptions, ntfSubscriptions, rcvQ, sndQ, sessionId} Serv
encNMsgMeta = C.cbEncrypt rcvNtfDhSecret cbNonce (smpEncode msgMeta) 128
pure . (cbNonce,) $ fromRight "" encNMsgMeta
processForwardedCommand :: EncFwdTransmission -> M BrokerMsg
processForwardedCommand (EncFwdTransmission s) = fmap (either ERR id) . runExceptT $ do
THAuthServer {serverPrivKey, sessSecret'} <- maybe (throwE $ transportErr TENoServerAuth) pure (thAuth thParams')
sessSecret <- maybe (throwE $ transportErr TENoServerAuth) pure sessSecret'
let proxyNonce = C.cbNonce $ bs corrId
s' <- liftEitherWith (const CRYPTO) $ C.cbDecryptNoPad sessSecret proxyNonce s
FwdTransmission {fwdCorrId, fwdVersion, fwdKey, fwdTransmission = EncTransmission et} <- liftEitherWith (const $ CMD SYNTAX) $ smpDecode s'
let clientSecret = C.dh' fwdKey serverPrivKey
clientNonce = C.cbNonce $ bs fwdCorrId
b <- liftEitherWith (const CRYPTO) $ C.cbDecrypt clientSecret clientNonce et
let clntTHParams = smpTHParamsSetVersion fwdVersion thParams'
-- only allowing single forwarded transactions
t' <- case tParse clntTHParams b of
t :| [] -> pure $ tDecodeParseValidate clntTHParams t
_ -> throwE BLOCK
let clntThAuth = Just $ THAuthServer {serverPrivKey, sessSecret' = Just clientSecret}
-- process forwarded SEND
r <-
lift (rejectOrVerify clntThAuth t') >>= \case
Left r -> pure r
Right t''@(_, (corrId', entId', cmd')) -> case cmd' of
Cmd SSender SEND {} ->
-- Left will not be returned by processCommand, as only SEND command is allowed
fromRight (corrId', entId', ERR INTERNAL) <$> lift (processCommand t'')
_ ->
pure (corrId', entId', ERR $ CMD PROHIBITED)
-- encode response
r' <- case batchTransmissions (batch clntTHParams) (blockSize clntTHParams) [Right (Nothing, encodeTransmission clntTHParams r)] of
[] -> throwE INTERNAL -- at least 1 item is guaranteed from NonEmpty/Right
TBError _ _ : _ -> throwE BLOCK
TBTransmission b' _ : _ -> pure b'
TBTransmissions b' _ _ : _ -> pure b'
-- encrypt to client
r2 <- liftEitherWith (const BLOCK) $ EncResponse <$> C.cbEncrypt clientSecret (C.reverseNonce clientNonce) r' paddedProxiedMsgLength
-- encrypt to proxy
let fr = FwdResponse {fwdCorrId, fwdResponse = r2}
r3 = EncFwdResponse $ C.cbEncryptNoPad sessSecret (C.reverseNonce proxyNonce) (smpEncode fr)
pure $ RRES r3
where
rejectOrVerify :: Maybe (THandleAuth 'TServer) -> SignedTransmission ErrorType Cmd -> M (Either (Transmission BrokerMsg) (Maybe QueueRec, Transmission Cmd))
rejectOrVerify clntThAuth (tAuth, authorized, (corrId', entId', cmdOrError)) =
case cmdOrError of
Left e -> pure $ Left (corrId', entId', ERR e)
Right cmd'@(Cmd SSender SEND {}) -> verified <$> verifyTransmission ((,C.cbNonce (bs corrId')) <$> clntThAuth) tAuth authorized entId' cmd'
where
verified = \case
VRVerified qr -> Right (qr, (corrId', entId', cmd'))
VRFailed -> Left (corrId', entId', ERR AUTH)
Right _ -> pure $ Left (corrId', entId', ERR $ CMD PROHIBITED)
deliverMessage :: T.Text -> QueueRec -> RecipientId -> TVar Sub -> MsgQueue -> Maybe Message -> M (Transmission BrokerMsg)
deliverMessage name qr rId sub q msg_ = time (name <> " deliver") $ do
readTVarIO sub >>= \case
src/Simplex/Messaging/Server/Env/STM.hs
+23 -7
View File
@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@ import Network.Socket (ServiceName)
import qualified Network.TLS as T
import Numeric.Natural
import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Lock
import Simplex.Messaging.Client.Agent (SMPClientAgent, SMPClientAgentConfig, newSMPClientAgent)
import Simplex.Messaging.Crypto (KeyHash (..))
import qualified Simplex.Messaging.Crypto as C
import Simplex.Messaging.Protocol
@@ -79,7 +80,9 @@ data ServerConfig = ServerConfig
-- | TCP transport config
transportConfig :: TransportServerConfig,
-- | run listener on control port
controlPort :: Maybe ServiceName
controlPort :: Maybe ServiceName,
smpAgentCfg :: SMPClientAgentConfig,
allowSMPProxy :: Bool -- auth is the same with `newQueueBasicAuth`
}
defMsgExpirationDays :: Int64
@@ -110,8 +113,9 @@ data Env = Env
tlsServerParams :: T.ServerParams,
serverStats :: ServerStats,
sockets :: SocketState,
clientSeq :: TVar Int,
clients :: TVar (IntMap Client)
clientSeq :: TVar ClientId,
clients :: TVar (IntMap Client),
proxyAgent :: ProxyAgent -- senders served on this proxy
}
data Server = Server
@@ -122,8 +126,14 @@ data Server = Server
savingLock :: Lock
}
data ProxyAgent = ProxyAgent
{ smpAgent :: SMPClientAgent
}
type ClientId = Int
data Client = Client
{ clientId :: Int,
{ clientId :: ClientId,
subscriptions :: TMap RecipientId (TVar Sub),
ntfSubscriptions :: TMap NotifierId (),
rcvQ :: TBQueue (NonEmpty (Maybe QueueRec, Transmission Cmd)),
@@ -155,7 +165,7 @@ newServer = do
savingLock <- createLock
return Server {subscribedQ, subscribers, ntfSubscribedQ, notifiers, savingLock}
newClient :: TVar Int -> Natural -> VersionSMP -> ByteString -> SystemTime -> STM Client
newClient :: TVar ClientId -> Natural -> VersionSMP -> ByteString -> SystemTime -> STM Client
newClient nextClientId qSize thVersion sessionId createdAt = do
clientId <- stateTVar nextClientId $ \next -> (next, next + 1)
subscriptions <- TM.empty
@@ -176,7 +186,7 @@ newSubscription subThread = do
return Sub {subThread, delivered}
newEnv :: ServerConfig -> IO Env
newEnv config@ServerConfig {caCertificateFile, certificateFile, privateKeyFile, storeLogFile, transportConfig} = do
newEnv config@ServerConfig {caCertificateFile, certificateFile, privateKeyFile, storeLogFile, smpAgentCfg, transportConfig} = do
server <- atomically newServer
queueStore <- atomically newQueueStore
msgStore <- atomically newMsgStore
@@ -189,7 +199,8 @@ newEnv config@ServerConfig {caCertificateFile, certificateFile, privateKeyFile,
sockets <- atomically newSocketState
clientSeq <- newTVarIO 0
clients <- newTVarIO mempty
return Env {config, server, serverIdentity, queueStore, msgStore, random, storeLog, tlsServerParams, serverStats, sockets, clientSeq, clients}
proxyAgent <- atomically $ newSMPProxyAgent smpAgentCfg random
return Env {config, server, serverIdentity, queueStore, msgStore, random, storeLog, tlsServerParams, serverStats, sockets, clientSeq, clients, proxyAgent}
where
restoreQueues :: QueueStore -> FilePath -> IO (StoreLog 'WriteMode)
restoreQueues QueueStore {queues, senders, notifiers} f = do
@@ -205,3 +216,8 @@ newEnv config@ServerConfig {caCertificateFile, certificateFile, privateKeyFile,
addNotifier q = case notifier q of
Nothing -> id
Just NtfCreds {notifierId} -> M.insert notifierId (recipientId q)
newSMPProxyAgent :: SMPClientAgentConfig -> TVar ChaChaDRG -> STM ProxyAgent
newSMPProxyAgent smpAgentCfg random = do
smpAgent <- newSMPClientAgent smpAgentCfg random
pure ProxyAgent {smpAgent}
src/Simplex/Messaging/Server/Main.hs
+45 -4
View File
@@ -14,10 +14,13 @@ import qualified Data.ByteString.Char8 as B
import Data.Functor (($>))
import Data.Ini (lookupValue, readIniFile)
import Data.Maybe (fromMaybe)
import Data.Text (Text)
import qualified Data.Text as T
import Data.Text.Encoding (encodeUtf8)
import Network.Socket (HostName)
import Options.Applicative
import Simplex.Messaging.Client (HostMode (..), NetworkConfig (..), ProtocolClientConfig (..), SocksMode (..), defaultNetworkConfig)
import Simplex.Messaging.Client.Agent (SMPClientAgentConfig (..), defaultSMPClientAgentConfig)
import qualified Simplex.Messaging.Crypto as C
import Simplex.Messaging.Encoding.String
import Simplex.Messaging.Protocol (BasicAuth (..), ProtoServerWithAuth (ProtoServerWithAuth), pattern SMPServer)
@@ -25,10 +28,11 @@ import Simplex.Messaging.Server (runSMPServer)
import Simplex.Messaging.Server.CLI
import Simplex.Messaging.Server.Env.STM (ServerConfig (..), defMsgExpirationDays, defaultInactiveClientExpiration, defaultMessageExpiration)
import Simplex.Messaging.Server.Expiration
import Simplex.Messaging.Transport (simplexMQVersion, supportedSMPHandshakes, supportedServerSMPRelayVRange)
import Simplex.Messaging.Transport (batchCmdsSMPVersion, sendingProxySMPVersion, simplexMQVersion, supportedSMPHandshakes, supportedServerSMPRelayVRange)
import Simplex.Messaging.Transport.Client (TransportHost (..))
import Simplex.Messaging.Transport.Server (TransportServerConfig (..), defaultTransportServerConfig)
import Simplex.Messaging.Util (safeDecodeUtf8)
import Simplex.Messaging.Version (mkVersionRange)
import System.Directory (createDirectoryIfMissing, doesFileExist)
import System.FilePath (combine)
import System.IO (BufferMode (..), hSetBuffering, stderr, stdout)
@@ -129,7 +133,7 @@ smpServerCLI cfgPath logPath =
)
<> "\n\n\
\# control_port_admin_password:\n\
\# control_port_user_password:\n\
\# control_port_user_password:\n\n\
\[TRANSPORT]\n\
\# host is only used to print server address on start\n"
<> ("host: " <> host <> "\n")
@@ -137,6 +141,18 @@ smpServerCLI cfgPath logPath =
<> "log_tls_errors: off\n\
\websockets: off\n\
\# control_port: 5224\n\n\
\[PROXY]\n\
\# Network configuration for SMP proxy client.\n\
\# `host_mode` can be 'public' (default) or 'onion'.\n\
\# It defines prefferred hostname for destination servers with multiple hostnames.\n\
\# host_mode: public\n\
\# required_host_mode: off\n\n\
\# SOCKS proxy port for forwarding messages to destination servers.\n\
\# You may need a separate instance of SOCKS proxy for incoming single-hop requests.\n\
\# socks_proxy: localhost:9050\n\n\
\# `socks_mode` can be 'onion' for SOCKS proxy to be used for .onion destination hosts only (default)\n\
\# or 'always' to be used for all destination hosts (can be used if it is an .onion server).\n\
\# socks_mode: onion\n\n\
\[INACTIVE_CLIENTS]\n\
\# TTL and interval to check inactive clients\n\
\disconnect: off\n"
@@ -214,8 +230,34 @@ smpServerCLI cfgPath logPath =
{ logTLSErrors = fromMaybe False $ iniOnOff "TRANSPORT" "log_tls_errors" ini,
alpn = Just supportedSMPHandshakes
},
controlPort = either (const Nothing) (Just . T.unpack) $ lookupValue "TRANSPORT" "control_port" ini
controlPort = either (const Nothing) (Just . T.unpack) $ lookupValue "TRANSPORT" "control_port" ini,
smpAgentCfg =
defaultSMPClientAgentConfig
{ smpCfg =
(smpCfg defaultSMPClientAgentConfig)
{ serverVRange = mkVersionRange batchCmdsSMPVersion sendingProxySMPVersion,
agreeSecret = True,
networkConfig =
defaultNetworkConfig
{ socksProxy = either error id <$> strDecodeIni "PROXY" "socks_proxy" ini,
socksMode = either (const SMOnion) textToSocksMode $ lookupValue "PROXY" "socks_mode" ini,
hostMode = either (const HMPublic) textToHostMode $ lookupValue "PROXY" "host_mode" ini,
requiredHostMode = fromMaybe False $ iniOnOff "PROXY" "required_host_mode" ini
}
}
},
allowSMPProxy = True
}
textToSocksMode :: Text -> SocksMode
textToSocksMode = \case
"always" -> SMAlways
"onion" -> SMOnion
s -> error . T.unpack $ "Invalid socks_mode: " <> s
textToHostMode :: Text -> HostMode
textToHostMode = \case
"public" -> HMPublic
"onion" -> HMOnionViaSocks
s -> error . T.unpack $ "Invalid host_mode: " <> s
data CliCommand
= Init InitOptions
@@ -306,4 +348,3 @@ cliCommandP cfgPath logPath iniFile =
pure InitOptions {enableStoreLog, logStats, signAlgorithm, ip, fqdn, password, scripted}
parseBasicAuth :: ReadM ServerPassword
parseBasicAuth = eitherReader $ fmap ServerPassword . strDecode . B.pack
src/Simplex/Messaging/Server/QueueStore/STM.hs
+1 -1
View File
@@ -54,7 +54,7 @@ addQueue QueueStore {queues, senders} q@QueueRec {recipientId = rId, senderId =
where
hasId = (||) <$> TM.member rId queues <*> TM.member sId senders
getQueue :: QueueStore -> SParty p -> QueueId -> STM (Either ErrorType QueueRec)
getQueue :: DirectParty p => QueueStore -> SParty p -> QueueId -> STM (Either ErrorType QueueRec)
getQueue QueueStore {queues, senders, notifiers} party qId =
toResult <$> (mapM readTVar =<< getVar)
where
src/Simplex/Messaging/Transport.hs
+78 -41
View File
@@ -36,6 +36,7 @@ module Simplex.Messaging.Transport
supportedSMPHandshakes,
supportedClientSMPRelayVRange,
supportedServerSMPRelayVRange,
proxiedSMPRelayVRange,
legacyServerSMPRelayVRange,
currentClientSMPRelayVersion,
legacyServerSMPRelayVersion,
@@ -44,6 +45,7 @@ module Simplex.Messaging.Transport
basicAuthSMPVersion,
subModeSMPVersion,
authCmdsSMPVersion,
sendingProxySMPVersion,
simplexMQVersion,
smpBlockSize,
TransportConfig (..),
@@ -74,14 +76,13 @@ module Simplex.Messaging.Transport
smpClientHandshake,
tPutBlock,
tGetBlock,
serializeTransportError,
transportErrorP,
sendHandshake,
getHandshake,
smpTHParamsSetVersion,
)
where
import Control.Applicative (optional, (<|>))
import Control.Applicative (optional)
import Control.Monad (forM)
import Control.Monad.Except
import Control.Monad.Trans.Except (throwE)
@@ -152,14 +153,25 @@ subModeSMPVersion = VersionSMP 6
authCmdsSMPVersion :: VersionSMP
authCmdsSMPVersion = VersionSMP 7
sendingProxySMPVersion :: VersionSMP
sendingProxySMPVersion = VersionSMP 8
currentClientSMPRelayVersion :: VersionSMP
currentClientSMPRelayVersion = VersionSMP 7
currentClientSMPRelayVersion = VersionSMP 8
legacyServerSMPRelayVersion :: VersionSMP
legacyServerSMPRelayVersion = VersionSMP 6
currentServerSMPRelayVersion :: VersionSMP
currentServerSMPRelayVersion = VersionSMP 7
currentServerSMPRelayVersion = VersionSMP 8
-- Max SMP protocol version to be used in e2e encrypted
-- connection between client and server, as defined by SMP proxy.
-- SMP proxy sets it to lower than its current version
-- to prevent client version fingerprinting by the
-- destination relays when clients upgrade at different times.
proxiedSMPRelayVersion :: VersionSMP
proxiedSMPRelayVersion = VersionSMP 8
-- minimal supported protocol version is 4
-- TODO remove code that supports sending commands without batching
@@ -172,6 +184,10 @@ legacyServerSMPRelayVRange = mkVersionRange batchCmdsSMPVersion legacyServerSMPR
supportedServerSMPRelayVRange :: VersionRangeSMP
supportedServerSMPRelayVRange = mkVersionRange batchCmdsSMPVersion currentServerSMPRelayVersion
-- This range initially allows only version 8 - see the comment above.
proxiedSMPRelayVRange :: VersionRangeSMP
proxiedSMPRelayVRange = mkVersionRange sendingProxySMPVersion proxiedSMPRelayVersion
supportedSMPHandshakes :: [ALPN]
supportedSMPHandshakes = ["smp/1"]
@@ -338,6 +354,8 @@ type THandleSMP c p = THandle SMPVersion c p
data THandleParams v p = THandleParams
{ sessionId :: SessionId,
blockSize :: Int,
-- | server protocol version range
thServerVRange :: VersionRange v,
-- | agreed server protocol version
thVersion :: Version v,
-- | peer public key for command authorization and shared secrets for entity ID encryption
@@ -370,6 +388,7 @@ data ServerHandshake = ServerHandshake
{ smpVersionRange :: VersionRangeSMP,
sessionId :: SessionId,
-- pub key to agree shared secrets for command authorization and entity ID encryption.
-- todo C.PublicKeyX25519
authPubKey :: Maybe (X.CertificateChain, X.SignedExact X.PubKey)
}
@@ -421,6 +440,8 @@ authEncryptCmdsP v p = if v >= authCmdsSMPVersion then optional p else pure Noth
data TransportError
= -- | error parsing transport block
TEBadBlock
| -- | incompatible client or server version
TEVersion
| -- | message does not fit in transport block
TELargeMsg
| -- | incorrect session ID
@@ -436,31 +457,29 @@ data TransportError
data HandshakeError
= -- | parsing error
PARSE
| -- | incompatible peer version
VERSION
| -- | incorrect server identity
IDENTITY
| -- | v7 authentication failed
BAD_AUTH
deriving (Eq, Read, Show, Exception)
-- | SMP encrypted transport error parser.
transportErrorP :: Parser TransportError
transportErrorP =
"BLOCK" $> TEBadBlock
<|> "LARGE_MSG" $> TELargeMsg
<|> "SESSION" $> TEBadSession
<|> "NO_AUTH" $> TENoServerAuth
<|> "HANDSHAKE " *> (TEHandshake <$> parseRead1)
-- | Serialize SMP encrypted transport error.
serializeTransportError :: TransportError -> ByteString
serializeTransportError = \case
TEBadBlock -> "BLOCK"
TELargeMsg -> "LARGE_MSG"
TEBadSession -> "SESSION"
TENoServerAuth -> "NO_AUTH"
TEHandshake e -> "HANDSHAKE " <> bshow e
instance Encoding TransportError where
smpP =
A.takeTill (== ' ') >>= \case
"BLOCK" -> pure TEBadBlock
"VERSION" -> pure TEVersion
"LARGE_MSG" -> pure TELargeMsg
"SESSION" -> pure TEBadSession
"NO_AUTH" -> pure TENoServerAuth
"HANDSHAKE" -> TEHandshake <$> (A.space *> parseRead1)
_ -> fail "bad TransportError"
smpEncode = \case
TEBadBlock -> "BLOCK"
TEVersion -> "VERSION"
TELargeMsg -> "LARGE_MSG"
TEBadSession -> "SESSION"
TENoServerAuth -> "NO_AUTH"
TEHandshake e -> "HANDSHAKE " <> bshow e
-- | Pad and send block to SMP transport.
tPutBlock :: Transport c => THandle v c p -> ByteString -> IO (Either TransportError ())
@@ -490,9 +509,10 @@ smpServerHandshake serverSignKey c (k, pk) kh smpVRange = do
ClientHandshake {smpVersion = v, keyHash, authPubKey = k'}
| keyHash /= kh ->
throwE $ TEHandshake IDENTITY
| v `isCompatible` smpVersionRange ->
pure $ smpThHandleServer th v pk k'
| otherwise -> throwE $ TEHandshake VERSION
| otherwise ->
case compatibleVRange' smpVersionRange v of
Just (Compatible vr) -> pure $ smpTHandleServer th v vr pk k'
Nothing -> throwE TEVersion
-- | Client SMP transport handshake.
--
@@ -503,8 +523,8 @@ smpClientHandshake c ks_ keyHash@(C.KeyHash kh) smpVRange = do
ServerHandshake {sessionId = sessId, smpVersionRange, authPubKey} <- getHandshake th
if sessionId /= sessId
then throwE TEBadSession
else case smpVersionRange `compatibleVersion` smpVRange of
Just (Compatible v) -> do
else case smpVersionRange `compatibleVRange` smpVRange of
Just (Compatible vr) -> do
ck_ <- forM authPubKey $ \certKey@(X.CertificateChain cert, exact) ->
liftEitherWith (const $ TEHandshake BAD_AUTH) $ do
case cert of
@@ -513,26 +533,33 @@ smpClientHandshake c ks_ keyHash@(C.KeyHash kh) smpVRange = do
serverKey <- getServerVerifyKey c
pubKey <- C.verifyX509 serverKey exact
(,certKey) <$> (C.x509ToPublic (pubKey, []) >>= C.pubKey)
let v = maxVersion vr
sendHandshake th $ ClientHandshake {smpVersion = v, keyHash, authPubKey = fst <$> ks_}
pure $ smpThHandleClient th v (snd <$> ks_) ck_
Nothing -> throwE $ TEHandshake VERSION
pure $ smpTHandleClient th v vr (snd <$> ks_) ck_
Nothing -> throwE TEVersion
smpThHandleServer :: forall c. THandleSMP c 'TServer -> VersionSMP -> C.PrivateKeyX25519 -> Maybe C.PublicKeyX25519 -> THandleSMP c 'TServer
smpThHandleServer th v pk k_ =
smpTHandleServer :: forall c. THandleSMP c 'TServer -> VersionSMP -> VersionRangeSMP -> C.PrivateKeyX25519 -> Maybe C.PublicKeyX25519 -> THandleSMP c 'TServer
smpTHandleServer th v vr pk k_ =
let thAuth = THAuthServer {serverPrivKey = pk, sessSecret' = (`C.dh'` pk) <$> k_}
in smpThHandle_ th v (Just thAuth)
in smpTHandle_ th v vr (Just thAuth)
smpThHandleClient :: forall c. THandleSMP c 'TClient -> VersionSMP -> Maybe C.PrivateKeyX25519 -> Maybe (C.PublicKeyX25519, (X.CertificateChain, X.SignedExact X.PubKey)) -> THandleSMP c 'TClient
smpThHandleClient th v pk_ ck_ =
smpTHandleClient :: forall c. THandleSMP c 'TClient -> VersionSMP -> VersionRangeSMP -> Maybe C.PrivateKeyX25519 -> Maybe (C.PublicKeyX25519, (X.CertificateChain, X.SignedExact X.PubKey)) -> THandleSMP c 'TClient
smpTHandleClient th v vr pk_ ck_ =
let thAuth = (\(k, ck) -> THAuthClient {serverPeerPubKey = k, serverCertKey = ck, sessSecret = C.dh' k <$> pk_}) <$> ck_
in smpThHandle_ th v thAuth
in smpTHandle_ th v vr thAuth
smpThHandle_ :: forall c p. THandleSMP c p -> VersionSMP -> Maybe (THandleAuth p) -> THandleSMP c p
smpThHandle_ th@THandle {params} v thAuth =
smpTHandle_ :: forall c p. THandleSMP c p -> VersionSMP -> VersionRangeSMP -> Maybe (THandleAuth p) -> THandleSMP c p
smpTHandle_ th@THandle {params} v vr thAuth =
-- TODO drop SMP v6: make thAuth non-optional
let params' = params {thVersion = v, thAuth, implySessId = v >= authCmdsSMPVersion}
let params' = params {thVersion = v, thServerVRange = vr, thAuth, implySessId = v >= authCmdsSMPVersion}
in (th :: THandleSMP c p) {params = params'}
-- This function is only used with v >= 8, so currently it's a simple record update.
-- It may require some parameters update in the future, to be consistent with smpTHandle_.
smpTHParamsSetVersion :: VersionSMP -> THandleParams SMPVersion p -> THandleParams SMPVersion p
smpTHParamsSetVersion v params = params {thVersion = v}
{-# INLINE smpTHParamsSetVersion #-}
sendHandshake :: (Transport c, Encoding smp) => THandle v c p -> smp -> ExceptT TransportError IO ()
sendHandshake th = ExceptT . tPutBlock th . smpEncode
@@ -543,7 +570,17 @@ getHandshake th = ExceptT $ (first (\_ -> TEHandshake PARSE) . A.parseOnly smpP
smpTHandle :: Transport c => c -> THandleSMP c p
smpTHandle c = THandle {connection = c, params}
where
params = THandleParams {sessionId = tlsUnique c, blockSize = smpBlockSize, thVersion = VersionSMP 0, thAuth = Nothing, implySessId = False, batch = True}
v = VersionSMP 0
params =
THandleParams
{ sessionId = tlsUnique c,
blockSize = smpBlockSize,
thServerVRange = versionToRange v,
thVersion = v,
thAuth = Nothing,
implySessId = False,
batch = True
}
$(J.deriveJSON (sumTypeJSON id) ''HandshakeError)
src/Simplex/Messaging/Version.hs
+23
View File
@@ -23,6 +23,8 @@ module Simplex.Messaging.Version
isCompatibleRange,
proveCompatible,
compatibleVersion,
compatibleVRange,
compatibleVRange',
)
where
@@ -98,6 +100,7 @@ class VersionScope v => VersionI v a | a -> v where
class VersionScope v => VersionRangeI v a | a -> v where
type VersionT v a
versionRange :: a -> VersionRange v
toVersionRange :: a -> VersionRange v -> a
toVersionT :: a -> Version v -> VersionT v a
instance VersionScope v => VersionI v (Version v) where
@@ -108,6 +111,7 @@ instance VersionScope v => VersionI v (Version v) where
instance VersionScope v => VersionRangeI v (VersionRange v) where
type VersionT v (VersionRange v) = Version v
versionRange = id
toVersionRange _ vr = vr
toVersionT _ v = v
newtype Compatible a = Compatible_ a
@@ -135,5 +139,24 @@ compatibleVersion x vr =
max1 = maxVersion $ versionRange x
max2 = maxVersion vr
-- | intersection of version ranges
compatibleVRange :: VersionRangeI v a => a -> VersionRange v -> Maybe (Compatible a)
compatibleVRange x vr =
compatibleVRange_ x (max min1 min2) (min max1 max2)
where
VRange min1 max1 = versionRange x
VRange min2 max2 = vr
-- | version range capped by compatible version
compatibleVRange' :: VersionRangeI v a => a -> Version v -> Maybe (Compatible a)
compatibleVRange' x v
| v <= max1 = compatibleVRange_ x min1 v
| otherwise = Nothing
where
VRange min1 max1 = versionRange x
compatibleVRange_ :: VersionRangeI v a => a -> Version v -> Version v -> Maybe (Compatible a)
compatibleVRange_ x v1 v2 = Compatible_ . toVersionRange x <$> safeVersionRange v1 v2
mkCompatibleIf :: a -> Bool -> Maybe (Compatible a)
x `mkCompatibleIf` cond = if cond then Just $ Compatible_ x else Nothing
tests/AgentTests.hs
+4 -4
View File
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ module AgentTests (agentTests) where
import AgentTests.ConnectionRequestTests
import AgentTests.DoubleRatchetTests (doubleRatchetTests)
import AgentTests.FunctionalAPITests (functionalAPITests, inAnyOrder, pattern Msg, pattern Msg')
import AgentTests.FunctionalAPITests (functionalAPITests, inAnyOrder, pattern Msg, pattern Msg', pattern SENT)
import AgentTests.MigrationTests (migrationTests)
import AgentTests.NotificationTests (notificationTests)
import AgentTests.SQLiteTests (storeTests)
@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ import GHC.Stack (withFrozenCallStack)
import Network.HTTP.Types (urlEncode)
import SMPAgentClient
import SMPClient (testKeyHash, testPort, testPort2, testStoreLogFile, withSmpServer, withSmpServerStoreLogOn)
import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Protocol hiding (CONF, INFO, MID, REQ)
import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Protocol hiding (CONF, INFO, MID, REQ, SENT)
import qualified Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Protocol as A
import Simplex.Messaging.Crypto.Ratchet (InitialKeys (..), PQEncryption (..), PQSupport (..), pattern IKPQOff, pattern IKPQOn, pattern PQEncOn, pattern PQSupportOff, pattern PQSupportOn)
import qualified Simplex.Messaging.Crypto.Ratchet as CR
@@ -429,8 +429,8 @@ testServerConnectionAfterError t _ = do
bob #: ("1", "alice", "SUB") =#> \("1", "alice", ERR (BROKER _ e)) -> e == NETWORK || e == TIMEOUT
alice #: ("1", "bob", "SUB") =#> \("1", "bob", ERR (BROKER _ e)) -> e == NETWORK || e == TIMEOUT
withServer $ do
alice <#=? \case ("", "bob", APC _ (SENT 4)) -> True; ("", "", APC _ (UP s ["bob"])) -> s == server; _ -> False
alice <#=? \case ("", "bob", APC _ (SENT 4)) -> True; ("", "", APC _ (UP s ["bob"])) -> s == server; _ -> False
alice <#=? \case ("", "bob", APC SAEConn (SENT 4)) -> True; ("", "", APC _ (UP s ["bob"])) -> s == server; _ -> False
alice <#=? \case ("", "bob", APC SAEConn (SENT 4)) -> True; ("", "", APC _ (UP s ["bob"])) -> s == server; _ -> False
bob <#=? \case ("", "alice", APC _ (Msg "hello")) -> True; ("", "", APC _ (UP s ["alice"])) -> s == server; _ -> False
bob <#=? \case ("", "alice", APC _ (Msg "hello")) -> True; ("", "", APC _ (UP s ["alice"])) -> s == server; _ -> False
bob #: ("2", "alice", "ACK 4") #> ("2", "alice", OK)
tests/AgentTests/FunctionalAPITests.hs
+49 -37
View File
@@ -45,6 +45,7 @@ module AgentTests.FunctionalAPITests
pattern REQ,
pattern Msg,
pattern Msg',
pattern SENT,
agentCfgV7,
)
where
@@ -70,17 +71,17 @@ import Data.Word (Word16)
import qualified Database.SQLite.Simple as SQL
import GHC.Stack (withFrozenCallStack)
import SMPAgentClient
import SMPClient (cfg, testPort, testPort2, testStoreLogFile2, withSmpServer, withSmpServerConfigOn, withSmpServerOn, withSmpServerStoreLogOn, withSmpServerStoreMsgLogOn, withSmpServerV7)
import SMPClient (cfg, testPort, testPort2, testStoreLogFile2, withSmpServer, withSmpServerConfigOn, withSmpServerOn, withSmpServerProxy, withSmpServerStoreLogOn, withSmpServerStoreMsgLogOn, withSmpServerV7)
import Simplex.Messaging.Agent hiding (createConnection, joinConnection, sendMessage)
import qualified Simplex.Messaging.Agent as A
import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Client (ProtocolTestFailure (..), ProtocolTestStep (..), UserNetworkInfo (..), UserNetworkType (..), waitForUserNetwork)
import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Env.SQLite (AgentConfig (..), InitialAgentServers (..), createAgentStore)
import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Protocol hiding (CON, CONF, INFO, REQ)
import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Protocol hiding (CON, CONF, INFO, REQ, SENT)
import qualified Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Protocol as A
import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.RetryInterval (RetryInterval (..))
import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.SQLite (MigrationConfirmation (..), SQLiteStore (dbNew))
import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.SQLite.Common (withTransaction')
import Simplex.Messaging.Client (NetworkConfig (..), ProtocolClientConfig (..), TransportSessionMode (TSMEntity, TSMUser), defaultClientConfig)
import Simplex.Messaging.Client (NetworkConfig (..), ProtocolClientConfig (..), SMPProxyFallback (..), SMPProxyMode (..), TransportSessionMode (TSMEntity, TSMUser), defaultClientConfig)
import qualified Simplex.Messaging.Crypto as C
import Simplex.Messaging.Crypto.Ratchet (InitialKeys (..), PQEncryption (..), PQSupport (..), pattern PQEncOff, pattern PQEncOn, pattern PQSupportOff, pattern PQSupportOn)
import qualified Simplex.Messaging.Crypto.Ratchet as CR
@@ -171,6 +172,9 @@ pattern MsgErr msgId err msgBody <- MSG MsgMeta {recipient = (msgId, _), integri
pattern MsgErr' :: AgentMsgId -> MsgErrorType -> PQEncryption -> MsgBody -> ACommand 'Agent 'AEConn
pattern MsgErr' msgId err pq msgBody <- MSG MsgMeta {recipient = (msgId, _), integrity = MsgError err, pqEncryption = pq} _ msgBody
pattern SENT :: AgentMsgId -> ACommand 'Agent 'AEConn
pattern SENT msgId = A.SENT msgId Nothing
pattern Rcvd :: AgentMsgId -> ACommand 'Agent 'AEConn
pattern Rcvd agentMsgId <- RCVD MsgMeta {integrity = MsgOk} [MsgReceipt {agentMsgId, msgRcptStatus = MROk}]
@@ -455,26 +459,28 @@ canCreateQueue allowNew (srvAuth, srvVersion) (clntAuth, clntVersion) =
let v = basicAuthSMPVersion
in allowNew && (isNothing srvAuth || (srvVersion >= v && clntVersion >= v && srvAuth == clntAuth))
testMatrix2 :: ATransport -> (PQSupport -> AgentClient -> AgentClient -> AgentMsgId -> IO ()) -> Spec
testMatrix2 :: ATransport -> (PQSupport -> Bool -> AgentClient -> AgentClient -> AgentMsgId -> IO ()) -> Spec
testMatrix2 t runTest = do
it "v7" $ withSmpServerV7 t $ runTestCfg2 agentCfgV7 agentCfgV7 3 $ runTest PQSupportOn
it "v7 to current" $ withSmpServerV7 t $ runTestCfg2 agentCfgV7 agentCfg 3 $ runTest PQSupportOn
it "current to v7" $ withSmpServerV7 t $ runTestCfg2 agentCfg agentCfgV7 3 $ runTest PQSupportOn
it "current with v7 server" $ withSmpServerV7 t $ runTestCfg2 agentCfg agentCfg 3 $ runTest PQSupportOn
it "current" $ withSmpServer t $ runTestCfg2 agentCfg agentCfg 3 $ runTest PQSupportOn
it "prev" $ withSmpServer t $ runTestCfg2 agentCfgVPrev agentCfgVPrev 3 $ runTest PQSupportOff
it "prev to current" $ withSmpServer t $ runTestCfg2 agentCfgVPrev agentCfg 3 $ runTest PQSupportOff
it "current to prev" $ withSmpServer t $ runTestCfg2 agentCfg agentCfgVPrev 3 $ runTest PQSupportOff
it "v8, via proxy" $ withSmpServerProxy t $ runTestCfgServers2 agentProxyCfg agentProxyCfg (initAgentServersProxy SPMAlways SPFProhibit) 3 $ runTest PQSupportOn True
it "v7" $ withSmpServerV7 t $ runTestCfg2 agentCfgV7 agentCfgV7 3 $ runTest PQSupportOn False
it "v7 to current" $ withSmpServerV7 t $ runTestCfg2 agentCfgV7 agentCfg 3 $ runTest PQSupportOn False
it "current to v7" $ withSmpServerV7 t $ runTestCfg2 agentCfg agentCfgV7 3 $ runTest PQSupportOn False
it "current with v7 server" $ withSmpServerV7 t $ runTestCfg2 agentCfg agentCfg 3 $ runTest PQSupportOn False
it "current" $ withSmpServer t $ runTestCfg2 agentCfg agentCfg 3 $ runTest PQSupportOn False
it "prev" $ withSmpServer t $ runTestCfg2 agentCfgVPrev agentCfgVPrev 3 $ runTest PQSupportOff False
it "prev to current" $ withSmpServer t $ runTestCfg2 agentCfgVPrev agentCfg 3 $ runTest PQSupportOff False
it "current to prev" $ withSmpServer t $ runTestCfg2 agentCfg agentCfgVPrev 3 $ runTest PQSupportOff False
testRatchetMatrix2 :: ATransport -> (PQSupport -> AgentClient -> AgentClient -> AgentMsgId -> IO ()) -> Spec
testRatchetMatrix2 :: ATransport -> (PQSupport -> Bool -> AgentClient -> AgentClient -> AgentMsgId -> IO ()) -> Spec
testRatchetMatrix2 t runTest = do
it "ratchet next" $ withSmpServerV7 t $ runTestCfg2 agentCfgV7 agentCfgV7 3 $ runTest PQSupportOn
it "ratchet next to current" $ withSmpServerV7 t $ runTestCfg2 agentCfgV7 agentCfg 3 $ runTest PQSupportOn
it "ratchet current to next" $ withSmpServerV7 t $ runTestCfg2 agentCfg agentCfgV7 3 $ runTest PQSupportOn
it "ratchet current" $ withSmpServer t $ runTestCfg2 agentCfg agentCfg 3 $ runTest PQSupportOn
it "ratchet prev" $ withSmpServer t $ runTestCfg2 agentCfgRatchetVPrev agentCfgRatchetVPrev 3 $ runTest PQSupportOff
it "ratchets prev to current" $ withSmpServer t $ runTestCfg2 agentCfgRatchetVPrev agentCfg 3 $ runTest PQSupportOff
it "ratchets current to prev" $ withSmpServer t $ runTestCfg2 agentCfg agentCfgRatchetVPrev 3 $ runTest PQSupportOff
it "v8, via proxy" $ withSmpServerProxy t $ runTestCfgServers2 agentProxyCfg agentProxyCfg (initAgentServersProxy SPMAlways SPFProhibit) 3 $ runTest PQSupportOn True
it "ratchet next" $ withSmpServerV7 t $ runTestCfg2 agentCfgV7 agentCfgV7 3 $ runTest PQSupportOn False
it "ratchet next to current" $ withSmpServerV7 t $ runTestCfg2 agentCfgV7 agentCfg 3 $ runTest PQSupportOn False
it "ratchet current to next" $ withSmpServerV7 t $ runTestCfg2 agentCfg agentCfgV7 3 $ runTest PQSupportOn False
it "ratchet current" $ withSmpServer t $ runTestCfg2 agentCfg agentCfg 3 $ runTest PQSupportOn False
it "ratchet prev" $ withSmpServer t $ runTestCfg2 agentCfgRatchetVPrev agentCfgRatchetVPrev 3 $ runTest PQSupportOff False
it "ratchets prev to current" $ withSmpServer t $ runTestCfg2 agentCfgRatchetVPrev agentCfg 3 $ runTest PQSupportOff False
it "ratchets current to prev" $ withSmpServer t $ runTestCfg2 agentCfg agentCfgRatchetVPrev 3 $ runTest PQSupportOff False
testServerMatrix2 :: ATransport -> (InitialAgentServers -> IO ()) -> Spec
testServerMatrix2 t runTest = do
@@ -482,10 +488,14 @@ testServerMatrix2 t runTest = do
it "2 servers" $ withSmpServer t . withSmpServerOn t testPort2 $ runTest initAgentServers2
runTestCfg2 :: HasCallStack => AgentConfig -> AgentConfig -> AgentMsgId -> (HasCallStack => AgentClient -> AgentClient -> AgentMsgId -> IO ()) -> IO ()
runTestCfg2 aCfg bCfg baseMsgId runTest =
withAgentClientsCfg2 aCfg bCfg $ \a b -> runTest a b baseMsgId
runTestCfg2 aCfg bCfg = runTestCfgServers2 aCfg bCfg initAgentServers
{-# INLINE runTestCfg2 #-}
runTestCfgServers2 :: HasCallStack => AgentConfig -> AgentConfig -> InitialAgentServers -> AgentMsgId -> (HasCallStack => AgentClient -> AgentClient -> AgentMsgId -> IO ()) -> IO ()
runTestCfgServers2 aCfg bCfg servers baseMsgId runTest =
withAgentClientsCfgServers2 aCfg bCfg servers $ \a b -> runTest a b baseMsgId
{-# INLINE runTestCfgServers2 #-}
withAgentClientsCfgServers2 :: HasCallStack => AgentConfig -> AgentConfig -> InitialAgentServers -> (HasCallStack => AgentClient -> AgentClient -> IO ()) -> IO ()
withAgentClientsCfgServers2 aCfg bCfg servers runTest =
withAgent 1 aCfg servers testDB $ \a ->
@@ -506,8 +516,8 @@ withAgentClients3 runTest =
withAgent 3 agentCfg initAgentServers testDB3 $ \c ->
runTest a b c
runAgentClientTest :: HasCallStack => PQSupport -> AgentClient -> AgentClient -> AgentMsgId -> IO ()
runAgentClientTest pqSupport alice@AgentClient {} bob baseId =
runAgentClientTest :: HasCallStack => PQSupport -> Bool -> AgentClient -> AgentClient -> AgentMsgId -> IO ()
runAgentClientTest pqSupport viaProxy alice@AgentClient {} bob baseId =
runRight_ $ do
(bobId, qInfo) <- A.createConnection alice 1 True SCMInvitation Nothing (IKNoPQ pqSupport) SMSubscribe
aliceId <- A.joinConnection bob 1 Nothing True qInfo "bob's connInfo" pqSupport SMSubscribe
@@ -519,18 +529,19 @@ runAgentClientTest pqSupport alice@AgentClient {} bob baseId =
get bob ##> ("", aliceId, A.INFO pqSupport "alice's connInfo")
get bob ##> ("", aliceId, A.CON pqEnc)
-- message IDs 1 to 3 (or 1 to 4 in v1) get assigned to control messages, so first MSG is assigned ID 4
let proxySrv = if viaProxy then Just testSMPServer else Nothing
1 <- msgId <$> A.sendMessage alice bobId pqEnc SMP.noMsgFlags "hello"
get alice ##> ("", bobId, SENT $ baseId + 1)
get alice ##> ("", bobId, A.SENT (baseId + 1) proxySrv)
2 <- msgId <$> A.sendMessage alice bobId pqEnc SMP.noMsgFlags "how are you?"
get alice ##> ("", bobId, SENT $ baseId + 2)
get alice ##> ("", bobId, A.SENT (baseId + 2) proxySrv)
get bob =##> \case ("", c, Msg' _ pq "hello") -> c == aliceId && pq == pqEnc; _ -> False
ackMessage bob aliceId (baseId + 1) Nothing
get bob =##> \case ("", c, Msg' _ pq "how are you?") -> c == aliceId && pq == pqEnc; _ -> False
ackMessage bob aliceId (baseId + 2) Nothing
3 <- msgId <$> A.sendMessage bob aliceId pqEnc SMP.noMsgFlags "hello too"
get bob ##> ("", aliceId, SENT $ baseId + 3)
get bob ##> ("", aliceId, A.SENT (baseId + 3) proxySrv)
4 <- msgId <$> A.sendMessage bob aliceId pqEnc SMP.noMsgFlags "message 1"
get bob ##> ("", aliceId, SENT $ baseId + 4)
get bob ##> ("", aliceId, A.SENT (baseId + 4) proxySrv)
get alice =##> \case ("", c, Msg' _ pq "hello too") -> c == bobId && pq == pqEnc; _ -> False
ackMessage alice bobId (baseId + 3) Nothing
get alice =##> \case ("", c, Msg' _ pq "message 1") -> c == bobId && pq == pqEnc; _ -> False
@@ -633,8 +644,8 @@ testAgentClient3 =
get c =##> \case ("", connId, Msg "c5") -> connId == aIdForC; _ -> False
ackMessage c aIdForC 5 Nothing
runAgentClientContactTest :: HasCallStack => PQSupport -> AgentClient -> AgentClient -> AgentMsgId -> IO ()
runAgentClientContactTest pqSupport alice bob baseId =
runAgentClientContactTest :: HasCallStack => PQSupport -> Bool -> AgentClient -> AgentClient -> AgentMsgId -> IO ()
runAgentClientContactTest pqSupport viaProxy alice bob baseId =
runRight_ $ do
(_, qInfo) <- A.createConnection alice 1 True SCMContact Nothing (IKNoPQ pqSupport) SMSubscribe
aliceId <- A.prepareConnectionToJoin bob 1 True qInfo pqSupport
@@ -651,18 +662,19 @@ runAgentClientContactTest pqSupport alice bob baseId =
get alice ##> ("", bobId, A.CON pqEnc)
get bob ##> ("", aliceId, A.CON pqEnc)
-- message IDs 1 to 3 (or 1 to 4 in v1) get assigned to control messages, so first MSG is assigned ID 4
let proxySrv = if viaProxy then Just testSMPServer else Nothing
1 <- msgId <$> A.sendMessage alice bobId pqEnc SMP.noMsgFlags "hello"
get alice ##> ("", bobId, SENT $ baseId + 1)
get alice ##> ("", bobId, A.SENT (baseId + 1) proxySrv)
2 <- msgId <$> A.sendMessage alice bobId pqEnc SMP.noMsgFlags "how are you?"
get alice ##> ("", bobId, SENT $ baseId + 2)
get alice ##> ("", bobId, A.SENT (baseId + 2) proxySrv)
get bob =##> \case ("", c, Msg' _ pq "hello") -> c == aliceId && pq == pqEnc; _ -> False
ackMessage bob aliceId (baseId + 1) Nothing
get bob =##> \case ("", c, Msg' _ pq "how are you?") -> c == aliceId && pq == pqEnc; _ -> False
ackMessage bob aliceId (baseId + 2) Nothing
3 <- msgId <$> A.sendMessage bob aliceId pqEnc SMP.noMsgFlags "hello too"
get bob ##> ("", aliceId, SENT $ baseId + 3)
get bob ##> ("", aliceId, A.SENT (baseId + 3) proxySrv)
4 <- msgId <$> A.sendMessage bob aliceId pqEnc SMP.noMsgFlags "message 1"
get bob ##> ("", aliceId, SENT $ baseId + 4)
get bob ##> ("", aliceId, A.SENT (baseId + 4) proxySrv)
get alice =##> \case ("", c, Msg' _ pq "hello too") -> c == bobId && pq == pqEnc; _ -> False
ackMessage alice bobId (baseId + 3) Nothing
get alice =##> \case ("", c, Msg' _ pq "message 1") -> c == bobId && pq == pqEnc; _ -> False
@@ -1503,9 +1515,9 @@ testSuspendingAgentCompleteSending t = withAgentClients2 $ \a b -> do
liftIO $ suspendAgent b 5000000
withSmpServerStoreLogOn t testPort $ \_ -> runRight_ @AgentErrorType $ do
pGet b =##> \case ("", c, APC _ (SENT 5)) -> c == aId; ("", "", APC _ UP {}) -> True; _ -> False
pGet b =##> \case ("", c, APC _ (SENT 5)) -> c == aId; ("", "", APC _ UP {}) -> True; _ -> False
pGet b =##> \case ("", c, APC _ (SENT 6)) -> c == aId; ("", "", APC _ UP {}) -> True; _ -> False
pGet b =##> \case ("", c, APC SAEConn (SENT 5)) -> c == aId; ("", "", APC _ UP {}) -> True; _ -> False
pGet b =##> \case ("", c, APC SAEConn (SENT 5)) -> c == aId; ("", "", APC _ UP {}) -> True; _ -> False
pGet b =##> \case ("", c, APC SAEConn (SENT 6)) -> c == aId; ("", "", APC _ UP {}) -> True; _ -> False
("", "", SUSPENDED) <- nGet b
pGet a =##> \case ("", c, APC _ (Msg "hello too")) -> c == bId; ("", "", APC _ UP {}) -> True; _ -> False
tests/AgentTests/NotificationTests.hs
+2 -1
View File
@@ -36,6 +36,7 @@ import AgentTests.FunctionalAPITests
pattern CONF,
pattern INFO,
pattern Msg,
pattern SENT,
)
import Control.Concurrent (ThreadId, killThread, threadDelay)
import Control.Monad
@@ -55,7 +56,7 @@ import SMPClient (cfg, cfgV7, testPort, testPort2, testStoreLogFile2, withSmpSer
import Simplex.Messaging.Agent hiding (createConnection, joinConnection, sendMessage)
import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Client (ProtocolTestFailure (..), ProtocolTestStep (..), withStore')
import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Env.SQLite (AgentConfig, Env (..), InitialAgentServers)
import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Protocol hiding (CON, CONF, INFO)
import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Protocol hiding (CON, CONF, INFO, SENT)
import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.SQLite (getSavedNtfToken)
import qualified Simplex.Messaging.Crypto as C
import Simplex.Messaging.Encoding.String
tests/CoreTests/BatchingTests.hs
+7 -6
View File
@@ -281,12 +281,12 @@ randomSUB_ :: (C.AlgorithmI a, C.AuthAlgorithm a) => C.SAlgorithm a -> VersionSM
randomSUB_ a v sessId = do
g <- C.newRandom
rId <- atomically $ C.randomBytes 24 g
corrId <- atomically $ CorrId <$> C.randomBytes 24 g
nonce@(C.CbNonce corrId) <- atomically $ C.randomCbNonce g
(rKey, rpKey) <- atomically $ C.generateAuthKeyPair a g
thAuth_ <- testTHandleAuth v g rKey
let thParams = testTHandleParams v sessId
TransmissionForAuth {tForAuth, tToSend} = encodeTransmissionForAuth thParams (corrId, rId, Cmd SRecipient SUB)
pure $ (,tToSend) <$> authTransmission thAuth_ (Just rpKey) corrId tForAuth
TransmissionForAuth {tForAuth, tToSend} = encodeTransmissionForAuth thParams (CorrId corrId, rId, Cmd SRecipient SUB)
pure $ (,tToSend) <$> authTransmission thAuth_ (Just rpKey) nonce tForAuth
randomSUBCmd :: ProtocolClient SMPVersion ErrorType BrokerMsg -> IO (PCTransmission ErrorType BrokerMsg)
randomSUBCmd = randomSUBCmd_ C.SEd25519
@@ -311,13 +311,13 @@ randomSEND_ :: (C.AlgorithmI a, C.AuthAlgorithm a) => C.SAlgorithm a -> VersionS
randomSEND_ a v sessId len = do
g <- C.newRandom
sId <- atomically $ C.randomBytes 24 g
corrId <- atomically $ CorrId <$> C.randomBytes 3 g
nonce@(C.CbNonce corrId) <- atomically $ C.randomCbNonce g
(sKey, spKey) <- atomically $ C.generateAuthKeyPair a g
thAuth_ <- testTHandleAuth v g sKey
msg <- atomically $ C.randomBytes len g
let thParams = testTHandleParams v sessId
TransmissionForAuth {tForAuth, tToSend} = encodeTransmissionForAuth thParams (corrId, sId, Cmd SSender $ SEND noMsgFlags msg)
pure $ (,tToSend) <$> authTransmission thAuth_ (Just spKey) corrId tForAuth
TransmissionForAuth {tForAuth, tToSend} = encodeTransmissionForAuth thParams (CorrId corrId, sId, Cmd SSender $ SEND noMsgFlags msg)
pure $ (,tToSend) <$> authTransmission thAuth_ (Just spKey) nonce tForAuth
testTHandleParams :: VersionSMP -> ByteString -> THandleParams SMPVersion 'TClient
testTHandleParams v sessionId =
@@ -325,6 +325,7 @@ testTHandleParams v sessionId =
{ sessionId,
blockSize = smpBlockSize,
thVersion = v,
thServerVRange = supportedServerSMPRelayVRange,
thAuth = Nothing,
implySessId = v >= authCmdsSMPVersion,
batch = True
tests/CoreTests/ProtocolErrorTests.hs
+36 -15
View File
@@ -2,21 +2,20 @@
{-# LANGUAGE LambdaCase #-}
{-# LANGUAGE ScopedTypeVariables #-}
{-# LANGUAGE StandaloneDeriving #-}
{-# LANGUAGE TypeApplications #-}
{-# OPTIONS_GHC -Wno-orphans #-}
module CoreTests.ProtocolErrorTests where
import qualified Data.ByteString.Char8 as B
import qualified Data.Text as T
import Data.Text.Encoding (encodeUtf8)
import GHC.Generics (Generic)
import Generic.Random (genericArbitraryU)
import Simplex.FileTransfer.Transport (XFTPErrorType (..))
import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Protocol
import qualified Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Protocol as Agent
import Simplex.Messaging.Client (ProxyClientError (..))
import Simplex.Messaging.Encoding
import Simplex.Messaging.Encoding.String
import Simplex.Messaging.Protocol (CommandError (..), ErrorType (..))
import qualified Simplex.Messaging.Protocol as SMP
import Simplex.Messaging.Transport (HandshakeError (..), TransportError (..))
import Simplex.RemoteControl.Types (RCErrorType (..))
import Test.Hspec
@@ -26,20 +25,34 @@ import Test.QuickCheck
protocolErrorTests :: Spec
protocolErrorTests = modifyMaxSuccess (const 1000) $ do
describe "errors parsing / serializing" $ do
it "should parse SMP protocol errors" . property $ \(err :: ErrorType) ->
it "should parse SMP protocol errors" . property . forAll possibleErrorType $ \err ->
smpDecode (smpEncode err) == Right err
it "should parse SMP agent errors" . property $ \(err :: AgentErrorType) ->
errHasSpaces err
|| strDecode (strEncode err) == Right err
it "should parse SMP agent errors" . property . forAll possibleAgentErrorType $ \err ->
strDecode (strEncode err) == Right err
where
errHasSpaces = \case
BROKER srv (RESPONSE e) -> hasSpaces srv || hasSpaces e
BROKER srv _ -> hasSpaces srv
SMP srv _ -> hasSpaces srv
NTF srv _ -> hasSpaces srv
XFTP srv _ -> hasSpaces srv
possibleErrorType :: Gen ErrorType
possibleErrorType = arbitrary >>= \e -> if skipErrorType e then discard else pure e
possibleAgentErrorType :: Gen AgentErrorType
possibleAgentErrorType =
arbitrary >>= \case
BROKER srv _ | hasSpaces srv -> discard
SMP srv e | hasSpaces srv || skipErrorType e -> discard
NTF srv e | hasSpaces srv || skipErrorType e -> discard
XFTP srv _ | hasSpaces srv -> discard
Agent.PROXY pxy srv _ | hasSpaces pxy || hasSpaces srv -> discard
Agent.PROXY _ _ (ProxyProtocolError e) | skipErrorType e -> discard
Agent.PROXY _ _ (ProxyUnexpectedResponse e) | hasUnicode e -> discard
Agent.PROXY _ _ (ProxyResponseError e) | skipErrorType e -> discard
ok -> pure ok
hasSpaces :: String -> Bool
hasSpaces = any (== ' ')
hasUnicode :: String -> Bool
hasUnicode = any (>= '\255')
skipErrorType = \case
SMP.PROXY (SMP.PROTOCOL e) -> skipErrorType e
SMP.PROXY (SMP.BROKER (UNEXPECTED s)) -> hasUnicode s
SMP.PROXY (SMP.BROKER (RESPONSE s)) -> hasUnicode s
_ -> False
hasSpaces s = ' ' `B.elem` encodeUtf8 (T.pack s)
deriving instance Generic AgentErrorType
@@ -47,6 +60,8 @@ deriving instance Generic CommandErrorType
deriving instance Generic ConnectionErrorType
deriving instance Generic ProxyClientError
deriving instance Generic BrokerErrorType
deriving instance Generic SMPAgentError
@@ -57,6 +72,8 @@ deriving instance Generic ErrorType
deriving instance Generic CommandError
deriving instance Generic SMP.ProxyError
deriving instance Generic TransportError
deriving instance Generic HandshakeError
@@ -71,6 +88,8 @@ instance Arbitrary CommandErrorType where arbitrary = genericArbitraryU
instance Arbitrary ConnectionErrorType where arbitrary = genericArbitraryU
instance Arbitrary ProxyClientError where arbitrary = genericArbitraryU
instance Arbitrary BrokerErrorType where arbitrary = genericArbitraryU
instance Arbitrary SMPAgentError where arbitrary = genericArbitraryU
@@ -81,6 +100,8 @@ instance Arbitrary ErrorType where arbitrary = genericArbitraryU
instance Arbitrary CommandError where arbitrary = genericArbitraryU
instance Arbitrary SMP.ProxyError where arbitrary = genericArbitraryU
instance Arbitrary TransportError where arbitrary = genericArbitraryU
instance Arbitrary HandshakeError where arbitrary = genericArbitraryU
tests/CoreTests/VersionRangeTests.hs
+36
View File
@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@
module CoreTests.VersionRangeTests where
import Data.Word (Word16)
import GHC.Generics (Generic)
import Generic.Random (genericArbitraryU)
import Simplex.Messaging.Version
@@ -38,6 +39,28 @@ versionRangeTests = modifyMaxSuccess (const 1000) $ do
(vr 1 3, vr 2 3) `compatible` Just (Version 3)
(vr 1 3, vr 2 4) `compatible` Just (Version 3)
(vr 1 2, vr 3 4) `compatible` Nothing
it "should choose mutually compatible version range (range intersection)" $ do
(vr 1 1, vr 1 1) `compatibleVR` Just (vr 1 1)
(vr 1 1, vr 1 2) `compatibleVR` Just (vr 1 1)
(vr 1 2, vr 1 2) `compatibleVR` Just (vr 1 2)
(vr 1 2, vr 2 3) `compatibleVR` Just (vr 2 2)
(vr 1 3, vr 2 3) `compatibleVR` Just (vr 2 3)
(vr 1 3, vr 2 4) `compatibleVR` Just (vr 2 3)
(vr 1 2, vr 3 4) `compatibleVR` Nothing
it "should choose compatible version range with changed max version (capped range)" $ do
(vr 1 1, 1) `compatibleVR'` Just (vr 1 1)
(vr 1 1, 2) `compatibleVR'` Nothing
(vr 1 2, 2) `compatibleVR'` Just (vr 1 2)
(vr 1 2, 3) `compatibleVR'` Nothing
(vr 1 3, 2) `compatibleVR'` Just (vr 1 2)
(vr 1 3, 3) `compatibleVR'` Just (vr 1 3)
(vr 1 3, 4) `compatibleVR'` Nothing
(vr 2 3, 1) `compatibleVR'` Nothing
(vr 2 3, 2) `compatibleVR'` Just (vr 2 2)
(vr 2 3, 3) `compatibleVR'` Just (vr 2 3)
(vr 2 4, 1) `compatibleVR'` Nothing
(vr 2 4, 3) `compatibleVR'` Just (vr 2 3)
(vr 2 4, 4) `compatibleVR'` Just (vr 2 4)
it "should check if version is compatible" $ do
isCompatible @T (Version 1) (vr 1 2) `shouldBe` True
isCompatible @T (Version 2) (vr 1 2) `shouldBe` True
@@ -63,3 +86,16 @@ versionRangeTests = modifyMaxSuccess (const 1000) $ do
case compatibleVersion vr1 vr2 of
Just (Compatible v') -> Just v' `shouldBe` v
Nothing -> Nothing `shouldBe` v
compatibleVR :: (VersionRange T, VersionRange T) -> Maybe (VersionRange T) -> Expectation
(vr1, vr2) `compatibleVR` vr' = do
(vr1, vr2) `checkCompatibleVR` vr'
(vr2, vr1) `checkCompatibleVR` vr'
(vr1, vr2) `checkCompatibleVR` vr' =
case compatibleVRange vr1 vr2 of
Just (Compatible vr'') -> Just vr'' `shouldBe` vr'
Nothing -> Nothing `shouldBe` vr'
compatibleVR' :: (VersionRange T, Word16) -> Maybe (VersionRange T) -> Expectation
(vr1, v2) `compatibleVR'` vr' =
case compatibleVRange' vr1 (Version v2) of
Just (Compatible vr'') -> Just vr'' `shouldBe` vr'
Nothing -> Nothing `shouldBe` vr'
tests/SMPAgentClient.hs
+10 -2
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@@ -20,7 +20,8 @@ import qualified Database.SQLite.Simple as SQL
import Network.Socket (ServiceName)
import NtfClient (ntfTestPort)
import SMPClient
( serverBracket,
( proxyVRange,
serverBracket,
testKeyHash,
testPort,
testPort2,
@@ -34,7 +35,7 @@ import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.RetryInterval
import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Server (runSMPAgentBlocking)
import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.SQLite (MigrationConfirmation (..), SQLiteStore (dbNew))
import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.SQLite.Common (withTransaction')
import Simplex.Messaging.Client (ProtocolClientConfig (..), chooseTransportHost, defaultNetworkConfig, defaultSMPClientConfig)
import Simplex.Messaging.Client (ProtocolClientConfig (..), SMPProxyFallback, SMPProxyMode, chooseTransportHost, defaultNetworkConfig, defaultSMPClientConfig)
import Simplex.Messaging.Notifications.Client (defaultNTFClientConfig)
import Simplex.Messaging.Parsers (parseAll)
import Simplex.Messaging.Protocol (NtfServer, ProtoServerWithAuth)
@@ -198,6 +199,10 @@ initAgentServers =
initAgentServers2 :: InitialAgentServers
initAgentServers2 = initAgentServers {smp = userServers [noAuthSrv testSMPServer, noAuthSrv testSMPServer2]}
initAgentServersProxy :: SMPProxyMode -> SMPProxyFallback -> InitialAgentServers
initAgentServersProxy smpProxyMode smpProxyFallback =
initAgentServers {netCfg = (netCfg initAgentServers) {smpProxyMode, smpProxyFallback}}
agentCfg :: AgentConfig
agentCfg =
defaultAgentConfig
@@ -217,6 +222,9 @@ agentCfg =
where
networkConfig = defaultNetworkConfig {tcpConnectTimeout = 1_000_000, tcpTimeout = 2_000_000}
agentProxyCfg :: AgentConfig
agentProxyCfg = agentCfg {smpCfg = (smpCfg agentCfg) {serverVRange = proxyVRange}}
fastRetryInterval :: RetryInterval
fastRetryInterval = defaultReconnectInterval {initialInterval = 50_000}
tests/SMPClient.hs
+27 -3
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@@ -16,7 +16,8 @@ import Control.Monad.Except (runExceptT)
import Data.ByteString.Char8 (ByteString)
import Data.List.NonEmpty (NonEmpty)
import Network.Socket
import Simplex.Messaging.Client (chooseTransportHost, defaultNetworkConfig)
import Simplex.Messaging.Client (ProtocolClientConfig (..), chooseTransportHost, defaultNetworkConfig)
import Simplex.Messaging.Client.Agent (SMPClientAgentConfig (..), defaultSMPClientAgentConfig)
import qualified Simplex.Messaging.Crypto as C
import Simplex.Messaging.Encoding
import Simplex.Messaging.Protocol
@@ -75,8 +76,12 @@ testSMPClient = testSMPClientVR supportedClientSMPRelayVRange
testSMPClientVR :: Transport c => VersionRangeSMP -> (THandleSMP c 'TClient -> IO a) -> IO a
testSMPClientVR vr client = do
Right useHost <- pure $ chooseTransportHost defaultNetworkConfig testHost
testSMPClient_ useHost testPort vr client
testSMPClient_ :: Transport c => TransportHost -> ServiceName -> VersionRangeSMP -> (THandleSMP c 'TClient -> IO a) -> IO a
testSMPClient_ host port vr client = do
let tcConfig = defaultTransportClientConfig {Client.alpn = clientALPN}
runTransportClient tcConfig Nothing useHost testPort (Just testKeyHash) $ \h ->
runTransportClient tcConfig Nothing host port (Just testKeyHash) $ \h ->
runExceptT (smpClientHandshake h Nothing testKeyHash vr) >>= \case
Right th -> client th
Left e -> error $ show e
@@ -112,12 +117,28 @@ cfg =
certificateFile = "tests/fixtures/server.crt",
smpServerVRange = supportedServerSMPRelayVRange,
transportConfig = defaultTransportServerConfig {Server.alpn = Just supportedSMPHandshakes},
controlPort = Nothing
controlPort = Nothing,
smpAgentCfg = defaultSMPClientAgentConfig,
allowSMPProxy = False
}
cfgV7 :: ServerConfig
cfgV7 = cfg {smpServerVRange = mkVersionRange batchCmdsSMPVersion authCmdsSMPVersion}
cfgV8 :: ServerConfig
cfgV8 = cfg {smpServerVRange = mkVersionRange batchCmdsSMPVersion sendingProxySMPVersion}
proxyCfg :: ServerConfig
proxyCfg =
cfgV7
{ allowSMPProxy = True,
smpServerVRange = mkVersionRange batchCmdsSMPVersion sendingProxySMPVersion,
smpAgentCfg = defaultSMPClientAgentConfig {smpCfg = (smpCfg defaultSMPClientAgentConfig) {serverVRange = proxyVRange, agreeSecret = True}}
}
proxyVRange :: VersionRangeSMP
proxyVRange = mkVersionRange batchCmdsSMPVersion sendingProxySMPVersion
withSmpServerStoreMsgLogOn :: HasCallStack => ATransport -> ServiceName -> (HasCallStack => ThreadId -> IO a) -> IO a
withSmpServerStoreMsgLogOn t = withSmpServerConfigOn t cfg {storeLogFile = Just testStoreLogFile, storeMsgsFile = Just testStoreMsgsFile, serverStatsBackupFile = Just testServerStatsBackupFile}
@@ -155,6 +176,9 @@ withSmpServer t = withSmpServerOn t testPort
withSmpServerV7 :: HasCallStack => ATransport -> IO a -> IO a
withSmpServerV7 t = withSmpServerConfigOn t cfgV7 testPort . const
withSmpServerProxy :: HasCallStack => ATransport -> IO a -> IO a
withSmpServerProxy t = withSmpServerConfigOn t proxyCfg testPort . const
runSmpTest :: forall c a. (HasCallStack, Transport c) => (HasCallStack => THandleSMP c 'TClient -> IO a) -> IO a
runSmpTest test = withSmpServer (transport @c) $ testSMPClient test
tests/SMPProxyTests.hs
+203
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@@ -0,0 +1,203 @@
{-# LANGUAGE DataKinds #-}
{-# LANGUAGE DuplicateRecordFields #-}
{-# LANGUAGE GADTs #-}
{-# LANGUAGE LambdaCase #-}
{-# LANGUAGE NamedFieldPuns #-}
{-# LANGUAGE OverloadedLists #-}
{-# LANGUAGE OverloadedStrings #-}
{-# LANGUAGE PatternSynonyms #-}
{-# LANGUAGE RankNTypes #-}
{-# LANGUAGE ScopedTypeVariables #-}
{-# LANGUAGE TupleSections #-}
{-# LANGUAGE TypeApplications #-}
module SMPProxyTests where
import AgentTests.FunctionalAPITests
import Control.Monad.Trans.Except (runExceptT)
import Data.ByteString.Char8 (ByteString)
import Data.List.NonEmpty (NonEmpty)
import qualified Data.List.NonEmpty as L
import SMPAgentClient
import SMPClient
import ServerTests (decryptMsgV3, sendRecv)
import Simplex.Messaging.Agent hiding (createConnection, joinConnection, sendMessage)
import qualified Simplex.Messaging.Agent as A
import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Env.SQLite (AgentConfig (..), InitialAgentServers (..))
import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Protocol hiding (CON, CONF, INFO, REQ)
import qualified Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Protocol as A
import Simplex.Messaging.Client
import qualified Simplex.Messaging.Crypto as C
import Simplex.Messaging.Crypto.Ratchet (pattern PQSupportOn)
import qualified Simplex.Messaging.Crypto.Ratchet as CR
import Simplex.Messaging.Protocol as SMP
import Simplex.Messaging.Server.Env.STM (ServerConfig (..))
import Simplex.Messaging.Transport
import Simplex.Messaging.Version (mkVersionRange)
import Test.Hspec
import UnliftIO
smpProxyTests :: Spec
smpProxyTests = do
describe "server configuration" $ do
it "refuses proxy handshake unless enabled" testNoProxy
it "checks basic auth in proxy requests" testProxyAuth
describe "proxy requests" $ do
describe "bad relay URIs" $ do
xit "host not resolved" todo
xit "when SMP port blackholed" todo
xit "no SMP service at host/port" todo
xit "bad SMP fingerprint" todo
xit "batching proxy requests" todo
describe "deliver message via SMP proxy" $ do
let srv1 = SMPServer testHost testPort testKeyHash
srv2 = SMPServer testHost testPort2 testKeyHash
describe "client API" $ do
let maxLen = maxMessageLength sendingProxySMPVersion
describe "one server" $ do
it "deliver via proxy" . oneServer $ do
deliverMessageViaProxy srv1 srv1 C.SEd448 "hello 1" "hello 2"
describe "two servers" $ do
let proxyServ = srv1
relayServ = srv2
(msg1, msg2) <- runIO $ do
g <- C.newRandom
atomically $ (,) <$> C.randomBytes maxLen g <*> C.randomBytes maxLen g
it "deliver via proxy" . twoServersFirstProxy $
deliverMessageViaProxy proxyServ relayServ C.SEd448 "hello 1" "hello 2"
it "max message size, Ed448 keys" . twoServersFirstProxy $
deliverMessageViaProxy proxyServ relayServ C.SEd448 msg1 msg2
it "max message size, Ed25519 keys" . twoServersFirstProxy $
deliverMessageViaProxy proxyServ relayServ C.SEd25519 msg1 msg2
it "max message size, X25519 keys" . twoServersFirstProxy $
deliverMessageViaProxy proxyServ relayServ C.SX25519 msg1 msg2
describe "agent API" $ do
describe "one server" $ do
it "always via proxy" . oneServer $
agentDeliverMessageViaProxy ([srv1], SPMAlways, True) ([srv1], SPMAlways, True) C.SEd448 "hello 1" "hello 2"
it "without proxy" . oneServer $
agentDeliverMessageViaProxy ([srv1], SPMNever, False) ([srv1], SPMNever, False) C.SEd448 "hello 1" "hello 2"
describe "two servers" $ do
it "always via proxy" . twoServers $
agentDeliverMessageViaProxy ([srv1], SPMAlways, True) ([srv2], SPMAlways, True) C.SEd448 "hello 1" "hello 2"
it "both via proxy" . twoServers $
agentDeliverMessageViaProxy ([srv1], SPMUnknown, True) ([srv2], SPMUnknown, True) C.SEd448 "hello 1" "hello 2"
it "first via proxy" . twoServers $
agentDeliverMessageViaProxy ([srv1], SPMUnknown, True) ([srv2], SPMNever, False) C.SEd448 "hello 1" "hello 2"
it "without proxy" . twoServers $
agentDeliverMessageViaProxy ([srv1], SPMNever, False) ([srv2], SPMNever, False) C.SEd448 "hello 1" "hello 2"
it "first via proxy for unknown" . twoServers $
agentDeliverMessageViaProxy ([srv1], SPMUnknown, True) ([srv1, srv2], SPMUnknown, False) C.SEd448 "hello 1" "hello 2"
it "without proxy with fallback" . twoServers_ proxyCfg cfgV7 $
agentDeliverMessageViaProxy ([srv1], SPMUnknown, False) ([srv2], SPMUnknown, False) C.SEd448 "hello 1" "hello 2"
it "fails when fallback is prohibited" . twoServers_ proxyCfg cfgV7 $
agentViaProxyVersionError
where
oneServer = withSmpServerConfigOn (transport @TLS) proxyCfg testPort . const
twoServers = twoServers_ proxyCfg proxyCfg
twoServersFirstProxy = twoServers_ proxyCfg cfgV8
twoServers_ cfg1 cfg2 runTest =
withSmpServerConfigOn (transport @TLS) cfg1 testPort $ \_ ->
withSmpServerConfigOn (transport @TLS) cfg2 testPort2 $ const runTest
deliverMessageViaProxy :: (C.AlgorithmI a, C.AuthAlgorithm a) => SMPServer -> SMPServer -> C.SAlgorithm a -> ByteString -> ByteString -> IO ()
deliverMessageViaProxy proxyServ relayServ alg msg msg' = do
g <- C.newRandom
-- set up proxy
Right pc <- getProtocolClient g (1, proxyServ, Nothing) defaultSMPClientConfig {serverVRange = mkVersionRange batchCmdsSMPVersion sendingProxySMPVersion} Nothing (\_ -> pure ())
THAuthClient {} <- maybe (fail "getProtocolClient returned no thAuth") pure $ thAuth $ thParams pc
-- set up relay
msgQ <- newTBQueueIO 4
Right rc <- getProtocolClient g (2, relayServ, Nothing) defaultSMPClientConfig {serverVRange = mkVersionRange batchCmdsSMPVersion authCmdsSMPVersion} (Just msgQ) (\_ -> pure ())
runRight_ $ do
-- prepare receiving queue
(rPub, rPriv) <- atomically $ C.generateAuthKeyPair alg g
(rdhPub, rdhPriv :: C.PrivateKeyX25519) <- atomically $ C.generateKeyPair g
QIK {rcvId, sndId, rcvPublicDhKey = srvDh} <- createSMPQueue rc (rPub, rPriv) rdhPub (Just "correct") SMSubscribe
let dec = decryptMsgV3 $ C.dh' srvDh rdhPriv
-- get proxy session
sess <- connectSMPProxiedRelay pc relayServ (Just "correct")
-- send via proxy to unsecured queue
Right () <- proxySMPMessage pc sess Nothing sndId noMsgFlags msg
-- receive 1
(_tSess, _v, _sid, _isResp, _entId, Right (SMP.MSG RcvMessage {msgId, msgBody = EncRcvMsgBody encBody})) <- atomically $ readTBQueue msgQ
liftIO $ dec msgId encBody `shouldBe` Right msg
ackSMPMessage rc rPriv rcvId msgId
-- secure queue
(sPub, sPriv) <- atomically $ C.generateAuthKeyPair alg g
secureSMPQueue rc rPriv rcvId sPub
-- send via proxy to secured queue
Right () <- proxySMPMessage pc sess (Just sPriv) sndId noMsgFlags msg'
-- receive 2
(_tSess, _v, _sid, _isResp, _entId, Right (SMP.MSG RcvMessage {msgId = msgId', msgBody = EncRcvMsgBody encBody'})) <- atomically $ readTBQueue msgQ
liftIO $ dec msgId' encBody' `shouldBe` Right msg'
ackSMPMessage rc rPriv rcvId msgId'
agentDeliverMessageViaProxy :: (C.AlgorithmI a, C.AuthAlgorithm a) => (NonEmpty SMPServer, SMPProxyMode, Bool) -> (NonEmpty SMPServer, SMPProxyMode, Bool) -> C.SAlgorithm a -> ByteString -> ByteString -> IO ()
agentDeliverMessageViaProxy aTestCfg@(aSrvs, _, aViaProxy) bTestCfg@(bSrvs, _, bViaProxy) alg msg1 msg2 =
withAgent 1 aCfg (servers aTestCfg) testDB $ \alice ->
withAgent 2 aCfg (servers bTestCfg) testDB2 $ \bob -> runRight_ $ do
(bobId, qInfo) <- A.createConnection alice 1 True SCMInvitation Nothing (CR.IKNoPQ PQSupportOn) SMSubscribe
aliceId <- A.joinConnection bob 1 Nothing True qInfo "bob's connInfo" PQSupportOn SMSubscribe
("", _, A.CONF confId pqSup' _ "bob's connInfo") <- get alice
liftIO $ pqSup' `shouldBe` PQSupportOn
allowConnection alice bobId confId "alice's connInfo"
let pqEnc = CR.PQEncOn
get alice ##> ("", bobId, A.CON pqEnc)
get bob ##> ("", aliceId, A.INFO PQSupportOn "alice's connInfo")
get bob ##> ("", aliceId, A.CON pqEnc)
-- message IDs 1 to 3 (or 1 to 4 in v1) get assigned to control messages, so first MSG is assigned ID 4
let aProxySrv = if aViaProxy then Just $ L.head aSrvs else Nothing
1 <- msgId <$> A.sendMessage alice bobId pqEnc noMsgFlags msg1
get alice ##> ("", bobId, A.SENT (baseId + 1) aProxySrv)
2 <- msgId <$> A.sendMessage alice bobId pqEnc noMsgFlags msg2
get alice ##> ("", bobId, A.SENT (baseId + 2) aProxySrv)
get bob =##> \case ("", c, Msg' _ pq msg1') -> c == aliceId && pq == pqEnc && msg1 == msg1'; _ -> False
ackMessage bob aliceId (baseId + 1) Nothing
get bob =##> \case ("", c, Msg' _ pq msg2') -> c == aliceId && pq == pqEnc && msg2 == msg2'; _ -> False
ackMessage bob aliceId (baseId + 2) Nothing
let bProxySrv = if bViaProxy then Just $ L.head bSrvs else Nothing
3 <- msgId <$> A.sendMessage bob aliceId pqEnc noMsgFlags msg1
get bob ##> ("", aliceId, A.SENT (baseId + 3) bProxySrv)
4 <- msgId <$> A.sendMessage bob aliceId pqEnc noMsgFlags msg2
get bob ##> ("", aliceId, A.SENT (baseId + 4) bProxySrv)
get alice =##> \case ("", c, Msg' _ pq msg1') -> c == bobId && pq == pqEnc && msg1 == msg1'; _ -> False
ackMessage alice bobId (baseId + 3) Nothing
get alice =##> \case ("", c, Msg' _ pq msg2') -> c == bobId && pq == pqEnc && msg2 == msg2'; _ -> False
ackMessage alice bobId (baseId + 4) Nothing
where
baseId = 3
msgId = subtract baseId . fst
aCfg = agentProxyCfg {sndAuthAlg = C.AuthAlg alg, rcvAuthAlg = C.AuthAlg alg}
servers (srvs, smpProxyMode, _) = (initAgentServersProxy smpProxyMode SPFAllow) {smp = userServers $ L.map noAuthSrv srvs}
agentViaProxyVersionError :: IO ()
agentViaProxyVersionError =
withAgent 1 agentProxyCfg (servers [SMPServer testHost testPort testKeyHash]) testDB $ \alice -> do
Left (A.BROKER _ (TRANSPORT TEVersion)) <-
withAgent 2 agentProxyCfg (servers [SMPServer testHost testPort2 testKeyHash]) testDB2 $ \bob -> runExceptT $ do
(_bobId, qInfo) <- A.createConnection alice 1 True SCMInvitation Nothing (CR.IKNoPQ PQSupportOn) SMSubscribe
A.joinConnection bob 1 Nothing True qInfo "bob's connInfo" PQSupportOn SMSubscribe
pure ()
where
servers srvs = (initAgentServersProxy SPMUnknown SPFProhibit) {smp = userServers $ L.map noAuthSrv srvs}
testNoProxy :: IO ()
testNoProxy = do
withSmpServerConfigOn (transport @TLS) cfg testPort2 $ \_ -> do
testSMPClient_ "127.0.0.1" testPort2 proxyVRange $ \(th :: THandleSMP TLS 'TClient) -> do
(_, _, (_corrId, _entityId, reply)) <- sendRecv th (Nothing, "0", "", PRXY testSMPServer Nothing)
reply `shouldBe` Right (SMP.ERR $ SMP.PROXY SMP.BASIC_AUTH)
testProxyAuth :: IO ()
testProxyAuth = do
withSmpServerConfigOn (transport @TLS) proxyCfgAuth testPort $ \_ -> do
testSMPClient_ "127.0.0.1" testPort proxyVRange $ \(th :: THandleSMP TLS 'TClient) -> do
(_, _s, (_corrId, _entityId, reply)) <- sendRecv th (Nothing, "0", "", PRXY testSMPServer2 $ Just "wrong")
reply `shouldBe` Right (SMP.ERR $ SMP.PROXY SMP.BASIC_AUTH)
where
proxyCfgAuth = proxyCfg {newQueueBasicAuth = Just "correct"}
todo :: IO ()
todo = do
fail "TODO"
tests/ServerTests.hs
+2 -4
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@@ -183,12 +183,12 @@ testCreateSecure (ATransport t) =
Resp "dabc" _ err5 <- sendRecv s ("", "dabc", sId, _SEND "hello")
(err5, ERR AUTH) #== "rejects unsigned SEND"
let maxAllowedMessage = B.replicate maxMessageLength '-'
let maxAllowedMessage = B.replicate (maxMessageLength currentClientSMPRelayVersion) '-'
Resp "bcda" _ OK <- signSendRecv s sKey ("bcda", sId, _SEND maxAllowedMessage)
Resp "" _ (Msg mId3 msg3) <- tGet1 r
(dec mId3 msg3, Right maxAllowedMessage) #== "delivers message of max size"
let biggerMessage = B.replicate (maxMessageLength + 1) '-'
let biggerMessage = B.replicate (maxMessageLength currentClientSMPRelayVersion + 1) '-'
Resp "bcda" _ (ERR LARGE_MSG) <- signSendRecv s sKey ("bcda", sId, _SEND biggerMessage)
pure ()
@@ -931,8 +931,6 @@ instance Eq C.ASignature where
Just Refl -> s == s'
_ -> False
deriving instance Eq (C.Signature a)
syntaxTests :: ATransport -> Spec
syntaxTests (ATransport t) = do
it "unknown command" $ ("", "abcd", "1234", ('H', 'E', 'L', 'L', 'O')) >#> ("", "abcd", "1234", ERR $ CMD UNKNOWN)
tests/Test.hs
+2
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@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@ import GHC.IO.Exception (IOException (..))
import qualified GHC.IO.Exception as IOException
import NtfServerTests (ntfServerTests)
import RemoteControl (remoteControlTests)
import SMPProxyTests (smpProxyTests)
import ServerTests
import Simplex.Messaging.Transport (TLS, Transport (..))
import Simplex.Messaging.Transport.WebSockets (WS)
@@ -59,6 +60,7 @@ main = do
describe "SMP server via WebSockets" $ serverTests (transport @WS)
describe "Notifications server" $ ntfServerTests (transport @TLS)
describe "SMP client agent" $ agentTests (transport @TLS)
describe "SMP proxy" smpProxyTests
describe "XFTP" $ do
describe "XFTP server" xftpServerTests
describe "XFTP file description" fileDescriptionTests
tests/XFTPClient.hs
+2
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@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ import Simplex.FileTransfer.Client
import Simplex.FileTransfer.Description
import Simplex.FileTransfer.Server (runXFTPServerBlocking)
import Simplex.FileTransfer.Server.Env (XFTPServerConfig (..), defaultFileExpiration, defaultInactiveClientExpiration, supportedXFTPhandshakes)
import Simplex.FileTransfer.Transport (supportedFileServerVRange)
import Simplex.Messaging.Protocol (XFTPServer)
import Simplex.Messaging.Transport (ALPN)
import Simplex.Messaging.Transport.Server
@@ -118,6 +119,7 @@ testXFTPServerConfig_ alpn =
caCertificateFile = "tests/fixtures/ca.crt",
privateKeyFile = "tests/fixtures/server.key",
certificateFile = "tests/fixtures/server.crt",
xftpServerVRange = supportedFileServerVRange,
logStatsInterval = Nothing,
logStatsStartTime = 0,
serverStatsLogFile = "tests/tmp/xftp-server-stats.daily.log",