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update protocol docs
This commit is contained in:
Evgeny @ SimpleX Chat
@@ -177,7 +177,7 @@ These messages are encrypted with per-queue shared secret using NaCL crypto_box
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decryptedSMPClientMessage = agentConfirmation / agentMsgEnvelope / agentInvitation / agentRatchetKey
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agentConfirmation = agentVersion %s"C" ("0" / "1" sndE2EEncryptionParams) encConnInfo
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agentVersion = 2*2 OCTET
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sndE2EEncryptionParams = TODO
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sndE2EEncryptionParams = <sender E2E ratchet parameters, see crypto-ratchet.md>
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encConnInfo = doubleRatchetEncryptedMessage
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agentMsgEnvelope = agentVersion %s"M" encAgentMessage
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@@ -187,11 +187,20 @@ agentInvitation = agentVersion %s"I" connReqLength connReq connInfo
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connReqLength = 2*2 OCTET ; Word16
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agentRatchetKey = agentVersion %s"R" rcvE2EEncryptionParams agentRatchetInfo
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rcvE2EEncryptionParams = TODO
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rcvE2EEncryptionParams = <receiver E2E ratchet parameters, see crypto-ratchet.md>
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doubleRatchetEncryptedMessage = TODO
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doubleRatchetEncryptedMessage = <double ratchet encrypted message, see crypto-ratchet.md>
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```
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The maximum size of the encrypted connection info and agent message depend on whether post-quantum key exchange is used:
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| Constant | PQ on | PQ off |
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|----------|-------|--------|
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| `e2eEncConnInfoLength` | 11106 | 14832 |
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| `e2eEncAgentMsgLength` | 13618 | 15840 |
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The PQ-on sizes are smaller because the ratchet header and reply link include larger PQ keys (SNTRUP761).
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This syntax of decrypted SMP client message body is defined by `decryptedAgentMessage` below.
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Decrypted SMP message client body can be one of 4 types:
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@@ -465,10 +474,20 @@ fixedData = agentVersionRange rootKey linkConnReq [linkEntityId]
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agentVersionRange = version version ; min and max agent protocol version
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version = 2*2 OCTET
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rootKey = length x509encoded ; Ed25519 public key
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linkConnReq = connectionRequestUri ; see full connection link syntax above
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linkEntityId = shortString
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userData = invitationLinkData / contactLinkData
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invitationLinkData = %s"I" agentVersionRange connInfo
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invitationLinkData = %s"I" agentVersionRange userLinkData
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contactLinkData = %s"C" agentVersionRange userContactData
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userLinkData = *OCTET ; opaque application data (e.g., user profile)
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userContactData = direct ownersList relaysList userLinkData
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direct = %s"T" / %s"F" ; whether direct connection via connReq is allowed
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ownersList = length *ownerAuth
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ownerAuth = shortString ; length-prefixed encoding of (ownerId ownerKey authOwnerSig)
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ownerId = shortString ; application-specific owner ID (e.g., MemberId)
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ownerKey = length x509encoded ; Ed25519 public key
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authOwnerSig = 64*64 OCTET ; Ed25519 signature of (ownerId || ownerKey) by previous owner
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relaysList = length *connShortLink ; alternative relay short links
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largeString = 2*2 OCTET *OCTET ; Word16 length prefix
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length = 1*1 OCTET
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shortString = length *OCTET
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@@ -564,6 +583,14 @@ This api is also used to acknowledge message delivery to the sending party - tha
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`getNotificationMessage` is used by push notification subsystem of the client application to receive the message from a specific messaging queue mentioned in the notification. The client application would receive `MSG` and any other events from the agent, and then `MSGNTF` event once the message related to this notification is received.
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#### Set short link data
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`setConnectionLink` api (`LSET` command) is used to set or update short link data associated with a contact address queue. Returns `LINK` event with the short link URI.
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#### Get short link data
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`getConnectionLink` api (`LGET` command) is used to retrieve and decrypt the short link data from the server. Returns `LDATA` event with the decrypted link data.
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#### Rotate message queue to another server
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`switchConnection` api is used to rotate connection queues to another messaging server.
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@@ -574,7 +601,7 @@ This api is also used to acknowledge message delivery to the sending party - tha
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#### Delete connection
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`deleteConnection` api is used to delete connection. In case of asynchronous call, the connection deletion will be confirmed with `DEL_RCVQ` and `DEL_CONN` events.
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`deleteConnection` api is used to delete connection. In case of asynchronous call, the connection deletion will be confirmed with `DEL_RCVQS` and `DEL_CONNS` events.
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#### Suspend connection
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@@ -601,8 +628,13 @@ Agent API uses these events dispatch to notify client application about events r
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- `MSGNTF` - sent after agent received and processed the message referenced in the push notification.
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- `RCVD` - notification confirming message receipt by another party.
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- `QCONT` - notification that the agent continued sending messages after queue capacity was exceeded and recipient received all messages.
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- `DEL_RCVQ` - confirmation that message queue was deleted.
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- `DEL_CONN` - confirmation that connection was deleted.
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- `LINK` - short link URI created or updated for a contact address.
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- `LDATA` - decrypted short link data received from the server.
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- `DELD` - notification that the connection was deleted.
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- `JOINED` - notification that a member joined via a contact address.
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- `STAT` - connection statistics event.
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- `DEL_RCVQS` - confirmation that receiver message queues were deleted.
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- `DEL_CONNS` - confirmation that connections were deleted.
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- `OK` - confirmation that asynchronous api call was successful.
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- `ERR` - error of asynchronous api call or some other error event.
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@@ -1,7 +1,12 @@
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Version 2, 2024-06-22
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Version 3, 2025-01-24
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# Overview of push notifications for SimpleX Messaging Servers
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This document describes Notification Server protocol version 3. Version history:
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- v1: initial version
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- v2: authenticated commands, command batching
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- v3: detailed invalid token reason
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## Table of contents
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- [Introduction](#introduction)
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@@ -91,13 +96,15 @@ To manage notification subscriptions to SMP servers, SimpleX Notification Server
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This protocol sends requests and responses in a fixed size blocks of 512 bytes over TLS, uses the same [syntax of protocol transmissions](./simplex-messaging.md#smp-transmission-and-transport-block-structure) as SMP protocol, and has the same transport [handshake syntax](./simplex-messaging.md#transport-handshake) (except the server certificate is not included in the handshake).
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The client and server use ALPN extension with `ntf/1` protocol name to agree handshake version.
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Protocol commands have this syntax:
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```
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ntfServerTransmission =
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ntfServerCmd = newTokenCmd / verifyTokenCmd / checkTokenCmd /
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replaceTokenCmd / deleteTokenCmd / cronCmd /
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newSubCmd / checkSubCmd / deleteSubCmd
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newSubCmd / checkSubCmd / deleteSubCmd / pingCmd
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```
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### Register new notification token
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@@ -159,7 +166,9 @@ The response to this command:
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```abnf
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tokenStatusResp = %s"TKN" SP tokenStatus
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tokenStatus = %s"NEW" / %s"REGISTERED" / %s"INVALID" / %s"CONFIRMED" / %s"ACTIVE" / %s"EXPIRED"
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tokenStatus = %s"NEW" / %s"REGISTERED" / tokenInvalid / %s"CONFIRMED" / %s"ACTIVE" / %s"EXPIRED"
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tokenInvalid = %s"INVALID" ["," invalidReason] ; optional reason added in v3
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invalidReason = %s"BAD" / %s"TOPIC" / %s"EXPIRED" / %s"UNREGISTERED"
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```
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### Replace notification token
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@@ -249,7 +258,7 @@ The response:
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subStatusResp = %s"SUB" SP subStatus
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subStatus = %s"NEW" / %s"PENDING" / ; e.g., after SMP server disconnect/timeout while ntf server is retrying to connect
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%s"ACTIVE" / %s"INACTIVE" / %s"END" / ; if another server subscribed to notifications
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%s"AUTH" / subErrStatus
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%s"AUTH" / %s"DELETED" / %s"SERVICE" / subErrStatus
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subErrStatus = %s"ERR" SP shortString
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```
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@@ -265,6 +274,17 @@ The response to this command is `okResp` or `errorResp`.
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After this command no more message notifications will be sent from this queue.
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### Keep-alive command
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To keep the transport connection alive the clients should use `PING` command:
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```abnf
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pingCmd = %s"PING"
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pongResp = %s"PONG"
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```
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This command is sent unsigned and without entity ID.
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### Error responses
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All commands can return error response:
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@@ -102,7 +102,7 @@ This document describes SMP protocol version 19. Versions 1-5 are discontinued.
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- v16: service certificates
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- v17: create notification credentials with NEW command
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- v18: support client notices in BLOCKED error
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- v19: service subscriptions to messages (SUBS, SOKS, ENDS commands)
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- v19: service subscriptions to messages (SUBS, NSUBS, SOKS, ENDS, ALLS commands)
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## Introduction
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@@ -445,11 +445,13 @@ SMP protocol supports client services - high capacity clients that act as servic
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### Service roles
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A client service can have one of two roles:
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A client service can have one of three roles:
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- **Messaging** - Message receiver service that subscribes to and receives messages from multiple SMP queues with a single command.
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- **Messaging** (`"M"`) - Message receiver service that subscribes to and receives messages from multiple SMP queues with a single command.
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- **Notifications** - Notification service that subscribes to queue notifications and delivers push notifications to user devices.
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- **Notifications** (`"N"`) - Notification service that subscribes to queue notifications and delivers push notifications to user devices.
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- **Proxy** (`"P"`) - Proxy service that forwards sender commands to destination servers.
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Service role is identified in the transport handshake and determines what commands the service is authorized to send.
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@@ -465,7 +467,7 @@ Service certificates are included in the client handshake and verified by the se
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```abnf
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clientHandshakeService = serviceRole serviceCertKey
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serviceRole = %s"M" / %s"N" ; Messaging / Notifier
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serviceRole = %s"M" / %s"N" / %s"P" ; Messaging / Notifier / Proxy
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serviceCertKey = certChainPubKey
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```
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@@ -506,7 +508,7 @@ transmissionCount = 1*1 OCTET ; equal or greater than 1
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transmissions = transmissionLength transmission [transmissions]
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transmissionLength = 2*2 OCTET ; word16 encoded in network byte order
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transmission = authorization authorized
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transmission = authorization [serviceSig] authorized
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authorized = sessionIdentifier corrId entityId smpCommand
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corrId = %x18 24*24 OCTET / %x0 ""
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; corrId is required in client commands and server responses,
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@@ -517,6 +519,8 @@ entityId = shortString ; queueId or proxySessionId
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authorization = shortString ; signature or authenticator
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; empty authorization can be used with "send" before the queue is secured with secure command
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; authorization is always empty with "ping" and server responses
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serviceSig = shortString ; optional Ed25519 service signature (v16+)
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; present only in service sessions when authorization is non-empty
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sessionIdentifier = "" ;
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sessionIdentifierForAuth = shortString
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; sessionIdentifierForAuth MUST be included in authorized transmission body.
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@@ -881,17 +885,17 @@ This command is sent to the server by the sender both to confirm the queue after
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send = %s"SEND " msgFlags SP smpEncMessage
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msgFlags = notificationFlag reserved
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notificationFlag = %s"T" / %s"F"
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smpEncMessage = smpEncClientMessage / smpEncConfirmation ; message up to 16064 bytes
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smpEncMessage = smpEncClientMessage / smpEncConfirmation ; message up to 16048 bytes (v11+)
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smpEncClientMessage = smpPubHeaderNoKey msgNonce sentClientMsgBody ; message up to 16064 bytes
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smpEncClientMessage = smpPubHeaderNoKey msgNonce sentClientMsgBody ; message up to maxMessageLength bytes
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smpPubHeaderNoKey = smpClientVersion "0"
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sentClientMsgBody = 16016*16016 OCTET
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sentClientMsgBody = 16000*16000 OCTET ; = maxMessageLength(v11+) - 48 = 16048 - 48
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smpEncConfirmation = smpPubHeaderWithKey msgNonce sentConfirmationBody
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smpPubHeaderWithKey = smpClientVersion "1" senderPublicDhKey
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; sender's Curve25519 public key to agree DH secret for E2E encryption in this queue
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; it is only sent in confirmation message
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sentConfirmationBody = 15920*15920 OCTET ; E2E-encrypted smpClientMessage padded to 16016 bytes before encryption
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sentConfirmationBody = 15904*15904 OCTET ; E2E-encrypted smpClientMessage padded to e2eEncMessageLength before encryption
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senderPublicDhKey = length x509encoded
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smpClientVersion = word16
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@@ -917,16 +921,18 @@ Until the queue is secured, the server should accept any number of unsigned mess
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The body should be encrypted with the shared secret based on recipient's "public" key (`EK`); once decrypted it must have this format:
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```abnf
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sentClientMsgBody = <encrypted padded(smpClientMessage, 16016)>
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sentClientMsgBody = <encrypted padded(smpClientMessage, e2eEncMessageLength)>
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; e2eEncMessageLength = 16000
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smpClientMessage = emptyHeader clientMsgBody
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emptyHeader = "_"
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clientMsgBody = *OCTET ; up to 16016 - 2
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clientMsgBody = *OCTET ; up to e2eEncMessageLength - 2
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sentConfirmationBody = <encrypted padded(smpConfirmation, 15920)>
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sentConfirmationBody = <encrypted padded(smpConfirmation, e2eEncConfirmationLength)>
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; e2eEncConfirmationLength = 15904
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smpConfirmation = smpConfirmationHeader confirmationBody
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smpConfirmationHeader = emptyHeader / %s"K" senderKey
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; emptyHeader is used when queue is already secured by sender
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confirmationBody = *OCTET ; up to 15920 - 2
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confirmationBody = *OCTET ; up to e2eEncConfirmationLength - 2
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senderKey = length x509encoded
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; the sender's Ed25519 or X25519 public key to authorize SEND commands for this queue
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```
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@@ -940,15 +946,15 @@ SMP transmission structure for directly sent messages:
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1 | transmission count (= 1)
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2 | originalLength
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299- | authorization sessionId corrId queueId %s"SEND" SP (1+114 + 1+32? + 1+24 + 1+24 + 4+1 = 203)
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....... smpEncMessage (= 16064 bytes = 16384 - 320 bytes)
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....... smpEncMessage (= 16048 bytes for v11+, within 16384 - 320 bytes)
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8- | smpPubHeader (for messages it is only version and '0' to mean "no DH key" = 3 bytes)
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24 | nonce for smpClientMessage
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16 | auth tag for smpClientMessage
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------- smpClientMessage (E2E encrypted, = 16016 bytes = 16064 - 48)
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------- smpClientMessage (E2E encrypted, = 16000 bytes = 16048 - 48, for v11+)
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2 | originalLength
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2- | smpPrivHeader
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.......
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| clientMsgBody (<= 16012 bytes = 16016 - 4)
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| clientMsgBody (<= 15996 bytes = 16000 - 4)
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.......
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0+ | smpClientMessage pad
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------- smpClientMessage end
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@@ -971,17 +977,17 @@ SMP transmission structure for received messages:
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2 | originalLength
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8 | timestamp
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8- | message flags
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....... smpEncMessage (= 16064 bytes = 16082 - 18 bytes)
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....... smpEncMessage (= 16048 bytes for v11+, padded within 16082 - 18 = 16064 bytes)
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8- | smpPubHeader (empty header for the message)
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24 | nonce for smpClientMessage
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16 | auth tag for smpClientMessage
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------- smpClientMessage (E2E encrypted, = 16016 bytes = 16064 - 48 bytes)
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------- smpClientMessage (E2E encrypted, = 16000 bytes = 16048 - 48 bytes, for v11+)
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2 | originalLength
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2- | smpPrivHeader (empty header for the message)
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....... clientMsgBody (<= 16012 bytes = 16016 - 4)
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....... clientMsgBody (<= 15996 bytes = 16000 - 4)
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-- TODO move internal structure (below) to agent protocol
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20- | agentPublicHeader (the size is for user messages post handshake, without E2E X3DH keys - it is version and 'M' for the messages - 3 bytes in total)
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....... E2E double-ratchet encrypted (<= 15996 bytes = 16016 - 20)
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....... E2E double-ratchet encrypted (<= 15980 bytes = 16000 - 20)
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1 | encoded double ratchet header length (it is 123 now)
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123 | encoded double ratchet header, including:
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2 | version
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@@ -989,12 +995,12 @@ SMP transmission structure for received messages:
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16 | double-ratchet header auth tag
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1+88 | double-ratchet header (actual size is 69 bytes, the rest is reserved)
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16 | message auth tag (IV generated from chain ratchet)
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------- encrypted agent message (= 15856 bytes = 15996 - 140)
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------- encrypted agent message (= 15840 bytes = 15980 - 140)
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2 | originalLength
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64- | agentHeader (the actual size is 41 = 8 + 1+32)
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2 | %s"MM"
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.......
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| application message (<= 15788 bytes = 15856 - 68)
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| application message (<= 15772 bytes = 15840 - 68)
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||||
.......
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0+ | encrypted agent message pad
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------- encrypted agent message end
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@@ -1117,7 +1123,7 @@ Transmission sent to proxy server should use session ID as entity ID and use a r
|
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Encrypted transmission should use the received session ID from the connection between proxy server and destination server in the authorized body.
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||||
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||||
```abnf
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proxyCommand = %s"PFWD" SP smpVersion commandKey <encrypted padded(transmission, 16242)>
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proxyCommand = %s"PFWD" SP smpVersion commandKey <encrypted padded(transmission, 16226)>
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smpVersion = 2*2 OCTET
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commandKey = length x509encoded
|
||||
```
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@@ -1127,7 +1133,7 @@ The proxy server will forward the encrypted transmission in `RFWD` command (see
|
||||
Having received the `RRES` response from the destination server, proxy server will forward `PRES` response to the client. `PRES` response should use the same correlation ID as `PFWD` command. The destination server will use this correlation ID increased by 1 as a nonce for encryption of the response.
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||||
|
||||
```abnf
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proxyResponse = %s"PRES" SP <encrypted padded(forwardedResponse, 16242)>
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||||
proxyResponse = %s"PRES" SP <encrypted padded(forwardedResponse, 16226)>
|
||||
```
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||||
|
||||
#### Forward command to destination server
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||||
@@ -1158,7 +1164,7 @@ relayResponse = %s"RRES" SP <encrypted(responseTransmission)>
|
||||
|
||||
### Short link commands
|
||||
|
||||
These commands are used by senders to access queues via short links (added in v8).
|
||||
These commands are used by senders to access queues via short links (added in v15).
|
||||
|
||||
#### Set link key
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1270,7 +1276,7 @@ The server must deliver messages to all subscribed simplex queues on the current
|
||||
message = %s"MSG" SP msgId encryptedRcvMsgBody
|
||||
encryptedRcvMsgBody = <encrypt padded(rcvMsgBody, maxMessageLength + 2)>
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; server-encrypted padded sent msgBody
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; maxMessageLength = 16064
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; maxMessageLength = 16048 (v11+)
|
||||
rcvMsgBody = timestamp msgFlags SP sentMsgBody / msgQuotaExceeded
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||||
msgQuotaExceeded = %s"QUOTA" SP timestamp
|
||||
msgId = length 24*24OCTET
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||||
@@ -1367,16 +1373,16 @@ deleted = %s"DELD"
|
||||
- `IDENTITY` - incorrect server identity (certificate fingerprint does not match server address).
|
||||
- `BAD_AUTH` - incorrect or missing server credentials in handshake.
|
||||
- authentication error (`AUTH`) - incorrect authorization, unknown (or suspended) queue, sender's ID is used in place of recipient's and vice versa, and some other cases (see [Send message](#send-message) command).
|
||||
- blocked entity error (`BLOCKED`) - the entity (queue or message) was blocked due to policy violation (added in v17). Contains blocking information:
|
||||
- blocked entity error (`BLOCKED`) - the entity (queue or message) was blocked due to policy violation (added in v12). Contains blocking information:
|
||||
- `reason` - blocking reason (`spam` or `content`).
|
||||
- `notice` - optional client notice with additional information.
|
||||
- service error (`SERVICE`) - service-related error.
|
||||
- crypto error (`CRYPTO`) - cryptographic operation failed.
|
||||
- message queue quota exceeded error (`QUOTA`) - too many messages were sent to the message queue. Further messages can only be sent after the recipient retrieves the messages.
|
||||
- store error (`STORE`) - server storage error with error message.
|
||||
- message expired (`EXPIRED`) - message has expired.
|
||||
- relay public key expired (`EXPIRED`) - relay public key has expired.
|
||||
- no message (`NO_MSG`) - no message available or message ID mismatch.
|
||||
- sent message is too large (> 16064) to be delivered (`LARGE_MSG`).
|
||||
- sent message is too large (> maxMessageLength) to be delivered (`LARGE_MSG`).
|
||||
- internal server error (`INTERNAL`).
|
||||
- duplicate error (`DUPLICATE_`) - internal duplicate detection error (not returned by server).
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1513,7 +1519,7 @@ clientKey = length x509encoded ; X25519 public key for session encryption - only
|
||||
proxyServer = %s"T" / %s"F" ; true if connecting client is a proxy server
|
||||
optClientService = %s"0" / (%s"1" clientService) ; optional service client credentials
|
||||
clientService = serviceRole serviceCertKey
|
||||
serviceRole = %s"M" / %s"N" ; Messaging / Notifier
|
||||
serviceRole = %s"M" / %s"N" / %s"P" ; Messaging / Notifier / Proxy
|
||||
serviceCertKey = certChain signedServiceKey
|
||||
signedServiceKey = originalLength x509encoded ; Ed25519 key signed by service certificate
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1530,7 +1536,14 @@ pad = *OCTET
|
||||
|
||||
`proxyServer` flag (v14+) disables additional transport encryption inside TLS for proxy connections, since proxy server connection already has additional encryption.
|
||||
|
||||
`clientService` (v16+) provides long-term service client certificate for high-volume services using SMP server (chat relays, notification servers, high traffic bots). The server responds with a third handshake message containing the assigned service ID.
|
||||
`clientService` (v16+) provides long-term service client certificate for high-volume services using SMP server (chat relays, notification servers, high traffic bots). The server responds with a third handshake message containing the assigned service ID:
|
||||
|
||||
```abnf
|
||||
paddedServerHandshakeResponse = <padded(serverHandshakeResponse, 16384)>
|
||||
serverHandshakeResponse = %s"R" serviceId / %s"E" handshakeError
|
||||
serviceId = shortString
|
||||
handshakeError = transportError
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
`ignoredPart` in handshake allows to add additional parameters in handshake without changing protocol version - the client and servers must ignore any extra bytes within the original block length.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
+2
-2
@@ -143,7 +143,7 @@ hostHello = %s"HELLO " dhPubKey nonce encrypted(unpaddedSize hostHelloJSON hello
|
||||
unpaddedSize = largeLength
|
||||
dhPubKey = length x509encoded
|
||||
pad = <pad block size to 16384 bytes>
|
||||
helloPad = <pad hello size to 12888 bytes>
|
||||
helloPad = <pad hello size to 12288 bytes>
|
||||
largeLength = 2*2 OCTET
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -190,7 +190,7 @@ ctrlHello = %s"HELLO " kemCiphertext encrypted(unpaddedSize ctrlHelloJSON helloP
|
||||
unpaddedSize = largeLength
|
||||
kemCiphertext = largeLength *OCTET
|
||||
pad = <pad block size to 16384 bytes>
|
||||
helloPad = <pad hello size to 12888 bytes>
|
||||
helloPad = <pad hello size to 12288 bytes>
|
||||
largeLength = 2*2 OCTET
|
||||
|
||||
ctrlError = %s"ERROR " nonce encrypted(unpaddedSize ctrlErrorMessage helloPad) pad
|
||||
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user